Enforcement of Human rights
open condemnation arising from public scrutiny, condemnation, findings of violation
States clearly lobby to avoid ‘shame’
Galvanise opposition
Lend credibility to opposition
Can have long-term corrosive effects
Can deprive countries of friends and influence
Can prompt stronger unilateral or multilateral sanctions
- slow to have on-the-ground effect
- not a level playing field
- can generate nationalistic backlash
- has the least effect on the most incorrigible governments
Security Council may authorise sanctions, including the use of force, against a State if it deems that that State is threatening “international peace and security”
Iraq (1991)
Somalia (1992)
Haiti (1994)
Libya (2011)
DISTINGUISH CH VI PEACEKEEPING
Problems with Security Council
Veto of the Permanent 5
Need 9 affirmative votes
No standing army so few resources
Responsibility to protect?
ICISS report
World Summit Outcome 2005
Numerous mentions in UN docs since
Levels of responsibility
DISTINGUISH PEACEKEEPING, CONSENT
Bangladesh 1970 (India)
Uganda 1979 (Tanzania)
Kampuchea/Cambodia 1979 (Vietnam)
Kosovo 1999 (NATO)
Iraq? 2003 (Coalition of the Willing)
Article 2(4): All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations
focus on Article 2(4)
responsibility to protect?
So long as certain conditions apply
Scale of abuse must be extreme
Motive
Last resort
Force used must be proportionate
Must be “good” humanitarian outcome
Strength of target state/imposing state
Effect on elite and effect on oppressed
Wishes of oppressed may be relevant (eg ANC)
Can take a very long time
‘Smart’ sanctions
Can lead to isolation of target government, loss of influence of sanctioning government
Economic sanctions
Diplomatic Sanctions
Sporting Sanctions
Individual criminal responsibility
The mobilisation of shame
Sarah Joseph
use of force
other sanctions
chapter vii
un cHARTER
Exception: Article 51 self defence
IRAN
GAZA
BURMA
IRAQ
ISRAEL
Sth Africa
unilateral humanitarian intervention
It is legal
it is illegal
orthodox position
rwanda
DRC
CAR
syria
mexico
SUDAN