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The Russian main offensive against Germany was set for 14 June. Brusilov immediately informed his four army commanders of the projected offensive. His instructions proved to be both unique and significant. First, enormous numbers of artillery batteries and reserves were to be concentrated on one specific section at the front of each of the four armies. Second, enemy barbed-wire emplacements and defensive trenches had to be destroyed by preparatory artillery barrages. The infantry would then attack with the support of continuing artillery barrages, ultimately resulting in that portion of the front collapsing, which would force other neighboring sections also to withdraw. Massive barrages would cover the entire two-hundred-mile front to keep the enemy off balance and preclude rapid and effective insertion of reserves.
Brusilov’s proposal was approved; however, because the main emphasis was the German front, no additional troops, artillery, or ammunition would be provided for the effort. Thus, the tsarist armies had a mere 130,000-soldier majority count on a two-hundred-mile front.
In December 1915 the Russians launched a two-army offensive against the Austro-Hungarian right-flank positions near the Romanian frontier. Austro-Hungarian commanders were successful in utilizing artillery to maintain their troops’ perseverance in battle. Much to their advantage, the Austro-Hungarians also made better use of their reserves.
Brusilov gatherd four armies totaling 40 infantry divisions and 15 cavalry divisions. He faced 39 Austrian infantry divisions and 10 cavalry divisions, formed in a row of three defensive lines. Brusilov, knowing he would not receive significant reinforcements, moved his reserves up to the front line. He used them to dig entrenchments about 300 meters long and 90 meters wide all along the front line. The Russians secretly crept to within 100 yards of the Austrian lines and at some points as close as 75 yards. Brusilov prepared for a surprise assault along a 300-mile front.
The brusilov offensive, also known
as the june advance, was considered
the triple entente's greatest victory.
The Brusilov offensive was one of the
bloodiest battles in world history.
Casualties ranged from 1,000,000 on the Russian side to 1,325,000 total from the german and austria-hungary side.
The Austro-Hungarian victory of December 1915 is critical to understanding the Brusilov Offensive of June 1916. While Brusilov learned from these earlier mistakes, the Habsburg Supreme Command was misled by the victory and became overly confident in the strength of their defensive positions.
The offensive began with the Russians destroying the Austrian Fourth and Seventh Armies. The Austrians lost a staggering 1.5 million men (including 400,000 taken prisoner) and ceded some 25,000 square kilometres of ground.
German defensive positions were much too strong, they contended, and the Russian armies lacked sufficient heavy artillery. Brusilov argued in favor of launching an offensive on his front, emphasizing that such an attack would pin down Habsburg forces and divert their reserves, thereby greatly assisting the projected northern offensive.
In the early hours of 4 June 1916, Russian artillery fired along the entire Austro-Hungarian front, signaling the commencement of the attack. The intensity of the artillery barrage far exceeded any previous engagement in the east. The Russians had profited from their tactical mistakes of January and March 1916, and they now had amassed superior artillery for the offensive, while the Habsburg High Command had unwisely removed fifteen heavy-artillery batteries and multi-battle-tried divisions from the Russian front for service against Italy
Enemy reserves were rushed in but hurled into battle in such small numbers that they proved ineffective. Enemy reserves had been rapidly committed, and Russian artillery could decimate the tightly packed Austrian forward trenches— where two-thirds of the manpower was located, as in the earlier 1916 battle. The result was a frightful number of casualties in the Austro-Hungarian lines.
Such clever tactics, new to the Russian army, came from Brusilov’s perception that previous Allied offensives had failed because the days-long artillery preparation destroyed any possibility of surprise.
The Fourth Army's strength dropping from 117,000 to 28,000 men in twenty-four hours, much more than the official version of 54 percent losses. These enormous losses, much more than 50 percent of fighting strength of the two armies (the Fourth and Seventh), were a result of the lack of sufficient heavy artillery support, poor coordination between infantry and artillery, and the loss of supporting artillery pieces.
At the same time the Russians surprisingly and rapidly achieved victory over the Austrian Fourth Army near Lutsk.
Other clever tactics put to use on the battlefield by Brusilov included the uniform forward movement of Russian trenches on the entire front to within two or three hundred feet of the enemy positions in order to hide each specific attack position just before the assault.
A few days before the offensive, shock troops and artillery batteries were shifted under the cloak of darkness to the front lines to achieve complete surprise. Replicas of Habsburg trenches were built far behind the front to allow mock-attack training for the tsarist troops.
Large dugouts with high ramparts were constructed along the front to hide the assembling reserve units. This strategy prevented the opposing Habsburg forces from massing troops at any one threatened location as they had successfully done in the 1915-1916 Bukovina campaign.
Citation
Tunstall, Graydon A., and David L. Ruffley. "Brusilov Offensive: Did the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 Demonstrate the Vigor of the Russian Army?" History in Dispute. Ed. Dennis Showalter. Vol. 9: World War I: Second Series. Detroit: St. James Press, 2002. 60-66. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 18 Feb. 2013.