Spot the Difference
The Role of the Secretary-General
[a form of "early warning" procedure]
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
1980
1990
Portugal's Colonial Wars
Hammerskjold - 1960, Congo
Waldheim - 1979, Iran
Perez de Cuellar - 1989, Lebanon
"It is article 99 more than any other which was considered by the drafters of the Charter to have transformed the Secretary-General from a purely administrative official to one with an explicit political responsibility" - Dag Hammarskjold
* SC Resolutions 180, 183, 218, 275 (1963-1969) - condemning Portuguese colonialism in general terms, "disturbs" peace & security (GB, Fr, US consistently abstain)
Chapter VIII and Regional Responses
Explicit right to take political initiative, but also (more important) implicit right to investigate, negotiate, arbitrate...
'quiet diplomacy'
[ "no point jumping into an empty swimming pool" ]
* authorises and encourages regional organisations to resolve disputes prior to intervention by the UN Security Council
* but Article 53:
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."
* what is meant by "regional"?
* benefits of regional responses?
* pitfalls/drawbacks?
* SC Resolution 290 (1970) - condemned violation of Guinea's territorial integrity; "the presence of Portuguese colonialism on the African continent is a serious threat to the peace and security of independent African States" (GB, Fr, US abstain)
* SC Resolution 295 (1971) - only mentioned Guinea's territorial integrity - passed unanimously
AFISMA - "African-led International Support Mission to Mali"
* initial ECOWAS plan rejected by SC as lacking sufficient detail
* Oct 2012 - French written resolution SC 2071 approves African-led force to assist the Mali army in combating militants
* Dec 2012 - SC 2085 "authorizes the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year"
- plan was to deploy in Sept 2013
* Jan 2013 - French intervention, ECOWAS subsequently deploys AFISMA troops
Cold War era conflicts - UN inaction/impotence
Angola, Mozambique 1961-1974
Falklands / Malvinas 1982
UN Operation in Congo 1960-64
Collective Security
Collective Security
& the Cold War
* attack on one treated as attack on all
* expansion of right to act in self-defence
* all states join forces to prevent any one state from using coercion/force to gain advantage
* 1960 - Congolese independence, continued Belgian interference
* Congolese authorities requested UN military assistance against external aggression
* SC Resolution 143 (1960) > 8:0 in favour including US & USSR (France, Britain, China abstaining)
- called for Belgian withdrawal of troops
- ONUC > peacekeeping force initially but would later become first UN mission with Chapter VII enforcement powers
* SC Resolutions 145, 146 (1960) > Congo a unitary state, Belgium must withdraw, UN forces to enter Katanga (but no use of force)
* USSR supporting PM Lumumba, sent military assistance after UN refusal to use force in Katanga; US increasingly supporting President Kasa-Vubu and army chief Mobutu. 1961 Lumumba assassinated.
* SC Resolution 161 (1961) > authorised 'all appropriate measures' to 'prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including ... the use of force, if necessary'. Political negotiations continue. Operation Rumpunch in Katanga.
* S-G Dag Hammarskjöld killed in plane crash while negotiating ceasefire in Katanga. Irish UN troops besieged, killed.
*SC Resolution 169 (1961) > 'vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary'
* 1962 - UN Operation Grand Slam ends Katanga seccession; phasing out of UN mission begins in early 1963 while Marxist rebellions in other provinces continue. UN withdrawal complete by 1964, from a unified Congo, but...
* UN scarred by the experience: intervention triggered further instability; lack of agreement among members as to how to execute the mandate; ended up morphing from neutral peacekeepers into enforcement army for the central government, from dealing with an international dispute to a domestic one; significant casualties suffered; loss of S-G; debt incurred nearly bankrupted the UN; fighting resumed following ONUC's departure. Experience would inform cautious UN attitudes to peacekeeping over following decades.
The hunters, the stag and the rabbit
- gaps in the collective effort
GA Resolution 377 (1950) - Uniting for Peace
* Security Council stalemate over Korea once Soviet Union returned in late 1950
"if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
* 'Emergency session' mechanism - ten emergency sessions since 1950 (Middle-East, Hungary, Congo, Afghanistan, Palestine, Namibia)
* Contentious views of 377:
> has become customary norm of international law allowing circumvention of the veto
power (Security Council role is primary but not exclusive)
- vs. -
> an illegal and invalid attempted alteration of the UN Charter, SC retains sole
authority on peace & security
GAPS in the collective security effort (Cold War and beyond):
> regional/ideological military alliances - incompatible with global collective security
> impracticality of enforcement against P5/nuclear powers/economic powers
> sanctions also cost the collective defenders – trading partners
> based on false assumption of non-discrimination - that all 'victims' will be seen as equally important to the collective interest
> difficulties in agreeing, organising and enforcing collectively
*Successful collective security requires CONSENSUS, COMMITMENT, ORGANISATION
"By its very nature, collective security is a legal principle, while the balance of power is a principle of political convenience" - Hans Kelsen
Korea 1950
the P5 veto power
* half the vetoes in the history of the Security Council were cast by the Soviet Union; vast majority before 1965 - Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov aka "Mr. Veto"
*155 vetoes cast since 1966; 133 of which issued by one of the council's three NATO members
* SC Resolution 82 - initial condemnation of aggression by N.Korea, labelled situation a breach of the peace
* SC Resolution 83 - approval of assistance to S.Korea and military action against N.Korea
* SC Resolution 84 - UN members to assist S. Korea by making military forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the US
(all in USSR's absence)
* Soviet return to SC table made implementation of resolutions difficult
* Not strictly application of collective security - UN authorised the use of force rather than imposing itself
* S-G Tryvge Lie isolated by Soviets for taking position against N. Korea and forced to resign
* lack of cooperation between the big powers as an obstacle to collective security during the Cold War >> veto use/threat merely the manifestation of this lack of CONSENSUS
Cold War era conflicts - UN action
(exceptions to the dominant trend)