Audio Transcript Auto-generated
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Hello everyone.
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This is William Roe.
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Today we're gonna be discussing a communication strategy about the
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potential O ring failures for the upcoming challenger space shuttle
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launch and the risk that could involve to introduce the
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topic. We want to describe our communication strategy and how
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we believe that will help prevent a disaster occurring on
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the challenger space shuttle launch.
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Looking at the content of this presentation, we'll have a
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general description of the scenario, we'll try to identify the
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stakeholders evolve, assess their backgrounds, how they're likely to respond
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to these communications, um where they're from, what their interests
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are. Things of that nature will next discuss the methods
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and the media that we intend to use the communication
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process, how we will receive and respond to feedback and
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a contingency plan in the event that our advice is
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not heated and this launch is not delayed.
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All right.
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So the scenario at hand and all of our previous
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cold weather launches, there has been evidence of O ring
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damage. This particular launch is scheduled to occur in sub
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freezing temperatures.
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We have a meeting tonight with our morton thiokol management
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team as well as Nasa representative for the solid rocket
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booster program to discuss our concerns about the safety of
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the O rings.
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We have derived the scenario from the presidential commission on
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the space shuttle challenger And the scenario will be set
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in modern times instead of 1986.
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Uh so that we can better discuss modern communication techniques
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such as video conferences, uh power point presentations, uh things
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like this, Prezi and other advances in media that would
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help us better communicate data.
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All right, so onto our strategy for communication, the first
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thing we need to do is identify who the stakeholders
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are. Then.
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We will discuss how we intend to communicate with the
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state quarters, look at the potential for feedback, how we
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will respond and handle that feedback and then we'll discuss
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our contingency plan.
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So the stakeholders are primary stakeholders.
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We have the engineering team here at morton fire call,
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our morton thiokol management team.
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Nasa and their representative and the final group of stakeholders
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on this list is the astronauts.
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They won't be directly involved in the decision making process.
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However, the results, the decision making process will have the
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largest and most direct impact on them.
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All right.
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So the engineering team here, we're looking at a group
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of people that are highly technically oriented and our experts
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on this particular field and the risks involved.
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We will be the ones presenting this data to the
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mortified Call Management Team and Nasa and making our recommendation
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to delay the launch mortified Call Management.
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Many of them do have a technical background.
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However, their primary concerns will be more related to the
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business and financial end.
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In that aspect, we will have to address the financial
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concerns that would result from delaying this launch.
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As far as Nasa is concerned, this is a highly
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publicized launch.
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So a delay in this launch does have political impacts
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for them to effectively communicate our recommendation to delay.
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We will also need to address those political indications.
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So for more than five calling NASA, it's going to
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be important to address the concerns of those particular stakeholders
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in a way that fits their backgrounds.
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Right. The next thing we want to look at is
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the communication plan.
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Right? So we need to highlight the data on a
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ring failures.
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Um, there's a pretty good chart here showing that o
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ring failures have occurred In almost every launch below 65°..
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So, if you look at the 24 launches of the
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challenger shuttle, you'll see a few o ring failures above
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65°.. However, The launches that have occurred below 65°,, every
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single one of them has an open o ring failure
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and as you get lower and lower in temperature, you
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have increasing rates of opening failures.
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This has allowed us to project that we are almost
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certainly going to have an O ring failure below that
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53 degrees.
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And at tomorrow's launch forecast temperature of 31 degrees.
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We have not had the ability to test that yet
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and prove the no ring will definitely fail below free
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one degrees.
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However, the data indicates that it is a highly likely
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scenario and that we should delay the launch and either
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run those tests or launch in warmer weather.
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So the next thing we're gonna need to discuss is
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the financial and political risks of a disaster for a
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mission With such a high profile right.
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This mission has one of the first civilians to launch
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in a Nasa shuttle and is heavily covered by the
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media. Any accidents that were to occur or if the
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shuttle were to have a catastrophic event that would be
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highly publicized and would greatly affect both the financial bottom
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line of morton thiokol and the political views on Nasa
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and the running of the space shuttle program from the
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public's point of view.
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Uh, the best way I think, to get them to
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delay the launch is present a path forward.
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We can't just say, don't launch and then leave it
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to them to figure out what to do next.
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If we present a path forward with steps goals, measurable
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milestones of how we can proceed to a launch, then
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we are much more likely to get the launch delayed
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and prevent a dangerous situation to accomplish this.
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However, it will be necessary to speak with confidence, using
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good body language.
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There's really no room for weak resolve in this scenario.
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There will be a lot of pushback trying to get
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the launch to happen.
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There's a lot of pressure on both the management team
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and Nasa to get the launch off and get it
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off on time in order to counter that.
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It will require a good amount of confidence and a
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strong resolve.
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Alright, so now we're gonna look at feedback.
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So the feedback portion of this, she'll come throughout the
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meeting as well as in a question and answer type
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sessions towards the end of the meeting as engineering team.
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You must be ready for technical questions.
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You've got to have the answers, will be able to
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quickly get the answers for any technical questions about why
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you were recommending to delay the launch.
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The next thing to keep in mind is uh, we
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need to be prepared to reiterate the cost of a
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potential disaster.
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Like I said earlier, both the financial and political aspects
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should be addressed to help address the concerns of the
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different stakeholders.
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It's going to be important to be authoritative, be firm,
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be confident, but you don't want to be combative or
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seem angry or demeaning in your speech that are just
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alienate the stakeholders and you are less likely to have
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an effective communication.
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Another thing that we can look at doing is asking
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the stakeholders to tell us what they think the data
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indicates. Um, if there's pushback on things like maybe the
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launch though and won't fail and the launch and proceed
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again, show them the data asked him to tell us
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what data they're drawing from that mason think that the
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launch should proceed and then finally repeat the path forward.
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That frequent reputation of a path forward helps establish the
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idea of this potential optional path to achieve everyone's ghouls,
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establishing that path in the stakeholders minds gives us a
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chance to direct action instead of just telling them don't
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do this.
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Now come up with your own path forward.
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Presenting that path forward greatly increases our chance of delaying
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the launch and finally, we have a backup plan.
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Backup plan is a last ditch, drastic effort to prevent
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disaster. This should only be put in place if every
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other way of delaying and this launch has failed.
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Obviously we should route up internally, route up through Nasa.
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Try to get this launch delayed within the organizations before
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putting a plan like this into effect.
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However, as a team, we are fairly certain that a
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disaster will occur if this rocket launches and that disaster
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will result in the loss of life and a billion
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dollar spacecraft.
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So as a backup plan, we know that this launch
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is heavily covered by the media.
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We can bring our concerns and our data to the
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media. Let them cover it.
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Let them show it to the public before the launch
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occurs. That high profile media coverage will force Nasa and
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morton thiokol to delay the launch.
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However, there will be high personal and organizational costs to
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that decision.
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Bringing that to the public would show that you did
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not have confidence in Nasa's management or your own management
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team to make the safe decision that's going to alienate
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them and it's going to have political and financial costs.
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People on the outside will judge the Nasa and morton
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thiokol management teams probably quite harshly for this.
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And for this reason, this backup plan is a last
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ditch effort to present disaster.
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All right.
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So now we're gonna move on to a conclusion.
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The planning that goes into a complicated and important communication
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event is vital for the success of that communication.
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The things you need to look at is the kind
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of things that we've laid out here in this plan.
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We've assessed the stakeholders.
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We've looked at who they are, what their values are,
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what their concerns are, what their goals are doing.
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That helps you know how they're going to respond to
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communication, what kind of concerns you need to address, how
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to address those concerns and how to move them in
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the direction you need them to go.
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Uh The next thing we've done is outlined our communication
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plan, how we intend to communicate to all those different
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stakeholders and parties on this example, it's a meeting in
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a video conference.
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The next thing to look at is preparing a response
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to feedback.
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So if you have assessed your stakeholders, if you understand
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their needs concern, schools, et cetera.
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It helps you to look at what kind of feedback
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you were likely to get from them and prepare responses
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for that feedback.
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That's not saying there won't be surprises, There won't be
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questions you didn't see coming.
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However, it allows you to prepare a general plan for
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how you intend to respond to feedback.
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And then finally, we've created a backup plan, the contingency
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plan for what to do if this communication fails.
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So no matter how well you plan, the best laid
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plans are vulnerable to failure.
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In that scenario, you were best chance for success is
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to have a backup plan, have an idea of what
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you will do next if your plan fails.
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So we have concluded that the kind of backup plan
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into this presentation and finally, we will take a look
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at our references.
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So to develop this, we looked at Breckenridge is E.
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I, on leadership, from the center Creative Leadership, talking about
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emotional intelligence um and helping to lay out the need
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to use good body language and firm language.
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I've used Edward toughs figure from the space shuttle challenger
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decision right.
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That shows the different launches at different temperatures.
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Also looked at lutherans and Stewart's general contingency theory, that
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is kind of what directs us to look at the
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different stakeholders to assess them.
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There are multiple other articles and books on this idea
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of assessing all the different stakeholders, contingencies and parties.
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This particular one is useful.
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And then finally we developed the whole scenario from the
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Presidential Commission on the Space Charter challenger accident.
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This occurred in 1986 however, I've moved it to today
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In order to help better present an understanding of modern
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communication tools that they didn't necessarily have in 1986.
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All right, and that concludes the presentation.
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If anybody has any questions, let me know, and I'll
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be glad to answer them.