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Supreme Court of Sweden, Tommy Olsson, 15 June 2000 [2001] E.C.D.R. 22
Article 2(3) Swedish CA: the concept of “making available for the public” embraces three activities, namely public performance, distribution of copies and public exhibition.
(1)
Visitor to Olsson’s website who clicked on a link were immediately transferred to a music file. The file was then available for transmission to the visitor's own computer.
(2)
Creating the link was therefore a public performance.
(3)
But no liability due to exception for related rights that instead introduces an equitable remuneration right
VS
Rebecka Jonsson v. Les Editions de L’Avenir
Attunda District Court, 13 October 2016
YouTube video was embedded on the website of L'Avenir, a Belgian media company.
According to the court, it was “obvious” that L’Avenir had published the link with the intention of pursuing a profit.
Johnson had sent cease-and-desist letters
L’Avenir therefore not able to rebut the presumption
The court also ruled that, by failing to acknowledge the name of author, the defendant had also infringed the claimant’s moral right of attribution
Bangoura
Vs
"Even if the connection is significant, however, the case for assuming jurisdiction is proportional to the degree of damage sustained within the jurisdiction. It is difficult to justify assuming jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant unless the plaintiff has suffered significant damage within the jurisdiction"
Court of Appeal for Ontario 2005
Let's go crazy!
I'll sue you!
Stephanie Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015)
(1)
“the statute requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending takedown notification.”
(2)
applicability of section 512(f) of the DMCA that allows for the recognition of damages in case of proven bad faith
(3)
which would occur if the copyright holder did not consider fair use or paid “lip service to the consideration of fair use by claiming it formed a good faith belief when there is evidence to the contrary.”
Whether safe harbor applies to Veoh against vicarious and contributory copyright infringement claims
(A)
Storage v. Access
the DMCA must not be interpreted as meaning that hosting provider that provide access to files on top of storage disqualify themselves from safe harbor protection
(C)
Right and Ability to Control
"right and ability to control" infringing activity must logically encompass more than "the mere ability to delete and block access to infringing material" and "substantial influence on the activities of users", such as detailed control over content or active involvement in listings on sites such as eBay can constitute "the right and ability to control" infringing materials
(B)
Actual & Constructive Knowledge
(1)
the burden of identifying infringing material must fall on the rightholder and not the service provider
(2)
merely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the general knowledge that one's services could be used to share infringing material, is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge
(3)
hints of infringement, such as tagging of videos with keywords which may imply infringement or news articles discussing illegal copies on Veoh, do not constitute apparent "red flag" knowledge
(9th Cir. 2012)
V.
(1)
had been informed that their platform provides access to infringing content;
(2)
could not in any case have been unaware that the platform provides access to infringements, given that a very large amount of infringing content was shared using the platform;
(3)
had expressly displayed on blogs and forums on the platform their purpose to make protected works available to the users;
(4)
encouraged users to infringe; and
(5)
operated for profit.
“That would undermine the objective of EU legislation in the relatively abundant field of copyright, which is precisely to harmonise the scope of the rights enjoyed by authors and other rightholders within the single market. That is why the answer to the problems raised in the present case must, in my view, be sought rather in EU law.”
AG Szpunar
Case C-610/15, Ziggo (14 June 2017)
[2016] IECA 231
"Because the defendant is the company which profits - albeit indirectly - because it derives revenue from its subscribers who are engaged in this practice, it is the defendant who should, in my view, be primarily liable for the costs."
80%
imposing an obligation to implement a "Graduated Response Strategy" (GRS):
Step 1
R would furnish all relevant infringement
Step 2
AP would send 1st letter requesting to cease and desist.
Step 3
AP would send 2nd letter to its subscriber requesting to cease and desist.
Step 4
AP would send to the plaintiffs a notification that a subscriber account has been the subject matter of three such notifications.
Step 5
R, having been informed of the relevant IP addresses etc, could make a Norwich Pharmacal type application to ascertain the subscriber’s identity and address and the could then seek an order for the suspension and/or termination of the subscriber’s service.
V.
Sony Music
(Ireland)
(B)
Termination Policy
The implementation of a policy to terminate accounts of users who repeatedly infringe copyright must be reasonable, not perfect
(A)
Red Flag Knowledge
The mere fact that an employee of the service provider has viewed a video posted by a user (absent specific information regarding how much of the video the employee saw or the reason for which it was viewed), and that the video contains all or nearly all of a copyrighted song that is “recognizable,” does not establish 'facts or circumstances' giving rise to 'red flag' knowledge of infringement.
Falcon
V
‘The purchaser will not make unlawful copies because he has been induced or incited or persuaded to do so by Amstrad. The purchaser will make unlawful copies for his own use because he chooses to do so. Amstrad's advertisements may persuade the purchaser to buy an Amstrad machine but will not influence the purchaser's later decision to infringe copyright.’
Atkin LJ: “authorise” = “to grant or purport to grant to a third person the right to do the act complained of, whether the intention is that the grantee shall do the act on his own account, or only on account of the grantor.” (p. 499)
Bankes LJ: “authorise” = “sanction, approve and countenance” (p. 491)
[1926] 2 KB 474
Dramatico [2012] R.P.C. 27 [81]
CBS
V
Any ordinary person would, I think, assume that an authorisation can only come from somebody having or purporting to have authority and that an act is not authorised by somebody who merely enables or possibly assists or even encourages another to do that act, but does not purport to have any authority which he can grant to justify the doing of the act.’
‘In my judgment, the operators of TPB do authorise its users' infringing acts of copying and communication to the public. They go far beyond merely enabling or assisting. On any view, they "sanction, approve and countenance" the infringements of copyright committed by its users. But in my view they also purport to grant users the right to do the acts complained of. It is no defence that they openly defy the rights of the copyright owners. I would add that I consider the present case to be indistinguishable from 20C Fox v Newzbin in this respect. If anything, it is a stronger case.’
COMMON LAW
Authorisation ‘Mere Facilitation’
NO STRICT LIABILITY
must know or have reason to believe that the article is an infringing article.
Joint Tortfeasance
[1981] R.P.C. 407
“The underlying concept for joint tortfeasance must be that the joint tortfeasor has been so involved in the commission of the tort as to make himself liable for the tort. Unless he has made the infringing act his own, he has not himself committed the tort.”
Vs
‘Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright’
[2003] RPC 264 [59]
s. 16(2)
Common Design
Procurement &
Inducement
‘In the present case, the matters I have considered in relation to authorisation lead to the conclusion that the operators of TPB induce, incite or persuade its users to commit infringements of copyright, and that they and the users act pursuant to a common design to infringe. It is also relevant in this regard that the operators profit from their activities. Thus they are jointly liable for the infringements committed by users.’
"brazen" and "massive" copyright infringement
‘[T]he defendant has intervened in a highly material way to make the claimants' films available to a new audience, that is to say its premium members. Furthermore it has done so by providing a sophisticated technical and editorial system which allows its premium members to download all the component messages of the film of their choice upon pressing a button, and so avoid days of (potentially futile) effort in seeking to gather those messages together for themselves. As a result, I have no doubt that the defendant's premium members consider that Newzbin is making available to them the films in the Newzbin index.’
(A)
DMCA safe harbor requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringements
"[we should grow] as aggressively as we can through whatever tactics, however evil [the site is] out of control with copyrighted material [if we remove] the obviously copyright infringing stuff, site traffic [would] drop to maybe 20% […] steal it!"
(B)
Doctrine of willfully blindness can be used to show A
(C)
The “right and ability to control” infringing activity does not require knowledge of specific infringements
2007-2014
(No. 1) [2010] FSR 21 [90]
No manufacturer and no machine confers on the purchaser authority to copy unlawfully. The purchaser or other operator of the recorder determines whether he shall copy and what he shall copy. By selling the recorder Amstrad may facilitate copying in breach of copyright but do not authorise it. […] Amstrad conferred on the purchaser the power to copy but did not grant or purport to grant the right to copy.’
Authorisation ‘Mere Facilitation’
The grant or purported grant to do the relevant act may be express or implied from all the relevant circumstances. In a case which involves an allegation of authorisation by supply, these circumstances may include [1] the nature of the relationship between the alleged authoriser and the primary infringer, [2] whether the equipment or other material supplied constitutes the means used to infringe, [3] whether it is inevitable it will be used to infringe, the [4] degree of control which the supplier retains and [5] whether he has taken any steps to prevent infringement. These are matters to be taken into account and may or may not be determinative depending upon all the other circumstances.’
[1988] RPC 567 [HL]
“[…] the public has always had, and should have, a right to cite. Referring to a copyrighted work without authorization has been and should be legal. Referring to an infringing work is similarly legitimate […] Drawing a map showing where an infringing object may be found or dropping a footnote that cites it invades no province the copyright owner is entitled to protect even if the object is blatantly pirated from a copyrighted work. Posting a hypertext link should be no different.”
‘Generally speaking, the operators of the Target Servers are not merely linking to freely available sources of Premier League footage. Even if in some cases they do, the evidence indicates that they do so for profit, frequently in the form of advertising revenue, and thus are presumed to have the requisite knowledge for the communication to be to a new public’.
BT [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch)
Vs
(SDNY, 31 December 2013)
‘Someone who uses one of those addresses to bypass Flava’s pay wall and watch a copyrighted video for free is no more a copyright infringer than if he had snuck into a movie theater and watched a copyrighted movie without buying a ticket. The facilitator of conduct that doesn’t infringe copyright is not a contributory infringer.’
No Liability, Even Upon Notice
No effect on IP law
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)
No effect on privacy law
Carlos Sánchez de la Peña v. Google México, S. de R.L., PPD.0094/14 (National Institute for the Access to Information, January 2015)
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(1)
government cannot punish speech unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
(2)
‘Brandenburg test’ = the violence advocated must be intended, likely and imminent
(3)
hate speech is permitted as long is doesn’t cause imminent (physical) harm = imminent violence
Not necessary that the link itself be provided “for financial gain”, e.g. through cost-per-click calculations.
It is instead sufficient that the link is provided on a website that is operated for financial gain, i.e. run with the intention to realising profits, irrespective of the commercial impact of the particular link.
(1) D was offering educational material via his website, therefore intended profit (2) D could not rebut the presumption due to notification
The applicant argued that imposing liability would infringe his fundamental rights. Court said that the CJEU had already struck the right balance.
LG Hamburg, Case no. 310 O 402/16,
18 November 2016 [47]-[48]
"Political Correctness"
Decentralized
Soft Control
‘I woke up this morning in a bad mood and decided to kick them off the Internet’
GEMA
Vs
The act of making the work available to the public had been committed by the YouTube uploader, not by YouTube itself.
YT also had not ‘adopted’ the content as its own
(‘Zu-Eigen-Machen’, see BGH, marions-kochbuch.de, 12 November 2009, I ZR 166/07).
(1)
YouTube is a “service inclined to infringement”, but also has a business model “in the mainstream of society”
(2)
When YT receives notification of a clear infringement, not only take-down is necessary but also stay-down, incl. other infringements on the same work and other recordings
(3)
Word-based filter and Content ID necessary
Fundamental rights were not relevant
OLG Hamburg, 1 July 2015, 5 U 87/12
This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.”
Art. 21(2) - 2. In examining the need for an adaptation of this Directive, the report shall in particular analyse the need for proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool services, "notice and take down" procedures and the attribution of liability following the taking down of content.
Privacy & Data
8(3). Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.
Those measures shall consist of, as appropriate:
(a)
defining and applying in the terms and conditions for content concerned
(b)
establishing and operating mechanisms for users of video-sharing platforms to report or flag to the video-sharing platform provider concerned the content referred to in paragraph 1 stored on its platform;
(c)
establishing and operating age verification systems for users of video-sharing platforms with respect to content which may impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors;
(d)
establishing and operating systems allowing users of video-sharing platforms to rate the content referred to in paragraph 1;
(e)
providing for parental control systems with respect to content which may impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors;
(f)
establishing and operating systems through which providers of video-sharing platforms explain to users of video-sharing platforms what effect has been given to the reporting and flagging referred to in point (b).
“Video-sharing platform services” are defined in new Article 1(aa) AVMSD ‘… a service [...] which meets the following requirements:
(i)
the service consists of the storage of a large amount of programmes or user-generated videos, for which the video-sharing platform does not have editorial responsibility;
(ii)
the organisation of the stored content is determined by the provider of the service including by automatic means or algorithms, in particular by hosting, displaying, tagging and sequencing;
(iii)
the principal purpose of the service or a dissociable section thereof is devoted to providing programmes and user-generated videos to the general public in order to inform, entertain or educate;
(iv)
the service is made available by electronic communications networks within the meaning of point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC.’
Without violating Art 14/15 ECD providers shall take appropriate measures to:
(a)
protect minors from content which may impair their physical, mental or moral development;
(b)
protect all citizens from content containing incitement to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to sex, race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.
Article 11 - Injunctions - Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. [...]
Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC.
Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance.
Störerhaftung
= ‘interferer liability’ or ‘disturber liability’
i.e. liability of persons who knowingly and causally contribute to an infringement by another
2 conditions:
(1)
have adequately contributed to that infringement
through
(2)
the violation of a reasonable duty to review possible infringements (Prüfpflicht)
Art. 823
Liability in Damages
(1)
A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this.
(2)
The same duty is held by a person who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to protect another person. If, according to the contents of the statute, it may also be breached without fault, then liability to compensation only exists in the case of fault.
Art. 830
Joint tortfeasors and persons involved
(1)
If more than one person has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then each of them is responsible for the damage. The same applies if it cannot be established which of several persons involved caused the damage by his act.
(2)
Instigators and accessories are equivalent to joint tortfeasors.
Legal v. Illegal
Centralized
Hard Control
The Commission will also continue to engage with platforms in setting up and applying voluntary cooperation mechanisms aimed at depriving those engaging in commercial infringements of intellectual property rights of the revenue streams emanating from their illegal activities, in line with a "follow the money" approach.
‘the responsibility of online platforms is a key and cross-cutting issue.’ (p. 9)
BUT NOT
Microenterprises and small-sized enterprises within the meaning of Title I of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC and services acting in a non-commercial purpose capacity such as online encyclopaedia, and providers of online services where the content is uploaded with the authorisation of all right holders concerned, such as educational or scientific repositories, shall not be considered online content sharing service providers within the meaning of this Directive. Providers of cloud services for individual use which do not provide direct access to the public, open source software developing platforms, and online market places whose main activity is online retail of physical goods, should not be considered online content sharing service providers within the meaning of this Directive
‘online content sharing service provider’
means a provider of an information society service one of the main purposes of which is to store and give access to the public to a significant amount of copyright protected works or other protected subject-matter uploaded by its users, which the service optimises and promotes for profit making purposes.
The definition of an online content sharing service provider under this Directive shall cover information society service providers one of the main purposes of which is to store and give access to the public or to stream significant amounts of copyright protected content uploaded / made available by its users, and that optimise content, and promote for profit making purposes, including amongst others displaying, tagging, curating, sequencing, the uploaded works or other subject-matter, irrespective of the means used therefor, and therefore act in an active way.
"Trusted Flaggers"
called to adopt effective voluntary ‘proactive measures to detect and remove illegal content online’ by using automatic detection and filtering technologies (3.3.2)
"Hosting service providers should take proportionate and specific proactive measures, including by using automated means, in order
(1)
to detect, identify and expeditiously
remove or disable access to terrorist content (36)
(2)
in order to immediately prevent content providers from re-submitting content which has already been removed or to which access has already been disabled because it is considered to be terrorist content (37)"
"economic impacts are mostly assessed from a qualitative point of view, considering how the different policy options would affect the negotiations between those creating or investing in the creation of content and those distributing such content online. The limited availability of data in this area [. . .] did not allow to elaborate a quantitative analysis of the impacts of the different policy options." (p. 136)
Member States shall ensure that authors receive an appropriate share of the additional revenues press publishers receive for the use of a press publication by information society service providers
Non
Retroactive
20 March 2018
enable their subscribers who are temporarily present in a Member State to access and use the online content service in the same manner as in the Member State of residence
Online services such as
(1) video-on-demand platforms (such as Netflix, HBO Go, Amazon Prime, Mubi, Chili TV);
(2) online TV services (such as Viasat's Viaplay, Sky's Now TV, Voyo)
(3) music streaming services (such as Spotify, Deezer, Google Music) or
(4) game online marketplaces (such as Steam, Origin).
"[T]he very purpose of hyperlinks is, by directing to other pages and web resources, to allow Internet‑users to navigate to and from material in a network characterised by the availability of an immense amount of information. Hyperlinks contribute to the smooth operation of the Internet by making information accessible through linking it to each other. Hyperlinks, as a technique of reporting, are essentially different from traditional acts of publication in that, as a general rule, they merely direct users to content available elsewhere on the Internet. They do not present the linked statements to the audience or communicate its content, but only serve to call readers’ attention to the existence of material on another website. A further distinguishing feature of hyperlinks, compared to acts of dissemination of information, is that the person referring to information through a hyperlink does not exercise control over the content of the website to which a hyperlink enables access, and which might be changed after the creation of the link – a natural exception being if the hyperlink points to contents controlled by the same person. Additionally, the content behind the hyperlink has already been made available by the initial publisher on the website to which it leads, providing unrestricted access to the public."
BGH,
17 July 2003, I ZR 259/00 [42]
(1)
hyperlinks merely facilitate access to a work which has been placed online
(2)
the decision as to whether the work should remain available to the public or not remains with the initial publisher
(3)
Users who knew the URL, i.e. the address of the page on the World Wide Web, could also go directly to the page without a hyperlink.
(4)
If the webpage containing the protected work is deleted after the setting of the hyperlink, the hyperlink won’t work
(5)
hyperlinking is thus no different to referencing in traditional printed matter
BGH, Session-ID, 29 April 2010, I ZR 39/08, [30]
However, if a link bypasses technical measures taken by the rightholder to ensure that the works are only be accessed by certain users or through certain channels, there may be making available to the public
“we are disappointed to see that the proposals are not grounded in any solid scientific (in particular, economic) evidence.”
General Monitoring
Specific Monitoring
“the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”
(1)
Not bound by national definitions
(2)
Three basic grounds: race, religion, other forms of intolerance “expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism”
(3)
"denial of protection" and "balancing"
(4)
Margin of appreciation: tighter for incitement to hatred Vs wider for morals/religion
(5)
Intent is crucial: context & content
BGH, Vorschaubilder III, 21 September 2017, I ZR 11/16
‘This assumption does not apply to search engines and to hyperlinks leading to a search engine because of the particular importance of Internet search services for the functionality of the Internet. The provider of a search function cannot be expected to check whether the images found by the search engine in an automated process have been legally posted on the Internet in first place before listing them as thumbnails on its website.’
(i)
Hyperlinks do not amount to “transmission” of a work, and such transmission is a pre-requisite for “communication”
(iii)
Even if a hyperlink is regarded as a communication of a work, it is not to a “new public.”
(ii)
Hyperlinks do not intervene to provide access to the works
what “technically possible” and “reasonable.”
(1)
precautions against clearly noticeable infringements—such as blatant counterfeit items—reasonable
(2)
it would be unreasonable a filtering obligation questioning the business model of the intermediary.
(3)
manually checking and visually comparing each product offered in an online auction against infringement—which was not clear or obvious would be unreasonable.
(4)
obligations are unreasonable if due to the substantial amount of products offered, the platform’s business model would be endangered
“Kerntheorie”, i.e. infringements similar in their core (Kern)
trigger a duty to review & notice-and-stay-down
‘consideration must be given to the fact that the defendant participates in the sale of the pirate goods in the form of the commission payable […] Whenever the defendant's attention has been drawn to a clear infringement of rights not only is it obliged to block access to the specific offer […], it must also ensure that such trade mark infringements will as far as possible not occur in the future. […] The defendant is obliged to react to these cases by subjecting offers of Rolex watches to a special examination.’
‘A business that, like the defendant, operates a platform on the internet for third-party auctions cannot reasonably be expected to examine every offer for sale for a possible infringement of rights before publication on the internet. Such an obligation would jeopardise the entire business model.’
Remedies:
(1)
expeditious removal;
(2)
word filter;
(3)
subsequent manual reassessment for the avoidance of over-blocking;
(4)
general “Marktbeobachtungspflicht”, i.e. market monitoring duty through Google, Facebook or Twitter for illegal links to its service
NTD
R’s business model not a priori designed to facilitate infringement, i.e. deserving of protection,
but
R increased risk of the illegal use of its services, i.e. significantly facilitated copyright infringement.
As a result it had lost its neutrality.
Professional but “offensive and vulgar” rather than hate speech
(1)
a duty could only arise once R made aware of a clear infringement through notification.
(2)
Once notification received the provider can not simply rest at deleting existing infringing files, but must go further and perform searches for future infringements of the notified content, as well as take all reasonable measures to make sure users could not proceed with such infringements in the first place, as long as these did not threaten Rapidshare’s business model.
(3)
This could include automatic word filters supplemented by subsequent manual controls.
Non Professional (Blog)
(1)
In a situation of higher than-average
risk of defamation or hate speech,
(2)
if comments from non-registered users are allowed,
(3)
a professionally managed and commercially based
Internet news portal
should exercise the full extent
of control at its disposal and must go beyond automatic keyword-based filtering or ex-post notice-and-take-down procedures to avoid liability
NTD
BGH, 12 July 2012, I ZR 18/11
“[d]defamatory and other types of clearly unlawful speech, including hate speech and speech inciting violence, can be disseminated like never before, worldwide, in a matter of seconds, and sometimes remain persistently available online.”
Paris Court of Appeal, DM v APP, Microsoft, Sacem et autres, 7 June 2017
Wawa-mania.eu offered a forum allowing members to index links redirecting internet users to servers hosting infringing content they could then download.
Revenue generated from advertising
The owner of website acted as "super administrator“: engaged in content editing, user management, update of the operating software and held special rights to access to the server. Admitted to knowing that most of the content shared were infringing.
Urt. v. 6.7.2017 (Nr. 909; SFR, Orange, Free, Bouygues télécom et al. / Union des producteurs de cinéma et al.)
“given that the internet service provider is an inevitable actor in any transmission of an infringement over the internet between one of its customers and a third party, since, in granting access to the network, it makes that transmission possible ( . . . ), it must be held that an internet service provider ( . . . ) is an intermediary whose services are used to infringe a copyright or related right within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29.”
"[an injunction] constrains its addressee in a manner which restricts the free use of the resources at his disposal because it obliges him to take measures which may represent a significant cost for him.”
to take such measure as will dissuade and render impossible any and all consultation on Yahoo.com of the auction service of Nazi objects as well as any other site or service which makes apologies of Nazism or questions the existence of Nazi crimes
Art. R645-1: prohibits insignias and emblems which "recall those used" by an organization declared illegal by Art. 9 of the Nuremberg Statute
legitimate and in accordance with the principle of proportionality that [ISPs and search engines] contribute to blocking and delisting measures” because they “initiate the activity of making available access to this websites” and “derive economic benefit from this access (especially by advertising displayed on their pages).”
Nevertheless, these provisions do not prevent the costs of the measures strictly necessary for the safeguarding of the rights in question [...] from being borne by the technical intermediaries, even when such measures may present significant costs for the intermediaries. The aforementioned Directives 2000/31 and 2001/29, [...] foresee that notwithstanding the principle of non responsibility of the intermediaries, the ISPs and hosting providers are required to contribute to the fight against the illegal content and, in particular, against the infringement of copyright and related rights, when they are best positioned to put an end to such violations.
Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1) and 14bis(1)
Right of communication to the public
the authors of literary works, artistic works, dramatic and dramatico-musical works, musical works and cinematographic works
communication to the public by wire, communication to the public by wireless means & communication to the public by loudspeaker or analogous instruments, broadcasting, rebroadcasting
Cour de cassation
(09-67.896), 17 February 2011
Sté Nord-Ouest
C.
(1)
the sale of advertising space
(2)
the implementation of technical means ensuring the content’s compatibility with the viewing interface and limiting the size of posted files for reasons of optimisation of the server’s integration capacity
(3)
the provision of presentation frames and of tools for the classification of content, which are necessary for the organisation of the service and in order to facilitate user access to the content
are mere technical operations that are part of the essence of a hosting service do not imply that the provider is involved in the selection of uploaded content.
“Les enfants perdus de Tranquility Bay“, TGI de Paris, 19 October 2007
Notice-and-take-down notice-and-stay-down
Diligences approprieés
the three main obligations incumbent on service providers that it declared derive from the general duty of care
Article L.335-2-1
Anyone who does the following is punished by three years of imprisonment and a fine of 300.000 euros:
(1)
Publishes, makes available to the public or communicates to the public, knowingly and in any form whatsoever, software obviously intended for making available to an unauthorized public protected works or other subject matter;
(2)
Knowingly incites, including through an advertisement, the use of software mentioned under 1.
According to the court, once Google had been informed of the existence of infringing copies of the film, it was under an obligation to implement any means necessary to avoid future dissemination
Lacoste, TGI de Nanterre, 8 December 1999
Delicts and Quasi-Delicts
(1) to bring the need to respect the rights of others to the attention of users (obligation d’information);
(2) to remain vigilant against infringement along a standard of professional care (obligation de vigilance); and
(3) to act against verified infractions by removing the unlawful material and impeding its future re-posting (obligation de réaction).
Article 1382
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it.
Article 1383
We are responsible not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but also by our own negligence or imprudence.
Article L.122-4
“Any complete or partial communication to the public or reproduction made without the consent of the author or of his successors in title or assigns is unlawful.”
Primary liability applicable not just to the material acts of infringement, but also to the provision of means for their commission
BUT: No systematic and general examination of all content. Only due diligence checks once the intermediary acquires knowledge of or reason to suspect unlawfulness.
bon père de famille = prestataire diligent et avisé
Cour d’appel de Paris, 14 January 2011
Article 15 ECD irrelevant, as the obligation was specific to the documentary in question and notice as to its copyright status had already been given
“Le génocide arménien”, “L’affaire Clearstream”, “Les dissimulateurs” and “Mondovino”
Cour de cassation, 12 July 2012
(1) The obligation would have forced Google to seek out infringements, as well as implement a blocking mechanism with no limitation in time, which would have disproportionate general monitoring.
(2) Google should have been allowed to benefit from the hosting safe harbour.
(3) Right-holders must themselves monitor the internet and notify intermediaries of each new infringement of protected content
Cour d’appel de Paris
2 December 2014
TF1
C.
Dailymotion did not comply with its obligation to remove promptly the unlawful content upon proper notification – some videos were still available on Dailymotion 7 to 13 days after the notice. Other videos were still on line around 100 days after the notice.
Preventive filtering measure incompatible with a general monitoring obligation
Art. 8 - The right of communication to the public is the right to authorize any communication to the public
Agreed statement concerning Art. 8 WCT: ‘It is understood that the
mere provision of physical facilities
for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis(2).’
C-494/15
“Nor can the intermediary be required to exercise general and permanent oversight over its customers. By contrast, the intermediary may be forced to take measures which contribute to avoiding new infringements of the same nature by the same market-trader from taking place.”
Broad Notion of Intermediary
English Learning Diary of Koala Xiaowu – to Those Fighting for Their Dreams
(1)
reasonable for Baidu to exercise a duty to monitor and examine the legal status of an uploaded work once it has been viewed or downloaded more than certain times
(2)
Baidu needs to inspect the potential copyright status of the work by contacting the uploader, checking whether the work is originally created by the uploader or legally authorized by the copyright owners
(3)
failed to set a clear indication of how many views or downloads are enough to trigger the duty
Delta Center
Vs
Art. 14 applies to ISPs who do not play an active role that give it knowledge or control over the data stored
but not an active monitoring of all the data of each of its customers in order to prevent any future infringement
The intermediary must be neutral
Adwords
injunctions ex Art 11 Dir. 04/48/EC to take measures that contribute not only to bringing to an end infringements committed through that marketplace, but also to preventing further infringements would be available
ISP can be ordered (injunction) to suspend the perpetrator of the infringement of intellectual property rights in order to prevent (1) further infringements of that kind (2) by the same seller (3) in respect of the same trade marks
(Keyword=Trademark)
the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but to have played an active role
The mere facts that (1) Adwords is subject to payment, (2) Google sets the payment terms, or (3) provides general information to its clients do not deprive from the liability exemption
BSkyB
Vs
"the ordinary principle is that unless there are good reasons for a different order an innocent intermediary is entitled to be indemnified by the rights-holder against the costs of complying with a website-blocking order"
Technical impossibility defense!
lack of a technical solution for fixing a defective new product does not exempt the manufacturer from liability, or from the obligation of providing a solution [...] If Google created an untameable monster, “it should be the only one charged with any disastrous consequences generated by the lack of control of the users of its websites.”
a copyright bill establishing a statutory safe harbor for online service providers for copyright infringement, provided that OSPs meet certain prescribed conditions, including the taking of reasonable steps to limit or stop copyright infringement when being notified
(Copyright Amendment Bill 2014, C2957, Clause 50)
(1)
right-holders will be able to file complaints for online copyright infringement with AGCOM’s Directorate by using an online form available on AGCOM’s website (art. 6).
(5)
Decisions over the complaints will be taken by an AGCOM decision body, which will receive the results of the investigation from the Directorate (art. 8). If the collegial body is satisfied that the alleged infringement has occurred, it will adopt – within 35 days from the filing of the initial complaint – the following measures to prevent further infringement:
(1) if the infringing website is hosted in a server located in Italy, the decision body will order hosting service providers to selectively remove the infringing digital works; in case of massive copyright infringement, the decision body may order the service providers to disable access to infringing works, in lieu of the selective removal (art. 8, par. 3);
(2) if the infringing website is hosted outside Italy, the decision body will order mere conduit (Internet) service providers to block access to the website (art. 8, par. 4);
(3) in any event, when access to content or website is disabled, the service providers must automatically redirect users to a courtesy page, which will be set up according to AGCOM’s instructions (art. 8, par. 4).
(2)
The administrative procedure before AGCOM will not target users (art. 2, par. 3). Instead, it will focus exclusively on service providers, uploaders of the infringing content, and website operators hosting infringing material (art. 7).
(3)
The relevant parties will be informed that a procedure has been started against them and they will have the possibility to immediately comply with the right-holders’ request by removing or blocking access to the infringing materials (art. 7, par. 2-3).
(4)
If the party receiving the notice decides to resist the right-holders’ requests, it must do so by presenting counterarguments within five days of receiving the notice. Special terms and deadlines may apply if AGCOM’s Directorate deems the case especially complex (art. 7, par. 5).
(6)
Service providers must comply with these measures within three days. If, upon a discretionary evaluation of the Directorate, the case is deemed to be a severe infringement of the economic right of exploitation of a digital work or a massive violation, the procedural terms may be shortened (art. 9).
(1)
introduced a civil liability exemption for Internet access providers and other Internet providers.
(2)
In the case of hosting providers, Article 19 provides that, “in order to ensure freedom of expression and to prevent censorship, an Internet application provider shall only be subject to civil liability for damages caused by virtue of content generated by third parties if, after specific court order, it does not take action [ . . . ], according to the framework and technical limits of its services and within the time-frame ordered, to make the infringing content unavailable.”
(3)
This broad civil—and not criminal—liability exemption, however, does not apply to copyright infringement
ICANN-Registry Agreement (2013) 2.17 Specification 11 (requiring registry operators to include in their contracts with registrars a provision requiring registrars to include in their contracts with registrants “a provision prohibiting Registered Name Holders from […] piracy, trademark or copyright infringement […] and providing [...] consequences for such activities including suspension of the domain name.”
ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement (2013) 3.18.
What is communication to the public?
(A)
Recital 27: The mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Directive.’
(B)
Recital 23: ‘This Directive should harmonise further the author's right of communication to the public. This right should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place where the communication originates. This right should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting. This right should not cover any other acts.’
Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the making available to the public, (a) by wire or wireless means, (b) in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them:
(a)
for performers, of fixations of their performances;
(b)
for phonogram producers, of their phonograms;
(c)
for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the original and copies of their films;
(d)
for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.
Intra-copyright solutions
Why not primary liability?
When is one person liable for a copyright infringement where the material act of infringement was performed by somebody else?
(i)
(ii)
(aka accessory liability, indirect liability, third party, i.e. cases where the defendant is held liable for the infringement of somebody else)
esp. intermediary liability
‘broadcasting’
‘making available’
Each member of the public at a time and place of their own choosing
for all members of the public simultaneously
‘linear transmissions’ or
‘push services’
‘on-demand’ or
‘pull’ services or
‘non-linear’ transmissions
Conditions
Deep Linking
Hyperlinking
an ‘act of communication’, as it ‘affords users of the [site with the hyperlink] direct access’ to the works’
SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles, C-306/05
Is linking communication to the public?
Strict Liability v. Negligence Standards
Linking
(7 Mar)
2013
(24 Nov)
2011
(4 Oct)
2011
‘[W]here it is established that [the linker] knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet, for example owing to the fact that he was notified thereof by the copyright holders, it is necessary to consider that the provision of that link constitutes a “communication to the public”’
‘[W]hen the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright holder. In such circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which was illegally placed on the internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’
General Principles of Private (Tort) Law
(26 April 2017)
2006
(7 Dec)
2012
(15 Mar)
2011
(12 Oct)
Case C-527/15,
Does a link to materials that the copyright holder DID NOT authorize infringe communication to the public?
May the Member States give wider protection to the exclusive right of authors by enabling ‘communication to the public’ to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(2) of the Information Society Directive?
Conditions
Court of Appeal of Athens
Decision No 1909/2017 (18th section)
D did not know and could not have known whether the third-party websites, to which the user was redirected had obtained a lawful licence
No profit-making purpose of hyperlinking: in the very few cases where the websites had not obtained a lawful licence, D was not involved in the management of those nor received profits generated from the transmission of the works per se.
.com
International Private Law
(1)
the Argentinian Supreme Court repudiated a strict liability standard and adopted a test based on actual knowledge and negligence;
(2)
requested judicial review for issuing a notice to take down content except in a few cases of “gross and manifest harm”; and
(3)
rejected any filtering obligation to prevent infringing links from appearing in the future
“a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.”
finding the University of New South Wales liable for authorizing the infringements of those who used the photocopiers it provided in its library
holding that iiNet, Australia’s second largest ISP, was not liable for authorizing its customers’ infringement of copyright films downloaded over BitTorrent
200. [...] what the appellant seeks to do, is to impose upon Australian residents for the purposes of this and many other cases, an American legal hegemony in relation to Internet publications. The consequence, if the appellant's submission were to be accepted would be to confer upon one country, and one notably more benevolent to the commercial and other media than this one, an effective domain over the law of defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious disadvantage of those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United States. A further consequence might be to place commercial publishers in this country at a disadvantage to commercial publishers in the United States.
finding Sharman, who operated the Kazaa filesharing platform, liable for authorizing the infringements of its users