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Thaddeus Hoffmeister

on 26 January 2018

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Transcript of Class7MensReaRobinsonTiptonCollins

Mens Rea
A guilty mind
A guilty or wrongful purpose
Any morally blameworthy state of mind

Specific Intent
General Intent
Strict Liability

Strict Liability

State v. Collins
Justice Stratton: Wants the OH SCT to consider public policy and legislative intent.

She says that courts have imposed strict liability (1) when the statute was silent as to applicable mental state and (2) when there was the absence of a specific statement of mens rea.

Unlike the examples cited by the majority, there is no innocent explanation for failure to pay child support

The Ohio legislature has already distinguished between ORC 2919.21(A) and ORC 2919.21(B)
State v. Robinson
FACTS: Ds Robinson and Logan arrive at the One Way and a mob quickly convenes around Robinson's car. At this time, Logan was punched. He subsequently fired shots toward a crowd of people. Robinson then fired towards the back of the car. After the second shots were fired, Bubbles was killed. The car then sped off.

PRO: Agg. murder, murder x 2, felonious assault x x 6, discharge of firearm near prohibited premises. D not guilty of murder.
Justice Stratton

Looks at the plain language of the statute

"No person shall" indicates the General Assembly's intent to impose strict liability

Statute designed to protect the health, safety and welfare

Public policy supports a strict liability interpretation
Issue: Did the D act knowingly?

Holding: Yes

Analysis: D acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.

A firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality use of which is reasonably likely to produce serious injury or death.
COA: The legislature did not set forth a mental element or plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict liability. Thus, the state had the burden to prove recklessly.

OH SCT: Absent a mental element or intentional conduct, there must be a plain indication by the legislature to impose strict liability.

Driving directly at V and killing V

Driving directly at V who is standing by B

Driving a car at a crowd in order to hit the V

Driving at 90mph in Downton Dayton and hitting V

Driving 5-10 mph over the speed limit during a rain storm and hitting V

FACTS: Appellant executes a wage assignment in 1990. Lump sum judgment of $137,000 entered against Appellant in 1994. No payments received from 1991-1997.

ISSUE: What is the applicable mens rea for 2919.21(B)?

No person shall abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally obligated to support.

HOLDING: Recklessness
State v. Tipton
FACTS: D killed another person when his vehicle crossed left of center and caused the death of another.

ISSUE: Did the prosecution establish that the D was negligent?


D argues that the Gov't must prove a lapse of substantial due care and that he only committed an ordinary lapse of due care.

Court agrees with the D that there is a difference between "ordinary lapse of due care" and "substantial lapse of due care" and that the government must prove the latter for a conviction.

Court says that while "ordinary" and "substantial" are different words and have different definitions they are not degrees of negligence. These words modify "lapse from due care" not "negligence."
Court says that "negligence is something more than denominated either by due care or ordinary lapse from due care. That something more is called a substantial lapse from due care, or negligence for purposes of the Ohio criminal law."

Court says that "negligence consists of a lapse from due care that is no longer customary, usual or normal" but rather "of moment, important, essential, or material"

Court says that "some negligence," "ordinary negligence," etc. "are all negligence under the Ohio criminal law, there being no varying degrees of negligence within the definition."
The court basically redefines "negligence" to equate to "substantial lapse from due care"
Full transcript