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Kashmir Conflict

Conflict Studies
by

Jared Timmer

on 3 December 2013

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Transcript of Kashmir Conflict

Kashmir Conflict
Sam Henderson, JT Timmer, Troy Stratford, Hai Do
Group 7
Intro to Conflict Studies - Professor Goldberg

Kashmir Conflict
Conflict has lasted nearly 70 years
Two countries with nuclear powers in open conflict
India and Pakistan formed in 1947 after the destruction of the British Raj
3 most recent conflicts we will look at in depth:
Siachen Conflict
Kargil War
2001-2002 India-Pakistan Standoff
Goal: Ascertain underlying driving force in these conflicts and what methods can be used to help settle the issues at stake
Party Interests
India
Pakistan
Kashmir
Kashmir represents an unsolved problem of partition, part of Pakistan
Help Muslim brothers in Kashmir
Kashmir region a part of Indian identity
Saving face
Security concern of Pakistan controlling Kashmir
Desire independence from conflict and violence
Self-rule
Theory of
Destructive Conflict
Occurs when person or group denied basic human needs
Identity, recognition, security are key
Inequalities between two or more groups
Denial of certain freedoms
Limited access to resources
Siachen Conflict Background
Who controls area unknown, leads to conflict in 1984
Line of Control - line dividing Indian (South) and Pakistani (North) controlled Kashmir
Pakistan attempts covert mission to gain control of area
India discovers troop movement and deploys forces
2003 - Ceasefire, but both countries maintain sizeable forces on glacier
Glacier holds little to no strategic value
One of the most inhospitable battlegrounds on planet
From 1984-2003, total of 2,000 Pakistani and Indian soldier deaths
Kargil War Background
May 1999 - Pakistani military & Kashmiri insurgents cross Line of Control into Indian controlled Kashmir
Indian army response swifter than expected
Kargil War ensues
By June 30, 1999, Indian army in region numbered 730,000 in addition to 60 aircraft deployed to the frontline
Conflict ends July 14, 1999
Death toll:
524 Indian soldiers
696 Pakistani soldiers

US pressured Pakistan to retreat forces due to rising fears of a possible nuclear war
2001-2002 India-Pakistan
Standoff Background
December 2001 - suicide bombing at Indian Parliament in New Delhi
Two Pakistani militant groups take responsibility for attack
Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba
India considers this an act of war
Pulled envoy from India
Closed borders to Pakistan
Massive troop deployments along Line of Control
700,000 soldiers by May 2002
Indian Navy, Air Force, nuclear missiles mobilized
Pakistan responds in kind deploying of 300,000 troops
Analysis Theories
Basic Human Needs
Intractable & Identity Conflict
6 Essential Needs: Security, Identity, Recognition, Autonomy, Dignity, Bonding
If any unable to be met or violated , more likely to be resistance which can turn violent
Intractable conflict - those in which pattern of opposition becomes imbedded in one's or a group's central sense of identity
Complexity and way it touches central identities make this conflict almost impossible to resolve
Reach this point through four stages
Strong sense of threat to central commitments
Distortion of positions
Hardening of positions - central assumptions become fixed for both parties
Development of fixed patterns of response that assume conflict as central and ongoing
(Burton, 1997, pp. 32-40) (Schellenberg, 1996, pp. 75-76)
Analysis Theories
Conflict Escalation
Realism
Analysis of
Siachen Conflict
Analysis of
Kargil War
Analysis of 2001-2002
India-Pakistan
Standoff
Moving Towards Resolution
Principled Negotiation
Moving Towards Resolution
Baskin's Bottom-Up Approach
Interactive
Pruitt and Rubin
Contending strategy increases likelihood of conflict escalation
Contending strategy likely to occur where each party thinks they are powerful and has high aspirations for future
Little perception of interests in common
Deutsch
Three main factors for a destructive spiral to occur: (1) competitive processes, (2) misperception and selective information, and (3) pressures toward cognitive and societal consistency
States are main actors
No true, powerful international government body
States primarily motivated by competition and self-interest
Peace through strength
Basic Human Needs
Security and Identity
India & Pakistan view each other as potential threats
Pakistan moves to stake claim and gain territory
Potential proximity of enemy forces
Action leads to security driven response from India
Both sides still maintain a military presence in area
Pakistani President - "emotions run very high here...Siachen is a barren wasteland, but it belongs to us" (Kapur, 2008, 76)
Identity - Siachen conflict became part of national identity
Once a shared common identity, have now split
Siachen just latest in long line of conflicts over identity
Intractable & Identity Conflict
Hate has to become ingrained in national identity
Takes time for this to occur
Constant of military conflict for all involved
Negatives of war become associated with "other" side
Affects multiple generations
(Schellenberg, 1996, pp. 75)
(Schellenberg, 1996, pp. 71)
(“Why International Wars Have Become Increasingly Rare”, 2009-2010, pp. 21)
Realism
Pakistan action show clear belief that having best military (and in best positions) will result in a win
Indian army showed realism as responded with increased military forces (amounting to 730,000 soldiers)
Conflict Escalation
Pakistan had initial contending strategy with perception of power
All parties involved had high future aspirations
Indian army also perceived themselves as powerful military force
Basic Human Needs
Security at stake for India after Pakistani militant groups bombed Indian Parliament
With security compromised, India felt need to respond accordingly to get security back
Indian response threatened Pakistan's security
Conflict Escalation
Pruitt and Rubin
Both sides respond to other's military buildup with military buildup - demonstrates contending strategies on both sides
Deutsch
Destructive Spiral theory
Both sides believed military would be victorious in a war
Competitive process led to respective militaristic actions
Great deal of misperception about other side
Neither side could easily back down because of fear of losing face and looking weak in the eyes of their public
Four Parts
Separate people from the problem
Focus interests not positions
Invent options for mutual gain
Insist on using objective criteria

Hard bargaining ineffective over course of conflict
Likely to lead to destructive processes
Principled negotiation considers larger implications
Negotiation with Kashmiris, India, Pakistan could prove very productive
Sides will have to work hard given intractable nature of conflict and denial of basic human needs
Focusing on positions has been deadly in this conflict
Interests allows parties to move towards resolution
Voicing interests addresses security and identity
Identity deeply rooted in conflict
(Fisher, Ury & Patton, 2011, pp. 10-15)
Creating open dialogue
Communication needs to be free and without threat of persecution
Due to deep root of identity - sides may not believe there is a life outside of the conflict
Kashmiri voices need to be heard by India and Pakistan
Educating the youth of the nations
Promote peace in youth so generation more inclined to push for peace
Deep roots of intractable conflict make this step even more important
Help address identity aspect
Reconciliation requires a change psychologically
Aid in moving towards resolution if psychological impacts are understood
(Baskin, 2011)
(Bar-Tal, 2000, pp. 356)
3 Groups
India
Pakistan
Kashmir - Pro self-rule
Consider interests provided
Negotiate to attempt to reach resolution
(“2002 – Kashmir Crisis”, 2011)
(“1999 Kargil Conflict”, 2011) (“Kashmir: Conflict Profile", 2011)
(MacDonald, 2012)
(Hajni, 2008, pp. 14)
(“Kashmir: Conflict Profile”, 2011)
(Thorner, 1949, 17-30)
("VICE Season 1: Episode #2 Preview", 2013)
("VICE Season 1: Episode #2 - The Morning After", 2013)
References
(MacDonald, 2012)
("1999 Kargil War", 2011)
(Burton, 1997, pp. 32-40)
1999 Kargil conflict. (2011). Global Security. Retrieved from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm

2002 - Kashmir crisis. (2011). Global Security. Retrieved from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir-2002.htm

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2000. From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis. Political Psychology, 21(2), 351-365. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791795

Baskin, Gershon. (2001). Bottom-up: Creating peace from the bottom-up. Retrieved from: http://www.todaysalternativenews.com/index.php?event=link,150&values%5B0%5D=1&values%5B1%5D=93

Basrur, R. M. (2002). Kargil, Terrorism, and India's Strategic Shift. India Review, 1(4), 39-56. Retrieved from https://ezproxy.depauw.edu:443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=11418580&site=ehost-live

Burton, J. W. (1997). Needs theory. Violence explained: The sources of conflict, violence and crime and their prevention (32-40). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Easen, Nick. (2003). Siachen: The world's highest cold war. CNN. Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/20/siachen.kashmir/

Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2012). Don't bargain over positions. In Getting to yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in (p. 11). London: Random House Business.

Hajni, Mehraj. (2008) The kashmir conflict: A kashmiri perspective. Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 12-14.

Ganguly, S. (2010). India, pakistan, and the bomb: debating nuclear stability in south asia. Columbia University Press. New York, New York. Retrieved from
http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-14374-5/india-pakistan-and-the-bomb/excerpt#copyright

Kapur, P. (2008). Ten years of instability in a nuclear south asia. International Security, 33(2), pp. 71-94.

Kashmir: conflict profile. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/kashmir/conflict-profile/

Kemkar, N. A. (2006). Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between India and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park. Stan. Envtl. LJ, 25, 67.

Khan, I. (2007). Pakistan's Post September 11 2001 Afghan Policy Shift: Impact on Pak-India-Afghan Geopolitics. Journal Of Asian & African Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.), 42(5), 461-475. doi:10.1177/0021909607081127. Retrieved from
https://ezproxy.depauw.edu:443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=27396141&site=ehost-live

Lieven, A. (2002). The pressures on Pakistan. Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, pp. 106-118. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033006

MacDonald, Mrya. (2012). Cold War. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/11/cold_war

McGirk, T. & Adiga, A. (2005, July 04). War at the top of the world. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1079528-1,00.html

Navlakha, G. (1999). Kargil: Costs and consequences. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34, pp. 1747-1749. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4408147

Northrup, T. A., Kriesburg, L., & Thorson, S. J. (1989). The dynamic of identity in personal and social conflict. Intractable conflicts and their transformation (pp. 55-82). New York, NY: Syracuse University Press. Retrieved from http://legacy.earlham.edu/~chriss/ConflictRes/pdf files/KriesburgIntractableConflictsAndTheirTransformationp55_92.pdf

Puri, B. (1999). India's Kargil policy: Serious flaws. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34, pp. 1867-1868. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4408174

Schellenberg, J. A. (1996). Conflict resolution: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 70-77). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Siegal, R. (2008, December 18). Fears Of India-Pakistan Nuclear War Raged In 2002. All Things Considered (NPR). Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98443922

Swain, A. (2009). The Indus II and Siachen Peace Park: Pushing the India-Pakistan Peace Process Forward. Round Table, 98(404), 569-582. doi:10.1080/00358530903151854

Thorner, Alice. 1949. The Kashmir Conflict. Middle East Journal, 3(1), 17-30. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4322039

VICE Season 1: Episode #2 Preview. (2013, April 05). YouTube. Retrieved from: www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwX3mzwoqMc.

Vice Season 1: Episode #2 - The Morning After. (2013, April 12). YouTube. Retrieved from: www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yGo0KgfiDA.

Wajahat, A. (2008, August 27). Kashmir And The United Nations By Wajahat Ahmad. Kashmir And The United Nations By Wajahat Ahmad. Retrieved from http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmad270808.htm

Why international wars have become increasingly rare. Human Security Report 2009-2010 (pp. 21). (2009-2010)
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