Apollo 13: How Communication and Teamwork can create a "Successful Failure"

Apollo 13:

How Communication and Teamwork can create a "Successful Failure"

In a complex web

- Apollo 13 Review Board, 1971

Three distinct stages of

Thank you for watching and listening...

Credit: NASA

"Only outstanding performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other members of the team which supported the operations successfully returned the crew to Earth."

Exceptional Communication and Teamwork

Poor Communication and Teamwork

Can overcome the greatest of adversities and ensure success

Communication

Played an integral part in creating a "Successful Failure"

Apollo 13

Negatively affects engineering projects

and

Personality Types and Learning Styles

Teamwork

Credit: NASA

Poor levels of Communication and Teamwork

Satisfactory levels of Communication and Teamwork

Started a chain of events that caused the explosion

Procedure was followed as fitting a professional organisation

Design & Assembly

NASA relied on Communication and Teamwork between individuals and departments...

Launch and initial stages of flight

Credit: NASA

After the explosion

Credit: NASA

Exceptional levels of Communication and Teamwork

Set the standard for future missions

The SM used cubic filters

The LM used tubular filters

-

Filters cartridges were incompatible

filters

2

CO

Spark initiated the explosion

-

Caused by damaged internal components

Oxygen tank explosion

Unaware that the tank had previously been dropped

Due to warning system being muted

Due to the loose filler tube

-

Rapid increase of internal pressure went undetected

The detanking procedure was unable to be completed

-

During testing

Oxygen tank pressure

Incomplete and inaccurate information used

Without a detailed understanding of the tank or its history

-

A new procedure was created as a "work-around"

Detanking Procedure

Relaxed & informal

Design flaws in the tank assembly

-

Installation of the incorrect heater assembly

Damaged internal components

-

The internal filler tube had been knocked loose

Because of the design flaw, the internal components could not be checked properly for damage

New detanking Procedure

-

Was muted due to fault

-

Due to damaged components in the tank

Occurred during preparation of Apollo 10 - the tank was dropped about 5 cm

Became faulty during the flight

-

Contractor

Oxygen Tank #2 was damaged

Oxygen tank warning system

NASA

Poor communication was two-fold:

- Apollo 13 Review Board, 1971

Heater assembly for tank was changed from a 28V unit to a 65V unit

both

Components used were dangerous for the environment subjected to

Change in specifications

internally

& externally

Design didn't allow for a physical inspection of internal components

-

Designers and Manufacturer didn't communicate in regards to design flaws:

Oxygen Tank design

Facilitates recovery from the stress and pressure

Credit: Gompute.com

Interpersonal relationships

with an "unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving design"

Professional relationships

Poor levels of Communication and Teamwork were defining the course of Apollo 13's future

Confidence in self & others

Credit: NASA

Trust in other team members

In a complex web

Teamwork and Communication

History

Design & Assembly

Public

Contractor Technicians

Contactor Management

Media

Astronauts

-

Design Engineers

Debrief

-

Congress

Systems Engineers

-

Mission Control

-

Strengthens:

-

NASA Management

of roles and responsibilities

Are there any questions?

2 Personality Type theories &

2 Learning Style theories

This kept the public informed with accurate and timely information.

Through reflective learning from the Apollo 1 incident NASA realized the importance of communication with the public

Two media personnel were selected by the world's media

Media Liaisons

- Didn't broadcast a live interview with astronauts

The media was bored with Apollo flights

- One Print and one TV

- Avoided speculation

-

Organisational Attitude

After the Apollo 1 incident a new sense of responsibility developed.

were applied retrospectively to

Reinforced need for competence and accountability

Minor incidents dealt with quickly and smoothly

Accentuated need for greater integrity and better communication policies

Credit: NASA

"The Kranz Dictum", 1967

"Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble and so were we. The simulators were not working, Mission Control was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily. Nothing we did had any shelf life. Not one of us stood up and said, 'Dammit, stop!' I don't know what Thompson's committee will find as the cause, but I know what I find. We are the cause! We were not ready! We did not do our job. We were rolling the dice, hoping that things would come together by launch day, when in our hearts we knew it would take a miracle. We were pushing the schedule and betting that the Cape would slip before we did. From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: 'Tough' and 'Competent.' Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities. Every time we walk into Mission Control we will know what we stand for. Competent means we will never take anything for granted. We will never be found short in our knowledge and in our skills. Mission Control will be perfect. When you leave this meeting today you will go to your office and the first thing you will do there is to write 'Tough and Competent' on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room these words will remind you of the price paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the price of admission to the ranks of Mission Control." - The Kranz Dictum, 1967

-

Launch and Initial Stages of Flight

Satisfactory levels of Teamwork and Communication

Procedures were followed as fitting a professional organisation.

- Kranz, 2000

Each team worked independently of the others

Effective communication between the teams was crucial

"The handovers... were smoother than on an Olympic relay team."

Shift Changes

Required to pass on all relevant information

Minimal loss of information and time

Facilitate a seamless transition

-

NASA & it's Engineers

Flight Directors Role

Flight Controllers communicated directly with the head authority

Flight Director now the sole figure responsible for mission success

Had power and responsibility to "take any action necessary for mission success."

Significantly reduced decision making time

-

-

So what happened in the case of Apollo 13?

MBTI

The styles of Communication and Teamwork displayed were assessed and analysed

using

Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator, Keirsey's Termperament Groups, Kolb's Learning Style Inventory & Felder et al.'s Index of Learning Styles.

Keirsey

Kolb

Felder

Credit: Salemmarafi.com

Credit: NASA

After the explosion

The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation

These theories show...

Outstanding Communication, Teamwork and Leadership during periods of high stress and pressure

- Kranz, 1971

- Allowed efficient flow of communication

- Everyone became a part of the solution.

Formation of sub teams

- Allowed delegation of tasks

- Alligned and maintained focus

“A 100 percent correct answer, too late to be of use, was worthless."

• Organisational influences

• The unsafe acts themselves

• Preconditions for unsafe acts

Strong Leadership was integral

• Unsafe supervision

Solutions had to be communicated and executed with 100% accuracy

Credit: NASA

Between Mission Control and the Astronauts was critical

Effective Communication

Credit: NASA

Four areas within which failure can occur.

This set the benchmark for not only future missions at NASA, but also future engineering projects worldwide.

The level of

Communication and Teamwork

Presidential Medal of Freedom

displayed during the crisis was so exemplary that the

was awarded to NASA

Credit: NASA

"Engineering organizations are a particular specialization of business industrial organizations and clearly have distinct character, culture and style."

NASA's engineers appear to concure with this correlation

Synonymous with the demands and requirements of engineering work.

Engineers in general exhibit similar Personality Types and Learning Styles;

The concentration of these can define an organisations' culture and behaviour.

-Briggs & Little, 2007

Credit: Dreyfus, 1991

MBTI and Keirsey

it's impact and role

NASA communicated to the public and congress via the media

Media:

Credit: Derro & Williams, 2009

Press Conference held within 3 hours of the crisis

Media portrayed Apollo 13 as a "triumph of teamwork, initiative and ingenuity" - Kauffman, 2001

"When things are going well, tell the media everything they want to know; when things are going badly, tell them even more." - NASA Media Unit

which allows parallels to be drawn between preferred Learning Styles and Personality Type

Credit: NASA

Personality Type and Learning Style analysis.

Flight Director Gene Kranz

Troubleshooter (MBTI) with S & P attributes

Learned and developed his leadership skills through experience

Global and Intuitive Learner (Felder)

Accomodator (Kolb)

Artisian (Keirsey)

Analysed as:

was applied

-

a high concentration of similar learning styles was indicated.

to NASA and it's engineers

Kolb

When

It was an amalgamation of minds and ideas: Felder, Soloman & Silverman

However its primary role when designed was a direct application to engineers.

is similar to Kolb

Felder

Credit: ScienceDirect.com

- The Kranz Dictum, 1967

"Tough & Competent"

Reactive

Reflective Learning

Adaptable

dictated by culture and staff personality

Organisational Behaviour