Introducing
Your new presentation assistant.
Refine, enhance, and tailor your content, source relevant images, and edit visuals quicker than ever before.
Trending searches
"Identity" Physicalism
Dualism with interaction
Dualism without interaction
Functionalism (a kind of physicalism!)
If you like rationalism or common sense, you're likely to find the difference arguments for dualism to be sound, and the inductive arguments for physicalism to be unconvincing.
If you like empiricism, you might have good reason to think that the inductive arguments for physicalism are convincing, and that the difference arguments for dualism are unsound.
If you like pragmatism, you'd probably be swayed by the life after death argument for dualism.
If you're a coherentist, you'll probably be especially worried about the ghostly causation objection against dualism, and somewhat convinced by the inductive arguments for physicalism.
If this unit piqued your interest, I recommend enrolling in PHI376 (Philosophy of Mind) or PHI378 (Minds and Machines), where you'll hear more!
We've discussed physicalism and dualism. But many people think other stuff...
Idealists think that there are only minds, no matter.
Neutral Monists think that there is only one thing, but that it doesn't make sense to ask whether it is mental or physical.
Panpsychists think that everything is conscious (to some degree).
Non-Reductive Physicalists think that the mind is produced by the brain, but not identical to it.
Neo-Aristotelians think that the mind is related to the brain as the form is to an object.
Neo-Pragmatists think that the distinction between mind and body is fundamentally misguided.
And that's just the beginning!
What makes up our thoughts (language, concepts, neither?)
What are "mental representations"?
How do we perceive the world through the senses?
What are beliefs, desires, emotions, judgments, creativity?
How do our beliefs and desires cause our behaviors?
Are meanings determined by our thinking or by the world?
What counts as consciousness?
What is the relationship between having a mind and being a person with moral rights and duties?
Nagel's point: we can never know what it's like to be a bat, because conscious experience is uniquely irreducible. But many (Carruthers and Churchland) like physicalism because it purports to succeed in reducing the mind to the brain. So that's a bad reason to like physicalism. But maybe some other argument for physicalism is alright.
Jackson's point: Mary learns something new through experience, because qualia are non-physical. But any physicalism rules out qualia. So physicalism is a bad view, no matter how you argue for it.
In other words, Nagel is attacking a way of arguing for physicalism. Jackson is attacking physicalism itself.
Thomas Nagel argues that no amount of physical information can tell us what it is like to be a bat, and indeed that we, human beings, cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat. His reason is that what this is like can only be understood from a bat's point of view, which is not our point of view and is not something capturable in physical terms which are essentially terms understandable equally from many points of view. [...] Nagel speaks as if the problem he is raising is one of extrapolating from knowledge of one experience to another, of imagining what an unfamiliar experience would be like on the basis of familiar ones [... and] the trouble with bats et al. is that they are too unlike us. It is hard to see an objection to physicalism here. Physicalism makes no special claims about the imaginative or extrapolative powers of human beings, and it is hard to see why it need do so. Anyway, our Knowledge argument makes no assumptions on this point. If Physicalism were true, enough physical information about Fred would obviate any need to extrapolate or to perform special feats of imagination or understanding in order to know all about his special colour expereience. The information would already be in our possession. But it clearly isn't.
View: "We shouldn't let people eat in the library."
Argument: "We shouldn't let people eat in the library because it's gross."
Attacking Argument: "It's not gross at all - it's highly envigorating to smell somebody else's food while working!"
Attacking View: "Legislating where people should or should not eat is a violation of our fundamental rights. Any argument you give will be no good!"
They are the subjective features of experience, which are uniquely accessible through introspection.
For example, the experience of seeing a red rose is different from seeing a yellow rose. The difference between them is in the different qualia associated with the colors red and yellow.
"Qualia" is the plural word. The singular is "quale".
Jackson: "the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise, or seeing the sky." (127)
https://evolutionsupplements.com.au/neurohacker-collective-qualia-stack/
Taylor Swift, Jaden Smith, Frankie Muniz, Demi Lovato, Mindy Kaling, Justin Bieber, and Kanye West see blue and black.
Anna Kendrick, B.J. Novak, Katy Perry, Julianne Moore, Sarah Hyland, and Kim Kardashian see white and gold.
Their experiences differ in terms of the qualia!
Jackson calls this "The Knowledge Argument". This thought experiment is meant to show us that physicalism must be false.
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible to obtain all this physical information from black and white television, otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use colour television.)
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false. [...]
The conclusion in each case is that the qualia are left out of the physicalist story. And the polemical strength of the Knowledge argument is that it is so hard to deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have.
1. If physicalism is true, someone who knows all the physical facts about color perception would learn nothing by seeing color for the first time.
2. Someone who knows all the physical facts about color perception would learn something by seeing color for the first time.
3. Physicalism is false.
It sure looks that way. It is of the following form (called "modus tollens" in Latin).
1. If A, then B.
2. Not B.
3. Not A.
Any argument which has this form is valid!
If physicalism is true, someone who knows all the physical facts about color perception would learn nothing by seeing color for the first time.
This is just the definition of physicalism. According to physicalism, there is nothing more to any mental event than physical events. So, if Mary were to know all the physical facts about color perception, there would be nothing more for her to learn!
Premise 1 seems to be true by definition!
Someone who knows all the physical facts about color perception would learn something by seeing color for the first time.
The evidence for the truth of Premise 2 seems to be an overwhelming intuition. It just seems very obvious to us that, when Mary emerges from her black-and-white room, she'd learn something she didn't know before!
But suddenly Jonas had noticed, following the path of the apple through the air with his eyes, that the piece of fruit had - well, this was the part that he couldn't adequately understand - the apple had changed. Just for an instant. It had changed in mid-air, he remembered. Then it was in his hand, and he looked at it carefully, but it was the same apple. Unchanged. The same size and shape: a perfect sphere. The same nondescript shade, about the same shade as his own tunic.
There was absolutely nothing remarkable about that apple. He had tossed it back and forth between his hands a few times, then thrown it again to Asher. And again - in the air, for an instant only - it had changed.
It had happened four times. Jonas had blinked, looked around, and then tested his eyesight, squinting at the small print on the identification badge attached to his tunic. He read his name quite clearly. He could also clearly see Asher at the other end of the throwing area. And he had had no problem catching the apple.
Jonas was completely mystified. (page 24)
"I'm right, then," The Giver said. "You're beginning to see the color red."
"The what?"
The Giver sighed. "How to explain this? Once, back in the time of the memories, everything had a shape and size, the way things still do, but they also had a quality called color.
"There were a lot of colors, and one of them was called red. That's the one you are starting to see." (page 94)
Unlike Mary, Fred sees two colors - "red1" and "red2" - where we see one. Even if we were to know all there is to know about Fred,
Jackson thinks we would be really interested to find out "what it is like to see the extra color," and that we'd look forward to the day when "at last we will know how Fred has differed from us in the way he has struggled to tell us about for so long."
1. If physicalism is true, and if we knew all the physical facts about Fred's color perception, we would learn nothing by seeing the way Fred does.
2. But, if we knew all the physical facts about Fred's color perception would learn something by seeing the way Fred does.
3. Physicalism is false.
The fact that the situation with Mary which Jackson describes never happened, or couldn't even happen in any future, doesn't matter.
Thought experiments are pure fictions, but they are supposed to help us to figure out what we think about a complicated issue.
The conclusions of thought experiments are then taken to help guide our theorizing about more complicated questions.
In each case, a fictional situation reveals something about our thinking.
"You see a small child drowning in a shallow pool. You could easily save it, but it would get your clothes dirty."
"You are morally obligated to save the child - the minor inconvenience to you does not matter at all."
So, you are also morally obligated to donate to charities to alleviate famine - the minor inconvenience to you does not matter at all!
"It's totally possible that a supremely powerful and supremely evil demon is deceiving me about absolutely anything"
So, I should never believe anything at all!
"A trolley is barrelling down a track, directly towards five people, who will be seriously injured if it hits them. You happen to be standing next to a lever which will divert the trolley onto a different track, avoiding the five people. But, a single person stands on the different track, and they will be seriously injured if the trolley hits them. Should you pull the lever?"
People tend to disagree about this thought experiment. Whatever you choose, the answer will determine whether you think it's okay to make big sacrifices.
"The monster looks like it feels pain, and we feel bad for it."
So, things without brains can have pains and other mental states, and identity physicalism is false.
Lots of people have given reasons to resist the Knowledge Argument.
C.L. Hardin (a former SU philosopher) thought this was the right response
According to some physicalists, if Mary truly knew all there is to know about visual perception, she would learn nothing new!
The argument misleads our intuitions - our knee-jerk reaction is that she would be surprised, but that's just because we aren't imagining someone who genuinely knows all there is to know!
Some people think that Mary learns only a new practical ability or skill when she first sees the color red. For example, she learns how to recognize or recall the color red.
Of course, since Mary knew all there is to know about color, she already knew that people see that particular color when they see apples and sunsets. But she didn't have the relevant know-how.
David Lewis thought this.
Some people think that Mary learns only a new way to describe a fact that she already knew. That is, she learns a different way that the same fact can be represented, just like "there is H2O in the cup" is a different representation of the fact "there is water in the cup".
So the second premise of the Knowledge Argument is false: Mary does not learn anything new when she sees the color red for the first time.
So physicalism is saved from this objection!