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Morally good actions are the ones which are performed in accordance with our duties.
Kant's idea of duty is summarized by the Categorical Imperative, which is a duty for any rational creature. We've considered two formulations of the imperative: (1) The Formula of Universal Law, and (2) The Formula of Humanity.
Here it is, in simple terms:
1. Having sex with someone, while lacking her morally valid consent, is seriously wrong.
2. Deceiving another person into sex involves having sex with that person while lacking her morally valid consent.
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3. Therefore, deceiving someone into sex is seriously wrong.
Premise 1 is less controversial.
Dougherty wants to establish that non-consensual sex is a serious kind of wrong. This will get him the conclusion which he wants.
Roughly: we have a particular right to control our own bodies and what happens to them.
It is a violation of someone's rights (rather than a mere instance of harm) to do something to them to which they don't consent.
Consider cases of "rape by deception".
In these cases, we don't think that the action is wrong because of the harm the victim has suffered. Rather, we think that they are wrong because there has been a failure of consent.
Both views agree that "rape by deception" is wrong. But they disagree why it is so.
According to a fan of deontology like Dougherty, it is a failure of appropriate consent.
According to a consequentialist, it is an instance of harm - probably best understood as a "bad consequence".
Dougherty suggests that, if a deception is never uncovered, it is difficult to account for the harm which has been incurred.
But is he being too quick here?
This is the second premise of Dougherty's argument. It might be a bit surprising.
"Suppose that Chloe meets a hippie, Victoria, on a night out. Victoria makes it clear that she wants to have sex only with someone who shares her love of nature and peace.
Consequently, Chloe falsely claims to have spent time in a war zone as a humanitarian, when in fact she was there on military service. When Victoria asks whether she likes animals, Chloe omits the truth — “only to eat or to hunt” —and pretends to love petting them and watching them in the wild. As a result of this deception, the two spent a night together.
My claim is that Victoria did not validly consent to sex with Chloe.
I expect that most friends of the Lenient Thesis will insist that Victoria did validly consent to sex, even if they disapprove of Chloe’s deception on other grounds."
I agree to have Aisha's dog at my apartment. I hate Chihuahuas and she knows it. She tells me that her dog is a Great Dane.
I come home expecting to find Aisha's Great Dane. Turns out, it's a Chihuahua. I hate them.
"But you agreed," Aisha says, "You said it would be fine to have the dog in your house - and it didn't seem to matter to you whether it was a Great Dane!"
Dougherty's take-away: my consent to the dog staying at my place was not morally valid. Aisha and her dog have trespassed, entering my apartment without my consent!
Dougherty is not defending what he calls "The Lenient Thesis" which states that it's only a minor wrong to deceive another person into sex.
He thinks that most people will take the lenient thesis to be obviously true. However, he also thinks that it does not go far enough!
Dougherty thinks that the Lenient Thesis, unlike his own view, is based on "moralism about sex": the view that the moral status of sexual experiences is set by their objective features.
“One of the key achievements of waves of sexual liberations has been the promotion of a sexual pluralism that allows each individual to pursue his or her own conception of the sexual good, so to speak. Appropriately valued, sexual autonomy permits ‘individuals to act freely on their own unconstrained conception of what their bodies and their sexual capacities are for.’” (quote from Stephen Schulhofer).
Here's the contrast Dougherty wants to set up:
Sexual Moralism
Consent depends on what happens/what words are spoken
Lenient Thesis
Sexual Freedom
Consent depends on whether people were free to choose
Deceiving someone into sex is seriously wrong
We need some way to specify when someone is being genuinely autonomous in their preferences (rather than subtly coerced). Where do we put the line between what's allowed and what isn't?
One might worry: Dougherty hasn't really told us what really matters for respecting someone's autonomous consent.
Not all cases of deception actually undermine one's ability to consent. Some of them don't really matter to whether one has consented appropriately or not.
"In consenting, we intend to allow a restricted range of possibilities, where these restrictions are both implicit and explicit. Any actual interaction with our persons or property is consensual only if this interaction falls within this restricted range of permitted possibilities."
"Someone is deceived into sex when she forms
a false belief about a dealbreaker: the deception conceals a feature of the sexual encounter that makes a decisive difference to the victim’s decision to have sex." (731)
We need some way to distinguish innocent and bad deception. Where do we put the line between what's allowed and what isn't?
One might worry: Dougherty hasn't really told us what really matters for respecting someone's autonomous consent.
Dougherty's argument shares many of Kant's concerns: respect for others' autonomy and avoiding deception are both good examples of our duties.
Our worries about specifics could be obviated by invoking some Kantian principles about freedom, autonomy, and consent.
Do Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative offer specifications of what Dougherty could mean by "dealbreakers" and avoiding moralism?
Here are some reasons why you might be unhappy with Dougherty's argument.
Is there a way to make sense of our duties to ourselves which are not so restrictive?