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G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral
Plaintiff: contrary to expectations - newlyweds to make love i.e. sex; defendant merely went to bed to sleep disregarding her needs and expectations.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner
vs
COURT OF APPEALS and
GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents
A. Signifier without signified
Art. 36 defined:
Art. 36, FC - as proposed by Civil Code Revision Committee (CCRC) of the UP Law Center
Caguioa: differs from insanity (impaired consent) as the incapacity resides in the impaired understanding of marital obligations; former is curable/treatable and with lucid intervals
Vitug: mental (not physical) incapacity existing at time of ceremony causing a party to be incognitive of marital obligations
Proposes no-fault divorce
Antagonizes absolute divorce
Formulates Art. 36 as an alternative
Not divorce, merely judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
B. The Crisis of Jurisprudence
There is no such thing as "psychological incapacity"
The term "Psychological Incapacity"
Has no concrete definition
No examples either
BUT WHY?
Statutory Construction maxim: "of the same kind" when the law enumerates specifics and then refers to them in general, the later statements would carry the definition of the prior enumeration. [E.g. if law refers to trees like; mango, coconut, orange, durian and other fruit-plants, "fruit-plants" if used later] would not include grapes, as the list is composed of trees with wooden trunks.
CCRC - no to "ejusdem generis"
Art. 36 brought questions to:
Absence of sufficient standard
Malleable descriptions befitting singular purpose
No empirical bases or court rulings
There is a perceived need for
"an exit mechanism"
without compromising our image
Chi Ming Tsoi is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations
Art. 36 has no medical definition
It is a medical case of its own
C. Procedural Glitches
Art. 36 before a court yields no predicable ruling
Judges has liberty to dispose interpretation
Litigants have the implied leeway to MANIPULATE
Promulgating a virtual indirect
of Molina / Santos
Specified allegation
Complete facts
Physical manifestations
No expert opinion needed
The difference
Neither of them were muted or actually overturned
The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon
They slept together on the same bed from 1988 to 1989. But, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse.
First published in 1960
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
Most cited article in the combination of
Actions of one
translate to
Harmful effects on another
0 transaction costs
Efficient outcome to occur regardless of choice of legal rule
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
>0 transaction costs
Efficient outcome may not occur under all legal rules
Choosing legal rule to minimize the transaction cost
Marriage : Economic Transaction
Parties : Agents
Max Happiness : Max Utility
an instance of being happy
happiness
Lao-Tsoi = rational maximizer
> release herself from PI husband to be better off
Tsoi = negative externality
> Not affected
Under free marriage
Results into optimum felicity for Lao-Tsoi
A inflicts harm on B; how should B restrain A?
That is not the case.
Reciprocal nature of problems:
To avoid harm, B inflicts reciprocal harm on A
"Whom should be allowed to harm the other (avoiding grater harm)?"
Art 36 is a MESS
Given the size, there is possibility
Had she allowed not having sex
Then no legal issue
Should Tsoi be allowed to remain married (harming Gina) or should she be allowed to leave (harming Tsoi)
Policymaker to craft the rule
1. Assign liability
2. Effect of assignment on felicity
Liability on Gina
> Marriage preserved
> Harm on Gina
> Tsoi better off?
Liability on Tsoi
> Marriage dissolved
> Harm on Tsoi
> Gina better off
Art 36 petitions alters net distribution of felicity
Reluctance to consummate marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
Decide Art. 36 based on facts - if there is no more marriage to save, don't
Reasons for marital
failure rooted on
Arts. 68 - 71 FC
Arts. 220, 221, & 225 FC
Dishonesty of the system is driven by the bottleneck the SC created...
searching and retaining lawyers
hiring psychologist/psychiatrist
appearing in court, testifying, and petition
THE AMBIGUITY
No divorce policy is akin to 20th Century (Prohibition Era)
created by
Art 36
fuels
COSTS
As long as there is
Costs > Quasi-divorce
couples in failed marriages will but their way out of marriage REGARDLESS
Art 36 feeds corruption
when
<
=
more
social
cost
As rational maximizer for personal felicity
> Disregards the law
> How much / is it worth?
> Risks in breaking the law?
High = observe
Low = err
Molina gives incentive to bogus petition for Art 36, marriage fail:
Continue living together
Separate informally
Unaffordable costs
Welfare of children
Myth of family
= inexpensive remedy
Exit by defect
Either defect in consent or fraud, may affect property distribution
Prescription / statute of limitations
Likewise, incentive arise only:
1. Fault is to be established
2. Properties carry significant value
Remedy for Property Separation
Not marital separation
Obligation to live with spouse is purely personal
Fault finding endeavor
Only yields benefit if:
1. Fault reasonably established
2. Properties to be dissolved sufficient/significant value
No-fault exit
Held: nullification under Art 36 does arise from willful error or deliberate misconduct
No incentive as to value of properties
Incentive is freedom and full capacity
Bogus marriages, reasons outside of concrete standards of first two
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)