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A timeline showing how the first four days of the online PR battle between Nestle and Greenpeace . It shows the numbers of people online who helped drive the PR disaster for Nestle over the company's alleged use of unsustainable palm oil and resultant dam

Branavan Jeyarasa

on 13 June 2011

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Transcript of Copy of NESTLE KERFUFFLE

have a break or what a PR disaster looks like online have a quick spat agreed with 50 tweets per page on a single search term on a single day Source Analysis for Mr A the source : A. F. Kerensky The Catastrophe 1927 CHAPTER VI
DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMYJUST as the old administrative machinery disappeared suddenly, unexpectedly, almost miraculously, in the country, so were the millions at the front left without a governing apparatus. The very spirit of the army was gone and its heart—the moving force of the word of command—ceased to beat.Immediately after the Revolution the Russian army ceased to fight, for the soldiers ceased to obey and the officers lost the capacity to command. The power and authority of the officers disappeared.All those who had the opportunity to observe the Russian Front in the last year before the Revolution, all those who had any more or less clear conception of the atmosphere at the front felt the deadly peril that was advancing upon the army together with the dissolution of the old regime. But no one expected all these symptoms of exhaustion and decay to culminate in the shocking picture of chaos that arose after the Revolution. Of course, one must not paint the entire Russian Front as it appeared after the March explosion in one shade of black. Those troops who had won victories in the past or who had as commanders men of the less reactionary type, men who had shown sympathy with the more progressive circles of the country and had fought for the liberation of the government from the meshes of Rasputin, as well as the troops farthest removed from the poisonous influence of Petrograd— in the Caucasus, in the Southwest (Galicia), in Rumania, and the Black Sea Fleet—preserved their organization and their fighting capacity.
In every individual army the measure of dissolution was likewise uneven. As a rule, the artillery and all the specialized branches, containing the more intelligent and cultural elements of the army, the elements that had been regarded with suspicion under the old regime, remained after the Revolution but little touched by the wave of disintegration, or, if disintegration did appear, the process was a slow one. Above all, it was the infantry which lost the capacity to fight and to obey. This is explainable. First of all, the Russian infantry in 1916-17, following the terrible defeats of 1914-15, no longer represented a regular army, but a poorly trained militia. The various infantry divisions were no longer coordinated harmonious bodies. The raw recruits from the villages, who had found their way hurriedly and accidentally into the various regiments, had no knowledge or conception of their respective regimental traditions. Frequently this was the case also with the commanders, the wartime lieutenants, who, after two or three months of ephemeral training, were hurled from their student desks or office swivel chairs into leadership of the strange gray masses of soldiery. But even in the infantry the measure of disorganization was varied. The principal fields for the disintegrating propaganda and activity of Bolshevist and German agents were the so-called "third" divisions, the formation of which was begun in January, 1917. The transformation of the army corps on the basis of three instead of two divisions to a corps—a most unfortunate reform, which had met with sharp disapproval from General Alexeyeff and the majority of the General Staff officers—was carried out by General Gurko, temporary chief of staff of the commander-in-chief, the Emperor Nicholas II, at the time when General Alexeyeff was on furlough in the Crimea because of illness. These "third" divisions, consisting of units of which commanders of already existing divisions had sought to rid themselves, because of their uselessness, represented accidental masses of people without any organization and discipline, and operating under the very poorest material and technical conditions. Subsequently, during my inspection of the various fronts, I heard loud complaints against these accursed "third" divisions, which had become the carriers of cowardice, anarchy and disintegration. It was in the infantry where the Bolshevist and German agents concentrated their work. Only here did they have any real success. Only the very darkest, most ignorant and out and out reactionary sections of the Russian army came to the assistance of these worst enemies of Free Russia. Here all the slogans of the Revolution merged into one solid, brutal roar: "To the devil with the War! Let us go home! You have drunk enough of our blood!" The only language which these lower depths of the army could understand was the language of force. And as soon as this force was restored by the Provisional Government, it was put into effect. Well its really one source but split up Perspective The source shown previously is a publication by A.F. Kerensky and is a primary source
It's a first person account of what happened during the last Tsarist regime
The author of this source is Kerensky him self, and he was a prominent figure during this era, leader of the Provisional Government that succeeded the autocratic regime. relIABILITY
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