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"One of the fundamental pillars of the
sovereignty of the modern nation-state is its
monopoly of legitimate violence both within
the national spac and against other nations.
Within the nation, the state not only has an
overwhelming material advantage over all
other social forces in its capacity for violence,
it also is the only social actor whose exercise
of violence is legal and legitimate." - Hardt and Negri
The Zapatista movement in Mexico provides a seminal case of
"social netwar." In January 1994, a guerrilla-like insurgency begun in
Chiapas by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), and the
Mexican government's response to it, aroused a multitude of civil-
society activists associated with a variety of nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) to "swarm"—electronically as well as physically—
from the United States, Canada, and elsewhere into Mexico City and
Chiapas. There, they linked up with Mexican NGOs to voice solidar-
ity with the EZLN's demands and to press for nonviolent change.
Thus, what began as a violent insurgency in an isolated region mu-
tated into a nonviolent though no less disruptive "social netwar" that
engaged activists from far and wide and had both national and for-
eign repercussions for Mexico.
The information revolution is leading to the rise of network forms of
organization, whereby small, previously isolated groups can communicate, link up, and conduct coordinated joint actions as never before. This, in turn, is leading to a new mode of conflict— "netwar"—in which the protagonists depend on using network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology. Many actors across the spectrum of conflict—from terrorists, guerrillas, and criminals who pose security threats to social activists who do not—are developing netwar designs and capabilities.
The insurrection by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)
erupted on New Year's Day 1994, when one to two thousand
variously armed insurgents occupied five towns and a city, San Cristobal
de las Casas, in the highlands of Mexico's southernmost state, Chia-
pas. Over the next few days, the EZLN declared war on the Mexican
government, vowed to march on Mexico City, proclaimed a revolu-
tionary agenda, began an international media campaign for sympa-
thy and support, and invited foreign observers and monitors to come
to Chiapas.
It has shaken the foundations of the Mexican political system, by creating
extraordinary pressure for democratic reforms and raising the specter of instability in America's next-door neighbor. More to the point, it is inspiring radical activists around the world to begin
thinking that old models of struggle—ones that call for building "parties" and "fronts" and "focos" to "crush the state" and "seize power"_are not the way to go in the information age. A new concept, akin to the Zapatista movement, is emerging that aims to draw on the power of "networks" and strengthen "global civil society" in order to counterbalance state and market actors.
Changing formations of resistance requires 3 Guiding Principles that help us understand its evolution:
i) There is always a historical reference that refers to the most effective method for combating a specific form of power.
ii) In each era, the model of resistance that proves to be most effective turns out to have the same form as the dominant models of economic and social production.
iii) Each new form of resistance is aimed at addressing the undemocratic qualities of previous forms, creating a chain of ever more democratic movements
In the 2011 “Arab Spring” protests, social media networks played an important role in
the rapid disintegration of at least two regimes, Tunisia and Egypt, while also
contributing to sociopolitical mobilization in Bahrain and Syria
The profile of the most active users—young, urban, and relatively educated—
fully correspond to the core of the first anti-government protesters in January that later
led to a larger and more mass-based campaign. Overall, the input of the social media
networks was critical in performing two overlapping functions: (a) organizing the
protests and (b) disseminating information about them, including publicizing
protesters’ demands internationally
While the Tunisian government blocked certain routes and
singled out specific sites that coordinated protest actions, the response from Egypt’s
government was qualitatively harsher, even unprecedented in Internet history. Having
first blocked Twitter and Facebook, the Egyptian authorities moved directly to ordering
all major telecommunications providers to block Internet access; Telecom Egypt,
Vodafone/Raya, Link Egypt, Etisalat Misr, and Internet Egypt all complied. As a result,
93 percent of Egypt’s Internet addresses and networks were shut down.
Also, while effective as a grassroots tool to bring down an authoritarian
regime, social media-based network activism may not be best suited for political
competition at the stage of “post-revolutionary” state-building, governance reform, and
institutionalized politics in general, compared to more institutionalized and better
organized actors.