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Quest for Effective and Sustainable Performance at DOE

Improving our culture

William Roege

on 17 April 2015

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Transcript of Quest for Effective and Sustainable Performance at DOE

Quest for Effective and Sustainable Performance at DOE
Key Reports on DOE's Security Challenges

Cold War Ends
Decision to Compete Lab Contracts
Cox Report on Counterintelligence

GAO Report

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Hamre report
ADM Chiles report
ADM Mies report
Y-12 Reports
follow DNFSB recommendation on WTP
START Treaty Signed 1991 and implemented in 1994

US Stops nuclear testing in 1992
First, DOE managers and contractors have shown a
lack of attention and/or priority to security matters
. Second, and probably most importantly, there is a
serious lack of accountability at DOE
. Efforts to address security problems have languished for years
without resolution or repercussions to those organizations responsible
…the Special Investigative Panel
has concluded the
Department of Energy
is incapable of reforming itself,
bureaucratically and culturally
in a lasting way,
even under an activist Secretary.
Therefore, a reshuffling of offices
and lines of accountability
may be a necessary step
toward meaningful reform,
it almost certainly
will not be sufficient.
This report finds
that DOE’s performance,
throughout its history,
should have been regarded
Mies Report
Of greatest concern,
our panel finds that past studies and
reviews of DOE/NNSA security
have reached similar findings
regarding the
cultural, personnel,
organizational, policy and
procedural challenges
that exist
within DOE and NNSA.
Many continue to exist
because of a
lack of clear accountability,
excessive bureaucracy,
organizational stovepipes,
lack of collaboration, and
unwieldy, cumbersome processes.
Robust, formal mechanisms to
evaluate findings,
assess underlying root causes,
analyze alternative courses of action,
formulate appropriate corrective action,
gain approval, and
effectively implement change
are weak to non-existent
within DOE/NNSA.
Accordingly, our panel strongly
recommends that NNSA continue
to work within DOE to develop,
with urgency, a more robust,
integrated DOE/NNSA-wide
to provide accountability and
follow up on security findings and recommendations.
Committed, well trained,
and experienced
people can overcome
organizational deficiencies;
no organizational improvements
can overcome uncommitted,
poorly trained, or
inexperienced people
Finan Report
As concerning as these structural and
assessment issues might be, the most striking result of this review falls in the area of culture sustainment. It quickly became evident that
the Task Force findings closely resemble those presented in numerous prior reports such as the
2005 Mies Report and the 2004 Chiles Report.

...NNSA has been resistant to the kind of organizational, cultural, and operational
changes that would put security on a
sustainably sound footing.
While outside the charter of this
Task Force, it must be acknowledged that
leadership plays the key role
in mission accomplishment. The Task Force recognized
that effective leadership may compensate
for structural deficiencies within an
organization; however,
alone cannot overcome
leadership shortcomings.
Wen Ho Lee
Security and
Operations Office
Security and Safety Performance Assurance Office
NNSA Security Reorg
NNSA Reorg
Throughout its history,
the Department has been

subject of scores of critical reports from
the General Accounting Office (GAO), the intelligence community, independent commissions, private management
consultants, its Inspector General, and
its own security experts.
It has repeatedly attempted reforms.
Yet the Department’s ingrained
behavior and values have
caused it to continue to
falter and fail.
The commission identified 5 fundamental problems:
(1) continuing
management dysfunction
poor collaboration
between the science and security/counterintelligence communities;
lack of
an effective system for
risk-based security management
(4) inadequate investment in
new tools and technologies
for its security and counterintelligence programs; and
insufficient attention to cyber security
Y-12 Infiltration
Mies Report
Cultural Problems That Must be Addressed

Lack of a team approach
to security
Disparate views and an
under appreciation of security
across the enterprise,
such that security is not
fully embraced as
integral to mission
Ingrained organizational
relationships that inhibit
an enterprise approach
to security
A bias against training
An over-reliance on a
compliance-based approach
to security rather than a
more balanced approach
using performance-based
Lack of trust in the
security organization
An absence of
Common Themes
Repeated Failures
Lack of appreciation for the security mission
Lack of accountability
Resistance to change
Compliance vs a systems risk/performance approach
Cumbersome processes
No improvement process
Excessive stovepipes
Lack of collaboration
Why do we let these problems persist?
Lack of
DOE through the Cold War
Manhattan Engineer District
Atomic Energy Commission
Energy Research and Development Administration
Department of Energy
Cerberus Project
Major Reorganization

under ADM Watkins
Nuclear Regulatory Commission spins off

Pieces of Interior, EPA and NSF added
Adds Federal Energy Administration and various pieces of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interstate Commerce Commission, SEC, HUD, Transportation, and Interior (Power Administrations);

FERC is affiliated with the Department
"Increase effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards and security at DOE facilities"
Forge a strong partnership between HQ and field operations
Systematically tie together S&S objectives, plans and programs...
Align resources and objectives
EM Formed
Field sites assigned to HQ Program Offices and
Other organizational reforms
ADM Watkins is confirmed unanimously.
poor management, antiquated systems and lack of attention
as key issues.
A 35-year culture of
production over safety, health and the environment
Decision-making in "
collegial secrecy
Lack of an "excellence"
Adopt Key Management Principles
Customer focus
Involve people
Process approach
System approach to management
Continual improvement
Factual approach to decision-making
Mutually beneficial approach to suppliers (e.g., labs)
DOE Culture
Necessary conditions to build a highly collaborative and effective leadership team
Enduring core values, mission & vision
Executive teaming and learning
Comprehensive strategic and implementation planning system
Enterprise Risk Management
Corporate change management and improvement process
Open, collaborative and formal decision-making processes
Disciplined execution with accountability
What should
we do?
DOE lacks a functioning
Enterprise or headquarters level management system
that it can use to fix its problems
Commitment to change for a brighter future
September 11, 2001
Develop and Execute an
Enterprise Security Management System
A system of processes that drive performance
Management commitment and stakeholders
Strategy, planning and risk
Resources (budget, people, infrastructure, knowledge, natural, work environment)
Process management
Monitor, measure and review
Improvement, innovation and learning
Must decide to manage DOE as an enterprise and address DOE cultural improvements if we are to achieve our potential.
Bold collective leadership
"[The emphasis] on planning can be expected to provide sound, business-like structure to S&S measures necessary to address evolving and anticipated challenges to the integrity of the DOE protection program."
Elephant in the Room
Aligning Risk
Lab directors come to DC complaining about being told what to do, ignoring the fact that these events happened because their organizations didn't follow accepted practices and their alternative practices were ineffective.
In particular, there seem to be two assertions that underpin continuing the GOCO system at all labs without any serious review:
Contracting entities bring world-class management to our labs, plants and projects
An indemnified contractor decision-maker's risk calculus is aligned with the Secretary's and the National Interest
The Department gets beat up by Congress...
Major untoward events happen in contractor organizations...
Internal and independent investigations and reports are written mostly about the federal side and no one assesses the impact of the GOCO operating model.
The evidence does not support these assertions.
Changed Mindsets
and Behaviors

Time and Energy
Access to
Network of
Senior Level
Someone at a very high level with access to the Secretary and standing with organizational leaders
Committed formal and informal leaders throughout the Department who will work with the Senior Champion to implement the necessary behavioral and process changes.
Experts in change management, facilitation, risk management, strategic planning, organizational culture, process improvement, human performance and other management and social science disciplines to help the Senior Champion and DOE leadership through the change process and make it stick.
In order to align senior leadership, the Secretary will need to spend significant time and energy on the project.
Everyone has to be aligned with a new way of thinking and doing business. Some leaders may be able to adapt and learn new norms. Others will need to get off the bus.
How do we change?
Center of Excellence
ORNL Cyber Attack
Lost Hard
Mies Report Recommendations
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
Security Policy
Cyber System Security
Site Safeguards and Security Plans, Vulnerability Analyses and Performance Testing
Protective Force
Security Incidents and Inquiries
Design Basis Threat Implementation
Security R&D Programs
Nuclear Materials and Waste Storage
Security Resources and Requirements
Security Contracting
World War II
Cold War
OPEC Oil Embargo
From "Great Place to Work" website
Manager's View
From "Great Place to Work" website
What is the Cost of Not Changing?
It currently takes "heroic" effort by some accomplished people to "get the mission done" despite systemic headwinds. However,
DOE is significantly less effective and efficient than its stakeholders expect.
We must find ways to better
align risk perception
between contractors, federal employees and National Interests...
Misaligned Risk Calculus is a
to the Department
and recognize important situations where risk misalignment might happen...
DOE will continue to experience serious shortfalls that cost taxpayers billions of dollars, damage national security, injure or expose its people, endanger the environment and significantly damage its credibility.
then take action to collaboratively make the right decision...
It is hard.
It will take a lot of work.
do it!
cost of change

compared to the
cost of not changing
The question is

"Do we have the courage to change?"
Do we have the
to change and make it stick?
ideally using
Core Values
as a signpost and
Enterprise Risk Management
as the common framework.
Reinventing Energy...
Excellence Inclusion
Making DOE a
2013 Great Place to Work® Institute
"In closing, let me observe that the Department’s most significant mission accomplishments – such as keeping the stockpile safe and reliable, successfully closing nuclear facilities such as the old Rocky Flats plant, consolidating nuclear material, and energy and science breakthroughs –
are too often overshadowed by repeated project cost overruns, schedule delays, glaring security incidents, and safety mishaps. Until these key management issues are addressed, such problems will continue to cast a shadow over DOE’s mission accomplishments.

"A key step in addressing these longstanding issues will be for DOE to embrace sound project management, credible security and safety programs, and reliable management information systems as key elements of the Department’s mission instead of impediments to its mission.
(D. Trimble, GAO 7/24/2013 to Congress)
How can an organization with so many great people and remarkable achievements suffer so many chronic and acute failures?
From ISO 9004:2009 - Managing for the sustained success of an organization
ISO 9004:2009
More security events
More Reorganizations
GOCO + Field Oversight
Classification Scheme
Personnel Security
Science and Programs
High risk weapons and science programs must rely on scientists to determine promising approaches to achieve program goals.

is most appropriate here since no one knows the best approach when the initiative starts. Each evolution is unique.
Engineering and Operations
High risk operations such as safety, security and project management are well defined, repeatable engineering processes broadly in use throughout industry.

is very appropriate here as DOE should expect each contractor to use well established best practices to avoid untoward consequences and the resultant mission delays in DOE's high-risk environments.
What versus How
Who Owns the Risk?
Limited Liability Companies
Worst consequences for contractors:
Enforcement action ($100's of thousands)
Contract termination ($10's of millions in potential earnings)

No liability for repairing broken infrastructure or program impacts ($billions)

Workers Compensation is an allowable cost
How does DOE hold a contractor accountable when the government provides free unlimited liability insurance?
Lack of Accountability
What does this really mean?
DOE is often said to be "risk averse"

However, the prevailing view is that leaders often decide
not to deal with difficult risk issues or to document risk decisions

There are many instances where leaders
refuse to acknowledge certain risks even exist

Leaving no paper trail

and accountability
However, NO DECISION is often the

option for the Department and the American taxpayer
2. a person who refuses to face reality or accept facts.
Full transcript