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Transcript of Nonproliferation
Areas or regions that prohibit the use, stationing, or development of any nuclear weapons on their soil
Outer Space (1967)
Non-state Actors and Non-proliferation
Organizations - Nuclear Threat Initiative, Global Zero, Wisconsin Arms Control, Carnegie Endowment
Individuals - Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, MacArthur Foundation, Barack Obama's Prague Speech
IAEA Safeguards Agreements
Called for by the NPT, which specifies that each state enters into such an agreement. However, there is no specified time frame in which this should occur. There is also no enforcement mechanism to guarantee that states do this.
IAEA safeguards agreements are bilateral agreements between a state and the IAEA, which is an autonomous organization working under the umbrella of the United Nations
Agreements are based on a reporting system, which the IAEA in turn verifies through on-site inspection and remote monitoring
Over time, there has been a move from verifying the accuracy of a countries reports to the completeness of those reports, but the agency is still restricted. This is why APs were instituted.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Formally called the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Negotiations began in 1965, opened for signature in 1968.
25 year treaty
Focused on three "pillars":
Early Attempts at Nonproliferation
Baruch Plan - Not only an attempt to internationalize atomic power and weapons, but to discourage the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states
Bilateral verification agreements - Under the US Atoms for Peace program, US required inspections of atomic-related facilities to verify that weapons were not being developed
Nonproliferation & Counter-Proliferation
The goal of both is to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that shouldn't have them.
How can this be accomplished?
How do we determine who should and should not have them?
The NPT and Non-proliferation
Called for the institution of a verification regime to certify that states were fulfilling their treaty obligations
Recognized two groups of states:
Nuclear weapon states (NWS)
Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)
Does not address states who are outside of the treaty
Supreme National Interest clause
North Korea exercised in 2003
Debate over technology under the NPT
Calls for the 5 NWS to "negotiate in good faith" towards eliminating their nuclear weapon arsenals
This clause is hotly debated by the NWS and the NNWS
Does not specify a time frame, nor does it say that states cannot retain the ability to produce nuclear weapons
Guarantees all states the right to the use of peaceful nuclear technologies
Does not specify what technologies this includes, so it is interpreted as all technologies because even those that are highly useful for weapons production have peaceful purposes
Because of the gaps in the IAEA safeguards agreements, the agency institute a voluntary additional protocol agreement, moved the burden away from verifying the accuracy of report to verifying the completeness of those reports
Calls for intrusive inspections, which can be conducted at any time.
The "Mystery Building" Problem
IAEA inspectors are prohibited from entering any building that is not previously designated as "inspectable," this gives rise to the "mystery building problem"
Was critical in the inspections of the Iraqi nuclear infrastructure, caused inspectors to miss almost the entirety of their weapons establishment
Historically, there has been a western/developed state bias, discounting technologies that the US largely deemed as inefficient
NPT Review Process
Eight review conferences since it opened for signature in 1968
Perhaps the most important was the 1995 conference, where the treaty was indefinitely extended
Most recent was 2010, introduced the concept of the "humanitarian approach" to non-proliferation and disarmament, building on the 1996 ICJ ruling on the legality of nuclear weapons
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Bans all nuclear tests
Establishes a monitoring system for detecting nuclear explosions
Opened for signature in 1996
Follows logically from initiative laid out by JFK, first step being the PTBT
162 States have ratified as of March, 2014
The 1 kt threshold
Treaty specifies that it will only enter into force after a select group of states ratifies the treaty
These Annex II states include the 5 NWS, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, etc.
Only eight such states remain
US ratification contingent, in large part, on the demonstration of a scientifically based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
India has said that they will only ratify after the US takes measurable steps to reduce stockpile
1999 Attempt at Ratification
Perhaps the best chance for US ratification was in 1999
Clinton was first leader to sign treaty in 1996, urged quick action
After a small delay, submitted bill to Congress. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) viewed as low priority. Held up for almost 2 years.
Dems finally submitted a formal request to proceed with debate, Helms and Trent Lott (R-MS), orchestrated a quick vote that had no change of passing. Was last time that CTBT has even been close to a vote.
Unlike the NPT, the CTBT actually includes a verification/compliance mechanism
Establishes a world-wide monitoring system and organization designed to detect nuclear explosions (IMS)
50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic monitoring stations.
11 hydro-acoustic stations detecting acoustic waves in the oceans.
60 infra-sound stations using microbarographs (acoustic pressure sensors) to detect very low-frequency sound waves.
80 radionuclide stations using air samplers to detect radioactive particles released from atmospheric explosions and/or vented from underground or under-water explosions.
16 radionuclide laboratories for analysis of samples from the radionuclide stations.
Actions taken by states or other actors to prevent or deter the acquisition of nuclear weapons and related technologies
A number of such actions can be adopted, including economic sanctions, military attack (either general or targeted), cyber attack, formal protests (Démarche)
The difficulty is deciding when to respond and how best to do so
States cannot know, definitively, whether any particular form of counter-proliferation will actually have an effect
Hostile actions may actually make things worse (the Osirak case)
Is also subject to bias (the South African case)
The Proliferation Paradox