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From Beirut to Jerusalem Presentation
Transcript of From Beirut to Jerusalem Presentation
Friedman is the author of five best selling books.
In HS Friedman developed his passions: an interest in the Middle East and journalism Friedman became very interested while visiting Isreal in 1968 with his parents. Friedman attended the university of Minnesota and Brandeis, and he received a degree in Middle Eastern studies from Oxford. In 1984 he was transfered from Beirut to Jerusalem. The book from Beirut to Jerusalem was on the bestseller list for 12 months and it was published in more than 25 languages! CHAPTER SIXTEEN chapter fifteen Journalists outnumbered the Israeli soldiers. General Mitza had to argue his way through the journalists in order to even get through the battle. General Amram Mitza, commander of Israel's central front witnessed a confrontation between his soldiers and Palestinian teenagers. 700 journalists flock during the height of the 1987-88 Palestinian uprisings. Religious stories were most popular to cover for stories. News from modern Israel is more appealing to people in the West because it's familiar. The Palestinian uprising was often covered by journalists. Friedman says, "Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising was at times both brutal and stupid." Friedman says it is too much to compare it to the genocide at Babi Yar where 33,000 Jews were killed and the holocaust where 6 million Jews were killed. "The liberating quality of news from Israel has a particular appeal for Europeans who carry guilt over the Holocaust." European coverage of the Middle East: there was a tendancy to overromanticize Isreal. It was as if emphasizing their strenght after WW2 lightens the weight of the Holocaust. There was a tendancy in the German, French, & Italian media to focus on Isreal as being triumphant. Friedman feels that people (particularly Americans) get an "emotional high" from reading news about Isreal. In 1986 Spain establishes a diplomatic relationship with Israel. "Had the early Zionists taken up the British offer to establish their state in Uganda instead of in the holyland, news from Israel might have been a little less interesting." Friedman tells us how Israelis feel a deep need to be visible, loved, & admired. When Friedman left Jerusalem everyone had asked if he enjoyed his stay. When he replied "yes," they would always ask, "Really?"
There seemed to be an Israeli obsession with the American media and how they were perceived. The spotlight on Israel was so distorted that it was difficult for people to make any sense of the Arab Israeli conflict (because it was only seen through print media & television lenses). The treatment of the Palestinians was often "back page news-if reported at all." Meanwhile there was up to 3,000 Palestinian deaths. The spotlight on Israel has been a curse for Palestinians. Isreali leaders find themselves unable to handle the intense judgemental spotlight (also unable to address the ugly reality). They hide behind the "curtain of the Holocaust." "Under the Spotlight" Isreal and AMERICAN JEWS: WHO IS DREAMING ABOUT WHOM? Friedman remembers the day he "discovered Isreal" :June 6, 1967 He really became interested when he saw Isreal's dramatic victory of the 6 Day War. Isreal was able to make him a prideful American Jew. He returned to Isreal in 1984 as the correspondent for New York Times. After the 1967 War the perceptions of Isreal in the mind of many American Jews shifted. Isreal's victory of 1967 gave a new spirit to the Jewish state. Americans who immigrated to Isreal after 1967 complained Isreal was turning into what they were trying to escape (Isrealis followed the "American-style"). Friedman compares the fascination to a love affair. But the "mutual discovery procress" begins by the 1970s. By 1988 an estimated 300,000-400,000 Isrealis moved to the US. America gives $3 billion each year to Isreal. For American Jews discovering the "real" Isreal it happened around 1973 when the Egyptian troops overran the Isreali army. In 1977 a right wing party takes over power. Begin tells America they have no right to tell the Jews what to do. Many American Jews join a synagogue for the purpose of communal solidarity. Isrealis recognize their country no longer projects a heroic image in America. Isreal mainly identified with the Democratic group in America. America in the eyes of the Isrealis has gone from a "huge disneyland to an essential lifeline." -Friedman in this chapter discusses four Jewish schools of thought which define the people residing in Israel
-The largest is made up of secular nonobservant Israelis, Shamir would be considered one of these people. Secular Zionists came to Israel in part of a rebellion against their grandfathers and the Orthodox synagogue
-The second school of thought consist of religious Zionists, this group is made up of traditional or modern Orthodox Jews that fully support the secular Zionist state, yet impose there is no substitute for the synagogue
-The third school is made up of messianic Zionists, this group makes up about 5% of the Jewish population. For them the rebirth of a Jewish state is the first process that will instigate the coming of the Messiah
-The last school of thought of the Jewish population is that of the ultra-Orthodox or non-zionist Jews who make up 15% of the Jewish population. They believe that celebrating the formation of a Jewish state religiously is only recommended after the coming of the Messiah and the rule of Jewish law is total.
-On the morning of June 1, 1984 Friedman took a taxi from Beirut to Jerusalem, on the way he encountered multiple checkpoints and customs officials ( Israeli checkpoint, Lebanese checkpoint) -After crossing the Israel- Lebanon border he hired a taxi for the final leg of the drive to Jerusalem -Friedman noticed a sign warning people of high crosswinds and it made him think that Jerusalem was a “real country”, he quickly discovered this was a political innuendo -Israel and Lebanon are similar in that during the late 1960’s they both were answering the same question. What kind of state do we want to have? -The Lebanese and Israeli people have failed in resolving their issues revolving around that question and have ultimately left themselves politically incapable. -The reasons behind Israel’s paralysis was because the Zionist Jews wanted to create a Jewish State, a democratic state, and a state located in the historical homeland of the Jewish people, and it was this reason why the Israelites have political instability, the homeland of Zionist Jews conflicts with the homeland of the Lebanese. -Between 1948 and 1967 Zionism flourished with 2/3 of their objectives complete, they had a Jewish state and a democratic one but lacked all of the land of Israel. -Friedman arrived in Jerusalem in 1984 during a national election campaign, he observed campaign commercials that lacked addressing the fundamental issue of what to do with the west bank and Gaza strip. -Friedman interviewed the Labor Party opposition leader Shimon Peres and noticed when asked about the Gaza strip and the West Bank he chose his words carefully and never eluded to a “territorial compromise” -He later interviewed Likud Party Prime minister Yitzhak Shamir and asked similar questions only to be left wanting and understood that Shamir neglected the 1967 UN security council resolution 242, and continued by saying they must increase settlements in the west bank area without any pause. -Israeli politics became paralyzed over the question of what to do with the occupied territories after the Six Days War -The Labor party was overtaken by the Likud Begin regime in 1977 -Begin had a nationalistic ideology for the annexation of the West Bank but had to agree with the 1978 camp David accords which recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” -During the early 1980’s differences in views regarding the West bank between the Labor and the Likud were very insignificant -Begin signed peace treaty with Egypt in 1979 -Former Likud party members broke away and formed their own party Tehiya led by former Likudniks Geula Cohen and Yuval Neeman. (true annexationists) -Feb 10, 1983 a man named Emil Grunzweig who was a peace now activist was killed by a grenade thrown by a fanatical Begin supporter during a demonstration against the Lebanon war in Jerusalem -Grunzweig’s murder was thought by many as a major turning point in Israeli politics, it brought both sides together and frightened many into backing away from their differing viewpoints -During late 1980’s Israeli leaders and the nation they led became unmotivated and discouraged believing their issues were insurmountable and impossible to accomplish -Victory in 1967 for Israel temporarily lightened the load of issues revolving around their nation, but following, the 1973 war when Egypt and Syria attacked simultaneously on Yom Kippur left the state of Israel in its current conflict and form Setting the Stage Melting Pot In The Middle East? The Egged Bus System Made In Isreal Submission Why Roll Over? Rebirth Of The Palestinian Movement Guntanamo In Isreal The First Crack The End Result Arafat's Back "Geologic" Activity The Earthquake We Are The Palestinians Terrorists No More But Still Not A Nation Chapter Seventeen "From Beirut to Jerusalem to Washington" •Friedman was asked to move to Washington in late 1987 to become the Times diplomatic correspondent. •The longer he stayed in the Middle East, the less magnificent it became. •On the way to lunch with his family, a teenage Palestinian boy threw a stone at their windshield because he had seen the Israeli license plates on the car. •The Middle East was quickly introduced to modernization leading to a less tribal world. The new world blurred identities, so people reverted back to the past. •After Friedman returned to the U.S., he was surprised to discover how many people believed that in the Middle East "...the past had buried the future, and possibly always will." •Friedman believes that "Washington can still bring Arabs and Israelis the best of America's outlook, without being devoured by the feuds and passions that consume them." • The solution is that American must learn to play several roles simultaneously; "Think like an obstetrician, behave like a friend, bargain like a grocer, and fight like a real son-of-a-bitch." •America must observe what the parties say to each other and not what is said to us. •"The most important thing an American friend can offer Arabs and Israelis is American optimism." -Yaron Ezrahi •"The only way you can hope to live apart and at peace is by first coming together to produce a settlement that guarantees Israelis their security and Palestinians their right to self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nothing short of that will ever bring peace." •Never take no for an answer and everything must have a price tag on it, otherwise you can't do business. •If necessary, one must be ready to engage in operations that directly threaten either the life or the domestic stability of the leaders of those countries which threaten America's interests. Chapter Eighteen "Talking with My Grocer" •Friedman wanted the readers to focus on his journey instead of any proposals he may have. •Believes Israelis will only respond to overwhelming pain or pleasure and the Palestinians can produce neither. •Approach is based on several assumptions; Israel holds all of the cards; the Israelis must convince themselves that they are better off allowing such a state to come into being; the decision to withdraw from territory cannot be based on a narrow majority. •Sasson and the silent majority are the key to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. •The Israeli public is divided into three sections; 5% (far left) are ready to allow a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, 20% (far right) will never be prepared, 75% (middle) believe that they are locked in an all-or-nothing communal struggle with the Palestinians. •Friedman believes that the deadlock can be broken with "the right kind of Israeli leader and the right kind of plan." •The needs of the silent majority must be met in order to establish peace. •Two suggestions: Tribal solution to a communal war and a diplomatic solution to a communal war. •The tribal solution is south Lebanon; unilateral withdrawal from settlement that are not essential for security without anyone's consent. •First obstacle: The traditional obsession of both Arabs and Israelis with their "legitimate rights," as opposed to their legitimate interests. •Second obstacle: The deep-rooted Israeli obsession with stated Arab intentions, as opposed to actual Arab capabilities. •Third obstacle: The deep mistrust Israelis had in any kind of land-for-peace agreement with a country that had been seeking their destruction for forty years. •These obstacles exist between the Israelis and Palestinians except they are ten times as high. •The diplomatic solution is "...we should declare out readiness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip." •Three conditions: Palestinian representatives would have to agree to recognize the Israelis' right to exist as a Jewish state; the Palestinian representatives would have to agree that their state would be permanently demilitarized; and the Palestinians must agree that the implementation of this plan would occur in stages over a period of five years. Chapter Nineteen "Buying A Ticket" •Israelis and Palestinians had always reminded him of Goldberg-beseeching God to deliver them, not neither really ready to make the fundamental compromises or sacrifices that were required for a peace settlement. •September 13, 1993-Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands, agreeing to make real sacrifices and compromises for peace. •Friedman was surprised because he never believed "Rabin would recognize that Israel had the power to take its future into its own hands and that Arafat would acknowledge the weakness of the Palestinians and negotiating with Israel on a pragmatic, take-whatever-you-can-get-basis, instead of holding out for everything from the start." •Friedman wondered how he could have been so blind to the fact that the Israelis and Palestinians were preparing to do what they needed to do. •"A combination of global changes that ranged from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the fallout from the Gulf War to the election of Bill Clinton as President to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to the invention of the Lexus automobile in Japan." •Collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Arafat of guns and votes.
•No military backing for the PLO because the Kremlin was more interested in cultivating a relationship with the West and the U.S. in particular. •The General Assembly voted in November 1975 in favor of a resolution declaring that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.
•December 16, 1991-Voted in favor of repealing the resolution
•The Gulf Arabs bankrolled Arafat and the PLO for years for protection money against radical Palestinian terrorism. •Turned off money tap to the PLO, depriving it of hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid and remittances from Palestinians. •PLO was both a military organization and a social welfare organization. •Arafat lost a lot of his "walkin' around money" that was used to maintain his political standing and to buy the loyalty of the boys on the street. •In contrast, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) bank balance increased, resulting in an increase of influence on the street. •First sign of Arafat's weakness was his decision to accept the Bush Administration's terms for the Madrid peace conference. •Madrid put Israel into a direct dialogue with its Arab neighbors.
•Madrid got the Arabs and Israelis over the hurdle of never dealing directly with each other. •America becomes more of a cheerleader and coach-"the one who stands on the sidelines and coaxes, cajoles, and occasionally directs the players on the field to do only what they can do." •Madrid opened a bridge to contacts between Israel and the non-front-line Arab states. •"Multilateral talks' aim was to demonstrate to Israelis that peace with their immediate neighbors would unlock peace with the wider Arab world and have all sorts of additional economic and security benefits for the Jewish state." •Could no longer use the excuse that there was nobody on the other side to talk to. •Bill Clinton becoming President became the last major political force to weigh Arafat down. •With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel was flooded with Jews, leading to the loaning of money from the U.S. so that there would be enough housing and education •“Kitchen wars” •Rabin sealed off the Israeli pre-1967 borders for defense.
•In effect saying that the Israelis are safer without those territories than they were with them.
•May 24, 1992-Palestinian Fuad abu al-Amrin stabbed a fifteen-year-old Israeli girl. •Iraqi Scud missile attacks 1991-There was no longer a distinction between the front lines and daily life. •The Hamas made Arafat and the PLO look reasonable. July 6, 1989-Palestinian fundamentalist veers an Israeli Egged Bus into a ravine. •“The global phenomenon of countries consolidating economically into larger and larger blocs while fragmenting politically into smaller and smaller entities.” The Lexus and the olive tree. •Friedman is torn between pessimism and optimism. •The most important reason for optimism is that the conflict has transformed from something that was about rights to a conflict that is concerned about interests.
•Arafat agreed to acknowledge his weakness concerning Israel and to negotiate on the basis of his real power, not some imagined power.
•Silence is both positive and negative-there are those who welcome the peace with a silent acceptance and those who can’t stand the silence and are driven to do something drastic.
•The degree of integration between the Palestinians and Israelis is a cause for worry because they dream of separation, not coexistence. The sheer amount of Jews in the West Bank is preventing the separation.
•Syria-Friedman isn’t sure if they are ready to fully embrace the Jewish state.
•Arafat and his style of leadership-divide and conquer.
•The bottom line: “There are going to be good days and there are going to be bad days, and all one can hope for is that the good days will vastly outnumber the bad.”