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Possible Future Worlds | Part 4

This is an online course for Carnegie Council Ethics Fellows for the Future on www.globalethicsnetwork.org. It is based on the e-book, Of All Possible Future Worlds: Global Trends, Values, and Ethics, available at www.possiblefutureworlds.com.
by

Thong Nguyen

on 19 October 2014

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Transcript of Possible Future Worlds | Part 4

in anarchy against other states.
Eventually, these individuals and groups form states
Hierarchical
Polycentric

Of All
Possible Future

Worlds

GLOBAL TRENDS, VALUES, AND ETHICS
What will our world be like
in the next fifteen to twenty years?

We need a
theory

to make sense of this variance.
and a
logic
We'll start by looking at . . .
An individual could design and print houses
An individual can design and print musical instruments
An individual can design and print rocket parts
Creepy
Fast
Resilient
can fly and coordinate
Notice the direct positive relationship between economic growth and urbanization
Fusion
Nonstate
World

Gini
Out-of-the
Bottle

Interconnected
Polycentric

Darkside of
Exclusivity

Clash of
Modernities

New
Powers

Deceptive
Stability

Stalled
Engines

"Which is better:
a multipolar or polycentric world?"
Henceforth, for the sake of continuity and convenience, we will focus only on the ten worlds of 2030.
Let's keep going and return to the question that has taken us this far.
We could see in what worlds people might be freer, distribution more just, peace less certain, or diversity more robust.
With Walzer's theory, we became capable of categorizing any world.
Anyway enough of my philosophical fanboyism.
But now, let's build up to how logic will fit into our project.
"Did someone say logic? I know a bit about that."
Like every high school student, he constructed a completeness theorem in modal logic.
And then, without ever earning a PhD, he would become a professor at Princeton and later CUNY, contributing to the fields of mathematical logic and philosophy of language.
He would continue on to Harvard for a bachelor's in mathematics, teaching MIT students logic as a sophomore.
What? You didn't?
Meet Saul Kripke
He would go on to create a new logical system.
Aside from his seminal work,
Naming and Necessity
, Kripke rarely published, instead he simply jots down notes and makes recordings of his lectures. He has an entire center at CUNY dedicated to capturing these scraps of brilliance.
Although you've probably never heard of him, philosophers have described him as one of most important philosophers in the past 200 years.
He's a modern-day Socrates.
Not ten.
In short, we learned how values might be arranged in a set of ten possible worlds.
Yet, we will ultimately live in only one world.
We'll see how Kripke can help us in just a bit.
We could proceed by asking one of two questions:
The one world they think might happen would be similar to the EU's Interconneceted Polycentric world or the US's Fusion world.
They might be right. In fact, I kind of hope they are right. Those are probably the most desirable worlds to live in.
In short, what is their logic?
Thus, it might be more helpful to think about the second question: what one world will we live in?
We need some reasoning that will allow us to rationally work toward the best world, while still acknowledging why our values might be in danger from other worlds.
This logic will allow us to know what worlds and values will be
We can answer this question by looking toward Saul Kripke's
Possible Worlds Semantics
.
For a quick primer on the logic you can read my explanation in Chapter 7 in the box titled, "Possible Worlds Semantics".
Or you can watch these three videos by YouTube user Kaneb. Frankly, he explains Kripke's logic much better than I can.
Here, we'll focus on the basics.
http://www.possiblefutureworlds.com/chapter7
Let's start with definitions of possible, impossible, and necessary worlds.
Worlds in this set may be possible in our definition if and only if they are not necessarily false.
Assume we have a set of ten worlds.
Any world outside of this set is deemed an impossible world.
Since these ten worlds have not yet existed we cannot categorically dismiss their future existence—however likely or improbable.
In the conventional sense one might say that an impossible world could happen.
After all, worlds once thought impossible have happened. The earth is not flat, the sun does not rotate around us, and mankind has set foot on the moon.
Thus, the selection biases of tradition, methodology, and time have the utmost relevance for people in charge of directing the future of the world.
However, such worlds can only be made possible, according to our definition, by incorporating them into the original set of worlds.
This choice to include or exclude worlds into a set is key to whether or not worlds are thought to be possible or impossible.
Finally, a world is necessary if and only if it is not possibly false.
Based on this definition, within the set of worlds presented in the global trends reports there is
no necessary world.

These worlds could possibly be false: none of the worlds has come to existence yet nor may they ever.
However, this does not mean that there is no necessity in our values.
According to Kripke's logic, given this set of possible worlds,
a value may be considered necessarily true if it exists in all possible worlds.
Thus, even if a value exists in nine of the ten worlds, we might say that the value will exist in many possible worlds, but we cannot say that it will necessarily exist.
So to find out what is necessary, we should evaluate all ten of our worlds.
True or False:
More people will attain our values in these four possible future worlds?
So I think, in general, we can be guardedly optimistic about the future, knowing that we are on the right track toward a freer and more diverse world with more work to be done for the disadvantaged.
"Why would they pick one world over another?"
"Why would they be right? "
"What if they are wrong? "
"What risks might we run in not preparing for other worlds?"
Ask yourself
"
Which
world will we live in?"
Some like Kishore Mahbubani and the UN High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda have answered the first question on which.
"
What
world will we live in?"
But you should really . . .
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Here's one evaluation.
Future Attainment of Values for More People
Anarchy


Weak States
and Institutions



International
Civil Society


Decentered
World
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
True
Good for national, regional, and transnational identities
True
Good for individuals/groups across borders, but less certain within states
True
Good, but weaker groups are less protected
True
Greatest chance for those able/willing to fight for it
False
War/conflict is most prevalent
True/False
Poor, but states provide some security to individuals/groups
True
Decent, but unclear who will organize and enforce
True
Multiple means to achieve
False
No mechanisms
True/False
Worst off are better off within states, but not in other states
True
Networks can provide more for the worst off
True
Multiple ways to help the worst off
True
Freer and safer
True
More free without government, but uncertain who will enforce
True
Free, more stable and restricted by government
True
Most free from government, but uncertain
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?
?
Anarchy


Weak States
and Institutions



International
Civil Society


Decentered
World
True or False: All people will attain our values in these ten possible future worlds?
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Darkside of Exclusivity

Gini Out-of-the Bottle

Deceptive Stability

Nonstate World

Clash of Modernities

Interconnected Polycentric

Stalled Engines

New Powers

Fusion

Hierarchical Polycentric
Here's one evaluation.
Future Attainment of Values for All People
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Darkside of Exclusivity

Gini Out-of-the Bottle

Deceptive Stability

Nonstate World

Clash of Modernities

Interconnected Polycentric

Stalled Engines

New Powers

Fusion

Hierarchical Polycentric
True/False
True
False
False
False
False
False
False
True
False
False
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
False
True
True
True/False
True/False
False
False
False
What two values are true in all possible worlds?
What value is true in all possible worlds?
The previous evaluation reached general conclusions with a weak criterion for value prevalence rather than universality.
Let's evaluate each of the ten particular worlds, with an criterion for the attainment of values for all people.
The attainment of liberty and pluralism for more people in 2030 will be necessary.
However, justice and peace for more people will be less certain— possible for some, but not others.
"Am I more optimistic or pessimistic about the future?"
"Did my evaluations lead me to the same conclusion?"
"Which of Walzer's worlds were excluded and hence considered impossible? "
"What threats and opportunities for our values are lost when these excluded worlds are considered impossible?"
Ask rself
you
Thus, it is not the contours that matter most: it is the content of the future world and the texture of the values themselves that are the most important considerations for individuals to think about when choosing—to the extent that we can—what should be the quality of our future lives and livelihoods.
Necessity can take a myriad of possible forms, and we have some ability to both bend and adapt to the trending arches of an untold, yet determinate history.
For example, to say that liberty will necessarily exist is not the same as saying that it is necessary that liberty will be monolithic, that liberty will be enjoyed by all people, that new liberties enabled by technology will not come at the cost of lost liberties of privacy, or that pursuing one’s liberty will always lead to security and peace.
Pluralism is the only necessary value across all of the 2030 worlds.
Thus it seems that policymakers across the world should respect the existence of many peoples when choose how to better improve their own liberty, justice, and peace.
True
True
True
True
It is desirable to think about how our values might fare with more resolution.
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
"Would I evaluate or interpret the necessity of diversity differently?"
"Do I share this same conclusion?"
"Three worlds attain all four of our values. Which one is the best?"
"What should we do today to attain the best possible future world?"
Ask rself
you
The choice among these future worlds should not be seen as a choice among impossible, idealistic worlds, but rather they should be seen as approximations of what the preeminent political philosopher John Rawls called realistic utopias: possible worlds that illustrate “how reasonable citizens and peoples might live peacefully in a just world.”
Our final challenge, thus, is a classic one posed before by Kant, Rousseau, and Rawls: taking people as they are and laws as they might be.
Reasonable people may disagree over which particular world we should aspire toward. The most difficult task is to choose a right course of action that optimizes our values given the constraints and possibilities of global trends.
In our closing section, we will consider future global
How are we to choose the right course? And is there only one right way?
Joel Rosenthal has helped lead us in such a search for a global ethic.
This paradox can arise from universal pushes toward pluralism in the form of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, nation, or class against a people's particular identity as individuals, families, friends, colleagues, and compatriots.
Thomas Hobbes is famous for characterizing life as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Which of Walzer's worlds reflect the one people view?
Let's try to relate the cosmopolitan ethic to our possible worlds.
The thesis holds that democratic peoples do not go to war against each other for three reasons:
Learn how some of the Thought Leaders have conceived of a global ethic and of the world's greatest future challenges.
Your answers will likely be in the negative. Should this diminish the rational appeal of cosmopolitanism?
I don't think so. But local concerns, idiosyncratic interests, and particular politics often intervene for both selfish and rational reasons, at times rendering this one world, one people logic unsound and incomplete.
Some have called for a logic of one world, which most resembles the EU's Interconnected Polycentric world.
We must ultimately cope with this paradox in one world.
However, our discussion of modal logic and possible worlds semantics illustrates the fallacy of focusing only on the logic of a particular world, no matter how ideal.
We can abstractly categorize peoples in three ways.
Human nature.
Men and women must cope with natural dispositions toward competition, diffidence, and glory.
In contradistinction from the cosmopolitans, though, Hobbes arrives at the conclusion that conflict is inevitable. Why would he predict conflict rather than cooperation?
(1) All men and women are self-interested, rational, and equal.
(2) We are all interconnected and interdependent.
(3) State boundaries are morally arbitrary.
Cosmopolitans make three assumptions:
Justice should be maximized depending on values that are common to all of humanity regardless of state borders, distance, class, what other individuals do, regardless of whether an individual is rich or poor or if greater powers stand idly by.
Competition makes us fight over scarce resources.
Singer would later elaborate on this analogy in his illustration of one world, growing more globalized and connected through technology.
Rawls sought to develop a theory of justice by assuming that if we were to fairly choose our livelihoods under a veil of ignorance from an arbitrary set of possible lives, then we would have to agree on two principles . . .
Thus, for some the problem with the cosmopolitan view is that it is not realistic enough.
"When different nations led more separate lives, it was more understandable—though still quite wrong—for those in one country to think of themselves as owing no obligations, beyond that of noninterference, to people in another state. But those times are long gone. Today, as we have seen, our greenhouse gas emissions alter the climate under which everyone in the world lives. Our purchases of oil, diamonds, and timber make it possible for dictators to buy more weapons and strengthen their hold on the countries they tyrannize. Instant communications show us how others live, and they in turn learn about us and aspire to our way of life. Modern transport can move even relatively poor people thousands of kilometers, and when people are desperate to improve their situation, national boundaries prove permeable."
Second Principle
: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
(a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
(b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
First Principle
: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;
In this context, Michael Ignatieff has asked, whether we should talk about one global ethic or multiple global ethics.
For example, the cosmopolitan view may be categorized as a global ethic in the singular.
"Our newly interdependent global society, with its remarkable possibilities for linking people around the planet, gives us the material basis for a new ethic."
I'll assume that you've read Rawls before. But if you haven't, watch this introduction (from the professor that first introduced me to philosophy and ethics):
We might first look at his earlier example of the rationality of saving a child drowning in a pond.
Peter Singer would also embrace the same three assumptions, but from a utilitarian perspective:

(1) Nation state boundaries are arbitrary distinctions.
(2) Resource distributions across the world are random.
(3) States are not self-sufficient.
The same reasoning would apply to foreign assistance regardless of state boundaries.
Extending this intuition, to the global scale, Singer asks what if that child were drowning or suffering oceans away.
(1) Nation state boundaries are arbitrary distinctions.
(2) Resource distributions across the world are random.
(3) States are not self-sufficient.
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, however, saw no good reason to limit justice within boundaries for three reasons:
But what does pluralism look like?
This recognition of pluralism will help us optimize the other values.
Why would you?
If you were to see a child drowning in a pond, you would likely save him if it were no risk to you.
"What trends might make coordination across boundaries be better in the future?"
"If cosmopolitan values are necessary, why don't we enjoy them now?"
"Do I share cosmopolitan convictions? Have capitals embraced cosmopolitanism?"
Ask rself
you
and we are 'pulled' toward a global ethic by a universal core implicit in the very idea of ethics—a core articulated most powerfully by the idea of human rights."
"We are 'pushed' toward a global ethic by the need to address urgent issues that are increasingly global in nature,
Shared
Ideas
"We are
one humanity
This is the essential challenge of global ethics: how to accommodate the tension between our universal and particular natures."


,
but
seven billion humans
.
Shared
Ideas
The actors in Rawls's international theory are not
individuals

:
they are
peoples
.
We have seen how global trends from the perspectives of many people will push us toward the universal.
We have seen how our values will continue to pull us toward toward the particular.
(Scroll to zoom in.)
— David Rodin
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “How Do You Define a Global Ethic?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “The Greatest Ethical
Challenges?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
All possible worlds should be considered in order to establish an overarching logic.
Global economic growth and political reform may stall.
The great powers new and old are the most significant actors.
States may not matter at all.
In the future, humanity may be more divided.
Networks might be more fractured.
Rival regionalism could accompany the rise of new states.
Hierarchy may be a more stable order than an equal one.
These worlds challenge one another.
Kripke's logic showed us that increasing cultural diversity is the one necessary value across worlds.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
One
World,
One
People
One
World,
Two
Peoples
One
World,
Many
Peoples
And we can
reimagine
past global ethics with these different conceptions of pluralism.
Reimagine
cosmopolitanism as a



ethic.
Reimagine
Kant as a



ethic.
Reimagine
Rawls as a



ethic.
We will explore each ethic.
Let's start with the cosmopolitans.
Cosmopolitans can come in two forms:
(1) Social Contractarians (e.g., Beitz and Pogge)
(2) Utilitarians (e.g., Singer)
For our purposes, according to Rawls, justice as fairness only applies to a domestic population, not globally.
For the utilitarian, you would do so because you would maximize the good of preserving a life with a minimal of cost getting your clothes wet or damaging your iPhone.
"What policies or practices are in place that might lead us to a cosmopolitan world?"
Look back at the three possible worlds.
Who will the actors be in each?
Which of these worlds is impossible?
What are three instantiations of these archetypes?
Governance can take on three forms based on the world instantiations, viewing the world’s actors in terms of individuality, multipolarity, or polycentrism.
A major challenge for these cosmopolitan worlds is not cooperation among actors:
it is a lack of coordination.
His critics often forget, however, that he started his thesis from premises identical to those of the cosmopolitans: all men and women are equal and rational.
Cosmopolitans also cannot explain or respond to the US’s Gini-Out-of-the-Bottle and Stalled Engines worlds, which leave different peoples with variegated values.
It can neither explain nor respond to the possible emergences of NATO’s or Russia’s predicted worlds, which do not view all humanity as one and instead recognize state boundaries as determinative of which peoples will be privileged to enjoy the four values unequally.
For Hobbes, individuals form groups because they will assist in preserving individual self-interests.
The great challenge for the one people ethic is to make all people in the world see themselves as one group while at the same time recognizing that some natural dispositions may drive us apart.
To form such an ethic Ignatieff—following a Nagel and Rawls before—asks us to imagine ourselves in the abstract "view from nowhere."
Morality, in one global ethic, extends with equal concern “to defend all human beings and our common habitat against partialities and interests grounded in family, community, ethnicity, economic position, and nation.”
Other than a separate peace, liberal values of liberty, justice, and pluralism in varying contingent degrees will necessarily exist within and among the societies of democratic peoples against non-democratic peoples.
You might observe that the democratic peace view of the world tolerates a greater variance of our values compared to the cosmopolitans.
They are political documents negotiated among states to solve specific problems, thus they may not be in full accord with a singular global ethic, and they may at times conflict with one another.
The justice found in the other worlds of the cosmopolitans (i.e., Nonstate, Interconnected Polycentric, and Fusion) are possible if liberal peoples choose to promote their principles of representative respect, human rights, and market economy to like-minded peoples in non-democratic states.
These particular values are legally embodied in existing international law in the
Charter of the United Nations
, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
, the
Geneva Conventions
, and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
.
For Ignatieff, global ethics in the plural, on the other hand, refer to partialities—those things that may be arbitrary yet still carry a great deal of moral significance.
The greatest challenge for the one world, two peoples ethics is for liberal republics to prevent war with non-democratic states.
Notice that global justice from liberal peoples toward the unfortunate liberal individuals in non-democratic states is not taken as a primary goal for the neo-Kantians.
While an alternative definition of global ethics might encompass more than solely particular ethics embodied by international legal texts, Ignatieff’s juxtaposition of a global ethic versus multiple global ethics opens up a consideration of one world composed of more than one people, each compromising and competing with one another over multiple ethics.
A reimagined global ethic “defends the universal interests of mankind and the planet; its purpose is to engage all forms of ethical particularism in adversarial justification; and the rules of these encounters, flowing as they do from the starting premise of human equality, preclude coercion and mandate tolerance.” It investigates particularism at the nation-state and community levels as well as universalism of international law.
The two peoples ethic will not perform such deeds categorically, systematically, or as a matter of duty.
However, any such individual, nongovernmental, or state policies will be idiosyncratic, marginal, interest-based, supererogatory, and limited by the imperative for liberal peoples to secure their own peace.
He is most famously associated with his modern take of Kant's "Perpetual Peace" as the democratic peace thesis.
For Michael Doyle, the fracturing a global ethic into multiple ethics can be explained by a fundamental problem: “the absence of a genuine sense of global community, the sense that we are in a common social project.”
Let's next look toward neo-Kantian liberals for an explanation of a two peoples ethic.
In our context, we will continue to illustrate alternative global ethics by varying the value of pluralism and we will look at the ethics of one world, two peoples and one world, many peoples.
Neo-Kantian liberals hold that there are only two types of peoples.
(1) Liberal peoples must elect and internalize the costs of going to war whereas monarchs and dictators do not.
(2) Since liberal peoples share the same principles, they will respect the rights of similarly free peoples.
(3) Respect for property rights and the benefits of commercial exchange reinforce these moral commitments.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Democratic
Peoples
Non-Democratic
States
A global ethic among

may not lead to peace because they do not embrace the three liberal principles, and thus war may hold value because of the externalization of the costs to leaders, disrespect for others, and the preclusion of gains from participation in the market economy.
A global ethic between





will to lead to the emergence of a separate peace for liberal democratic peoples versus non-democratic ones.
A global ethic among

will lead to peace because peoples and their states harbor all three liberal principles.
will form their own . . .
Liberal Democratic
Republics
Non-democratic
Peoples
will form their own . . .
Which of Walzer's worlds can be explained by the two peoples ethic?
Let's try to relate the neo-Kantian ethic to our possible worlds.
Notice the explanatory power of this ethic: unlike the cosmopolitan view, it can explain all of Walzer's worlds.
Which of these worlds is impossible?
All instantiations are possible, including the divided worlds.
In dividing peoples through state boundaries, the default worlds tend toward the worlds of difference: Darkside of Exclusivity, Deceptive Stability, Stalled Engines, Clash of Modernities, Gini-out-of-the Bottle, and New Powers.
This is not to say that the democratic peace is lacking in means or motives to help those in some non-democratic states.
Might another one world ethic help us arrive at better futures?
There are many possible answers to this question. Thus, it is unclear how and why we might arrive at the best possible worlds—more just, peaceful, and freer for more peoples—through the two peoples ethic alone.
Peoples have three fundamental interests:
Protecting their own political independence, territory, and security;
Maintaining their own political and social institutions and civic culture;
Securing their self-respect as a people, which rests on its citizens' awareness of its own history and cultural accomplishments.
Rawls's responds to this global ethics question with eight principles:
"Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of human history—unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness . . . . The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear."
The range of peoples’ acceptance of all, some, or none of these eight principles will lead to multiple ethics among
Other ethics might challenge the many peoples ethic.
Recall that Ignatieff called for different global ethics to stand in adversarial justification.
If this ethic is the most explanatory, is this Law of Peoples ethic then the one global ethic we should subscribe to—is it the best?
For example, although Rawls suggested that liberal tolerance toward decent hierarchical peoples can help us move toward a better world, there may be some limits to application.
Further, in contrast to the neo-Kantian thesis, liberals cannot be sure to extend the respect that they have for one another because hierarchical peoples do not respect their own people through democratic accountability. As Doyle asks, “If those governments will not trust their own publics, why should
we
trust them?”
For example, Michael Doyle has suggested that the number of such decent states is few and their population sizes are small (e.g., Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and to some degree Qatar, Bhutan, the United Arab Emirates, and perhaps Jordan).
And since the duty to assist Burdened peoples and bring Outlaws into the Well-Ordered society of peoples only calls for these societies to become Decent peoples, the potential to maximize their values further is out of the question for Rawls.
Then the cosmopolitans might further challenge the Rawlsian ethic as being too conservative and too tolerant of impaired liberties, injustices, and conflict just short of war within decent societies.
While Rawls would agree with the neo-Kantians that there are both democratic and non-democratic peoples . . .
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Liberal
Peoples
Outlaw
Peoples
form just domestic political institutions based on legitimate constitutions, representative governments, and core human rights: rights to subsistence, security, personal property, and formal equality before the law, as well as freedoms from slavery, protections of ethnic groups against genocide, and some measure of liberty of conscience.
do not seek to build liberal or decent institutions, and instead seek to expand their power, influence, and territory. They violate the core human rights of people within their state borders.
Shared
Ideas
Decent
Peoples
form institutions based on comprehensive doctrines (e.g., religions) that do not treat all people as free and equal citizens, but they respect a core list of human rights, genuinely consult with society, and do not have aggressive foreign policies.
Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
Peoples are to honor human rights.
Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
Shared
Ideas
desire to maintain liberal or decent institutions but lack sufficient social or economic resources.
Burdened
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Democratic
Peoples
Non-Democratic
Peoples
he saw a spectrum of other peoples between this dichotomy.
Rawls envisioned four types of peoples.
Liberal peoples follow the logic of Rawls's domestic theory of justice.
However, he also realized that at the international level, there is a greater degree of pluralism outside of liberalism.
Other peoples may form alternative institutions—quasi-liberal, failed, and threatening.
Under an international veil of ignorance (i.e., no knowledge of territory, population, or political or economic power), he then asks free, equal, and reasonable liberal and decent peoples what terms would constitute a just global order.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Outlaw
Peoples
Liberal
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Decent
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Burdened
Peoples
A global ethic among


is similar to the ethic of republics under the neo-Kantiandemocratic peace thesis: Liberal peoples are satisfied with their own institutionally-secured values and gains through trade. They have no reason or desires for war, imperial glory, territorial expansion. These institutions will secure the greatest liberty, justice, and peace compared to the other peoples.
A global ethic among


will be similar to the ethic among liberals to the extent that they partake in liberalism. But institutions formed mainly from comprehensive doctrines such as religions will also govern relations among these peoples. The potential for liberty, justice, and peace will be good, but not as great or predictable as for liberals.
A global ethic among


of different burdened peoples will be limited by the lack of development of liberal or decent institutions and deficiencies of economic and social resources. They will likely only interact if they are geographically or culturally close. Yet there is little they can do for one another. Without assistance, liberty, justice, and peace will be poor indefinitely.
A global ethic among


is unintelligible under Rawls’s scheme, because these are peoples who do not respect any or most of the eight principles. Hence, it is questionable whether an peaceful ethic among outlaws is possible, although, they may base relations with other states on other considerations (e.g., realpolitik). The prospects for peace, justice, and peace are worst for these peoples.
Liberal
and
Decent
Peoples
A global ethic between





can best be summarized with one word: tolerance. Since decent hierarchical peoples are not aggressive or threatening to liberal peoples, value many of the eight principles, and secure the core human rights for their people, they can reasonably take part in the liberal peace. Liberals, under international law, are to treat the decent as equals, even if they disagree with particular practices. This tolerance means that liberal republics should not intervene with—or even criticize—the affairs of decent hierarchical peoples.
Well-Ordered
and
Burdened
Peoples
A global ethic between





is founded principally on the eighth principle: the duty to assist. Well-ordered peoples (particularly liberal ones), have an imperative to assist these societies in becoming self-determining, well-ordered peoples. However, distributive justice extends only so far as to raise these peoples to a decent hierarchical Thus, well-ordered peoples will tolerate as a range of inequalities. There will be no war between these peoples. And if interventions are well designed, the liberties of the burdened will improve.
A global ethic between





leads liberal peoples to owe neither respect nor tolerance for outlaws because they do not respect the eight principles. Intervention, in varying degrees, by well-ordered peoples is justified because outlaw societies either do not respect human rights, threaten liberal peace, or threaten their own people with genocidal policies at the extreme. In accordance with the principles, these wars should recognize noncombatant immunity and not revert to the indiscriminate nature of wars in the past. Such wars must be prudent in the sense that the purpose of intervention should be to bring outlaw societies into a global well-ordered society of peoples. Peace is most precarious here, with liberty and justice challenged for both peoples consequently.
Well-Ordered
Peoples
Non-Ordered
Peoples
{
{
Well-Ordered
and
Outlaw
Peoples
Burdened
and
Outlaw
Peoples
A global ethic between





could lead to outlaws, in their disrespect for rights, freedom, and equality of the burdened, to abuse these defenseless people and pillage their lands for the resources they have. Outlaws will show no conception of justice other than might. The liberties of the burdened will be the worst off.
&
There will also be multiple ethics between
Which of Walzer's worlds can be explained by the many peoples ethic?
The Rawlsian global ethic is just as explanatory as the neo-Kantian ethic in justifying the emergence of all possible worlds.
Similarly, certain archetypes are impossible for our consideration.
And again, all instantiations are possible.
Let's try to reimagine the Law of Peoples ethic in regard to our possible worlds.
However, the many peoples ethic goes one step further, explaining how to move from the worse worlds . . .
at either end of the spectrum toward what he called realistic utopias . . .
and toward what we would consider the best of all possible worlds.
(i.e., those worlds that are ideal and attainable) . . .
These


associate with one another as . . .
States
States
The other


will exist in a separate anarchy as a collection of . . .
Liberal Democratic
Republics and
Non-Democratic
States
You might notice the obvious:
Of our four values, peace takes precedence in the democratic peace thesis.
We can then define three particular global ethics with peace being taken as the primary goal.
For the non-democratic states, there is no systematic reason to treat democratic states any different from other non-democratic ones. Thus, war is as viable of an option as it is for any non-democratic state.
For the neo-Kantians, liberty and peace are prior to considerations of distributive justice. Yet, the neo-Kantians, are no angels either.
Unlike the cosmopolitans, they do not accept the premise that all peoples are the same, and they acknowledge that the liberties of liberal and illiberal peoples may conflict.
Neo-Kantians would never agree to a one world, one people global ethic where illiberal peoples may limit the maximum liberties of democratic peoples.
This thesis applies to our project in its division of the world by peoples.
This is not necessary within non-democratic states.
Liberal peoples will enjoy liberty, justice, and peace among themselves, never fearing tyranny from another liberal republic.
Nor is it necessary between liberal republics and non-democratic states.
Liberal republics, at one extreme, may elect to conduct crusades against non-democracies to either liberate like-minded peoples or to force their values onto the rest of the world. However, such acts would challenge global peace and justice.
Or republics might opt for lighter footprints through modest intervention, aid, or assistance.
You might observe that the Rawlsian view of the world tolerates an even greater variance of our values compared to both the cosmopolitans and neo-Kantians.
Many social contractarians disagree with this limitation. For example, you can see disagreement from one of Rawls's greatest students on one of today's leading ethicists, Thomas Pogge.
Pogge argues that we have both positive and negative duties in the world beyond a state's borders. In particular, we have a duty not to diminish the human rights of others, yet our current institutions are causing harm to the poor.
Diffidence makes us seek our own security.
Glory makes us seek reputation.
This is a hill.
And it is in this sense that all of history is the story of us against them.
Do you think we can achieve this by . . .
Enlarging particular states?
Establishing one global state?
Electing certain states as leaders?
Eliminating or connecting states?
The imperative is to make men and women free from scarcity, trusting of others, and respectful of others' interests.
Other global ethics could help us answer these questions.
This view asks how rational and equal people might form policies without consideration of arbitrary and accidental factors such as state boundaries, place of birth, class, or gender.
He specifically refers to multiple ethics enshrined by universal principles such as sovereignty, individual rights, civilian immunity in war, and rights of refugees and displaced persons.
How might other global ethics rival cosmopolitanism and the the ethic of one people?
Liberal peoples will enjoy liberty, justice, and peace among themselves, never fearing tyranny from other liberal peoples or decent peoples.
Decent peoples will enjoy similar, but not as great senses of liberty, justice, and peace among themselves and with liberal peoples.
Burdened and Outlaw peoples will vary depending on their own circumstances, but they will be worse off than Well-Ordered peoples.
"Do I share neo-Kantian convictions? Can the peoples be neatly divided between liberal democracies and non-democracies?"
"How do global trends such as technology, individual empowerment, and urbanization fit within this ethic? "
"If peace becomes perpetual in the neo-Kantian future, will liberty, justice, and pluralism be perpetual too?"
Ask rself
you
"What policies or practices might lead us to a neo-Kantian world?"
"What decent peoples exist today that are worthy of tolerance? Who would you consider an outlaw? How would the Rawlsian help today's burdened?"
"Does the division of peoples limit the future improvement of our values compared to those levels desired by the cosmopolitans or secured by the neo-Kantians?"
"Is an ethic that aims principally to rid the world of the 'great evils of human history' (e.g., starvation, poverty, and genocide) best-equipped to respond to history's 'little evils' that may persist into the future (e.g., discrimination, unemployment, climate change, crime, or corruption)?"
Ask rself
you
"Do I agree with the 8 principles that Rawls thought all reasonable peoples would accept? Does the duty to assist automate intervention—at what cost to the security of libral peoples?"
We will continue to live in a world with imperfect choices, and these three global ethics will not be sufficient in themselves to solve all future dilemmas.
I would suggest that neither one of these ethics will always be the most suitable for future planning.
Let's look at our last global ethic:
one world, many peoples.
Let's start with the contractarians, who attempt to extend John Rawls's domestic theory of justice globally.
We'll take a glance at Rawls's
Theory of Justice
.
While Beitz and Pogge sought to extend Rawls’s domestic theory of justice globally, and Singer sought to maximize utility for all people across borders, and Doyle started with the democratic peace thesis, Rawls began from a different starting point—one notably different from his domestic
Theory of Justice
.
However, they offer us reasonable ways to respond to the particular opportunities and challenges posed by future global trends, which will ultimately lead us to one world.
The cosmopolitan view can motivate and guide us toward a few of the most desirable of possible worlds, which may optimize our four values more than other approaches.
The principles of the cosmopolitans, the prudence of the neo-Kantians, and the pragmatism of Rawls can all help us work toward the best of all possible worlds.
The neo-Kantian view offers us a realism that explains why all of the possible worlds might exist, and it provides rationales that will help us cope with future conflicts among peoples.
The ethical choice for you as individuals, communities, organizations, and citizens of states will be to determine what degree of each of our values we can achieve not only in the next fifteen years, but also, as we have in the past, for the longer future of humanity to come.
And finally, the Law of Peoples view gives us a more complex rational basis to extend peace, justice, and liberty to more peoples, giving us a chance to tend toward the most promising decentered worlds.
We might look to thought leaders and ask . . .
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “What Does Moral Leadership Mean?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “Who is Ultimately Accountable?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014
Given such uncertainty, we might then ask,
"Is world peace possible?"
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “Is World Peace Possible?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
David Rodin, in his response to this search, has concisely framed the core challenge of defining a global ethic.

In his denial of moral exceptionalism and his affirmation of pluralism, he saw many possible ways of working toward a global ethic.
Over the past three years, the Council has re-enlivened perennial ethical debates with its academic journal, events, websites, Global Ethics Network, Thought Leaders Forum, and Global Ethics Fellows and some of their most promising students as Ethics Fellows for the Future.
In reflecting on the centennial of Andrew Carnegie's establishment of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, Rosenthal stewarded all of the activities of the organization in this search.
Read the beginning of these efforts, “In Search of a Global Ethic,” Carnegie Council, August 31, 2011, available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110831/index.html .
Read Michael W. Doyle, “One World, Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls’s ‘The Law of Peoples,’”
Perspectives on Politics
4, No. 1 (March 2006): 109–120.
Full disclosure: Doyle was my international ethics professor. Many of the considerations in this book and course were cultivated from his classroom. He's kind of a big deal.
Read David Rodin, “Toward a Global Ethic,”
Ethics and International Affairs
26, No. 1 (Spring 2012): 33–42.
Read:
Charles R. Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
4, No. 4 (Summer 1975): 360–389.
Thomas W. Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
23, No. 3 (Summer, 1994): 195–224.
Read
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
1, No. 3 (Spring 1972): 229–243.
Peter Singer,
One World: The Ethics of Globalization
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
Read Michael Ignatieff, “Reimagining a Global Ethic,”
Ethics and International Affairs
26, No. 1 (Spring 2012): 7–19.
Who is ultimately accountable?
What does moral leadership mean?
In the Nonstate World, governments would no longer be needed, and individuals through global civil society networks would perfectly coordinate among themselves.
The Interconnected Polycentric World would be the most encompassing, allowing civil societies, states, regional organizations, and global institutions to help foster the best possible world.
In the Fusion World, states would still be the primary actors, but they would support subnational, regional, and global solutions to optimize our four values.
Notice the limited explanatory power of this ethic: some worlds cannot be accounted for with the cosmopolitan ethic.
Why do values vary in each world?
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