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OPERATION VULPES

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by

Rowan Metcalfe

on 8 May 2014

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Transcript of OPERATION VULPES

Operation Vulpes
OPERATION FENNEC
Main offences being investigated:
Protection of Children Act 1978, S1 (10 years)
Sexual Offences 2003, S67 (2 years)

-R v Stamford [1972]
INITIAL LINES OF INQUIRY
Police National Computer

Open Source Intelligence

Equifax
OPERATION VULPES
OPERATION TIBETAN SAND
Investigating potential Computer Misuse Offences

-Main Suspect is Malcolm KUKIC
OPERATION SWIFT
Investigating conspiracy to commit sexual offences against children abroad.

Main suspect is John BYRNE
OPERATION BLANFORD
OPERATION FENNEC
Investigating the possible child abduction and conspiracy to commit sexual offences.

Main suspect is Stephan STIBLINSKI
Investigating the alleged distribution of indecent images.

Main suspects are John BYRNE, Kevin COLLINGHAM and Alison ASHWORTH
John BYRNE
Owner of Anytown Computer Store
Kevin COLLINGHAM
Employed by BYRNE at Anytown Computer Store
Alison ASHWORTH
Common law wife of BYRNE and cleaner at local Sports Centre
Malcolm KUKIC
Intelligence suggests KUKIC is an associate with BYRNE
Stephan STIBLINSKI
STIBLINSKI is a regular associate of KUKIC.
SUSPECTS
COLLINGHAM
ASHWORTH
Gain internet history from the Internet Service Provider
Section 22 of RIPA 2000
authorised by Superintendent

Necessary for:
prevention and detection of crime
in the interests of public safety


Taking photos from outside the address of each suspect


Links with the communications data


Absolute necessity for the Operation
INTRUSIVE SURVEILLANCE
Secondary option for the Operation

-Cameras placed inside address
Property Interference - Police Act 1997, S93

Section 32 of RIPA 2000 - Chief Constable's authority

Necessary for:
prevention and detection of serious crime

Proportionate
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
OPERATION SWIFT
Main offences being investigated:
Sexual Offences Act 2003, S14 (14 years)
Sexual Offences Act 2003, S50 (14 years)
Criminal Law Act 1977, S1A (life)
SUSPECTS
BYRNE
KUKIC
INITIAL LINES OF INQUIRY
Equifax- to obtain financial data- Magistrate warrant required

Open Source Intelligence and social networking- identify BYRNE's associates
Obtaining Communications Data
Browser history to be obtained from Internet Service Provider

Obtain BYRNE and KUKIC's phone records

s22 RIPA- authorised by a Superintendent
Necessary- to prevent and detect serious crimes and in the interests of public safety
Proportionate in the circumstances

Directed Surveilllance
ANPR- monitor BYRNE's movements

s28 RIPA- authorised by Superintendent
Necessary to prevent and detect serious crimes
In the interests of public safety

Proportionate in the circumstances
Property Interference
GPS tracking device in BYRNE's car to monitor his movements

Part 3 of The Police Act 1997 s93- authorised by the Chief Constable
Necessary to prevent and detect serious crimes

Proportionate-
Uzun v Germany
Interception of Communications
Intercept communications from BYRNE's phone to gain intelligence

s5 RIPA- authorised by Home Secretary
Necessary to prevent and detect serious crimes

Will breach Article 8 rights but seriousness outweighs infringements.
R v Khan
OPERATION TIBETAN SAND
Main offences being investigated:

Computer Misuse Act 1990, S1 (2 years)
Computer Misuse Act 1990, S2 (5 years)
SUSPECTS
KUKIC
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
What is proposed?

Mobile covert CCTV placed in a vehicle outside the subject's home address- 3 TOW LAW CRESCENT
-Operating between 5am-11pm
- <2 month period

Mobile surveillance team, deployed when intelligence suggests the subject is meeting associates
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
ANPR
-Once VRN has been established from DVLA


GPS tracker on the subject's van
-Provide more detailed information on the subject's movements
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES
Provide evidence of subject's relationship with STIBLINSKI and any other associates

Provide evidence of subject's involvement in other offences
-S2, Computer Misuse Act 1990

Ensure the safety of any potential victim
INITIAL LINES OF INQUIRY
Mobile and Land line phone records
-Build picture of associates

Request internet history from his ISP
-Evidence of accessing grammar school network?

S22(2) (b) and (d) - Authorised by a Superintendent

PG and JH v UK-
No Breach of Article 8 Rights
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
RIPA, S28(3):

(b) 'for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime...'

(d) 'in the interests of public safety'


Authorised by Superintendent
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
-NECESSITY
-Significant chance of gathering valuable evidence

-Help prevent subject causing harm to others

-Less intrusive methods will prove less effective
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
-PROPORTIONALITY
- Surveillance will amount to a breach of the subject's Article 8 rights
Niemietz v Germany (1992)

-The seriousness of the offences outweighs the breach of privacy
R v Khan (1996)

-Efforts have been made to limit any intrusion on the subject
Uzun v Germany
PROPERTY INTERFERENCE
-Police Act 1997, S93(2)
Preventing/detecting serious crime
Proportionate


-Also necessary in order to protect any potential victim

-Seriousness of suspected offences high

-Strong chance of gathering pertinent intelligence/evidence
PASSIVE DATA COLLECTION
CCTV
-Provide evidence of an association

-Purchasing of items for commission of a crime?

R v Rosenberg
- no breach of Article 8
PASSIVE DATA COLLECTION
Local non-police CCTV
-Evidence of meetings with associates

CPIA 1996, S23 (1)
'...all reasonable lines of inquiry are pursued.'

R v Rosenberg
- No breach of Article 8 Rights
BYRNE
To gather intelligence and evidence of the suspect's involvement in various serious offences.....
OBTAINING COMMUNICATIONS DATA
Power of Entry
-S17, PACE

Arrest Strategy - Simultaneous
-S24, PACE

Search property
-S32, PACE

Seize all relevant evidence
-S19, PACE
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Conclusions
All investigative strategies designed to minimise human rights infringements

Article 8(2)
-To ensure safety of public
-To Protect rights and freedoms of others
- To prevent and detect crime

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Daly
SUSPECTS
STIBLINSKI
OPERATION BLANFORD
Main offences being investigated:


Criminal Law Act 1977, s1 (life)


Sexual Offences Act 2003, s5 (life)


Child Abduction Act 1984, s2 (7 years)
INITIAL LINES OF INQUIRY
Passport Application
- Her Majesty's Passport Office



Equifax
- Magistrate warrant required



Mobile phone details
- Open Source Intelligence

INITIAL LINES OF INQUIRY
Phone records can be legally accessible
- s22 RIPA
- authorised by Superintendent



Necessary
- s22(2) (b) and (d)



PG and JH v United Kingdom

DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
Covert CCTV
- situated on the housing block opposite the hostel



Outdoor day/night camera



Set sight line
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
Mobile covert CCTV
- unmarked private vehicle



Location: House number 2,
Anytown.



24/7
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
DIRECTED SURVEILLANCE
s28 RIPA
- Superintendent authorisation


Necessary, s28(3)(b) and (d)
- preventing or detecting crime
- in the interests of public safety


Proportionate, s28(2)(b)
-
R v Khan
(1996)


PROPERTY INTERFERENCE
Police Act 1997, s93


Necessary
- s93(2)(a)
- preventing or detecting serious crime


Proportionate
- s93(2)(b)
-
Uzun v Germany



Chief Constable authorisation
COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
In conjunction with
Operation Tibetan Sand


What is Proposed?

Introduce a CHIS to KUKIC and STIBLINSKI

Befriend the suspects and gather evidence/intelligence



INTRUSIVE SURVEILLANCE
Listening device installed inside Malcolm KUKIC's vehicle



Authorisation, s32 RIPA
- Chief Constable



Property interference authorisation required
- s93(2) Police Act 1997
- Chief Constable
In regards to Malcolm KUKIC's vehicle:


ANPR
- Establish VRN via DVLA prior


GPS tracker


In conjunction with
Operation Tibetan Sand
INTRUSIVE SURVEILLANCE
Necessary
- s32(3)(b) RIPA
- preventing or detecting serious crime



Proportionate
- s32(2)(b) RIPA
KUKIC
CHIS - LEGALITY
RIPA, S29

Necessity - S29(3) (b) and (d)

Proportionality - S29(2) (b)
-Protecting Article 2 rights of any potential victim
-Likely to obtain valuable evidence/intelligence about the suspects.

R v Allsopp and others
DIGITAL FORENSICS
Follow ACPO guidelines on Digital Evidence

Be aware of Encrypted files

Unintentional Interception of Communications
Thank you for Listening
All information contained in this presentation is confidential
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
RECORD

RETAIN

REVEAL
CPIA, S23(1) (B), (C), (D)
Full transcript