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Justice & Peace

Set Backs and Achievements of Peru and Colombia
by

Jennifer Chaves

on 15 October 2013

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Transcript of Justice & Peace

Even though Perú is better off economically, inequality is worse (Rebecca K. Root, 130)
State has taken a hostile stance towards efforts of reconciliation
reconciliation would mean forgiving terrorists
Comisión multisectoral de alto nivel :
In charge of supervising reparations and reconciliation
Retributive justice (
backward looking
) and restorative justice (
forward looking
).
Duality of victims and perpetrators:
micropolitics of reconciliation calls for reintegration of combatants into society
Macropolitics of reconciliation would address the relation between
state and society
#LASP503
COLOMBIA:
ACTORS
Justice
Violence
Truth - Yuyanapaq
JUSTICE & PEACE: set backs and achievements of Peru and Colombia
P
E
R
Ú

VIOLENCE

Internal Armed Conflict
Longest armed conflict in the world
Multiple state and non-state actors
Complex nature
Polarization of Colombian society
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Finding balance between peace and justice
LESSONS LEARNED:
Reconciliation ...TBA
Dirty war in which the army and Shining Path rarely engaged in battle
Law 25237 - Desgined by Alan García to create a national council of peace
This alternative to a militaristic solution failed to reach consensus
After being captured, Guzmán rejected the arm struggle and called for peace
Post-conflict Perú has remained ambiguous, was the Truth Commission a peace-building process?
Micro Reconciliation
Politics of Macro Reconciliation
Vertical reconciliation
At the State/national level there is no such broad attemp:
it's not part of the politics
to this day, there is a total negation of the structural violence that precipitated the violence of the internal conflict
once a terrorist, always a terrorist.
No room for redemption, no space for dialogue, no reconciliation.
Why would they reconcile with the defeated?
The prevalent language is of "only the innocent have rights" (Theidon dixit)
legitimizes human rights violations in the past
There are no political leaders that are willing to articulate the roots of the conflict - socioeconomic and ethnocultural tensions - or employ the language of human rights
Hatun Willakuy - "The Great Story"
Origins
1980's
PCP-SL begins armed actions,burning ballot boxes in Chuschi.
Start of Fernando Belaunde’s administration
1981, the army was put in charge of the fight
First counter-insurgency operations by the armed forces; death of journalists in Uchuraccay
1985, massacre in Accomarca
Andean peasants accussed soldiers in Ayacucho of killing 59 people in a massacre.
Most victims were children and elderly people.
1990's
the two Perus exist to this day
Present
Center of colonial rule in South America for 300 years
Lima as the center of political and economic power
The colonial dynamic was carried over to the formation of the Republic
Ethnic composition:
Two nations within Perú
One is in the coast (Lima and northern provinces); the other is found in the rest of the territory
One is urbanized, and the other is rural
One is mestizo and white, and the other is indigenous
People of indigenous descent in Perú (31% or 45%)
The gap:
Developmental differences
Linguistic, geographic and cultural cleveages
Began with 48 combatants grew to approx. 18,000 by 2005
1984 formed the Patriotic Union Party (UP)
Political genocide
80s-90s high revenue from drug trafficking
90s on: Rural and urban youth caught between the fire and poverty join
Political exclusion
Access to state resources
National security strategies
FARC
since 1964
ELN
Since 1966
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion Nacional
Goes from 800 in 1986 to 4,500 in 2001
Resisted the conflict three main characteristics
Challenged Uribe's hard-line approach
Casa de Paz (House of Peace) 2005-2007
Late 2000s- Drug-trafficking in Narino?
“If the proportion of victims estimated for Ayacucho according to its population in 1993 had occurred in the same proportion in the entire country, the armed conflict would have caused nearly 1.2 million victims in all Perú..”
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Chernick 314)
" No queremos, ciertamente, que el socialismo sea en América calco y copia. Debe ser creación heroica. Tenemos que dar vida, con nuestra propia realidad, en nuestro propio lenguaje, al socialismo indoamericano.". -
José Carlos Mariátegui
"...that there is a real nation completely separate from the official nation is, of course, the great Peruvian problem...that people who participate in the 20th century can simultaneosly live in a country with people...who live in the 19th - if not to say the 18th - century." -
Mario Vargas Llosa dixit
"Peru is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country at the same time. Though this may seem as a paradox, this is a fact and has to be changed" -
Mariátegui dixit

Ley de Justicia y Paz (2005)
Applicable for paramilitaries responsible for serious crimes & drug trafficking
Reduced sentences (5-8)


Ley de Victimas
(2011)
Compensate ~4 million victims (1985-2021)
For land restitution (1991-2021)
Gov. to spend ~$50 billions
Marco Juridico para la Paz (2012)
Article I: Truth Commission led by Attorney General and Congress
Article III: Regulation of crimes to determine political participation
Article IV: Transfer of funds from military purposes to
social needs
Reforma al Fuer
o Militar
Crimes against humanity to be tried in Military court
The military already in jail will be transferred to their own facilities
PEACE PROCESSES
The CVR has established that
75%
of the
69 280 victims
spoke Quechua or other indigenous langauages as their mother tonge
Brutal counter-insurgency war in which
“indigenous peasant”
became conflated with
“terrorist.”
The geography of the conflict was delineated according to ethnoculural divisions
Most of the violence was experienced in the rural Andean and jungle areas, specially the Quechua and Ashaninka peoples -
"the other Perú
".
Ayacucho was one of the most heavily indigenous - impoverished and neglected- regions of Peru
40% of the victims came from Ayacucho
"Gonzalo Thought" was indifferent to indigenous cultures, traditions, and issuesimpossible to separate ethnicity and economic class in the highlands

why isn't this considered a genocide?
An ethnocultural war?
STATE
PARAMILITARIES

The two Perus have to horizontally reconcile
Fear has led people to support the authoritarian measures taken by Fujimori
Peruvian society is still polarized.
Fujimori's pardon
Abimael's pardon
Movadef has emerged as a political branch
Petition to be legitimized as a party
AUC- Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
"La Violencia" era of violence between Liberal & Conservatives from 1946 to 1965
WHO
Rural sector and rural poor
Women & youth
Afro-Colombians
Indigenous groups
At least 13% of Colombia's rural population is now displaced
About 1/3 of Colombia's displaced is of African descent
More than 1/2 are women
1/2 are under age 15
Historically polarized
Conservative v. Liberal Parties
Bogotazo after Gaitan's death
Political elites links with paramilitary groups
Parapolitica
As of 2008, 33 members of Congress were jailed
Armed Forces
falsos positivos
WHAT
Massacres
Selected killings
Disappearances
Kidnapping
Sexual violence
Child soldiers
Displacement
Torture
Founded by elite ranchers and farmers
range of groups based on regional dynamics
1998 AUC 6,000 grown to more than 30,000 by 2003
1970s-1980s: Death squad operations
1980s-1990s: drug trade funded private armies
1990s-present: consolidation and participation in public political life
Technology, orgs, & claims of HL recognition
Strong links with State Security Forces
~32,000 paramilitary demobilized (2003-2007)
government stipend
employment and education benefits
The conflict for land, power and impunity against Human Rights
Fujimori's fall opened a golden opportunity to address human right violations
Social pressure demanded for a formal investigation to uncover the truth
Transitional President Paniagua ordered the implementation of a Truth Comission in july of 2001.
Limits and objectives of the Commission :
Ivestigate human rights abuses from state forces and "terrorist organizations" from 1980 to 2000
Granted a total of 24 months to finish its tasks
Included regional centers
Collaborated with the International Commitee of the Red Cross, the Ombudsman of HR and NGOs to search for disappeared people
the main tasks encompassed:
Determine the roots of the conflict
Contribute to judicial processes by identifying HR violations
Outline plans for reparation
Design recommendations for reforms
CVR - Comisión de la verdad y la reconciliación

Despite the Pro-military and anti-human rights political discourse...

the CVR has supported the advancement of more than 300 prosecutions (Heyner, 129)
First Latin American commission to make public audiences.
The conclusions and recommendaions of the CVR has propelled most of these judicial processes
It has been efficient in creating a general consensus in the post-conflict Peruvian society
More than 500,000 copies of a summarized version of the CVR report have been distributed throughout Perú
Furthermore, the CVR has - for the most part - represented the needs of victims for redressing and pursuing justice
Except for violations to the collective rights of indigenous peoples. These have not been resolved
The CVR's results have

also reaffrimed democratic values
Results
Restorative Justice
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Violence I
Period 1980-2000
Fernando Belaunde Terry 1980-1985 (democratic)
Alan García 1985-1990 (democratic)
Alberto Fujimori 1990-2000 (authoritarian)
Economic
Hyperinflation, balance of payments, foreign debt – 80s
Neoliberal economic reform – 90s
Actors
Strong armed forces
Rondas Campesinas – Paramilitary
Insurgency
Shining Path – Maoist
MRTA – Castroist
Geography
Andes (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junin)
Closer to Lima, late 80s
**Contitutional Court reforms -- 2006**
Violence II
Violence sequence – HHRR Violations
1980 Shining Path launches war
1982 armed forces in charge in the Andean region
Constitutional guarantees suspended
1984 violence peaked (both sides)
1987 unleashes the armed forces
1988 First death squad formed
1991 Grupo Colina death squad formed
Brrios Altos, Nov 3, 1991
Cantuta, July 18, 1992
1992 (April 5) Self coup
Immunity from prosecution for armed forces
Military courts for suspected terrorists
Hooded/secret judges
Ashaninkas
Uribe 2002-2010
Ley de Alternatividad penal 2003
Presidential pardoning power
modeled off the M-19
El ojo que llora - The crying eye
Six programs developed by the CVR in consultation with civil society:
Mental and physical health services
Educational benefits
Restitution of citizens' rights and individual financial compensation
Symbolic reparation
Collective reparations
Victims will be remembered!
Violence III
Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzman, captured
Sept 12, 1992
Domestic prosecution for Barrios Altos massacre
Amnesty laws passed
Ad Hoc Review Commission
Active from 1995-1999
1,000 wrongly convicted released
No compensation or apology from the state
Withdrawal from the IACHR, August 24, 2000
Fujimori regime collapses
Nov 13, 2000 Fujimori flees country, faxes resignation
Massive evidence of corruption
Vladivideos
Transitional government installed Nov 16
DEMOCRATIC & EMANCIPATORY TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Effects
Victims' rights are in the forefront
Transformed victims into political actors
Allows for "from-below" proposals
Goals
Truth, justice and reparations
Inclusive justice system
Manipulative VERSUS
Democratic
in
COL
OMB
IA
a work in progress
Articulo 21:
1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Transition II
Transitional justice period begins
Peru returns to the IACHR
End to amnesties
New civilian trials for alleged terrorists
A Truth Commission
Truth commission was to be a precursor to trials
Broad public mandate for CVR (83% public support)
To make prosecution recommendations
Plans for wide-reaching reforms
Prosecution of those accused of grievous crimes
Peru signs Rome statute
Inter-America Democratic Charter
Peru’s major role
Atmosphere ready for firm steps toward
Retributive justice
Restorative justice
Transition I
Precipitated by the fall of Fujimori, 2000
Window of opportunity
Transition by collapse
Search for legitimacy, inevitable pressure from below
Valentin Paniagua as interim president for 8 months
Justice Cascade begins
Several prominent HHRR activists enter government
Pressure groups
Domestic human rights groups(ANFASEP, APRODEH, IDL, Coordinadora)
US State Dept.
HHRR-sympathetic governments
2000-2011
Peace without negotiations
Justice I
Implementation of the CVR recommendation
Re-trials for accused terrorists in civilian courts
Hundreds gained their freedom
Ordered by the IACHR
Abimael Guzman retried, and conviction held
Evidence gathered by the CVR used to convict him, Lucanamarca massacre
IACHR orders the release of a prisoner for the first time in Loayza-Tamayo vs Perú
Lori Berenson retried
Prosecution of suspected HHRR violators
22 investigations opened as a result of CVR recommendations
383 officers charged
Julio Salazar Monroe, head of intelligence, sentenced to 35 years
La Cantuta students massacre
4 other offices also sentenced for the massacre
General Clemente Noel remains free
Human Rights Defenders
Civil Society Leaders
Justice III
Obstacles to further justice
Military resistance
Military fueros
Reluctance to release documents
Political support of the military
The Right and Left shifted to align with the military
Attempts at amnesty laws (repealed)
Military gained the right to vote (138,000 new voters)
Overloaded justice system
Impossibility to order exhumations
“un limeño auténtico, hoy, ya no existe; debe ser el 4% de la población...El limeño nuevo es ese ser detestable, agresivo,
generalmente provinciano
, que ha entrado por la violencia a la ciudad, por la puerta falsa y quiere salir por la puerta principal” - Alfredo Bryce Echenique: Peruvian writer, recepient of the Order of the Sun and endangered limeño
http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/graficos/mapa-del-conflicto-colombiano
Justice II
Successes - Fujimori Trial and Conviction
Chile extradites Fujimori to stand trial for HHRR violations
Peruvian Supreme Court rejected Fujimori’s invocation of immunity as former head of state
Highest standards of due process
Found guilty on all counts, including human rights violations, 25 years
“The crimes for which they found Fujimori guilty formed part of a broader pattern of ‘state crimes’ that could not have been committed without the prior knowledge of high ranking government and military authorities, including Fujimori himself…The Court found evidence of a pattern of systematic violations of human rights and, drawing widely on international jurisprudence, defined these as ‘crimes against humanity’”. (Jo-Marie Burt)
First democratically-elected head state convicted for crimes against humanity
Violators of HHRR on both sides of the conflict share a prison.
Transition
"[The Ministry of Education] cannot present information against the state. We cannot. Being very sincere, we simply cannot. So we undertook a revision and we rewrote the sections about the State." - Coordinator of Recordándonos
Break
Truth Commissions are crucial tools for reconciliation
Transition by collapse created golden windows of opportunity
Progression of the Justice Cascade
Two steps forward and one back
Community based peace efforts are needed in Colombia
Manipulative transitional justice is not sustainable

Santos' government & FARC
72% of Colombian support
High transnational support
Mechanisms for citizen participation
ELN considers joining
Land & Rural development
1300 civilian participants sent 546 proposals
Full transcript