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Possible Future Worlds

This is an online course for Carnegie Council Ethics Fellows for the Future on www.globalethicsnetwork.org. It is based on the e-book, Of All Possible Future Worlds: Global Trends, Values, and Ethics, available at www.possiblefutureworlds.com.
by

Thong Nguyen

on 16 July 2014

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Transcript of Possible Future Worlds

in anarchy against other states.
Eventually, these individuals and groups form states
Hierarchical
Polycentric

Of All
Possible Future

Worlds

GLOBAL TRENDS, VALUES, AND ETHICS
What will our world be like
in the next fifteen to twenty years?

individual
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “What Is Distinct About Our Era?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014, video available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/thought-leaders/questions/distinct.









Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of
People, Nations and Business (New York: Random House, 2013). See a video presentation of the book, “Google’s Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen: The New Digital Age,” at Oxford University, June 14, 2013.









Peter Theil and Blake Masters, Zero to One: Notes on Startups or How to Build the Future (Crown Business, 2014) or Masters’s lecture notes on Thiel’s spring 2012 Stanford course, “CS183: Startup” at www.blakemasters.com/peter-thiels-cs183- startup. Or Peter Thiel, “You Are Not a Lottery Ticket,” South by Southwest Interactive 2013
conference, October 14, 2013.
individual
Increasingly
interdependent
and
interconnected
s
$
Culture
Communication
Commerce
Travel
Shared
Ideas
$
Culture
Communication
Commerce
Travel
Shared
Ideas
$
Commerce
Travel
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
and witness global cultural
convergence
A more
crowded
planet
of 8 billion people
states
conflict
among
A
complex
world of more than
cooperation
Well, there are many
possible
worlds.

How would you decide which one is the best?
One possible world . . .
Another possible world . . .
state
Values
vary
in each world.

Worlds may be
freer
some could be less

just
others, more
peaceful
and others might be more
diverse
We need a
theory

to make sense of this variance.
and a
logic
National Intelligence Council (NIC), “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,”
Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 2012.
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), “Global Trends 2030:
Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World,” Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, April 2012.
Alexander A. Dynkin, “Strategic Global Outlook 2030,” Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2011.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 2030,” 2009.
Individuals, communities, businesses, academics and policymakers have convened with think tanks, states, and multilateral organizations to produce trends reports for the year 2030.
We'll start by looking at . . .
Let's look at the US predictions.
Next, we'll look at the EU's projections.
Let's see what a leading think tank in Russia foresees.
Finally, let's see what
NATO anticipates
Since the trends predicted by each organization are different both in kind and degree, they each predict different future worlds.
In this pragmatic spirit, let's return to a particular individual.
you
"How would I measure a good future?"
Let's look at four in particular
might emphasize trends related to the . . .
Let's look at a few.
might focus on societal trends rather than the . . .
or societies
One world might have more . . .
Another world could have more . . .
Or maybe another could be . . .
Now let's return to our question.
You might look toward . . .
Ask rself
look at trends on actors larger than
individuals
Other worlds might
This world could be made of one
global unitary
or many . . .
demanding middle class comforts, competing over resources, and adapting to climate change, and migrating to cities

The US focused on four megatrends.
They also considered several game-changers.
Focusing on three themes, the EU first told a narrative of individual empowerment.
And they completed their narrative with a polycentric world.
The EU continued
its narrative with qualified human development.
A think tank in Russia evaluated four themes, first focusing on international security.
They then looked at the global economy.
The final two themes the Russian policymakers looked at were sociology and ideology.
NATO looked at the future systematically, first identifying structural drivers.
They then focused on deterministic drivers.
Finally, NATO questioned how systems might be compromised by sources of threat.
<
=
Friends
and Family
Create
Think
Time
Health
Consume
Gender inequalities will lessen
as we become more equal
more educated
and in general more capable
How has technology led to these new liberties?
The internet has allowed us to quickly and easily access information and create new neural connections . . .
even with strangers from distant places . . .
and to connect with
others . . .
with different perspectives . . .
Connectivity.
will lead to new liberties . . .
but with similar access to technology
and opportunities to enjoy more liberties.
The rise of the
technologically
empowered
The biggest difference is that
5 billion people
will be connected for the first time.
For many of you, this may be old news.
This never-before-seen level of complexity will turn our traditional relationships upside down . . .
"No duh. What you're talking about is globalization, which has been happening for centuries. This type of complexity, while more intricate, is only a difference in number, not kind."
"What do you think? How will the the connectivity of billions of people change the course of the future?"
For more detail, read or watch the following resources
What do you
?
Are you skeptical of a technologically driven future or excited by one?
"What do you mean, 'No duh'?! We are living in singular moment—a golden age of technology—not simply a continuation of a centuries-long trend. Our future will be fundamentally different."
"No duh."
"Yeah, totally. Look at some of the most influential individuals today who have challenged the power of governments and industries."
Let's start
with the original disrupter.
Bill Gates
The Harvard dropout who programmed software for personal computers
that would . . .
lead to an technology empire, making him the . . .
richest man in the world
,
who would then . . .
give almost all of it away
perhaps contributing to the human development of more people than other individual or most states.
"But, you know, Bill, there might be more disruptive ways that an individual can change the world."
"An individual shouldn't just think about software . . . "
"or just about hardware . . ."
"You need to think about design—how everything fits together. You need to . . . "
"Well, Woz, that's not quite it either."
"Yes!—All the best people in life seem to like Linux."
Individuals that think about technology this way can build computers people love.
They can change advertising . . .
change how people watch movies . .
change how people listen to music . . .
and change how people communicate with one another . . .
Although neither of these two individuals accomplished these feats on their own, each played a significant role in changing the world with technology—empowering themselves and others.
Two other individuals have also empowered themselves and others with a little bit of code.
Helping us find what we are looking for . . .
Another individual also changed how business is done in other ways. . .
creating new technologies and challenging preconceived notions of how business can be done . . .
changing the way we shop
and how we read.
But an individual doesn't have to be a billionaire to change what people read.
Anyone can.
But, in life, it's not only what you know . . .
it's also about who you know.
An individual can connect over a billion people.
A connected individual can openly expose government secrets—legally or not.
Or anyone could compromise establishments anonymously
Traditional players may adapt technology for their purposes and take controversial measures to counter threats new and old.
But an individual
can also open
a global debate on privacy, surveillance, liberties . . .
to both controversy and celebrity.
But one member of a "mafia" that changed how money moves is taking measures to safeguard liberties in new ways.
An investor who saw the potential of networks before anyone else . . .
Another "mafia" member is extending new frontiers of liberty
Building re-fuelable rockets that could propel us to Mars in the next two decades
Harnessing the power of the sun for more sustainable energy sources
And challenging old industries to compete to build electric cars
Some other individuals are also developing new ways to drive
Automatically
They are also changing the way we see . . .
now . . .
and in the future
And by launching balloons into the air to expand internet access to billions, they are building on the work of . . .
The one man who invented the Internet
ensuring that it
Like this person
who started an open-source movement
to build self-replicating 3D printers
An individual could design and print houses
An individual can design and print musical instruments
An individual can design and print rocket parts
And printing could help one individual develop one technology of the future we all were promised.
Robots
Some may make more socialable ones
Other individuals might build robots that are amazing and . . .
Creepy
Fast
Resilient
can fly and coordinate
In the future, technology will continue a long trend of empowering individuals to leap over obstacles.
aspires to use big data to challenge the dichotomy of security versus liberty.
will form
societies
will share
On the other hand, the world could be more conflicted for many reasons
Today, over half the world's
7 billion people live in cities.
The births of an additional 1 billion people, continuing economic growth, and migration trends, will lead to approximately 60% of the world's population will live in cities.
Cities from emerging countries will lead in the growth of global demand
Cities from all regions will grow.
Take a look at the top 75 cities of the future.
Notice the direct positive relationship between economic growth and urbanization
(You can zoom in and click and drag)
Did you notice how many cities you've probably never heard from one are in one particular country?
But Asia will not be the only

region to see growth.
An
Urban
World
But Asia will not be the only region to see cities proliferate
McKinsey and Company, “Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class,” McKinsey Global Institute, June 2012.
View an interactive map, McKinsey and Company, “Global Cities of the Future,” available at www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/global_cities_of_the_future_an_interactive_map.


Benjamin Barber,
If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities
(Yale University Press, 2013).
For more on cities, read or visit:
They may be able to better cope with water, resource, and energy scarcities with responsive planning, technology, and infrastructure.
In the future, mayors may play a more influential role in people's daily lives international, national, or state leaders
Let's take a look at how the globe has been changing
Resources
Climate Change
Cities
How might the global become local?
And as cities grow, so will economies
An anarchic order without strong linkages or effective international institutions may preclude sovereign states from ever connecting with one another in the way people can.
More people from Asia, for example, will have middle class aspirations, in what they buy . . .
and, perhaps, also in what they will value.
Global market competition for resources
However, nor is this a story of absolute decline.
The global story is not only about the relative decline of the West and the rise of the East, but it is also the emergence of the global South . . .
While the major story of the next century is the rise of Asia, particularly China and India . . .
The ways of the world may not change. But the actors will.
vs
vs
vs
vs
These changing political dynamics may lead to interstate conflict . . .
Uncertainty about the intentions of other states
State leaders serving their citizens before foreigners
Shifting political and economic asymmetries
for a number of reasons
, &
individuals
,
societies
vs
vs
Transnational civil societies, terrorists, and criminals
Empowered individuals
What other actors do you think might challenge state interests?
They might be . . .
We are living in the most peaceful time in history.
However, there is one reason to believe that the future world may be less conflict-ridden and less Hobbesian.
Evidence.
Archeological, ethnographic, and historical trends shows that violent death from warfare is on the decline since the beginning of humanity.
And trends show that there is something about states that has contributed to this centuries-long decline.
Interstate conflict is approaching
0
.
Soft power may matter more than material power.
Why do you think rising states might cooperate?
Think about the connections.
The post-World War II architects created a mutually beneficial order that facilitated . . .
The economic rise of countries like
China
Brazil
India
Turkey
Russia
South
Africa
US
EU
So there are material incentives for emerging countries to continue working within the liberal order and with the West
Can you think of other reasons why or how
Some
countries
exist within regions
that are more networked
than
others
So far we have only looked at states that are in a network of emerging or established wealth and relative peace.
What will life be like for


outside of those
networks?
Also, the historical decline of violence may extend to these outer-network regions too, after decades of rising intrastate conflicts are beginning to decline.
The news may be marginally positive.
Economies in least developed regions such as Africa and the Middle East have seen modest economic growth.
However, we should not be overly optimistic.
Some countries will effectively have no future better than today.
What do you think might cause this?
What demographic is the most violent cohort in history?
Young, unemployed men.
Let's explore a few reasons.
While the average demographic age structure of the world will continue a trend of maturing . . .
the rest of the world will get older, and the most violent demographic will decline . . .
except in certain regions.
Another cause may be resource competition, particularly over water in these same regions.
Can you think of other ways the world might be more complex in the future?
For more on complexity, cooperation, and conflict read:
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
The Future of Power
(New York: Public Affairs, 2011). A video presentation of the book held at Carnegie Council on February 10, 2011 is available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110210/index.html.

G. John Ikenberry,
Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). A video presentation of the book held at Carnegie Council on October 12, 2011 is available at www.ustream.tv/recorded/17837299.

Steven Pinker,
The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(New York: Viking, 2011).
Each organization focused on different trends and predicted different future worlds.
We'll describe each in detail later. But first, let's ask a question.
"My country's are the best!"
"The one that's most realistic."
"The one with no poverty."
"Well, it depends on what you want to measure."
Why these values?
"In 1948, the Declaration was adopted with 48 countries in favor without dissent. They are values to which all peoples agreed."
"
The General Assembly
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations
, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction."
"So what? These are just words. Laws are violated all the time. What makes this special?"
These four values are all necessary conditions for human dignity.
Read the first sentence of the Preamble of
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
.
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family
is the foundation of
freedom
,
justice
and
peace
in the world . . ."
The Preamble concludes that these values are the measures of future progress.
"Well, technically, there were abstentions from a number of countries. So not everyone agreed to them."
"Well, at the very least, all countries agreed not to disagree with it, knowing that dissent could have precluded the document from becoming law."
"Yeah, I guess. It's pretty hard to get all peoples to agree on one thing. So maybe it's good enough that these values aren't terrible."
"Even if you might not want them for others, you would certainly want them for yourself."
"These values are enshrined in binding international law. They must be the right metrics!"
Ask rself
"Are there better metrics to compare worlds?"
"What values are not considered but should have been? "
you
The Priority of Definition
Let's look at our values
a bit more in depth.
First, take a minute to define each of these values yourself.
We all have an intuitive idea of their meanings.
You might be surprised by how essentially contestable these concepts can be.
But do you think your definition would be the same as the person next to you?
What is
What is
What is
What is
?
?
?
?
One might look at how philosophers and theorists have defined these ideas.
"My fists are justice."
Liberty
?
Liberty
Justice
Peace
Pluralism
But for now let's assume to work with these simple definitions even if they are imperfect
Liberty
Justice
Peace
Pluralism
Distributive justice refers to what we should owe to other people.
Liberty refers to an individual’s positive and negative freedoms to pursue his or her desires without harming themselves or others and without external intrusion.
Peace is simply the absence of war.
Pluralism refers to cultural diversity and group identity.
,
such as the . . .
So far we've just looked at few.
But this is just the beginning.

Fusion
Nonstate
World

Gini
Out-of-the
Bottle

Interconnected
Polycentric

Darkside of
Exclusivity

Clash of
Modernities

New
Powers

Deceptive
Stability

Why would some worlds enjoy more or less of our four values?
What world order do you think would best promote our values?
Michael Walzer
"Governing the Globe: What is the Best We Can Do?"
"Worlds that triumph the individual."
"Worlds that eliminate poverty."
"Worlds with states at the center."
"Worlds that are the most democratic."
"Worlds where civil societies lead."
"Worlds with the best welfare systems."
"Imagine the possible political arrangements of international society as if they were laid out along a continuum marked off according to the degree of centralization. Obviously, there are alternative markings; the recognition and enforcement of human rights could also be measured along a continuum, as could democratization, welfare provision, pluralism, and so on. But focusing on centralization is the quickest way to reach the key political and moral questions, above all the classical question:
what is the best or the best possible regime?"
"Well, it all depends on the centralization of
global political order."
Think about what major writers, theorists, and philosophers have written.
List as many different global political orders you can think of.
Get a pencil and piece of paper.
It's hard, isn't it?
Well, here's a suggestion.
Here are some works that have described some possible orders.
Can you summarize each by filling in the blank with a few words?
"Author X argues for a ________ global political order."
Finally, arrange these orders on a spectrum, as Walzer suggested, from the least to the most centralized degree of unity.
Low
High
Degree of Unity
International
Anarchy
Weak States
and
Institutions
International
Civil Society
Network
Decentered
Federation
of
Nation-States
Global
Hegemonic
Empire
Unified
Global
State
Degree of Unity
Can you think of other works?
Okay. Let's compare your answers with Walzer's.
Let's look at each archetype and how our values fare.
Stalled
Engines

International Anarchy
Radically decentralized
A greater sovereign or law does not bind sovereign states
No organizations or long-lasting alliances around transnational issues
Cooperation happens only if there are coincident interests between states
Sovereignty is the best at protecting individual liberty and at preserving distinct historical cultures–national, ethnic, and religious
A situation of war or specter thereof
There are no international mechanisms to guard against inequality.
Weak States and Institutions
This is the least ideal world in the sense that it is the most similar to the actual world that we live in today.
There is some modification of state sovereignty, and there are more global organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and NATO, but they are still weak in the sense that they draw their powers from states.
Pluralism faces challenges here since weak states cannot protect their peoples.
There are weak protections for individual rights, and inequality has the potential to be high.
The frequency of conflict is less in this arrangement due to better organization and cooperation, but the threat of war remains.
International Civil Society Network
Role of states is limited; international associations proliferate across borders
International civil society associations tend to react to crises, rather than prevent them, lacking ability to plan, anticipate, and prevent
Understanding among peoples mitigates much conflict
Pluralism beyond borders thrives
Civil networks cannot always broker peace in countries torn by civil war.
Individuals are freer to communicate, associate, and bond with foreigners
Some actors’ liberties will be more pronounced than others, e.g., multinational corporations
Decentered
Federation of Nation-States
Multiple power sources and international organizations, but order is oligarchic, and the greatest powers act as the central mediators
States must chose to give up sovereignty in return for a contract with a constitutional division of power
Oligarchy offers more material equality
Since states agree to an order, they will be less likely to go to war
Constitution also ensures signatory states some security over their cultures
Order is likely forced rather than chosen
Liberty suffers greatly.
Global Hegemonic Empire
One dominant power rules over all
Autonomy for other states would be granted, rather than achieved
Some room for cultural independence, but only according to the hegemon
Empire: one of the most stable regimes
Hegemon only guarantees peace for some cultural groups, who would be subjects rather than citizens
Individuals and groups within states would receive no guarantees
No necessary aim at distributive justice, and empire would display the most extreme form of inequality.
United Global State
Sovereign states do not exist
Governance: completely centralized
All people are equal citizens
Maximization of absolute peace and egalitarian distributive justice
But no cultural divergence and individual differences are ignored
Notions of individual liberty and cultural diversity will be challenged, since no individuals as we understand them today will exist because convergence eliminates all personal and cultural differences.
Alternative centers of power such as international civil society, international organizations, and regional unions
International organizations are strengthened on top of the institutional structures that exist today.
Regional organizations play a large role
Presents the least risk of tyranny from other individuals, states, and organizations.
Greatest political possibility in contrast to the guaranteed political success of a unified global state (defined later) or the uncertainty of international anarchy
Liberty will be variegated: individuals in different settings will have different protections and entitlements
Questionable prospects of peace for the worst off
Difficult to determine who is responsible to ensure basic human rights for those people in power centers indifferent to liberty, justice, peace, and pluralism
Disadvantages: no perpetual peace and no single identity.
International
Anarchy
Weak States
and
Institutions
International
Civil Society
Network
Decentered
Federation
of
Nation-States
Global
Hegemonic
Empire
Unified
Global
State
Can you categorize them under each archetype?
Whew, that was a lot to absorb!
Let's see how well you understand the archetypes.
Remember these writings?
Here's one way they might fall.
Were your pairings the same or different?
For more on global orders, read or watch:
International Anarchy
Kenneth Waltz,
Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(Basic Books, 1974).

Weak States and Institutions
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003).
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,"
World Politics
30, No. 2 (1978): 167-214.
Stewart Patrick, “Global Governance Monitor,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at www.cfr.org/global-governance/global-governance-monitor/p18985#!/.
Bruce Jones et. al., “The State of the International Order,” Policy Paper No. 33, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, February 2014, available at www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2014/02/state-of-the-international-order.

International Civil Society Network
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
Foreign Affairs
72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49, available at http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/h-607-pdfs/S.Huntington-Clash.pdf.
Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A New World Order
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005) and “America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century,”
Foreign Affairs
88, No. 1 (January/February 2009): 94–113. See a video presentation on similar themes “Lego World” at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kv0z7tIsO8U.
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu,
Who Controls the Internet: Illusions of a Borderless World
(New York: Oxford University Press 2006).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Humanitarianism in the Network Age
, OCHA Policy and Studies Series (New York: UN, 2013), available at www.unocha.org/hina.
Others?
Global Orders
Decentered World
Ian Bremmer,
Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World
(New York: Portfolio, 2012). A video presentation of the book held at Carnegie Council on June 5, 2012 is available at www.ustream.tv/recorded/23098456. See also, www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/thought-leaders/leaders/bremmer- ian/index.html.
Charles Kupchan,
No One’s World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). A video presentation of the book held at Carnegie Council on April 4, 2012 is available at   www.ustream.tv/recorded/21596646.
Fareed Zakaria,
The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest
(New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
Andrew Hurrell, “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society,”
International Affairs
83, No. 1 (January 2007): 127–146, available at www.mwmt.co.uk/documents/MWML2006_Hurrell.pdf.

Global Hegemonic Empire
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, No. 1 (1990/1991): 23–33, available at www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Krauthammer.pdf.
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Unified Global State
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16, (Summer 1989): 3–18.
Global Governance and Values
Michael Walzer, “Governing the Globe: What is the Best We Can Do?,”
Dissent
(Fall 2000).
Wow. That was
a lot of theory
.
You understand how Walzer's worlds show why values may vary.
Congrats on making it this far.
You deserve some stickers!
You can identify values that can be used as standards for the future.
Great job!
Way to go!
International
Anarchy
Weak States
and
Institutions
International
Civil Society
Network
Decentered
Federation
of
Nation-States
Global
Hegemonic
Empire
Unified
Global
State
Hey, do you want to earn another sticker?
Let's return to Earth and to the predicted worlds.
Well grounded!
some now.
This world will be more stable and prosperous since it will be more socially cohesive and cooperative.
At the national, regional, and global levels, the rich will get richer, and the poor will get poorer.
Innovations will alleviate stresses on the food, water, and energy nexus.
The EU will use today’s eurozone crisis as a catalyst for political restructuring.
Technological innovation will skyrocket as all growth in all economies—developing, emerging, and OECD—accelerates.
Trust among civilizations will increase. Multilateral institutions will become more inclusive.
China will undergo political reform.
Both countries will coordinate to avoid conflict in the South China Sea, and they will look for other opportunities to cooperate.
This forward-thinking inclination sets a norm of cooperation over competition that other countries will internalize.
US and China realizing a shared interest in a growing global economy without conflict.
US
China
Nuclear fusion
is a reaction in which two or more atomic nuclei . . .
2030 World
and join to form a new type of atomic nucleus.
collide at a very high speed . . .
because some of the matter is converted to energy.
During this process, matter is not conserved . . .
E = Δmc
2
A global black swan
shock such as a pandemic will expose the weakness of multilateral governance as rich countries shield their own citizens from the poor countries where diseases might originate.
Fundamental economic and political reforms in China and India will not be made.
The US and EU no longer lead.
Globalization slows.
Emerging economies will continue to grow, but beneath their potential.
Technological innovation will consequently slow, although connectivity will continue
to grow.
The European Union will unravel as countries leave the eurozone.
The risk of interstate conflict increases in Asia and the Middle East.
An engine
This can happen due to 3 systematic failures.
stalls because it is not igniting gas in the cylinders.
A Fuel System Failure
An
Electrical System Failure
A Mechanical System Failure
Global Exhaustion
These failures could lead to . . .
Businesses
Megacities
Nongovernmental Organizations
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
The initiative on global challenges will be taken by . . .
With new technologies, individuals and small groups will no longer need governments to provide their services.
Social media, mobile communications, and big data will increasingly connect and inform individuals.
Governments will play the role of facilitators rather than directors.
International governance institutions will have to accommodate nonstate actors at the same table as states.
Dangers may also persist. Terrorists and criminal networks will be able to wield lethal and disruptive technologies and slip through the cracks of a patchwork of competing security authorities.
Private capital and philanthropy will outstrip official development assistance.
The global values of elites and the middle-class will have converged on poverty, the environment, anti-corruption, rule of law, and peace.
Line of equality
Cumulative share of people from lowest to highest incomes
Cumulative share of income earned
0%
100%
100%
Inequality within and between countries characterizes this world.
Chinese political institutions will become unstable while its coastal cities thrive and middle-class dreams will be snuffed out by corruption and governance gaps.

These political and economic inequalities will also increase the risk of intra- and interstate conflict.
With America disengaged and Europe looking after itself, African countries at most risk of state failure will suffer from sectarian tribal and ethnic conflicts without the sympathy of international aid and peacekeeping forces.
Uncompetitive Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal will be thrown out of the eurozone.
The US’s hydraulic fracturing investments and technological innovations will maintain its status the preeminent power.
Although global GDP growth will be greater than in the Stalled Engines world, the least well off in this world are worse off than in any other alternative.
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
Up and atom!
Alright, we're done with this world.
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
Next, we'll visit a world less well off.
Alright, we're done with this world.
What were the most prominent trends in each world?
International
Anarchy
Weak States
and
Institutions
International
Civil Society
Network
Decentered
Federation
of
Nation-States
Global
Hegemonic
Empire
Unified
Global
State
How do you think our values will fare in each world?
How would you categorize each world?
Well, that's the last of the US worlds.
But there's no time! Wipe the grease off your hands, and activate your inter-dimensional devices.
On to the next world!
Alright, we're done with this world.
Ok, so you can now split atoms, fix an engine, make new friends, and see the dangers of inequality.
Maybe you're now considering a career in auto repair.
Take off that lab coat. There are many more worlds to explore—on to the next!
Maybe we can visit our new friends another day. But there are other important considerations.
But what does it all mean?
Interdimensional travel can be disorienting, especially for first-time voyagers . . .
Let's think about these worlds more systematically.
If you're feeling a bit lost, don't worry.
Take some time to think about the following questions.
Congrats! You have just systematically evaluated these worlds.
We'll go back the theories we discussed earlier to help us get our bearings.
Whom did they focus on?
Societies?
Individuals?
States?
What did they focus on?
How comprehensive were the trends in each world?
Would you have predicted the same worlds?
Was there more or less governance than today?
What was the role of international institutions?
Do individuals need states?
Was there one center or more in each world?
Were groups of states colluding?
Was one state directing all others?
Was there only one government?
Here is one way to categorize the worlds.
Fill in the blank with one of the worlds.
_________
had the least
_________
had the most
_________
had the most
_________
had the least
It is conceivable that there are other worlds.
Hopefully, they make more sense now. This is a big deal.
But do you sincerely think these are the only worlds that could happen?
This type of analysis will help you plan for the future.
Why would the US, or any actor really, focus on some worlds and not others?
A limited option set could preclude planning for a world that could happen.
The chief importance of such biases is that they compromise planners’ abilities to steward policies that will safeguard our values.
One reason could be . . .
Drawing upon Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” Tetlock frames two ways that forecasters can envision the world.
Foxes know many small things.
False positives
—committed more by hedgehogs—erroneously predict worlds that will not happen, e.g., the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
The great challenge for policy planners is how to properly conceptualize the way that we can predict—or whether we can predict—the future world.
Hedgehogs know one big thing.
In a twenty-year study, Tetlock tested whether both hedgehog-like and fox-like experts from a number of fields were able to accurately forecast.
Their explanations about the world follow clock-like regular patterns and are parsimonious: simple, highly explanatory, and deterministic.
Their explanations are more cloud-like and complex and less ambitious and predictable.
They have one grand theory about the world, which extends to all matters.
They are skeptical about grand theories and are more willing to change their thinking based on circumstances and actual events.
Would you simply rely on expert judgment?
Forecasters can make two types of mistakes:
False negatives
—committed more by foxes—fail to predict worlds that will happen, e.g., the start of the two world wars or the game-changing effects of the invention of nuclear weapons and the Internet.
While foxes performed better than hedgehogs, he found that on the whole, their predictions performed
only slightly better than chance
, but less well than computer algorithms. In short, experts are not very good at predicting the future.
How would you go about forecasting?
Meet Philip Tetlock. He is not an expert.
The goal of forecasting should be to better balance these two ways of thinking, finding the optimal forecasting frontier where the tradeoff between false positives and negatives can be no better, i.e., the denial of more false positives will not lead to more false negatives and the denial of more false negatives will not lead to more false positives.
In providing us with a spectrum of possible worlds rather than a dichotomy or single world, Walzer’s conceptualizations helps us understand the range of true and false positive and negative worlds.
Since this spectrum is neither nebulous nor unyieldingly deterministic, we can begin to arrive at this optimum frontier where the logics of the cloud and the clock converge, holding that the future is neither radically unpredictable nor completely predictable.
Black swans are difficult to predict, low probability events that may have cataclysmic effects on the fundamental dynamics of world history.
Black Swans
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a scholar in randomness and unpredictability, has popularized the notion of false negatives and their role in history under a different name (and animal).
Is the future deterministic or indeterministic?
Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about 2030?
If expert predictions more matters of
luck
than clairvoyance, a number of questions might be raised.
It appears difficult to say whether the future is either deterministic or indeterministic or whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic.
Although we may retrospectively, explain why these events happened, why couldn't past experts?
Imagine if we could better mitigate these unforeseen events.
So we might pursue a hedging strategy.
You may not have realized it, but much of our discussion on theory has built up to this need.
Selection Bias
This is the phenomenon of excluding all meaningful options from due consideration.
Limited knowledge that steers policymakers into predicting certain trajectories at a given time or making inferences about the future based on isolated incidences.
Let's focus on three kinds of biases:
traditional, methodological, and temporal.
Idiosyncratic preferences of culture, ideology, or individual inclinations may lead a researcher or organization to favor one input over another.
Selective surveying, i.e., some important groups may have been excluded from a study or some groups’ opinions may be weighted more than others.
Traditional Bias
Methodological Bias
Temporal Bias
Why do you think selection bias happens?
"You mean
stupidity
, right?"
"Limited time."
"Limited budgets."
"Incomplete information."
"Absentmindedness."
"Well, I was trying to be nice."
"Arrogance."
We'll use today as our starting point.
"Will I be the same in each world?"
"Will I be different in each world?"
"Who will I be?!?!"
You
"Where will I be?!?!"
"Too . . .
worlds . . .
many . . .
+
-
Hedgehogs and Foxes
Philip E. Tetlock,
Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For a video on similar themes see “How to Win at Forecasting: A Conversation with Philip Tetlock,” Edge, December 12, 2012, available at www.edge.org/conversation/how-to-win-at-forecasting.
Isaiah Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History,” Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1953.

Black Swans
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 2010). Listen to an audio presentation of the book, “The Future has Always Been Crazier Than W Thought,” The Long Now Foundation Seminar Series, February 4, 2008, available at https://soundcloud.com/longnow/the-future-has-always-been-crazier-than-we- thought.

Lucky Rabbits
Peter Thiel, “You Are Not a Lottery Ticket,” South by Southwest Interactive 2013 conference, October 14, 2013, video available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZM_JmZdqCw.
For more on selection bias, read or watch:
Simply take all of the preceding as an introduction to selection bias.

We'll appreciate the concept in more detail as we explore different worlds.
Activate your interdimensional devices.
On to another alternative world!
Hope you have your bearings back.
Even if you don't, it doesn't matter—there's no time!
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
This world resembles the US-envisioned Nonstate world with diffuse centers of power
as well as the Fusion world led by
Technologies will continue to connect us, and create new networks among actors
,
however, on a scale more intricate than today.
The political character of the world will also be more distinctive.
will become citizens identifying with more centers than today.
Citizens of local groups,
cities, states, and of a borderless Internet will join a “post-Huntingtonian” global human community that internalize values such as human development, human security, human rights, democracy, women’s equality, non-conflicting identities, and the Earth.
will continue to play a prominent role in the future, but among other relevant actors.
And the global order will not be described as multipolar with them as the only centers.
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Businesses
Megacities
Wealthy Individuals
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
There will be many centers.
All connected.
“The realization that there is ultimately one global community will come about primarily because of the collective realization that people share similar aspirations and difficulties.”
you
Ask rself
"Which is better:
a multipolar or polycentric world?"
"Where does this world fall on Walzer's spectrum?"
"How do our values fare here?"
"What biases led to the prediction of this world rather than others?"
But snap out of it!
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
Meanwhile, a parallel world awaits . . .
Alright, we're done with this world.
What a nice place. It's hard not to lull off warm and fuzzy . . .
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
"Which is better:
a multipolar or polycentric world?"
"Does it matter whether our values are achieved by states or individuals?"
"How do our values fare here?"
"What biases led to
me
being missing from this world?"
Russia
China
European
Union
States
South Korea
South Africa
Turkey
India
Brazil
Japan
United
Although Russian policymakers also foresaw a world of many centers, they focused on more traditional actors.
One will continue to be the global military, innovative, financial, and economic leader.
While other states . . .
will continue to institutionalize a common political and economic identity to form a “collective actor”
as others will continue their own rapid economic growth and assume new global leadership roles.
Meanwhile in
Traditional sources of power, including natural resources and nuclear and military power, will keep the country a major fixture in world affairs.
The past century's middle powers
will be joined by emerging ones
in varying degree.
Finally, countries with limited resources, power, and influence on regional and global political and economic processes will occupy the lowest rung of the hierarchy.
It will be a more stable order with more
coordination and regional integration,
economic growth and global governance,
and democracy and inequality.
The report concludes that Russia should adapt its domestic and foreign strategy to major global trends in order to avoid marginalization, cope with future risks, and exploit new opportunities from globalization.
The development of the values depends on the reform of domestic political, social, legal and educational institutions to align with the principles of globalization and “non-destabilizing inequality.”
Compare the Hierarchical Polycentric world with the EU's Interconnected Polycentric world on two fronts.
First, what is the impetus for normative change?
Second, what actor is missing?
you
Ask rself
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
Foot on the thrusters—
there's more multiverse to explore!
Alright, we're done with this world.
What did you think of this order?
We will grow older on average together.
See how individual countries have aged over the past decades. Visit http://projects.flowingdata.com/life-expectancy/
States will be the basic building block.
However, a host of factors will compromise sovereignty, particularly state capacity and governance.
No international governance structures will prevent inequality for the poorest
Today’s developed world will best be able to adapt and stay atop of these challenges
Detrimental climate change
Poor resource allocation between and within states
Failed economic integration into the global economy
While weak and failed states not integrated into the global economy, starved of resources, and maladaptive to climate change will suffer the most.
the fight for group identity and dominance in these developing countries will be fierce.
Liberty, pluralism, peace, and justice will be variegated.
poorer nations will have the least prospects for peace.
Individuals living in rich countries will enjoy more freedom to pursue their preferences . . .
whereas individuals in poor countries will see no such opportunities.
While the specter of war may not affect developed countries . . .
While cultural pluralism will be settled for those living in stable states . . .
[khaah
"Welcome."
khaah]
. . .
"Under what circumstances would the West intervene in developing countries?"
"What would justice be like in this kind of world?"
"Would intervention be motivated by some universal urge?"
"What biases might lead to intervention in other worlds we visited?"
you
Ask rself
I'm going to make the jump to light speed.
Off to an alternative planet!
Alright, we're done with this world.
We're losing a deflector shield.
Go strap yourselves in.
In this world, all appears fine . . .
stability is maintained, particularly within today's developed states and tomorrow's rising powers like China and India . . .
but there are many reasons why states could topple over.
High asymmetry among states, demographic shifts in population and migration, poor resource allocation, and conflicting ideologies and worldviews will preoccupy resource-rich developed states with domestic concerns.
This self-centeredness may be due to trends of aging populations, urbanization, and governance gaps.
Resource-poor states, on the other hand, will face a world of transnational criminal activities, spill-over conflicts, and uncontrolled migration of their youth.
Liberal democracies will be too distracted with their own domestic concerns to intervene, and their ability to anticipate and shape their external security environments will be more limited.
Inequality, variegated liberty, poor prospects for peace, and fights for cultural dominance in the developing countries are also persistent though relatively less severe features of this world than in other worlds.
"Can states be anything other than introspective and self-interested?"
"How different is this world from ours today?"
"Is the fate of developing states as dependent on the rest of the world as this model suggests?"
"Does domestic political gridlock lead to global gridlock?"
you
Ask rself
Time to bend space and time once more!
Alright, we're done with this world.
Just a few more worlds left.
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
Businesses
Megacities
Individuals
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
States
Criminal
Networks
Terrorist
Networks
Super-empowered
Individuals
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
Super-empowered
Individuals
Super-empowered
Individuals
Businesses
Cities
Nongovernmental Organizations
States
Powerful
Individuals
Individuals
One future modernity we have seen is more cooperative and interconnected than today.
Those were worlds of one network.
But in this world there are other networks.
Other modernities not tied together with technology.
Disconnected from the rest of the world.
Rivaling regional modernities may form.
More bilateral bonds may bifurcate sets of states from multilateral orders.
may form intranets . . .
isolating them from other
States
States
Technology may embolden new actors, disconnected from and threatening states, such as . . .
Differing levels of state control will lead to a more fractured collection of political, social, and economic networks characterized with differing levels of freedom.
Let's look at a few clashing modernities.
The character of values in this world principally depends on global networks.

Ideologies and worldviews, demographics, and technology will shape multiple advanced-network societies that can connect with one another and grow mega-cities of wealth and culture.
In terms of pluralism, networks will define two broad cultural groups: those that belong to modern networks . . .
and those that do not.
However, there may also be a danger that individual liberty may run wild from the perspective of some of these states. In this view, member states may elect to monitor their own technologically empowered citizens as much as foreign individuals and groups.
Other modernities will be the sources of the most conflict for the developed world since peace and economic fairness cannot be maximized in these countries’ pre-modern networks.
And intervention by NATO countries for persecuted individuals may be limited only for people in certain networks.
"What does a clash mean—war, conflict, or disagreement?"
"What networks today might approximate each of these modernities?"
"How universal will values be in connected versus disconnected ones?"
"How will the prioritization of values in some networks be different from other networks?"
you
Ask rself
Let's look at our final world.
Alright, we're done with this world.
What a complicated place.
Activate your inter-dimensional devices.
US
China
Brazil
Russia
Japan
India
Turkey
South
Korea
South
Africa
As in the Stalled Engines and Interconnected Polycentric worlds, the United States and European Union will continue to influence the world, but as old powers.
And as in the Russian Hierarchical Polycentric world, states will be the primary actors and older middle powers such as Russia and Japan will continue to play significant roles.
However, in this decentered world, the rise of new powers will be one of the greatest transformations in global affairs over the next two decades.
This is a future of multipolar power politics where absolute wealth may grow, but regional powers compete for influence and resources.
EU
However, states will not be the only new powers. In the future, we will also see the rise of new regional powers.
In this world, more power equality among a greater number of states will lead to more competition and conflict.
Conflicts over Resource Allocation
Competing Ideologies and Worldviews
Lack of Economic Integration
Reasons for this include:
"Is peace better served through regionalism? If so, should connectivity be our priority—or should tolerance?"
"Will the lack of connection among regions lead to the same uncertainties of anarchy?"
"Which form of decentralization is best: Fusion, Stalled Engines, Interconnected Polycentric, or New Powers? Which is most realistic?"
"What do you think conflict will be like among states? Among regions?"
you
Ask rself
Well, that was the last world of 2030.
Congratulations on making it this far.
Let's take a minute to see where we have been and look at all of the worlds.
Again.
Here is one way to categorize the worlds.
It is conceivable that there are other worlds.
Even now, do you think these are the only worlds that could happen?
Why would the US, EU, Russia, and NATO focus on some worlds and not others?
A limited option set could preclude planning for a world that could happen.
The chief importance of such biases is that they compromise planners’ abilities to steward policies that will safeguard our values.
The answer should be familiar by now . . .
Remember:
Can you identify
es
held by the US, EU, Russia, and NATO?
Can you identify
es
held by the US, EU, Russia, and NATO?
The illustrations and questions of each world alluded to the first two biases primarily.
Let's now focus on
es.
The US's National Intelligence Council has published previous reports for the years 2015, 2020, and 2025.
Each of these reports focused on many trends leading to 2030 (e.g., emerging powers, climate change, and technological innovation).
But some emphasized trends were different (e.g., globalization and terrorism).
We won't go over each of these worlds in depth since most are similar to the worlds we've already seen.
As a result, the US predicted other
past future worlds.
Anyway by now, you know how to arrange and evaluate worlds yourself.
NIC, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 2000, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/Globa%20Trends_2015%20Report.pdf.

NIC, “Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 2004, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf.

NIC,“Global Trends 2015: A Transformed World,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 2008, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.
If you want, you can read the reports :
"Why do people in the present predict the futures that they do now?"
"Why did people in the past predict the futures that they did?"
"Are temporal biases unavoidable?"
"Do you think what we value most now (e.g., liberty) will lead to the future improvement of other values?"
you
Ask rself
But you might ask yourself some questions.
Let's approach this question from a different tack.
Henceforth, for the sake of continuity and convenience, we will focus only on the ten worlds of 2030.
Let's keep going and return to the question that has taken us this far.
We could see in what worlds people might be freer, distribution more just, peace less certain, or diversity more robust.
With Walzer's theory, we became capable of categorizing any world.
Anyway enough of my philosophical fanboyism.
But now, let's build up to how logic will fit into our project.
"Did someone say logic? I know a bit about that."
Like every high school student, he constructed a completeness theorem in modal logic.
And then, without ever earning a PhD, he would become a professor at Princeton and later CUNY, contributing to the fields of mathematical logic and philosophy of language.
He would continue on to Harvard for a bachelor's in mathematics, teaching MIT students logic as a sophomore.
What? You didn't?
Meet Saul Kripke
He would go on to create a new logical system.
Aside from his seminal work,
Naming and Necessity
, Kripke rarely published, instead he simply jots down notes and makes recordings of his lectures. He has an entire center at CUNY dedicated to capturing these scraps of brilliance.
Although you've probably never heard of him, philosophers have described him as one of most important philosophers in the past 200 years.
He's a modern-day Socrates.
Not ten.
In short, we learned how values might be arranged in a set of ten possible worlds.
Yet, we will ultimately live in only one world.
We'll see how Kripke can help us in just a bit.
We could proceed by asking one of two questions:
The one world they think might happen would be similar to the EU's Interconneceted Polycentric world or the US's Fusion world.
They might be right. In fact, I kind of hope they are right. Those are probably the most desirable worlds to live in.
In short, what is their logic?
Thus, it might be more helpful to think about the second question: what one world will we live in?
We need some reasoning that will allow us to rationally work toward the best world, while still acknowledging why our values might be in danger from other worlds.
This logic will allow us to know what worlds and values will be
We can answer this question by looking toward Saul Kripke's
Possible Worlds Semantics
.
For a quick primer on the logic you can read my explanation in Chapter 7 in the box titled, "Possible Worlds Semantics".
Or you can watch these three videos by YouTube user Kaneb. Frankly, he explains Kripke's logic much better than I can.
Here, we'll focus on the basics.
http://www.possiblefutureworlds.com/chapter7
Let's start with definitions of possible, impossible, and necessary worlds.
Worlds in this set may be possible in our definition if and only if they are not necessarily false.
Assume we have a set of ten worlds.
Any world outside of this set is deemed an impossible world.
Since these ten worlds have not yet existed we cannot categorically dismiss their future existence—however likely or improbable.
In the conventional sense one might say that an impossible world could happen.
After all, worlds once thought impossible have happened. The earth is not flat, the sun does not rotate around us, and mankind has set foot on the moon.
Thus, the selection biases of tradition, methodology, and time have the utmost relevance for people in charge of directing the future of the world.
However, such worlds can only be made possible, according to our definition, by incorporating them into the original set of worlds.
This choice to include or exclude worlds into a set is key to whether or not worlds are thought to be possible or impossible.
Finally, a world is necessary if and only if it is not possibly false.
Based on this definition, within the set of worlds presented in the global trends reports there is
no necessary world.

These worlds could possibly be false: none of the worlds has come to existence yet nor may they ever.
However, this does not mean that there is no necessity in our values.
According to Kripke's logic, given this set of possible worlds,
a value may be considered necessarily true if it exists in all possible worlds.
Thus, even if a value exists in nine of the ten worlds, we might say that the value will exist in many possible worlds, but we cannot say that it will necessarily exist.
So to find out what is necessary, we should evaluate all ten of our worlds.
True or False:
More people will attain our values in these four possible future worlds?
So I think, in general, we can be guardedly optimistic about the future, knowing that we are on the right track toward a freer and more diverse world with more work to be done for the disadvantaged.
"Why would they pick one world over another?"
"Why would they be right? "
"What if they are wrong? "
"What risks might we run in not preparing for other worlds?"
Ask yourself
"
Which
world will we live in?"
Some like Kishore Mahbubani and the UN High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda have answered the first question on which.
"
What
world will we live in?"
But you should really . . .
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Here's one evaluation.
Future Attainment of Values for More People
Anarchy


Weak States
and Institutions



International
Civil Society


Decentered
World
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
True
Good for national, regional, and transnational identities
True
Good for individuals/groups across borders, but less certain within states
True
Good, but weaker groups are less protected
True
Greatest chance for those able/willing to fight for it
False
War/conflict is most prevalent
True/False
Poor, but states provide some security to individuals/groups
True
Decent, but unclear who will organize and enforce
True
Multiple means to achieve
False
No mechanisms
True/False
Worst off are better off within states, but not in other states
True
Networks can provide more for the worst off
True
Multiple ways to help the worst off
True
Freer and safer
True
More free without government, but uncertain who will enforce
True
Free, more stable and restricted by government
True
Most free from government, but uncertain
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Anarchy


Weak States
and Institutions



International
Civil Society


Decentered
World
True or False: All people will attain our values in these ten possible future worlds?
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Darkside of Exclusivity

Gini Out-of-the Bottle

Deceptive Stability

Nonstate World

Clash of Modernities

Interconnected Polycentric

Stalled Engines

New Powers

Fusion

Hierarchical Polycentric
Here's one evaluation.
Future Attainment of Values for All People
Liberty Justice Peace Pluralism
Darkside of Exclusivity

Gini Out-of-the Bottle

Deceptive Stability

Nonstate World

Clash of Modernities

Interconnected Polycentric

Stalled Engines

New Powers

Fusion

Hierarchical Polycentric
True/False
True
False
False
False
False
False
False
True
False
False
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
False
True
True
True/False
True/False
False
False
False
What two values are true in all possible worlds?
What value is true in all possible worlds?
The previous evaluation reached general conclusions with a weak criterion for value prevalence rather than universality.
Let's evaluate each of the ten particular worlds, with an criterion for the attainment of values for all people.
The attainment of liberty and pluralism for more people in 2030 will be necessary.
However, justice and peace for more people will be less certain— possible for some, but not others.
"Am I more optimistic or pessimistic about the future?"
"Did my evaluations lead me to the same conclusion?"
"Which of Walzer's worlds were excluded and hence considered impossible? "
"What threats and opportunities for our values are lost when these excluded worlds are considered impossible?"
Ask rself
you
Thus, it is not the contours that matter most: it is the content of the future world and the texture of the values themselves that are the most important considerations for individuals to think about when choosing—to the extent that we can—what should be the quality of our future lives and livelihoods.
Necessity can take a myriad of possible forms, and we have some ability to both bend and adapt to the trending arches of an untold, yet determinate history.
For example, to say that liberty will necessarily exist is not the same as saying that it is necessary that liberty will be monolithic, that liberty will be enjoyed by all people, that new liberties enabled by technology will not come at the cost of lost liberties of privacy, or that pursuing one’s liberty will always lead to security and peace.
Pluralism is the only necessary value across all of the 2030 worlds.
Thus it seems that policymakers across the world should respect the existence of many peoples when choose how to better improve their own liberty, justice, and peace.
True
True
True
True
It is desirable to think about how our values might fare with more resolution.
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"Would I evaluate or interpret the necessity of diversity differently?"
"Do I share this same conclusion?"
"Three worlds attain all four of our values. Which one is the best?"
"What should we do today to attain the best possible future world?"
Ask rself
you
The choice among these future worlds should not be seen as a choice among impossible, idealistic worlds, but rather they should be seen as approximations of what the preeminent political philosopher John Rawls called realistic utopias: possible worlds that illustrate “how reasonable citizens and peoples might live peacefully in a just world.”
Our final challenge, thus, is a classic one posed before by Kant, Rousseau, and Rawls: taking people as they are and laws as they might be.
Reasonable people may disagree over which particular world we should aspire toward. The most difficult task is to choose a right course of action that optimizes our values given the constraints and possibilities of global trends.
In our closing section, we will consider future global
How are we to choose the right course? And is there only one right way?
Joel Rosenthal has helped lead us in such a search for a global ethic.
This paradox can arise from universal pushes toward pluralism in the form of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, nation, or class against a people's particular identity as individuals, families, friends, colleagues, and compatriots.
Thomas Hobbes is famous for characterizing life as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Which of Walzer's worlds reflect the one people view?
Let's try to relate the cosmopolitan ethic to our possible worlds.
The thesis holds that democratic peoples do not go to war against each other for three reasons:
Learn how some of the Thought Leaders have conceived of a global ethic and of the world's greatest future challenges.
Your answers will likely be in the negative. Should this diminish the rational appeal of cosmopolitanism?
I don't think so. But local concerns, idiosyncratic interests, and particular politics often intervene for both selfish and rational reasons, at times rendering this one world, one people logic unsound and incomplete.
Some have called for a logic of one world, which most resembles the EU's Interconnected Polycentric world.
We must ultimately cope with this paradox in one world.
However, our discussion of modal logic and possible worlds semantics illustrates the fallacy of focusing only on the logic of a particular world, no matter how ideal.
We can abstractly categorize peoples in three ways.
Human nature.
Men and women must cope with natural dispositions toward competition, diffidence, and glory.
In contradistinction from the cosmopolitans, though, Hobbes arrives at the conclusion that conflict is inevitable. Why would he predict conflict rather than cooperation?
(1) All men and women are self-interested, rational, and equal.
(2) We are all interconnected and interdependent.
(3) State boundaries are morally arbitrary.
Cosmopolitans make three assumptions:
Justice should be maximized depending on values that are common to all of humanity regardless of state borders, distance, class, what other individuals do, regardless of whether an individual is rich or poor or if greater powers stand idly by.
Competition makes us fight over scarce resources.
Singer would later elaborate on this analogy in his illustration of one world, growing more globalized and connected through technology.
Rawls sought to develop a theory of justice by assuming that if we were to fairly choose our livelihoods under a veil of ignorance from an arbitrary set of possible lives, then we would have to agree on two principles . . .
Thus, for some the problem with the cosmopolitan view is that it is not realistic enough.
"When different nations led more separate lives, it was more understandable—though still quite wrong—for those in one country to think of themselves as owing no obligations, beyond that of noninterference, to people in another state. But those times are long gone. Today, as we have seen, our greenhouse gas emissions alter the climate under which everyone in the world lives. Our purchases of oil, diamonds, and timber make it possible for dictators to buy more weapons and strengthen their hold on the countries they tyrannize. Instant communications show us how others live, and they in turn learn about us and aspire to our way of life. Modern transport can move even relatively poor people thousands of kilometers, and when people are desperate to improve their situation, national boundaries prove permeable."
Second Principle
: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
(a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
(b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
First Principle
: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;
In this context, Michael Ignatieff has asked, whether we should talk about one global ethic or multiple global ethics.
For example, the cosmopolitan view may be categorized as a global ethic in the singular.
"Our newly interdependent global society, with its remarkable possibilities for linking people around the planet, gives us the material basis for a new ethic."
I'll assume that you've read Rawls before. But if you haven't, watch this introduction (from the professor that first introduced me to philosophy and ethics):
We might first look at his earlier example of the rationality of saving a child drowning in a pond.
Peter Singer would also embrace the same three assumptions, but from a utilitarian perspective:

(1) Nation state boundaries are arbitrary distinctions.
(2) Resource distributions across the world are random.
(3) States are not self-sufficient.
The same reasoning would apply to foreign assistance regardless of state boundaries.
Extending this intuition, to the global scale, Singer asks what if that child were drowning or suffering oceans away.
(1) Nation state boundaries are arbitrary distinctions.
(2) Resource distributions across the world are random.
(3) States are not self-sufficient.
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, however, saw no good reason to limit justice within boundaries for three reasons:
But what does pluralism look like?
This recognition of pluralism will help us optimize the other values.
Why would you?
If you were to see a child drowning in a pond, you would likely save him if it were no risk to you.
"What trends might make coordination across boundaries be better in the future?"
"If cosmopolitan values are necessary, why don't we enjoy them now?"
"Do I share cosmopolitan convictions? Have capitals embraced cosmopolitanism?"
Ask rself
you
and we are 'pulled' toward a global ethic by a universal core implicit in the very idea of ethics—a core articulated most powerfully by the idea of human rights."
"We are 'pushed' toward a global ethic by the need to address urgent issues that are increasingly global in nature,
Shared
Ideas
"We are
one humanity
This is the essential challenge of global ethics: how to accommodate the tension between our universal and particular natures."


,
but
seven billion humans
.
Shared
Ideas
The actors in Rawls's international theory are not
individuals

:
they are
peoples
.
We have seen how global trends from the perspectives of many people will push us toward the universal.
We have seen how our values will continue to pull us toward toward the particular.
(Scroll to zoom in.)
— David Rodin
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “How Do You Define a Global Ethic?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “The Greatest Ethical
Challenges?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
All possible worlds should be considered in order to establish an overarching logic.
Global economic growth and political reform may stall.
The great powers new and old are the most significant actors.
States may not matter at all.
In the future, humanity may be more divided.
Networks might be more fractured.
Rival regionalism could accompany the rise of new states.
Hierarchy may be a more stable order than an equal one.
These worlds challenge one another.
Kripke's logic showed us that increasing cultural diversity is the one necessary value across worlds.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
One
World,
One
People
One
World,
Two
Peoples
One
World,
Many
Peoples
And we can
reimagine
past global ethics with these different conceptions of pluralism.
Reimagine
cosmopolitanism as a



ethic.
Reimagine
Kant as a



ethic.
Reimagine
Rawls as a



ethic.
We will explore each ethic.
Let's start with the cosmopolitans.
Cosmopolitans can come in two forms:
(1) Social Contractarians (e.g., Beitz and Pogge)
(2) Utilitarians (e.g., Singer)
For our purposes, according to Rawls, justice as fairness only applies to a domestic population, not globally.
For the utilitarian, you would do so because you would maximize the good of preserving a life with a minimal of cost getting your clothes wet or damaging your iPhone.
"What policies or practices are in place that might lead us to a cosmopolitan world?"
Look back at the three possible worlds.
Who will the actors be in each?
Which of these worlds is impossible?
What are three instantiations of these archetypes?
Governance can take on three forms based on the world instantiations, viewing the world’s actors in terms of individuality, multipolarity, or polycentrism.
A major challenge for these cosmopolitan worlds is not cooperation among actors:
it is a lack of coordination.
His critics often forget, however, that he started his thesis from premises identical to those of the cosmopolitans: all men and women are equal and rational.
Cosmopolitans also cannot explain or respond to the US’s Gini-Out-of-the-Bottle and Stalled Engines worlds, which leave different peoples with variegated values.
It can neither explain nor respond to the possible emergences of NATO’s or Russia’s predicted worlds, which do not view all humanity as one and instead recognize state boundaries as determinative of which peoples will be privileged to enjoy the four values unequally.
For Hobbes, individuals form groups because they will assist in preserving individual self-interests.
The great challenge for the one people ethic is to make all people in the world see themselves as one group while at the same time recognizing that some natural dispositions may drive us apart.
To form such an ethic Ignatieff—following a Nagel and Rawls before—asks us to imagine ourselves in the abstract "view from nowhere."
Morality, in one global ethic, extends with equal concern “to defend all human beings and our common habitat against partialities and interests grounded in family, community, ethnicity, economic position, and nation.”
Other than a separate peace, liberal values of liberty, justice, and pluralism in varying contingent degrees will necessarily exist within and among the societies of democratic peoples against non-democratic peoples.
You might observe that the democratic peace view of the world tolerates a greater variance of our values compared to the cosmopolitans.
They are political documents negotiated among states to solve specific problems, thus they may not be in full accord with a singular global ethic, and they may at times conflict with one another.
The justice found in the other worlds of the cosmopolitans (i.e., Nonstate, Interconnected Polycentric, and Fusion) are possible if liberal peoples choose to promote their principles of representative respect, human rights, and market economy to like-minded peoples in non-democratic states.
These particular values are legally embodied in existing international law in the
Charter of the United Nations
, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
, the
Geneva Conventions
, and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
.
For Ignatieff, global ethics in the plural, on the other hand, refer to partialities—those things that may be arbitrary yet still carry a great deal of moral significance.
The greatest challenge for the one world, two peoples ethics is for liberal republics to prevent war with non-democratic states.
Notice that global justice from liberal peoples toward the unfortunate liberal individuals in non-democratic states is not taken as a primary goal for the neo-Kantians.
While an alternative definition of global ethics might encompass more than solely particular ethics embodied by international legal texts, Ignatieff’s juxtaposition of a global ethic versus multiple global ethics opens up a consideration of one world composed of more than one people, each compromising and competing with one another over multiple ethics.
A reimagined global ethic “defends the universal interests of mankind and the planet; its purpose is to engage all forms of ethical particularism in adversarial justification; and the rules of these encounters, flowing as they do from the starting premise of human equality, preclude coercion and mandate tolerance.” It investigates particularism at the nation-state and community levels as well as universalism of international law.
The two peoples ethic will not perform such deeds categorically, systematically, or as a matter of duty.
However, any such individual, nongovernmental, or state policies will be idiosyncratic, marginal, interest-based, supererogatory, and limited by the imperative for liberal peoples to secure their own peace.
He is most famously associated with his modern take of Kant's "Perpetual Peace" as the democratic peace thesis.
For Michael Doyle, the fracturing a global ethic into multiple ethics can be explained by a fundamental problem: “the absence of a genuine sense of global community, the sense that we are in a common social project.”
Let's next look toward neo-Kantian liberals for an explanation of a two peoples ethic.
In our context, we will continue to illustrate alternative global ethics by varying the value of pluralism and we will look at the ethics of one world, two peoples and one world, many peoples.
Neo-Kantian liberals hold that there are only two types of peoples.
(1) Liberal peoples must elect and internalize the costs of going to war whereas monarchs and dictators do not.
(2) Since liberal peoples share the same principles, they will respect the rights of similarly free peoples.
(3) Respect for property rights and the benefits of commercial exchange reinforce these moral commitments.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Democratic
Peoples
Non-Democratic
States
A global ethic among

may not lead to peace because they do not embrace the three liberal principles, and thus war may hold value because of the externalization of the costs to leaders, disrespect for others, and the preclusion of gains from participation in the market economy.
A global ethic between





will to lead to the emergence of a separate peace for liberal democratic peoples versus non-democratic ones.
A global ethic among

will lead to peace because peoples and their states harbor all three liberal principles.
will form their own . . .
Liberal Democratic
Republics
Non-democratic
Peoples
will form their own . . .
Which of Walzer's worlds can be explained by the two peoples ethic?
Let's try to relate the neo-Kantian ethic to our possible worlds.
Notice the explanatory power of this ethic: unlike the cosmopolitan view, it can explain all of Walzer's worlds.
Which of these worlds is impossible?
All instantiations are possible, including the divided worlds.
In dividing peoples through state boundaries, the default worlds tend toward the worlds of difference: Darkside of Exclusivity, Deceptive Stability, Stalled Engines, Clash of Modernities, Gini-out-of-the Bottle, and New Powers.
This is not to say that the democratic peace is lacking in means or motives to help those in some non-democratic states.
Might another one world ethic help us arrive at better futures?
There are many possible answers to this question. Thus, it is unclear how and why we might arrive at the best possible worlds—more just, peaceful, and freer for more peoples—through the two peoples ethic alone.
Peoples have three fundamental interests:
Protecting their own political independence, territory, and security;
Maintaining their own political and social institutions and civic culture;
Securing their self-respect as a people, which rests on its citizens' awareness of its own history and cultural accomplishments.
Rawls's responds to this global ethics question with eight principles:
"Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of human history—unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness . . . . The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear."
The range of peoples’ acceptance of all, some, or none of these eight principles will lead to multiple ethics among
Other ethics might challenge the many peoples ethic.
Recall that Ignatieff called for different global ethics to stand in adversarial justification.
If this ethic is the most explanatory, is this Law of Peoples ethic then the one global ethic we should subscribe to—is it the best?
For example, although Rawls suggested that liberal tolerance toward decent hierarchical peoples can help us move toward a better world, there may be some limits to application.
Further, in contrast to the neo-Kantian thesis, liberals cannot be sure to extend the respect that they have for one another because hierarchical peoples do not respect their own people through democratic accountability. As Doyle asks, “If those governments will not trust their own publics, why should
we
trust them?”
For example, Michael Doyle has suggested that the number of such decent states is few and their population sizes are small (e.g., Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and to some degree Qatar, Bhutan, the United Arab Emirates, and perhaps Jordan).
And since the duty to assist Burdened peoples and bring Outlaws into the Well-Ordered society of peoples only calls for these societies to become Decent peoples, the potential to maximize their values further is out of the question for Rawls.
Then the cosmopolitans might further challenge the Rawlsian ethic as being too conservative and too tolerant of impaired liberties, injustices, and conflict just short of war within decent societies.
While Rawls would agree with the neo-Kantians that there are both democratic and non-democratic peoples . . .
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Liberal
Peoples
Outlaw
Peoples
form just domestic political institutions based on legitimate constitutions, representative governments, and core human rights: rights to subsistence, security, personal property, and formal equality before the law, as well as freedoms from slavery, protections of ethnic groups against genocide, and some measure of liberty of conscience.
do not seek to build liberal or decent institutions, and instead seek to expand their power, influence, and territory. They violate the core human rights of people within their state borders.
Shared
Ideas
Decent
Peoples
form institutions based on comprehensive doctrines (e.g., religions) that do not treat all people as free and equal citizens, but they respect a core list of human rights, genuinely consult with society, and do not have aggressive foreign policies.
Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
Peoples are to honor human rights.
Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
Shared
Ideas
desire to maintain liberal or decent institutions but lack sufficient social or economic resources.
Burdened
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Democratic
Peoples
Non-Democratic
Peoples
he saw a spectrum of other peoples between this dichotomy.
Rawls envisioned four types of peoples.
Liberal peoples follow the logic of Rawls's domestic theory of justice.
However, he also realized that at the international level, there is a greater degree of pluralism outside of liberalism.
Other peoples may form alternative institutions—quasi-liberal, failed, and threatening.
Under an international veil of ignorance (i.e., no knowledge of territory, population, or political or economic power), he then asks free, equal, and reasonable liberal and decent peoples what terms would constitute a just global order.
Shared
Ideas
Shared
Ideas
Outlaw
Peoples
Liberal
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Decent
Peoples
Shared
Ideas
Burdened
Peoples
A global ethic among


is similar to the ethic of republics under the neo-Kantiandemocratic peace thesis: Liberal peoples are satisfied with their own institutionally-secured values and gains through trade. They have no reason or desires for war, imperial glory, territorial expansion. These institutions will secure the greatest liberty, justice, and peace compared to the other peoples.
A global ethic among


will be similar to the ethic among liberals to the extent that they partake in liberalism. But institutions formed mainly from comprehensive doctrines such as religions will also govern relations among these peoples. The potential for liberty, justice, and peace will be good, but not as great or predictable as for liberals.
A global ethic among


of different burdened peoples will be limited by the lack of development of liberal or decent institutions and deficiencies of economic and social resources. They will likely only interact if they are geographically or culturally close. Yet there is little they can do for one another. Without assistance, liberty, justice, and peace will be poor indefinitely.
A global ethic among


is unintelligible under Rawls’s scheme, because these are peoples who do not respect any or most of the eight principles. Hence, it is questionable whether an peaceful ethic among outlaws is possible, although, they may base relations with other states on other considerations (e.g., realpolitik). The prospects for peace, justice, and peace are worst for these peoples.
Liberal
and
Decent
Peoples
A global ethic between





can best be summarized with one word: tolerance. Since decent hierarchical peoples are not aggressive or threatening to liberal peoples, value many of the eight principles, and secure the core human rights for their people, they can reasonably take part in the liberal peace. Liberals, under international law, are to treat the decent as equals, even if they disagree with particular practices. This tolerance means that liberal republics should not intervene with—or even criticize—the affairs of decent hierarchical peoples.
Well-Ordered
and
Burdened
Peoples
A global ethic between





is founded principally on the eighth principle: the duty to assist. Well-ordered peoples (particularly liberal ones), have an imperative to assist these societies in becoming self-determining, well-ordered peoples. However, distributive justice extends only so far as to raise these peoples to a decent hierarchical Thus, well-ordered peoples will tolerate as a range of inequalities. There will be no war between these peoples. And if interventions are well designed, the liberties of the burdened will improve.
A global ethic between





leads liberal peoples to owe neither respect nor tolerance for outlaws because they do not respect the eight principles. Intervention, in varying degrees, by well-ordered peoples is justified because outlaw societies either do not respect human rights, threaten liberal peace, or threaten their own people with genocidal policies at the extreme. In accordance with the principles, these wars should recognize noncombatant immunity and not revert to the indiscriminate nature of wars in the past. Such wars must be prudent in the sense that the purpose of intervention should be to bring outlaw societies into a global well-ordered society of peoples. Peace is most precarious here, with liberty and justice challenged for both peoples consequently.
Well-Ordered
Peoples
Non-Ordered
Peoples
{
{
Well-Ordered
and
Outlaw
Peoples
Burdened
and
Outlaw
Peoples
A global ethic between





could lead to outlaws, in their disrespect for rights, freedom, and equality of the burdened, to abuse these defenseless people and pillage their lands for the resources they have. Outlaws will show no conception of justice other than might. The liberties of the burdened will be the worst off.
&
There will also be multiple ethics between
Which of Walzer's worlds can be explained by the many peoples ethic?
The Rawlsian global ethic is just as explanatory as the neo-Kantian ethic in justifying the emergence of all possible worlds.
Similarly, certain archetypes are impossible for our consideration.
And again, all instantiations are possible.
Let's try to reimagine the Law of Peoples ethic in regard to our possible worlds.
However, the many peoples ethic goes one step further, explaining how to move from the worse worlds . . .
at either end of the spectrum toward what he called realistic utopias . . .
and toward what we would consider the best of all possible worlds.
(i.e., those worlds that are ideal and attainable) . . .
These


associate with one another as . . .
States
States
The other


will exist in a separate anarchy as a collection of . . .
Liberal Democratic
Republics and
Non-Democratic
States
You might notice the obvious:
Of our four values, peace takes precedence in the democratic peace thesis.
We can then define three particular global ethics with peace being taken as the primary goal.
For the non-democratic states, there is no systematic reason to treat democratic states any different from other non-democratic ones. Thus, war is as viable of an option as it is for any non-democratic state.
For the neo-Kantians, liberty and peace are prior to considerations of distributive justice. Yet, the neo-Kantians, are no angels either.
Unlike the cosmopolitans, they do not accept the premise that all peoples are the same, and they acknowledge that the liberties of liberal and illiberal peoples may conflict.
Neo-Kantians would never agree to a one world, one people global ethic where illiberal peoples may limit the maximum liberties of democratic peoples.
This thesis applies to our project in its division of the world by peoples.
This is not necessary within non-democratic states.
Liberal peoples will enjoy liberty, justice, and peace among themselves, never fearing tyranny from another liberal republic.
Nor is it necessary between liberal republics and non-democratic states.
Liberal republics, at one extreme, may elect to conduct crusades against non-democracies to either liberate like-minded peoples or to force their values onto the rest of the world. However, such acts would challenge global peace and justice.
Or republics might opt for lighter footprints through modest intervention, aid, or assistance.
You might observe that the Rawlsian view of the world tolerates an even greater variance of our values compared to both the cosmopolitans and neo-Kantians.
Many social contractarians disagree with this limitation. For example, you can see disagreement from one of Rawls's greatest students on one of today's leading ethicists, Thomas Pogge.
Pogge argues that we have both positive and negative duties in the world beyond a state's borders. In particular, we have a duty not to diminish the human rights of others, yet our current institutions are causing harm to the poor.
Diffidence makes us seek our own security.
Glory makes us seek reputation.
This is a hill.
And it is in this sense that all of history is the story of us against them.
Do you think we can achieve this by . . .
Enlarging particular states?
Establishing one global state?
Electing certain states as leaders?
Eliminating or connecting states?
The imperative is to make men and women free from scarcity, trusting of others, and respectful of others' interests.
Other global ethics could help us answer these questions.
This view asks how rational and equal people might form policies without consideration of arbitrary and accidental factors such as state boundaries, place of birth, class, or gender.
He specifically refers to multiple ethics enshrined by universal principles such as sovereignty, individual rights, civilian immunity in war, and rights of refugees and displaced persons.
How might other global ethics rival cosmopolitanism and the the ethic of one people?
Liberal peoples will enjoy liberty, justice, and peace among themselves, never fearing tyranny from other liberal peoples or decent peoples.
Decent peoples will enjoy similar, but not as great senses of liberty, justice, and peace among themselves and with liberal peoples.
Burdened and Outlaw peoples will vary depending on their own circumstances, but they will be worse off than Well-Ordered peoples.
"Do I share neo-Kantian convictions? Can the peoples be neatly divided between liberal democracies and non-democracies?"
"How do global trends such as technology, individual empowerment, and urbanization fit within this ethic? "
"If peace becomes perpetual in the neo-Kantian future, will liberty, justice, and pluralism be perpetual too?"
Ask rself
you
"What policies or practices might lead us to a neo-Kantian world?"
"What decent peoples exist today that are worthy of tolerance? Who would you consider an outlaw? How would the Rawlsian help today's burdened?"
"Does the division of peoples limit the future improvement of our values compared to those levels desired by the cosmopolitans or secured by the neo-Kantians?"
"Is an ethic that aims principally to rid the world of the 'great evils of human history' (e.g., starvation, poverty, and genocide) best-equipped to respond to history's 'little evils' that may persist into the future (e.g., discrimination, unemployment, climate change, crime, or corruption)?"
Ask rself
you
"Do I agree with the 8 principles that Rawls thought all reasonable peoples would accept? Does the duty to assist automate intervention—at what cost to the security of libral peoples?"
We will continue to live in a world with imperfect choices, and these three global ethics will not be sufficient in themselves to solve all future dilemmas.
I would suggest that neither one of these ethics will always be the most suitable for future planning.
Let's look at our last global ethic:
one world, many peoples.
Let's start with the contractarians, who attempt to extend John Rawls's domestic theory of justice globally.
We'll take a glance at Rawls's
Theory of Justice
.
While Beitz and Pogge sought to extend Rawls’s domestic theory of justice globally, and Singer sought to maximize utility for all people across borders, and Doyle started with the democratic piece thesis, Rawls began from a different starting point—one notably different from his domestic
Theory of Justice
.
However, they offer us reasonable ways to respond to the particular opportunities and challenges posed by future global trends, which will ultimately lead us to one world.
The cosmopolitan view can motivate and guide us toward a few of the most desirable of possible worlds, which may optimize our four values more than other approaches.
The principles of the cosmopolitans, the prudence of the neo-Kantians, and the pragmatism of Rawls can all help us work toward the best of all possible worlds.
The neo-Kantian view offers us a realism that explains why all of the possible worlds might exist, and it provides rationales that will help us cope with future conflicts among peoples.
The ethical choice for you as individuals, communities, organizations, and citizens of states will be to determine what degree of each of our values we can achieve not only in the next fifteen years, but also, as we have in the past, for the longer future of humanity to come.
And finally, the Law of Peoples view gives us a more complex rational basis to extend peace, justice, and liberty to more peoples, giving us a chance to tend toward the most promising decentered worlds.
We might look to thought leaders and ask . . .
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “What Does Moral Leadership Mean?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “Who is Ultimately Accountable?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014
Given such uncertainty, we might then ask,
"Is world peace possible?"
Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, “Is World Peace Possible?,” Thought Leaders Forum, February 2014.
David Rodin, in his response to this search, has concisely framed the core challenge of defining a global ethic.

In his denial of moral exceptionalism and his affirmation of pluralism, he saw many possible ways of working toward a global ethic.
Over the past three years, the Council has re-enlivened perennial ethical debates with its academic journal, events, websites, Global Ethics Network, Thought Leaders Forum, and Global Ethics Fellows and some of their most promising students as Ethics Fellows for the Future.
In reflecting on the centennial of Andrew Carnegie's establishment of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, Rosenthal stewarded all of the activities of the organization in this search.
Read the beginning of these efforts, “In Search of a Global Ethic,” Carnegie Council, August 31, 2011, available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110831/index.html .
Read Michael W. Doyle, “One World, Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls’s ‘The Law of Peoples,’”
Perspectives on Politics
4, No. 1 (March 2006): 109–120.
Full disclosure: Doyle was my international ethics professor. Many of the considerations in this book and course were cultivated from his classroom. He's kind of a big deal.
Read David Rodin, “Toward a Global Ethic,”
Ethics and International Affairs
26, No. 1 (Spring 2012): 33–42.
Read:
Charles R. Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
4, No. 4 (Summer 1975): 360–389.
Thomas W. Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
23, No. 3 (Summer, 1994): 195–224.
Read
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs
1, No. 3 (Spring 1972): 229–243.
Peter Singer,
One World: The Ethics of Globalization
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
Read Michael Ignatieff, “Reimagining a Global Ethic,”
Ethics and International Affairs
26, No. 1 (Spring 2012): 7–19.
Who is ultimately accountable?
What does moral leadership mean?
In the Nonstate World, governments would no longer be needed, and individuals through global civil society networks would perfectly coordinate among themselves.
The Interconnected Polycentric World would be the most encompassing, allowing civil societies, states, regional organizations, and global institutions to help foster the best possible world.
In the Fusion World, states would still be the primary actors, but they would support subnational, regional, and global solutions to optimize our four values.
Notice the limited explanatory power of this ethic: some worlds cannot be accounted for with the cosmopolitan ethic.
States
States
Why These Values?
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