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Metaphor, feeling, embodiment
Transcript of Metaphor, feeling, embodiment
Moving in or through a given place, the body imports its own emplaced past into its present experience: its local history is literally a history of locales. ... Orientation in place ... arises within the ever-lengthening shadow of our bodily past’. Durkheim explicitly spelled out the relation between the consciousness of the individual and that of the collectivity ... in terms of a thoroughgoing distinction between sensation and representation.
... the contrast between the ephemerality of sensations and the durability of representations.
... sensations are private and individual, representations are public and social. From a phenomenological standpoint ... the world emerges with its properties alongside the emergence of the perceiver in person, against the background of involved activity. Since the person is a being-in-the-world, the coming-into-being of the person is part and parcel of the process of coming-into-being of the world. As in any craft, the skilled maker who has a feel for what she is doing is one whose movement is continually and subtly responsive to the modulations of her relation with the material. Conversely, the clumsy practitioner is precisely one who implements mechanically a fixed sequence of instructions, while remaining insensitive to the evolving conditions of the task as it unfolds. Telling a story ... is not like unfurling a tapestry to cover up the world, it is rather a guiding the attention of listeners or readers into it. We have inherited from the Western philosophical tradition a theory of faculty psychology, in which we have a “faculty” of reason that is separate from and independent of what we do with our bodies. In particular, reason is seen as independent of perception and bodily movement. We form extraordinarily rich conceptual structures for our categories and reason about them in many ways that are crucial for our everyday functioning. All of these conceptual structures are, of course, neural structures in our brains. This makes them embodied in the trivial sense that any mental construct is realized neurally. But there is a deeper and more important sense in which our concepts are embodied. What makes concepts concepts is their inferential capacity, their ability to be bound together in ways that yield inferences. An embodied concept is a neural structure that is actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, sensorimotor inference. Our claim is ... that the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain and body are structured and the way they function in interpersonal relations and in the physical world. Rather notice, mon cher,
that the moon is
the point of the steeple
than that its color
that it is early morning
than that the sky
as a turquoise.
how the dark
of the steeple
meet at a pinnacle—
its little ornament
tries to stop them—
See how it fails!
See how the converging lines
of the hexagonal spire
that guard and contain
the eaten moon
lies in the protective lines.
It is true:
in the light colors
of the morning
brown-stone and slate
shine orange and dark blue
the oppressive weight
of the squat edifice!
the jasmine lightness
of the moon. Seeing is touching Form is motion Events are actions The body continues to be regarded as nothing more than an input device whose role is to receive information to be ‘processed’ by the mind, rather than playing any part in cognition itself. Listen, dreary dessicated thing! Why have you, a foul thing of earth, afflicted me?
(Soul and Body II)
O, WHO shall from this dungeon raise
A soul enslaved so many ways?
O who shall me deliver whole,
From bonds of this tyrannic soul? Constrained not only to endure
Diseases, but, what's worse, the cure;
And ready oft the port to gain
Am shipwrecked into health again. The mind is an enchanting thing
is an enchanted thing
like the glaze on a
subdivided by sun
till the nettings are legion.
Like Gieseking playing Scarlatti;
like the apteryx-awl
as a beak, or the
of haired feathers, the mind
feeling its way as though blind,
walks with its eyes on the ground.
It has memory's ear
that can hear without
having to hear.
Like the gyroscope's fall,
because trued by regnant certainty,
it is a power of
strong enchantment. It
is like the dove-
neck animated by
sun; it is memory's eye;
it's conscientious inconsistency.
It tears off the veil; tears
the temptation, the
mist the heart wears,
from its eyes -- if the heart
has a face; it takes apart
dejection. It's fire in the dove-neck's
iridescence; in the
its confusion to proof; it's
not a Herod's oath that cannot change. http://untappedcities.com/newyork/2011/01/28/sequence-art-in-new-york-city/