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Emergence & Group Minds

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Tram Ho Dac

on 6 February 2014

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Transcript of Emergence & Group Minds

"Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an
emergent autonomous organization
in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced)." ([10], p. 39)
"The interaction process emerges as an entity when social encounters acquire this operationally closed organization. It constitutes a level of analysis
not reducible
, in general, to individual behaviours." [11],p.8
Social Interaction
dynamical process of coupling and
of two embodied agents, who in turn regulate (sustain or modify) their coupling over time
individual agents and social interactions are
dynamics of the interaction
individual and collective behaviors mutate, self-organize and learn in response to changing environments
Emergence of Group Minds?
Collective Intentionality
Attributed to individuals or groups?
process in which the lived bodies of the group members/participants extend and form a
common intercorporality

in the dynamical process of interaction and coordination of two embodied agents
is transformed and generated
we-intention is a primitive phenomenon;
not reducible
to a set of I-intentions
Genuine Group Intention
"we"refers to a
plural subject
of a goal
Collective Affectivity
Attributed to individuals or groups?
Collective Agency
Attributed to individuals or groups?

Increasing Degree of Emergence
Increasing Degree of Emergence
Individual Emotion
strong intuition:
about feelings (exclusive first-person access)
Genuine Group Emotion
example: grief of parents
Shared Emotion
Group Action
Shared Action
second-person constitution of intersubjectivity in practical interaction
indistinguishable sets of coordinated bodily movements may imply a set of
individual actions
or a
collective action
e.g. rain shelter
e.g. choreography
we-intentions imply cooperation, but are still localized in the individuals
no reference to individual goals is necessary
example: walking together
obligations and entitlements are the result of conditional commitment
collective intentions are attributed to a plural subject, not to individuals
problem example: business school graduates
Tuomela & Miller
3 criteria for having "we"-intentions
A intends to do his part of X
A beliefs that the preconditions of success obtain
A believes that there is a mutual belief among the group members w.r.t. to these preconditions
we-intentions cannot be analyzed as
set of
I-intentions + belief
example: I am happy
emotions are not shared, especially the phenomenality of emotions is subjective
emotional episodes are attributed to the individual subject
only individuals can have emotions
the same type of shared emotion is instantiated in different individual tokens
example: symphony orchestra
numerically one feeling is shared
feeling has individually different aspects
feeling together
: one feeling is shared

are instantiated by a set of individual emotions
emotions in this case are not reducible to any individual member
example: atmospheric feeling
emotions are not personal, but identified with
superpersonal atmospheres
Broad Emergence
set of individual actions
of a plural agent
social interaction is more than the sum of individual actions
Group Properties?
candidates: social cognition, intersubjectivity,
collective affective intentionality etc.
participatory sense-making
account for the intentional, affective and agency dimensions of collective states?
Social Cognition
cognitive ability to understand another person's emotions, desires, intentions, thoughts etc.
integrate individual cognition and
interaction processes
in an explanation of social understanding
Background Debate
“intersubjectivity [...] means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning [participatory sense-making] through it.” ([12],465)
[1] Searle, J. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In: Cohen, P., Morgan, J. & Pollack, M. (Eds): Intentions in communication. Cambridge, MIT Press.

[2] Gilbert, M. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15(1), 1–14.

[3] Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(2), 173–192. doi:10.1007/s13164-011

[4] Schmid, H.B. (2009). Plural action: Essays in philosophy and social science. Dordrecht, Springer.

[5] Scheler, M. (1913/1974). Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Bern. Franke Verlag.-0052-5

[6] Slaby, J. (2011). Affektive Intentionalität - Hintergrundgefühle, Möglichkeitsräume, Handlungsorientierung. In: Slaby, J., Stephan, A., Walter, H. & Walter, S. (Eds.): Affektive Intentionalität. Paderborn, Mentis.

[7] Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2008). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi, 28(1), 23–30. doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2

[8] De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2008). Making sense in participation: An enactive approach to social cognition. EMERGING COMMUNICATION, 10, 33–14.

[9] Jaegher, H., & Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9

[10] Fuchs, T., & Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 465–486. doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9136-4

[11] Di Paolo, E. (2012). The interactive brain hypothesis, 1–16. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00163/abstract
Armin Egger
Imke Biermann
Ngan-Tram Ho Dac

seminar: Emergence
University of Osnabrueck
June 18th 2013

New Concept
is the active engagement of a living being in the
creation and appreciation of meaning
(due to its autonomous nature);
it is at the heart of what it is to be cognitive
Mutual Incorporation
coupling and coordination
Social Interaction
dynamic network of
interacting elements
individual sense-making can be coordinated in social encounters
Increasing Degree of Emergence
Agentive System
operative intentionality
(meaningful perception-action link) of interacting bodies become intertwined in embodied
how do systemic properties reflect back on the individuals?
explore the concrete dynamics + phenomenality
sense-making in interaction as constitutive for individual (intentional, affective...) mental states;
cf. development of children's mental states
Krueger (2013?), Fuchs & de Jaegher (2009)
Possible Lines of Argument
examine conditions that make it likely to attribute emergent properties to a specific group
cf. Sawyer
papers to read
Slaby: emotions and agency (2013?), emotions and the extended mind (2013?)
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