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william reedon 26 October 2012
Transcript of Peace Science
University of Maryland
email@example.com The Rebels' Credibility Problem Commitment Problems & Civil War Termination Asymmetric Power & Commitment Problems
The Government's Commitment Problem
The Rebels' Commitment Problem A Model of the Rebels'
Credibility Problem Rebels Bargain with the Government
The Rebels are uncertain about the Government's fighting capacity
How the Government responds to the Rebels' demands provide information about the consequences of fighting
Weak Rebels have a credibility problem.
The Rebels' search for credibility shapes their bargaining with the Government Analyzing the Model When the rebels are strong, there is an interior solution to the model.
When the rebels are weak, there is a corner solution to the model.
Comparative Statics when there is a corner solution.
What makes a Rebels' commitment problem (corner solution) more likely? Empirical Implications Relative fighting capacity has a non-monotonic effect on civil war termination.
Summary of Econometric Model The Rebels' Search for
Credibility Mobilization - making the threat to fight credible.
Lowering Costs - making the threat to fight credible.
Political Mobilization - raising the costs of backing down to the government.
The role of third parties. Conclusions Context matters
Relative effect of government vs. rebels' commitment problems.
Further empirical Implicaitions and Tests