Parkland, Florida High School Shooting

Disaster Details

On the afternoon of February 14, 2018 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida a suspect now known as Nikolas Jacob Cruz, began shooting and throwing smoke bombs after pulling the high school's fire alarm (Teproff, Herrera & Smiley, 2018). Prior to his apprehension by police, Cruz had killed 17 people and injured 15 more at the high school (Teproff, Herrera & Smiley, 2018).

Disaster Details

Suspect's troublesome history

• Nikolas Cruz's social media activity showed threatening behavior. A recent facebook post prior to the school shooting was reported to the fbi (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• cruz had voiced slurs against blacks and muslims (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• cruz reportedly had ties to white supremacists (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• cruz had an anspiration to be a "professional school shooter" (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• cruz's biological dad died a decade ago, his adoptive mom had died in 2016; he was taken in by a family who was familiar with him but was not aware of his social media activity (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• cruz struggled with depression, a fascination for weapons, had been receiving mental health treatment despite him personally owning a gun having passed a background check, had previously been in fights at school, and a possible victim of bullying (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).
• the school had recognized cruz as a threat to other students (Teproff, Herrera & Smiley, 2018).

the weapon bought legally

Despite the troubled history that followed and plagued Nikolas Cruz, he was able to legally purchase the Ar-15 assault rifle from a local gun shop (New York Daily News, 2018). The owners of the gun shop eventually closed their business doors in the aftermath of the school shooting stating they were mortified and shocked that a gun they sold was used against people (New York Daily News, 2018).The business did everything correctly on their end: appropriate background checks were made as were clearances, and they even held the gun for the required five day waiting period (New York Daily News, 2018). Unknown to them was the fact that Cruz marked "No" on ATF paperowrk in regards for being treated for/suffering from mental health issues (New York Daily News, 2018). They also stated there was nothing during the transaction that alerted them of a bad situation with Cruz (New York Daily News, 2018).

Suspect's mental health

It was reported that as a child Cruz was considered a special needs child and received extra help to include "sessions with licensed therapists, ongoing assessments of behavior, and accommodations such as extra time on tests" (Travis, 2018). As Cruz got older, he was transferred to a school that offered a program for emotionally and behaviorally disabled children and eventually school officials were confident that Cruz could be introduced into a regular school to which he had a optimistic transition into Stoneham Douglas High School (Travis, 2018). Not long after that, Cruz started having trouble at school and then he turned 18 years of age. Because he was now considered an adult, he could now revoke the special needs services that he had been receiving and the school could not force those services on him (Travis, 2018). In February 2018, there was a disiplinery issue with Cruz and he was expelled from school (Travis, 2018). He had previously been receiving mental health treatment, but had stopped going a year before (McLaughlin & Park, 2018).

Suspect's mental health

factor #1

A trickle down effect of non-appropriate notification of the emergency situation began with High School Resource Officer, Scot Peterson. Sources, audio, and video tapings from the school shooting show that Peterson did not enter the school during the school shooting (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018). The following accounts detail Peterson's actions:

• 10 mintues after gunfire began, Peterson alerted authorities of possible gunfire, to shut down street infront of school and to begin school lockdown (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• During this initial stage, authorities say that Peterson acted appropriately but that his order of officials to stay 500 ft from the school building may have slowed down emergency response (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• Agency Active Shooter Policy states deputies should interrupt shooting and search for victims during ceasefire (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• The Broward County Sheriff Department stated that Peterson should have entered the building to locate the shooter instead of remaining outside (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• There are conflicting reports from Peterson that has him stating on audio that he believed the gunfire to be coming from inside the school building, but released a statement via his attorney that he believed the gunfire to be coming from outside (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• Once a Broward County Sheriff Department Supervisor showed up to take over operations, he was told by dispatch that a perimeter had not been set up nor was everyone cleared from the school building (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018).
• After Peterson was placed on suspension without pay, he resigned from his position as High School Resource Officer (Flores, Cuevas 7 Chavez, 2018).

Other Factors

The issue of responding agencies not being able to effectively communicate to each other via radio controls was a factor in delayed response (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018). The merging of radio traffic between agencies into a common radio channel did not work (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018). This is believed to be because the radio control system used was managed by Broward County Sheriff Department, and this radio system was known to become impaired when large amounts of users access the system (Flores, Cuevas & Chavez, 2018). Thus, all radioed information was not heard by all agencies on radio system resulting in confusion and delayed response.

Other Factors

Finally, because of the trickle down effect of lack of communication and radio issues, another factor was that the Broward County Sheriff Department refused to allow EMTs to enter the building since it was unknown where the shooter Cruz was located (Finn, 2018). Reports from EMTs at the scene stated that they were denied entry into the school buiilding, and instead officers were bringing out victims to EMT workers (Finn, 2018). The events that took place was said by EMT personnel to be against what they were trained for - EMTs go in right behind police as soon as possible (Finn, 2018). The Division Fire Chief Mike Moser had stated that Rescue Task Force Mode was presented to the Sheriff's Department and was denied based on the unknown whereabouts of the shooter (Finn, 2018). RTF can only be implemented when law enforcement clears an area for EMT response (Finn, 2018). Many EMS personnel and officers were upset that they were denied entry to help victims, and further stated that they were ready to risk their own lives to save the victims (Finn, 2018). Because of these factors that resulted in the delayed response of emergency aid, full investigations are being conducted as they were instated by Florida Governor Rick Scott (Finn, 2018).

General Disaster plan outline for law enforcement and first responders

• Notification of an active shooter situation has been received to all appropriate responding agencies to include local police departments, local fire departments, emergency medical responders, local medical facilties and 9-1-1 dispatch.
• From here, the local police department officials and emergency medical responders should be the first responders arriving on the scene. The first arriving law enforcement officers are considered the first group and should be the first to enter the location of the building so that aggressive actions are taken into place to immediately engage the shooter (Marino, Delaney, Atwater & Smith, 2015).
• A perimeter should be set up surrounding the location of the active shooter just in case the shooter attempts to flee and to maintain control of anyone escaping the building. Additionally, road blocks also need to be coordinated and set up. Those setting up perimeters/road blocks should be the second group to include police officers and emergency medical responders in the event of anyone injured.
• As constant communication is effectively relayed back to those on scene and those en route, once confirmation of locating the active shooter has been established, the third group to consist of more law enforcement officers and emergency medical responders should be allowed to gain entry into the location of the shooting so that victims can be located, treat victims if necessary and remove victims from the premises.
• The awaiting fourth group of emergency medical responders outside of the shooting location should be ready to begin/continue care and treatment.
• Once confirmation that the active shooter has been engaged, disarmed and apprehended, the the fifth group of waiting law enforcement officers and emergency medical responders should then be allowed to gain entry to start evacuating those remaining within the shooting location. Appropriate disaster counseling agencies should be on hand and waiting for those evacuated to provide further assistance and be a future resource for all involved.

General Disaster plan outline for law enforcement and first responders

**IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT PLAN OUTLINE**

The reasons behind designated groups of teams responding in a flowing action makes sure that responders are to be in their proper places, at the correct times. Because of this, it is imperative that effective communication be relayed to all involved and responsibility be placed on the designated head of operations personnel to make sure teams are ready for deployment.

Additionally, it has been documented that the faster emergency medical responders are allowed to provide care and treatment to the injured, will increase the odds of the injured surviving (Marino, Delaney, Atwater & Smith, 2015). The "stage and wait" approach will only hinder the lives of those injured and immediate action should be put into place to make sure anyone injured is not waiting to be treated (Marino, Delaney, Atwater & Smith, 2015).