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IR5035 The Security Dilemma
Transcript of IR5035 The Security Dilemma
(Tang, S. 'The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis' 2009: 594) Security Dilemma Implication: the best way to survive is take advantage of others and gain power at their expense Security Dilemma and ‘traditional’ security The undersupply of cooperation is “the tragedy of the commons.” Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons (1968). While cooperation is collectively rational... The paradox of the PD game Modeling Two-party choice: Player 2 Player 2 Two possible strategies: Cooperate or Defect (specific context gives specific labels: build arms/don’t build arms, etc.) Modeling PD games How the game works -- a simple narrative. The Prisoners’ Dilemma Week 4: The Security Dilemma and arms racing IR5035 The Traditional Security Agenda The Security Dilemma is currently out of fashion (T. Christensen, 2002) Discuss Question
NATO expansion; US plans to base missile defence system in E. Europe US-Russian dilemma? The naval Dreadnought arms race between UK and Germany pre-WW1 Security Dilemma in practice: classic cases Vicious cycle of power competition John Herz and the security dilemma Modeling Two-party choice Player 1 Key Issues ‘attempt to move the arms race into space ; does not look as innocent as they are trying to present it (Russia) US-China space race? India, Japan suspicion, instead of cooperation Asian Naval and Space Race? Dilemma: a choice between two equally balanced alternatives Back to basics: what is a Dilemma? ‘Today's threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of terrorists -- less from strong states than from weak or failed states’ (NSS 2002) Globalization’s impact? Turning a PD game into a Chicken game.
What happens when joint defection is really bad? Player 1 Player 2 Turning a PD game into a Chicken game.
What happens when joint defection is really bad? Player 1 Player 2 Defection dominates for Player 1 Player 1 Plugging in payoffs Player 1 Player 2 Modeling Two-party Choice Player 1 Player 2 Modeling Two-party Choice Player 1 Player 2 Modeling Two-party Choice Player 1 Player 2 Modeling Two-party Choice:
Both Defect Player 1 Player 2 Modeling Two-party Choice:
Both Cooperate Player 1 Player 2 Defection dominates for Player 2 Player 2 Turning a PD game into a Chicken game.
Defection no longer dominates Player 1 Player 2 Game Theory and Security Dilemma Globalization's Impact on Security Dilemma Security Dilemma: Background, Theory & Definitions Security Dilemma in Practice: Arms Races? Case Studies: US-Russia; Asian Space & Naval Race; US-China; Japan-China; Taiwan A Simple Game that has Become a Dominant Paradigm for Social Scientists since it was Invented about 1960 Game theoretic problems: payoffs for each player depend on actions of both Player 1 Player 2 Defection is individually rational. Considered Core Issue of IR (Sorensen) Cause of Arms Races and Major Wars such as WWI States Always Possess some Offensive Capabilities Uncertainty about Intentions Basic Logic of Offensive Realism (Mearsheimer) 'Security Dilemma is in Decline' Insecurity Dilemma Instead? A New Security Dilemma? (Cerny) Has globalisation fatally undermined the Security Dilemma? Does it still have role today? Lemma: a proposition assumed to be valid Uncertainty about others’ intentions and their weapons (capability): how to respond? Atomic Bipolar World = Extreme Manifestation of Structural Anarchy Acquire More Power for Security Renders Others Less Secure Differs from Morgenthau’s view of flawed human nature and will to power Cause: structural anarchy 'Hobbesian Fear (Butterfield) State of perpetual war; gladiatorial contest (Hobbes) Uncertainty (Booth & Wheeler) Two-Level Strategic Predicament First Level: Dilemma of Interpretation Second Level: Dilemma of Response Threat Perceptions Action-Reaction Dynamics Anarchy Lack of Malign Intentions on Both Sides Accumulations of Power Unintentional in Origin; Defensive Realist States Self Reinforcing (Arms Race) Self Defeating (Less Secure) Vicious Cycle (Leads to Wars) Regulated by Material & Psychological Factors Arms Races Between Great Powers Best Know Case of Action-Reaction Dynamics China's Military Spending Up 'Defensive in Nature' (China) Real defence spending at least double stated amount (US Report on China’s Military Power, March 2008) ‘uncertainty and lack of understanding of China’s intentions’ (US) South Korea says: 'Look at how many Destroyers Japan is Building', and if you ask the Japanese Navy they say: 'Look how many Destroyers China is Building (Paul Kennedy) China silent about military applications of its space program (US) China Anti-Satellite Test Jan 2007: first since Cold War ‘some sort of spread, if you like, of an arms race into outer space’ (Alexander Downer, Australia FM): uncertainty about intentions US shoot-down Feb 2008: tit-for-tat? Will US-Russian Security Dilemma Recur? ‘It is already clear that a new phase in the arms race is unfolding in the world." (Putin, Feb 2008) ‘We are being forced to take retaliatory steps’ ‘They are continuing to persuade us that they have no intention to use these bases in Poland and the Czech Republic against us, but they have to accept our argument as well - in such things it's the potential and not intentions which matters’- Russian FM Sergei Lavrov, March 2008 Can We Transcend the Security Dilemma? How to Reduce Uncertainty? More Cooperation & Transparency Security Communities like EU, NATO (Herz) First number is payoff for Player 1 Second number is payoff for Player 2 Etc. Stag Hunt Actors Seek a Common Goal But Concern Over Other's Understanding Can Lead to Defection from First Preference Finally, Variations! Number of Players Sequential Moves Repeated Plays Communication