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Compatibilism
9
Compatibilism
October 28, 2019
Free Will, So far
It looks like it's tough to defend the thesis that we have free will.
Where we are
That sounds bad. Without free will, we can't make judgments about good and bad actions, we can't consciously make ourselves into the people we want to be, and we lose a sense of having a meaning in life.
Is the world determined or not?
DETERMINISM is the view that the current state of the world, together with the laws of nature, are only consistent with ONE possible future. All other futures are IMPOSSIBLE.
Determinism or indeterminism?
INDETERMINISM is the view that the current state of the world, together with the laws of nature, are consistent with MANY possible futures. Many futures are POSSIBLE.
The Case for Determinism?
We seem to have some evidence from scientific progress and from our own experience concerning determinism.
The case for determinism
The Case for Indeterminism
It seems like quantum physics suggests that there are genuine indeterministic phenomena - situations in which the past state of the world and the laws of nature are consistent with more than one future!
The case for indeterminism
This is NOT the question we'll settle here!
BUT...
We won't figure out how the world goes here. It seems like that's up to the scientists to sort out.
But what we can wonder about how this question bears on our capacity for free will.
Incompatible Determinism
If the world is determined, it is IMPOSSIBLE for me to have done anything other than what I did in the past, and it is IMPOSSIBLE for me to do anything other than what I will do in the future.
We have no free will if determinism is true
Free will is an illusion: I am not in control of my actions, because my actions are determined by things which are outside my control, like the circumstances of my birth and upbringing.
The Objection to Epiphenomenal Dualism
According to epiphenomenal dualism, the non-physical mind is a causally inert by-product of the physical brain.
Recall "Epiphenomenal" Dualism
This avoids the "ghostly causation" objection against dualism. But it means that our actions are, to a large extent, not up to our own thoughts, desires, wills, and decisions, but up to what happens to our brain.
In other words, we're merely along for the ride in our own bodies. If we complement this with incompatibilism, it sounds like epiphenomenal dualism is inconsistent with free will.
Incompatible Determinism
If our choices are not determined, they are just random. That is, my preferences, desires, aims, ambitions, and convictions have no effect on my future states. If each of my decisions is indeterminate, I could just as likely act in ways contrary to who I am.
We have no free will if indeterminism is true
This doesn't really sound like being free. It sounds like acting irrationally and randomly, without control!
What about a "hybrid"?
Here's the "master argument" against free will.
1. Either determinism is true or indeterminism is true.
2. If determinism is true, we have no free will.
3. If indeterminism is true, we have no free will.
4. So, either way, we have no free will.
Hybrid Determinism/Indeterminism?
But why think that the options are absolute? Why can't there be some of BOTH - determined sometimes, and not determined other times?
Doesn't Premise 1 make a false dichotomy?
False Dichotomy
A "false dichotomy" or "false dilemma" is an informal fallacy which rests on underrepresenting the variety of available choices, denying alternative options.
A False Dichotomy
"Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."
"Either dogs or mice are the smartest animals."
"Either all of our knowledge comes from experience, or all of our knowledge comes from reason alone."
Response
Consider Individual Choices
A hybrid view will still have to state whether any PARTICULAR choice is determined or not determined. Then, the master argument will crop up again, in modified form.
Consider the choice whether to have breakfast or not. Call it "C". C must be either determined or not determined!
1. Either C is determined or not.
2. If C is determined, it is not up to me, and not a free choice.
3. If C is NOT determined, it is random, and not a free choice.
4. Either way, C is not a free choice.
It seems like EACH CHOICE WE EVER MAKE can be substituted for C!
Choices are only SOMEWHAT determined?
So maybe, again, Premise 1 of the particular version of the master argument rests on a false dichotomy. Maybe C can be SOMEWHAT determined?
1. Either C is determined or not.
2. If C is determined, it is not up to me, and not a free choice.
3. If C is NOT determined, it is random, and not a free choice.
4. Either way, C is not a free choice.
Then, the argument fails. But...
Choices are only SOMEWHAT determined?
It sounds like "determined" just means "wholly determined", so "somewhat determined" will mean the same thing as "not determined".
If my choice whether to have breakfast or not was somewhat determined, it wasn't wholly determined, so you couldn't just have some of it.
Choices are only SOMEWHAT determined?
But even if that's not right, what's the difference between being SOMEWHAT determined and NOT DETERMINED?
It seems like ANY choice is SOMEWHAT determined! Surely, my choices at any point are limited - I can't fly out the window, so my choices are determined by the laws of physics!
Choices are only SOMEWHAT determined?
But even if that's not right, what's the difference between being SOMEWHAT determined and NOT DETERMINED?
My suspicion: there is a kind of randomness objection against any kind of "somewhat determined" account.
What is freedom?
This is a big question...
About freedom?
Two weeks ago...
We talked about some examples of situations where people are free and people are not free.
I tried to sell you on "freedom is being in control". But that's still pretty vague.
Recall the earlier discussion
It sounds like you can rely on slightly different senses of what "control" means. So maybe we can amend our definition?
Is there more to the story?
More than mere control?
More to the story?
Or, to put it another way. We care about freedom a lot. We think freedom is worth fighting for, and that this is a "good fight".
But is mere control just as worth fighting for?
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
What are your goals in bringing up children?
Or, maybe - what goals should people have when bringing up children?
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
What values, beliefs, or practices are important to pass on to children?
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
But, hold on! By achieving the previous task, aren't you infringing on your children's freedom? Aren't you telling them what they should do? Shouldn't you refrain from shaping the character of children, and let their development be shaped by whatever random events happen to them?
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
One possible answer: YES, absolutely! If we truly respect our children, we should have no say in how they turn out, or how their lives go! This should be left up to the world!
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
That answer sounds bad.
Another answer: NO! You're not infringing on their freedom - at least not in the sense that matters. They can still be free. Their upbringing shapes their general character and (maybe to some extent) their personality.
But they'll still be free so long as they're able to act in accordance with what their character, or their "true self" or their "heart of hearts" tells them!
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
But shouldn't a child be able to shape her own personality?
Sure. But she can still do that: your own self-development is your own so long as it is also consistent with your character!
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
So, more pointedly:
When we think about children's development, we tend to think of freedom as being able to act out the motivations of one's own self, one's true nature, or one's basic character.
Thought Experiment - Raising Children
So, in general:
We have reason to think that, in order to have free will, we must be able to act out the motivations of one's own self, one's true nature, or one's basic character.
This seems perfectly consistent with determinism.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Oh no! You've been taken captive by an evil mad scientist!
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
This scientist loves nefarious deeds. He has learned that you love chocolate ice cream, and hate vanilla.
He implants a chip in your brain which makes you choose vanilla ice cream whenever given the choice between chocolate and vanilla.
You continue to hate vanilla, but you choose it in a kind of uncontrolled way - it's like a muscle spasm.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Does this deprive you of some freedom? How come? Have you been wronged?
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Alright, now let's consider another scenario.
You've been taken captive by a mad scientist, but one far less evil.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
This scientist, too, has learned that you love chocolate ice cream, and hate vanilla.
But he's not about evil - he doesn't want to cause you harm. He decides that you'd be better off actually LIKING vanilla.
So, he implants a chip in your brain which makes you actually like vanilla ice cream. Since you actually like vanilla,you end up choosing it whenever given the choice between chocolate and vanilla.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Does this deprive you of some freedom? How come? Have you been wronged?
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
Maybe it's not decisive.
But it's clear that there's a MAJOR DIFFERENCE between the two scientists. It seems that the EVIL SCIENTIST has infringed on your freedom MUCH MORE than the NON-EVIL SCIENTIST!
The difference seems to have something to do with the fact that the evil scientist has made you act in a way which is contrary to your own self, whereas the other one permits you to act in a way consistent with yourself.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
So, more pointedly:
When we think about when we're being controlled, we tend to think of freedom as being able to act out the motivations of one's own self, one's true nature, or one's basic character.
Thought Experiment - Two Mad Scientists
So, in general:
We have reason to think that, in order to have free will, we must be able to act out the motivations of one's own self, one's true nature, or one's basic character.
This seems perfectly consistent with determinism.
Compatibilism
The view that determinism is compatible with free will. That is, we have free will, even if there is only one possible future.
Hobart and Compatibilism
Indeed, many compatibilists, including R.E. Hobart, think that we can ONLY have free will if the universe were determined.
Compatibilism Defended
Compatibilism saves free will from the two kinds of objections we've encountered so far.
Responding to Objections
The Mischevious Genie?
What if the mischevious genie from the ice cream store suddenly made you indeterministic?
The Mischevious Genie?
Hobart's theory tracks our intuitions in this case exactly. The mischevious genie would deprive us of our free will!
So, if you feel strongly about free will, you have to think that determinism is true!
No Control?
What about the argument that we have no free will because our choices are shaped by things beyond our control: genetics, upbringing, and so on?
No Control?
If compatibilism is true, this is not an issue - for the most part! So long as the things which determine our actions are products of our genuine, personal self, this kind of determination is consistent with free will!
The "No Control" Argument
1. Determinism is true.
2 If determinism is true, I have no control over my decisions.
3. Free will is the ability to control my decisions.
4. I have no control over my decisions.
5. I have no free will.
In Numbered Form?
If compatibilism is true, this argument fails. One plausible diagnosis: it equivocates on "control". In Premise 2, "control" is something trivial, something not really worth caring about. In Premise 3, "control" is more serious, like being able to act out one's character!
(Hobart doesn't talk about "control", so he'd just reject 3 outright. Other compatibilists might want to reject 2 outright.)
The "Sheer Feels" of Incompatibilism
The "Sheer Feels"
"I have the obvious and apparent experience of OPEN POSSIBILITIES. That's what my experience of freedom is. I wouldn't have that if Hobart were right. Being free is clearly about DIFFERENT POSSIBLE FUTURES, and about INDETERMINISM!"
Similar Response - Physicalism about the Mind
Dualists insist that there's more to the mind than the brain: pain is more than C-fiber stimulation, seeing the color red is more than having certain physical experiences.
Compare to Physicalism
Physicalists respond: "make an effort of analytical imagination! If you did, you'd see that all there is to your supposed 'experiences' are brain states! Stop looking for a horse when I've shown you the entire locomotive!"
Experience of indeterminacy?
I think this is what experiencing indeterminacy would be like.
I think that this is what experiencing determinacy is like.
What is that experience?
I think this is what we experience.
I don't think we experience anything like this.
Hobart's Response
People believe in incompatibilism because of "our natural want of the analytical imagination". That is, to see that incompatibilism is wrong, we need only exercise "the power we have, not by nature but by training, of realising that the component parts of a thing or process, taken together, each in its place, with their relations, are identical with the thing or process itself"
Lack of Analytical Imagination
" It has not occurred to them that our free will may be resolved into its component elements. (Thus far a portion only of this resolution has been considered.) When it is thus resolved they do not recognise it. The analytical imagination is considerably taxed to perceive the identity of the free power that we feel with the component parts that analysis shows us. We are gratified by their nods of intelligence and their bright, eager faces as the analysis proceeds, but at the close are a little disheartened to find them falling back on the innocent supposition of a horse inside that does all the essential work"
"Analytical Imagination"
Hobart has argued that all that we really think of as freedom is achievable while we are completely determined.
What does that mean?
He thinks that insisting that freedom is really SOMETHING ELSE is missing the point. He's shown you that all you need in order to be free is to act out of your self and your character. You don't need anything else, including the different possible futures!
The incompatibilist is looking for a horse in a steam locomotive!
The Locomotive
Illustration
When [the railway] reached the village of a certain enlightened pastor, he took his people to where a locomotive engine was standing, and in the clearest words explained of what parts it consisted and how it worked. He was much pleased by their eager nods of intelligence as he proceeded. But on his finishing they said:
" Yes, yes, Herr Pastor, but there's a horse inside, isn't there ?"
They could not realise the analysis. They were wanting in the analytical imagination. Why not ? They had never been trained to it. It is in the first instance a great effort to think of all the parts working together to produce the simple result that the engine glides down the track. It is easy to think of a horse inside doing all the work. A horse is a familiar totality that does familiar things. They could no better have grasped the physiological analysis of a horse's movements had it been set forth to them.
Hobart on Free Will
"The principle of free will says: "I produce my volitions Determinism says: " My volitions are produced by me Determinism is free will expressed in the passive voice. "
Some Quotes
An Argument for Compatibilism
Hobart's argument is roughly that the free will worth caring about is the one which permits us to act out of our own character an personal preferences. But that's consistent with determinism!
An Argument
An Argument for Determinism
Hobart's paper opens with a quick argument for determinism. (Pp. 1-2)
1. We have free will only if determinism is true.
2. We very clearly have free will.
3. So, determinism is true.
An Argument for Determinism
Premise 1 is the main target that the paper aims to establish.
Premise 2 Hobart takes to be immediately obvious. "That we are free in willing," he claims, "is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis."
The Argument from Self-Reproach (4-5)
The Argument from Self-Reproach
1. When I reproach myself, I am reproaching my character.
2. Therefore, my self is my character.
3. What it is for me to decide freely is for my self to be the cause of my decision.
4. Therefore, what it is for me to decide freely is for my character to be the cause of my decision.
A General Argument for Compatibilism
A General Argument
1. We are free only if we are the causes of our own actions.
2. We are the causes of our actions only if our "self" determines our actions.
3. We are free only if our "self" determines our actions. (1, 2)
4. If our "self" determines our actions, our actions are determined.
5. We are free only if our actions are determined. (3, 4)
Freedom and the Self
The Point of the Earlier Discussion
We seem to think that at least one important kind of freedom is about acting in a way which is consistent with one's sense of self, not contrary to it. That kind of freedom seems consistent with determinism!