Contributing Factors
- Routine failure to brief simulated DTE scenarios
- Organizational neglect of Enlisted Combat Operators
- Lack of operationally-focused training for point defense weapons system
- Equipment onboard but not installed (LLLTV)
In your opinion, have things changed?
Direct/Indirect Causes
- The late decision of CDCO to simulate a NSSMS engagement
- Failure to brief TAS operator
- Lack of understanding of "Arm and Tune" and its significance
- Failure of TAS to questions SWC or TAO
- Failure to man TAS console during COND III
- Lack of standard phraseology and checklists for NSSMS firing sequence
The SARATOGA Incident
References
- Court of Inquiry Into The Circumstances Surrounding The USS SARATOGA (CV 60) Seasparrow Firing on TCG MAUVENET (DM 357) on 2 October 1992 dtd 18 November 1992
- US Circuit Court of Appeals No. 96-2167 AKTEPE v. USA dtd 20 February 1997
- Accidental Firing of a Missile into the Turkish Ship TCG
MAUVENET, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, October 5, 1992, Volume 4 ISBN 0-016-039776-6
Overview
Scene Setter
- Ships participating in EXERCISE DISPLAY DETERMINATION 92
- Ships repositioning for commencement of third phase of exercise (Enhanced Tactical Phase), including opposed transit of BROWN forces
* No plans to use NSSMS for engagement
- SARATOGA part of GREEN forces
- TCG MAUVENET part of BROWN forces
- Real world WHITE/SAFE
- Exercise RED/TIGHT
02 October 1992
What about weapons posture?
“…a series of independent actions and events…where SARATOGA
officers in the ship’s CDC were conducting a simulated surface
Seasparrow exercise…while the FC personnel in the NSSMS and TAS
in CDC were under the mistaken belief that it was an actual real-life engagement.”
“For fifteen minutes, both groups interacted and conducted a
methodical NSSMS launch sequence with neither group aware of the
other’s understanding of the engagement or, more importantly, each
other’s intentions.”
“The CDCO, TAO, and SWC intended only to conduct a simulated
attack…and verifying each step for the launch of a NSSMS salvo.”
Results
- CO receives Letter of Reprimand
- The following receive Admiral's NJP:
* CDCO
* OPSO
* TAO
* SWC
* FC1 A
* FC1 B
* FC3 T1
- USN leases ex-USS CAPODANNO to Turkey, which renames TCG MAUVENET
Sequence of Events (T + 20)
2340: FC1 A wakes TAS FC personnel sleeping in berthing (FC3 T1 and FC2 T1)
2345: SWC calls down to aft NSSMS and directs acquisition of surface contacts with local search mode. Acquisition unsuccessful.
2345: BROWN commander releases FLASH message assigning BROWN force ASUW tactical responsibilities. SARATOGA isn't included as INFO or ACTION addee.
Sequence of Events (T + 40)
Sequence of Events
What are your concerns at this point?
ss
0000: CDCO reports on TG CMD to NS that SARATOGA had "Birds Affirm, Birds Away, Salvo Size 2" on three GREEN force tracks
0002: TAO to TAS to FOC request how long before ready? FOC answers "45 seconds"
0003: TAO orders take track with two missiles
* CO neither on bridge nor in CDC; Batteries Release not requested
0003+: FOC says Birds Affirm
0004: TAS tells FOC "Free to Take"
Sequence of Events (T + 39)
Sequence of Events (T + 35)
2350: TAS manned by FC3 T1
* Initially no headset on station
* Console in training mode to silence recurring buzzer received from high-speed
aircraft in normal mode
2352: TAS sends track to Firing Officer Console (FOC) in aft port NSSMS (FC3 A1)
2354: TAS directs aft mount to "Arm & Tune" missiles. When asked by FOC if "this is the real thing", replied "this is real world."
2355-0000: FC3 A2 proceeds to launcher, putting eight Arm/Inhibit switches to ARM and both Safe/Operate plugs to OPERATE
0000: FOC starts process of assigning missiles (tuning).
What are yours concerns at this point?
TAO: ''What do you mean, 'birds away'?''
TAS: ''I thought you said this is real world.''
TAO: ''I never said this was real world! It's an exercise. It's all an exercise.''
TAS: "I thought you said this was real world...I thought this was real world."
0004: TAS releases Hold Fire button
0004: FOC assigns launcher to Director B , depresses Firing Authorized pushbutton, selects two missile salvo, and states "I'm prepared to fire." On TAS acknowledgement, pushes fire button.
0004:41: First missile fired
0004:43: Second missile fired
0004:58" First missile impact
0005: Second missile impact
0005+: CDC fully realizes missiles fired.
Actual Footage
Sequence of Events (T + 12)
- 5 crewmembers killed, including CO
- 14 crewmembers injured
- Extensive damage to superstructure,
fire, and water damage
2030: TAO calls OEM office; reaches FC1 A and tells to get NSSMS/TAS on station
2030: New SWC (LT) assumes the watch
* No passdown that SARATOGA would use NSSMS
2332: FC1 A calls FC1 B to wake up aft NSSMS operators
2335: FC1 B wakes up aft NSSMS operators (FC3 A1 and FC3 A2) in mount
2337: TAO calls FC1 A to check status of FC wakeups
* Urging him to hurry or he's going to announce "Air Defense Stations" over 1MC
What are your concerns at this point?
2030-2345: BROWN Force commander planning begins for the Enhanced Tactical Phase of EXERCISE DISPLAY DETERMINATION, working closely with SARATOGA ASUW Module.
2325: CDCO unilaterally decides to man NSSMS stations for simulated surface engagement against GREEN targets. CO not informed or aware.
* NSSMS operators previously told to stand-down after 50-hour exercise
Sequence of Events (T+0)