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1st Sudanese Civil War - Was it Just?
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1st Sudanese Civil War 1955-1972
Just War: Defined
Just War Theory supports:
1. jus ad bellum
2. jus in bello
3. jus post bellum
Jus ad bellum
- Concerns the justice of resorting to war in the first place
- Addressed to heads of state – since political leaders are the ones who inaugurate wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held accountable to just ad bellum principles
Jus ad bellum
#1 - Just Cause
"A state may launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes most frequently mentioned include: self-defense from external attack; the defense of others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected; the resistance of aggression." (Stanford).
#1 - Just Cause
Aggression
-is the use of armed force in violation of someone else's basic rights.
-Aggression attacks the very spine of human civilization itself.
-“Which side is defending—or is seeking to establish—a legitimate political structure...? That's the side which it is permissible to:
a) be part of; or
b) if you're an outsider, to support.” P.2
Aggression
Aggression - in the case of Civil War
Aggression - in the case of Civil War
-There's no logical requirement that aggression can only be committed across borders. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation of someone else's basic rights.
That “someone else” might be:
a) another person (violent crime);
b) another state (international or “external” aggression); or
c) many other people within one's own community (domestic or “internal” aggression).
The commission of aggression, in any of these forms, causes the aggressor to forfeit its rights.
"If the aggressor doesn't stop, it is entirely permissible for its victims to resort to force to protect themselves—and for anyone else to do likewise in aid of the victims.” P.2
"If the aggressor doesn't stop, it is entirely permissible f...
Rights of the State
International law affirms that states have many rights, notably those to political sovereignty and territorial integrity. It thus affirms that aggression involves the use of armed forces—armies, navies, air forces, marines, missiles—in violation of these rights. (Stanford)
From the moral point of view - only legitimate govt's have rights - the criteria for a legitimate state is:
Rights of the State
1. the state is recognized as legitimate by its own people a...
1. the state is recognized as legitimate by its own people and by the international community. There is an uncoerced general peace and order within that society, and the state is not shunned as a pariah by the rest of the world
2. the state avoids violating the rights of other legitimate states. In particular, legitimate governments don't commit aggression against other societies
2. the state avoids violating the rights of other legitima...
3. legitimate states make every reasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of their own citizens, notably those to life, liberty and subsistence.
3. legitimate states make every reasonab...
*If these conditions are met, the state in question h...
*If these conditions are met, the state in question has rights to govern and to be left in peace. States failing any of these criteria have no right to govern or to go to war* (Stanford)
Preemptive Strikes
International law, for its part, sweepingly forbids pre-emptive strikes unless they are clearly authorized in advance by the UN Security Council
Preemptive Strikes
#2 Right intention
“A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out.” P.3
#2 Right intention
#3 Proper authority and public declaration
“A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The “appropriate authority” is usually specified in that country's constitution. States failing the requirements of minimal justice lack the legitimacy to go to war.” P.3
#4 Last Resort
“A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation.” P.3
#4 Last Resort
#5 Probability of Success
#5 Probability of Success
“state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile. International law does not include this requirement, as it is seen as biased against small, weaker states.” P.3
#6 Proportionality
“A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or “worth”, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must be stressed, since often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically discounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties.” P.3
#6 Proportionality
Jus in bello
-concerns the justice of conduct within war, after it has begun
- Responsibility falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state
Jus in bello
External jus in bello
“concerns the rules a state should observe regarding the enemy and its armed forces.” P. 4
#1 Obey all int'l laws on weapons prohibition
“Chemical and biological weapons, in particular, are forbidden by many treaties. Nuclear weapons aren't so clearly prohibited but it seems fair to say a huge taboo attaches to such weapons and any use of them would be greeted with incredible hostility by the international community.”’ P.4
#2 Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity
#2 Discrimination and Non-Combata...
“Soldiers are only entitled to use their (non-prohibited) weapons to target those who are, in Walzer's words, “engaged in harm.” Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminate between the civilian population, which is morally immune from direct and intentional attack, and those legitimate military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm.” P.4
#3 Proportionality
“Soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek. They must restrain their force to that amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target.” P.4
#4 Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs)
“If enemy soldiers surrender and become captives, they cease being lethal threats to basic rights. They are no longer “engaged in harm.” Thus, it is wrong to target them with death, starvation, rape, torture, medical experimentation, and so on. They are to be provided, as The Geneva Conventions spell out, with benevolent—not malevolent—quarantine away from battle zones and until the war ends, when they should be exchanged for one's own POWs.” P.4
#5 No Means Mala in Se
“Soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are “evil in themselves.” These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; using poison or treachery (like disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross); forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own side; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like biological agents.” P.5
#6 No reprisals
#6 No reprisals
“A reprisal is when country A violates jus in bello in war with country B. Country B then retaliates with its own violation of jus in bello, seeking to chasten A into obeying the rules. There are strong moral and evidentiary reasons to believe that reprisals don't work, and they instead serve to escalate death and make the destruction of war increasingly indiscriminate. Winning well is the best revenge.” P.5
Internal jus in bello
“concerns the rules a state must follow in connection with its own people [i.e. protection of citizens’ rights] as it fights war against an external enemy.” P. 4
Internal jus in bello
“Internal jus in bello essentially boils down to the need for a state, even though it's involved in a war, nevertheless to still respect the human rights of its own citizens as best it can during the crisis.” P.5
“Internal jus in bello essentially boils down to the need for...
“For some of the worst atrocities in wartime ha...
“For some of the worst atrocities in wartime have occurred within, and not between, national borders. Some states, historically, have used the cloak of war with foreign powers to engage in massive internal human rights violations, usually against some disfavored group” p.5
Jus post bellum
"concerns the justice of peace agreements and the termination phase of war. “It seeks to regulate the ending of wars, and to ease the transition from war back to peace.” P.5
Jus post bellum
#1 Proportionality and Publicity
“The peace settlement should be measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. To make a settlement serve as an instrument of revenge is to make a volatile bed one may be forced to sleep in later. In general, this rules out insistence on unconditional surrender” p.5
#2 Rights Vindication
“The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty. This is the main substantive goal of any decent settlement, ensuring that the war will actually have an improving affect. Respect for rights, after all, is a foundation of civilization, whether national or international. Vindicating rights, not vindictive revenge, is the order of the day.” P.5
#3 Discrimination
“Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war measures. These rules out sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment.” P.5
#4 Punishment #1
“When the defeated country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate punishment must be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular, should face fair and public international trials for war crimes.” P.5
#4 Punishment #1
#5 Punishment #2
“Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers, from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation and possible trial.” P.5
#6 Compensation
“Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. A post-war poll tax on civilians is generally impermissible, and there needs to be enough resources left so that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction. To beggar thy neighbor is to pick future fights.” P.5
#6 Compensation
#7 Rehabilitation
“The post-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime. They may involve: demilitarization and disarmament; police and judicial re-training; human rights education; and even deep structural transformation towards a minimally just society governed by a legitimate regime. This is, obviously, the most controversial aspect of jus post bellum.” P.6
Background on the War
Who?
Northern, primarily Muslim Sudan vs. Southern, primarily Christian Sudan
When?
1955-1972
Why?
Southern Sudan wanted to be a separate, autonomous region from Northern Sudan and were frustrated with their lack of representation in the Sudanese government.
How?
The war began with a mutiny in Torit based on what the South perceived to be isolating treatment by the North.
History of the War
1955: mutiny in Torit
-remnants of British colonial rule fail to guarantee equal government representation for both Northern, Muslim Sudanese and Southern, Christian Sudanese
-Arab-led government in Khartoum promised to prioritize equal representation, but never followed through on their promise
1963: formation of the Anyanya
-South Sudanese separatists form a guerilla army, the most effective of all insurgent groups in the conflict
-Anyanya receive weapons from Israel and Uganda and continue to put pressure on the Sudanese government
1971: formation of the South Sudan Liberation Movement
-Joseph Lagu forms the SSLM, encompassing the Anyanya
-this marks the first time that the separatist movement has a unified structure
Context of the War
- As British colonists gradually left the region, their power was subsumed by almost exclusively Northern Sudanese elite, breeding discontent among South Sudanese who yearned for representation.
- Regional identity in the South began to take form in the 1940’s, differing from the Arab-Islamic nationalism of the North. These differences both bound Southerners together and put them starkly at odds with Northerners.
- Moreover, the elite Northern government focused on public security rather than democratic reform, and curtailed social and economic development in the South, leading to the South’s desire to be an autonomous region. These reasons led to the eventual conflict.
Results of the War
1972: Addis Ababa Agreement
-ended the First Sudanese Civil War
-negotiations involved the Sudanese government and the South Sudan Liberation Movement
-established South Sudan as an autonomous region
Results of the War
Is the Sudanese War Just?
Based on our definition of what constitutes a just war, can we justify the 1st Sudanese War?
Is the Sudanese War Just?
Jus ad bellum
Jus ad bellum
- Just cause- Conflict from 1955 to 1972 between the northern part of Sudan (Muslim) and the southern part of Sudan (Christian), who demanded representation and more regional autonomy
- Right intention- Arab-led government (Khartoum in Northern Sudan) promised to create a federal system of government in which all people would be represented but never followed through on their promises
- Proper authority and public declaration- Began as a demonstration in Torit, South Sudan
- Last resort- History of economic exploitation of Arab Muslim north on Christian south Sudanese people, effects of colonization
- Probability of success- Low probability based on the lack of infrastructure to launch a major offensive and lack of government support
- Proportionality- Several separatist groups rose up, including the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and the Anya Nya
Jus in bello
Jus in bello
- Civil war created a set of national internal rules (a state must follow in connection with its own people as it fights war)
- Weapons prohibitions laws- Anya Nya amassed a cache of weapons, mostly procured from a failed insurgency in the neighboring Congo and Israel provided weapons via Uganda and Ethiopia; with these advanced weapons, they were able to ramp up their attacks (no evidence of biological or nuclear warfare)
- Government fluctuated between military and civilian rule
- Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity- By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people; more southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring countries (no evidence of purposeful civilian aim)
- Proportionality- For these 17 years, the southern region experienced civil strife, and various southern leaders agitated for regional autonomy or outright secession, doing what was necessary to create change (war fought was essential in the end goal)
- No Means Mala in Se- Rebellion was for representation and rights for the Southern community (no campaigns evil in themselves)
Jus post bellum
Jus post bellum
- 1972 Addis Abada Accords- formal, internationally recognized, and public agreement granted autonomy to the Southern provinces
- South Sudan was not granted secession, but it was given a certain level of autonomy over its administration, terminating the First war
- Peaceful transition- the SSLM had to disband its fighting force and integrate about six thousand units into a unified Sudanese army
- Agreement was ratified and passed into law
- Intentions were good among both the North and South (some evidence of rehabilitation within the country exists)
- Still led to a Second Sudanese War, lasting until 2005
- Overall successful in that South Sudan has been an independent nation since 2011
Conclusion
The First Sudanese War was justified based on:
- The rationale of why the Southern (Christian) Sudanese people had to resort to war in the first place
- The conduct within the war, after it began
- The peace agreement and the termination phase of war with the Addis Abada Accords, where the people sought to regulate the end of the war and ease the transition from war back to peace
- These events led to the independence of South Sudan
Group Members
Amanda DiCristoforo
Grace Gaskill
Megan Goodman
Kristina Kutsukos
Qiao Zou
Group Members
Sources
Sources
- Rolandsen, Øystein H. "A False Start: Between War And Peace In The Southern Sudan, 1956–62." The Journal of African History 52, no. 01 (2011): 105-23. doi:10.1017/s0021853711000107.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/
- The First Sudanese Civil War Begins: 1955. (2014). In J. Stock (Ed.), Global Events: Milestone Events Throughout History (Vol. 1). Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. Retrieved from http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/NPACDB058290952/WHIC?u=cant48040&xid=c9cfd4a8