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Copy of Copy of Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level game

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Transcript of Copy of Copy of Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level game

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Storyline
Tsarist Russia signed two unequal treaties with Imperial China, acquiring 100 million square kilometers of Russia Far East.
After the collapse of the friendship between communist china and soviet union, Chinese Leader Mao Zedong raised the problem.
In 1964 and between 1969 and 1978, two boundary talks were held but no result came out.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s July 1986 speech suggested a fresh round of boundary negotiations.
In October 2004, China and Russia agreed to share equally the territory.

Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games
Articles
Theory:
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” International Organization, Vol 42, No 3(Summer), pp427-460.

Issue:
Chung, Chien-peng, 2007. “Resolving China’s Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol.12, No.1, 2007
Bonn summit conference of 1978
All Conceded the world economy was in serious trouble
All Wanted to find a way to recovery from the first oil shock.

Result: At the Bonn summit, a comprehensive package deal was approved, and all participants happier than when they arrived.
How it became possible politically?
International pressure
Powerful minority within each government
Adopted policies different from previous
1. Uncertainty (imperfect information)
1.1 Implications:
a. A bargaining device or a stumbling block?
b. Increasing the risk of involuntary defection

1.2 bargaining tactics:
a. Convincing the opposite number that one’s own win-set is “kinky”.
Kinky win-set: the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favorable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified.
b. The controlled exchange of partial information.

Factors affecting the two-level games
2. Restructuring and Reverberation
2.1 Restructuring:
eg: the ambassadorial activities
Attention: the importance of multilevel analysis

2.2 Reverberation:International pressures “reverberate” within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations.
2.2.1 Rationales to explain reverberation:
a. A rational maxim: ”To get along, go along”.
b. Cognitive factors and uncertainty.
2.2.2 The likelihood of suasive reverberation:
a. Among countries with close relations
b. More frequent in economic than in political-military negotiations.
2.2.3 Negative reverberation: foreign pressure may create a domestic backlash.

3. The role of chief negotiator
3.1 Motives of the chief negotiator:
a. Enhancing his standing in the level II game.
b. Shifting the balance of power at level II.
c. To pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context.

3.2 Constraints of the role of chief negotiator on the two-level game:
a. giving primacy to his domestic calculus.
b. A veto over possible agreements.
c. the fixed costs of the leader’s coalition-building constrain the win-sets.
1. Uncertainty

2. Restructuring and Reverberation

3. The role of chief negotiator
The reciprocal influence between domestic and international affairs.
Several significant features of two-level games:
a. Distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection.
b. The contrast between issues on which domestic interests are homogeneous and heterogeneous
c. The possibility of synergistic issue linkage.
d. The paradoxical fact between the strength of the institutional arrangements and the international bargaining position
e. The importance of targeting international threats, offers, and side-payments.
f. The strategic uses of uncertainty and the special utility of “kinky win-sets”.
g. The potential reverberation of international pressures within the domestic arena.
h. The divergences of interest between”principal” and “agent”, and the international implications of fixed investments of the chief negotiator in domestic politics.
Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis
Summary of the article
Approach and methodology
Specific issues explanation
Key words
Interpretation of findings
Conclusions
Summary
Author’s interests:
Significant transnational roles over island claims involving China
Background:
1) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
2) The art of politicking, coalition-forming, and opinion-making involved in both levels of negotiations
Raise Query:
1) Why some inter-state disputes were quickly shelved at the stage of preliminary talks, or were left to linger? Little seemed to been done to understand.
2) To remedy this inadequacy, apply the propositions derived from the “Two-Level Game” framework to analyze the recurrent failure to start sovereignty negotiations over the disputed.
Aim of the article:
Examine more briefly the roles that trans-national (or “third – level”) actors
Approach and methodology used
Specific issues/concepts explanation
Diaoyu/Senkaku
Zhenbao/Damansky
Island disputes
Two-level games
Nationalism
Why so complicated?
1)Forego or Divide the claim over a group of five islets and three rocks totaling a mere 6.5 squared kilometers?

The answer, in short, is the rhetoric of sovereignty.

Historical Discovery vs. Effective Administration:
A) China: historical discoveries by ancient Chinese mariners and envoys from the Ming and Qing dynasties to the Ryukyu Kingdom of Okinawa and Treaty of Shimonoseki.
B) Japan & US: First country ever to exercise effective administration with undersea hydrocarbon resources; US control in 1945-1972.
C) valid criteria under international law
Why not fight directly?
2) Unilateral Military Action to settle the dispute in its favor?

The answer is obvious.

A) predominant superiority of military force over either of the other two necessary to assure outright victory

B) trading and investment partners of one another.

Could negotiators look forward to compromising?
3) By Setting Aside the issue of sovereignty, and concentrate on developing or enlarging “win-sets” or common grounds on areas of joint economic development?

The answer is sophisticated.

A) Mutual distrust and historical animosity are so deep between the Japanese and the Chinese.

B) Nationalistic elements opposed to any form of territorial compromises could be found in the governments of the disputant countries.
Final Result
A boundary agreement was signed in May 1991 between Soviet Union and China demarcating 3700km of border between both states which runs along the thalweg of Amur and Ussuri. It also transferred the island Zhenbaodao/Dmansky to China. Actually, Russia just adhere the widely accepted international law, but China had to claim to abandon all territory of Far East.

Why was it possible for a claimant country to forego territory that once prepared to go to war to retain?
It is the overlap of WIN-SET between 2 countries.
BEFORE 1990s
in the 1960s, two countries are in a harsh relationship, national pride prevented them to negotiate
in the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution sought out Moscow as enemy
Early 1980s,Moscow increased troops in far east
Why was it possible for a claimant country to forego territory that once prepared to go to war to retain?
I
N the 1990s
Configuration of forces in international politics make the two countries realize they need to negotiate again.Their WIN-SET overlapped
For Moscow, it can reduce expensive military presence and attract trade and investment.
For Beijing , it was being ostracized by the rest of the world after Tiananmen Incident in 1989, so it hoped to solute one dispute to reduce Russian mistrust and suspicion.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS DISPUTE AND “THREE-LEVEL” GAMES
Factors that dominate
the South China Sea Disputes
1) Fishermen
They form lobby groups to pressure their own authorities to claim as much as possible of their country’s territorial waters and EEZs.
2) Naval and air force officers
Patrol their own claimed areas of the South China Sea more effectively. They have argued for increases in their military budgets.
3) The South China Sea’s important strategic position and its potentially resources
Asia's Mediterranean
Its seabed is potentially rich in hydrocarbon.
These three factors shrink the win-sets in the two-level game

Trade volume between China and Southeast Asian countries has increased sharply. The economic interdependence will lead to more willingness to cooperate between the claimant countries.
This will enlarge the win-sets in the two-level game

Who is the “third-level”?
It refers to transnational forces like multinational oil companies and multilateral non-governmental confidence-building forums.
What is role of the “third-level” forces?
1) Multinational oil companies have business dealings with every claimant country.
They also have close connections with their home governments.
They do not want to get involved in a war.
Influence their host governments and also their home governments to prevent South China Sea Disputes
2)However, they may also separately call upon their host governments to use force, if threatened by a third party claimant.

Current situations
about the South China Sea
1)Focus on the potential for joint economic development, maritime research, anti-piracy measures, and “transparency enhancement” of military postures.
2)Exclude sovereignty issues at the moment

Trade
Conclusion
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dipute and
the Two Level Games
Conclusion:
Nationalist Force;

Confrontational Stand;

No credible evidence was forthcoming.

EXAMPLES:

JP:
Activities of Right- wing groups from Japan protected by Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.


CN:
Activists circling the Diaoyu rocks with their boats welcomed by local officials.
THE WAY
in which the issues have been, or will be, exploited by domestic nationalist groups to further their own objectives.

THE ATTEMPTS
made, or which should be made, by governments to play down the incidents in the interest of overall foreign relations, economic ties, and regional stability.

THE TEST
of the strengths and limitations of “two-level game analysis” for conflict resolution.

Talking to domestic colleagues
Negotiating with foreigners
Two Phases: Negotiation/Ratification
20Yr
10Yr
X0
X1
20Yr
20Yr
20Yr
5Yr
5Yr
5Yr
15Yr
5Yr
X0
X0
X0
Y0
Y0
Y0
Y0
Y1
U.S.A
Philippines
15Yr
15Yr
15Yr
10Yr
10Yr
10Yr
X1
X1
X1
Y1
Y1
Y1
Win-Set
Win-Set
12Yr
7Yr
Two-Level Games
Influences on the Size of Win-Set
(1) Distribution of Power & Policy Preference at Home
(2) Political Institution at Home
(3) Strategies of Negotiators
Distribution of Power & Policy Preference at Home
(1) Cost of “No-Agreement”
(2) Isolationists VS Internationalists
(3) Homogenous VS Heterogeneous
Political Institution at Home
(1) Ratification Procedure
(2) Autonomy of Decision-Makers
Strategies of Negotiators
(1) Side-Payments
(2) A High Position of Negotiators
1) What is Methodology:
The “two-level games” concept

Importance of win-sets
win-set sizes includes 3 determinants

2) How to use the Methodology:
exploring and evaluating

if and how affect inter-state bargaining behavior and state-society relations

which could be grouped into 3 parts.
The way The attempts The test

1)“Track II” channels: by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
“Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” hosted by Indonesia.
The individuals involved in the workshops are influential opinion-leaders

2)“Track I” channels: by governments
A non-binding Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was reached between China and ASEAN in November 2002.
Reach a Code of Conduct that eschews the use of force.

“Track II” and “Track I” arrangements towards the South China Sea
Thank You!
Shangbo Wang
Yao Song
Cuiling Zou

Yuchen Guo
Yue Wang
Kun Sui

Win-set “the set of all possible Phase 2 agreements that would win, namely, gain the necessary majority among the constituents- when simply voted up or down”
Xo: the US max. outcome
X1:the US min.outcome
Yo:the Philippines max.outcome
Y1: the Philippines min.outcome
President of PRC
National Congress of China
Foreign Affairs Ministry
Two State-run Petroleum Giants
President of PRC
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s PM
Barack Obama
Christine Lagarde,
Director of IMF
Ban Ki-Moon,
Secretary General of UN
Professor Robert D. Putnam
International Negotiation
Congress Ratification
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game.
At the national level, domestic group pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.
At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.
A Metaphor For Domestic-International Interactions
Conclusion
1,It is easier for the government of a non-democratic country to accept an international agreement than a democratic country.
2,When the cost of an agreement are concentrated on certain segments of a population whlie the benefits are diffused throughout the country ,the negatively affected sectors would thwart the negotiating process.
3,an asymmetrical distribution of information domestically increases the chances of a cooperative agreement
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