IOCL, Jaipur Fire

Jaipur

• The October fire at Indian Oil Corporation’s (IOC) Jaipur terminal was caused by the non-observance of normal safety procedures, according to the report of a committee set up by the government to probe the mishap.
• The fire raged for 11 days, killed 11 people and resulted in losses worth Rs 280 crore.
• “The basic or root causes were an absence of site-specific written operating procedures, absence of leak-stopping devices from a remote location and insufficient understanding of hazards and risks and consequences,” said the report.

• The October fire at Indian Oil Corporati...

View of all 11 tanks

Effects / Losses of the Burst Out

• 12+ people died.
• 150+ injured.
• $65,000,000 (Rs. 500 Crores) Property /Product damage.
• More than 80,00,000 liters petroleum products burnt.
• Environmental impact, beyond imagination!
• Fire could seen from 20km away.
• Glasses of periphery buildings were shattered.
• Many vehicles got badly damaged.
• It will take minimum 12 to 18 months to rebuild the facility.
• Nearby factory and houses also catched fire.
• Many people in surrounding areas complained about breathing problems.

Near by population on Run

Control Room & Maint. Building

Demolished Emergency Response Centre near Gate

Fire water Pump House

Collapsed car shed in the terminal

Terminal Office Building

Tank Truck Loading Gantry

Extent of Damage

Demolished Smoking Booth near Boundary Wall

KBPL Pumping Station

Ruptured pipelines

Terminal Pumping Station

Business Continuity Centre

Damage to Vehicles

Maintenance Building near gate

Damage at nearby car Showroom

Overturned Fire Monitor

Pictorial Depiction

Time-Line

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

• Explosion occurred to the tune of approximately 20 Tons of TNT.
• Nine of the total 11 tanks caught fire immediately after first explosion. Balance two tanks(at a distance) caught fire after some time.
• Decision was taken to allow the fuel(60,000 KL) to burn as all fixed fire fighting facilities at the location got demolished.
• Building in the immediate neighbourhood of the terminal were heavily damaged.
• Minor damages & window pane breakage occurred up to 2 KM distance from the facility.
• Total loss due to fire & explosion including loss of product, stores, fixed assets, compensation for third party losses were approximately $ 60 million

Pictorial Depiction of the Incident

Possible Scenarios

Scenario-I

• MOV was in open condition before the start of hammer blind reversal job. Opened by someone anytime between the previous blinding operation and 29.10.2009.

Scenario-II

• MOV opened accidentally when the blind was being reversed (due to spurious signal or manually).

Amongst the two Scenarios, Scenarios-I, that the MOV was in open condition before the start of the hammer blind reversal job, appear to be more likely.

Source of Ignition

• As Vapour Cloud spread in such a large area , the source of fire can be anything inside or outside the installation.

• The Non flameproof electrical fittings in administration block located in the south western direction of the terminal or Spark during starting of the vehicle at the installation are probable cause of source of fire.

Kerosene tanks

Fire on Three MS Tanks

HSD Tanks on 2rd day

Over pressurised Lube oil Drums near tanks in Fire Many Exploded

MS Tank collapsed

PLT Line up

Contributing Factors

• Non-availability of one of the shift workman, who was supposed to be on duty.
• Control room remaining unmanned due to above.
• Absence of specific written-down procedures for the works to be undertaken and, therefore, reliance on practices.
• Opening of the HOV before completion of hammer blind reversal operation.
• Not checking the MOV for its open/close status and not locking it in Closed position.
• Not using proper protective equipment while attempting rescue work.
• Initiation of the critical activity after normal working hours, leading to delay in response to the situation.
• Non-availability of second alternate emergency exit.
• Proximity of industries, institutes, residential complexes etc. close to the boundary wall.

Scenes of Fire

Scene of Fire

Kerosene tank & MS tanks(Behind)

Resque Operations

• Within minutes, two dozen fire extinguishers were rushed to the spot.
• 5 KM periphery area declared as “Dangerous zone.”
• The surrounding area has been evacuated and power cut off.
• 500,000 people shifted to safe location.
• The injured have been rushed to three major hospitals of Jaipur including the SMS hospital.
• All the factories and institution operating from the Sitapura industrial area have been asked to shift manpower to a different location.
• 300 army men helped with rescue, as some people were feared trapped in the depot.
• Cold water mixed with foam has been sprayed on the pipeline of LPG storage tankers located near the petroleum depot to keep it cool and unaffected from the heat generated from the fire.
• Precautionary measures were taken to secure a nearby Indane gas bottling plant.
• Nothing much could done to extinguish fire until “All fuel burnt out”
• Took more than 90 Hrs to control/extinguish fire completely!

Fire Scene at Jaipur Terminal

Safety at Jaipur Terminal

Fire on Kerosene Tansk

Fire on Diesel Tanks

Fire Protection Measures

• All the tanks were provided with Medium Velocity Water Spray System and Foam Proection Systems as per the norms of Oil Industries Safety Directorate (OISD)
• Water Storage tank (2 nos.) of 24,60,000 liters capacity each.
• Fire Water Pump (5 nos.) of 113.89 M^3/ hr. capacity each. All were desiel driven pumps.
• Foam Storage Tank - 10,000 liters.
• Fire Water Network in the entire Terminal.
• Foam Pourer System for all tanks.
• Water Sprinkler System
• Hydrants and Monitors

Short - Comings in Fire fighting Systems

• Only diesel driven pumps were available.
• Water cum Foam monitor was not available on the Fire Water Network.
• Cooling Water Systemdid not work, which added the risk of fire on the other tanks.
• Foam System of the first tank also did not work from where evaporating the flammable mixture.
• Inter Tank distance was not followed.
• Location of Fire Water Pump House was very near to the Tank Farm Area.
• Portable or Fixed type gas detection system was not available.
• Condition monitring system was not available.
• Personal Protective System like BA sets, Face Masks, Fire entry suit were not available.
• No trained officer was deployed.
• No policy for deputing a trained fire officer.
• Lack of effective Co-ordination.

Investigation Report

• Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India constituted an independent seven member committee headed by Sh. MB Lal , Ex. Chairman, HPCL to enquire into the Incident.

• MB Lal committee submitted their report on 29.11.2009 & made following observation: “The Jaipur incident was first of its kind in India & the third one reported globally.”

• MB Lal committee made following conclusions on cause:
• The Loss of containment in terms of time & quantity was never considered a credible event and accordingly not taken into hazard identification.
• Basic operating procedures for hammer blind opening was not followed.
• Accident could have been managed if safety measures provided in control room were not made defunct.
• Backup for emergency shutdown from Control room not available.
• There was delay in emergency response for long period.

Schematic Layout

Standard Sequence v/s Operated Sequence

• Source of MS Leak

• MOV on Discharge Line

• Hammer Blind and HOV on Discharge Line

• Source of MS Leak

Accident Recommendations

• MB Lal committee made 118 recommendation to be implemented at Oil installations.

• JIC segregated 118 recommendations into various categories for ease of implementation viz :

- Engineering related

- Operation related

- Procurement related

- Training related

- Policy related

- OISD related

- Ministry related

Engineering Related

• Only a closed system design should be adopted. All Hammer Blind valves should be replaced with Pressure Balancing type Plug Valves / Ball Valves.
• Adequate lighting should be provided in operating areas. Minimum Lighting lux level should be as:

Tank farm area/Roads – 20

Main operating area/pipe racks - 60

Pump house/sheds/switches – 100.

• For floating roof tanks, roof drain to be of more robust design to prevent oil coming out when roof drain is open for water draining operation.
• Piping design inside tank dyke area should ensure easy accessibility for any operations inside dyke in the tank farm.
• Tank Dyke Valves should be provided with position indicator (open or close) in control room and necessary hardware and instrumentation should be provided for this.

Engineering Related

• Wherever Pipeline transfers take place, Mass Flow Meter with Integrator should be provided on delivery pipelines.
• High level alarm from the radar gauge and high level alarm from a separate tap off should be provided.
• Buildings not related to terminal operation including canteen should be located outside the plant area.
• Locate buildings and structures in the upwind direction (for the majority of the year) as far as practicable.
• Control Room, Fire water tank and fire water pump house should be located far away from potential leak sources/tankage area.
• The emergency exit gate should be away from the main gate and always be available for use for personnel evacuation during emergency.

Fire Protection Related

• Remote operated long range foam monitors (1000 GPM and above) to fight tank fires shall be provided which should be of variable flow.
• Medium expansion foam generators shall be provided to arrest vapour cloud formation from spilled volatile hydrocarbons.
• The fire water requirement for terminals shall be based on two fire contingencies simultaneously as is the case in Refineries.
• An emergency kit consisting of safety items viz. fire suites, various leak plugging gadgets, oil dispersants and oil adsorbents, lifting jacks (for rescue of trapped workers), high intensity intrinsically safe search lights for hazardous area, etc. and should be readily available at the terminals.
• Wherever there is a cluster of terminals of different companies, an emergency response centre equipped with advanced fire fighting equipment viz. fire tenders and trained manpower shall be considered on cost sharing basis.
• Hydrocarbon (HC) detectors should be installed near all potential leak sources of class ‘A’ petroleum products e.g. tank dykes, tank manifolds etc.