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Breaking & Entering with SDR

Physical Access Control Systems or Wiegand Over VHF/UHF

Disclaimer

This information is freely provided and no warranty is provided. While this information is free and available, your actions can have consequences.

Do not break the law. It is illegal to transmit RF on the ranges discussed, without a license.

It is illegal to trespass, or otherwise gain unauthorized entry. Be kind! I am not responsible for your actions.

Basics of SDR

Next Level Mess

Closing Statements

  • Key-fob Cloning
  • Permanent Open-Lock
  • Forced Close-Lock (Jamming)
  • "God Codes"
  • 0000000000000000 ?
  • Application Bugs

Remediation steps:

  • New key-fob system?
  • Rotating keys
  • Awareness!

GNURadio Modulation

Questions?

Tim Shelton - redsand redsand@redsand.net

@redsandbl4ck

Limitations of Writes

  • Expectations?
  • Security?
  • Privacy?
  • Vendor suggestion - unique facility code per user.

Initial Assessment

  • Vulnerability - Replay Attack!
  • Tell me why?

Attack vectors increase with data control

Let's keep hunting!

  • 5 messages per second limitation
  • Multiple sends needed to verify message received
  • 1-2 tries per second.
  • Weigand-33 keyspace: 24 bits
  • 16,777,215 unique values
  • Never seen a keyfob in the wild < 600k or > ~1.4M
  • Facility code is consistent
  • 1 code per key-fob button
  • card # and facility are different for each button

Add'l reading: gracefulsecurity.com/keyfob-cloning

Problem and Impact

Modulation - Write Control

Who got hit?

  • Affects remote transmitters allowing physical building access.
  • Often times duals as garage and common space access controls.

Who's impacted?

  • We have:
  • facility codes and
  • matching card numbers
  • We want:
  • to test if they work
  • enumerate new codes
  • Why is this useful?
  • Commercial businesses with common space
  • Apartment complexes (a lot of them)
  • Problem impacts both domestic, as well as international.

RF Demodulation

Pulse Position Modulation

Courtesy of tutorialspoint.com

Pulse Width (update)

  • Monarch - 12.0
  • Other values out there but need discovering
  • Width value expected to be lower and not higher
  • Actual width of pulse be wider

Courtesy of tutorialspoint.com

GNURadio Demodulator

  • Phase-shift keying (PSK)
  • Frequency-shift keying (FSK)
  • Amplitude-shift keying (ASK)
  • On-off keying (OOK) (most common ASK).
  • Quadrature amplitude modulation (PSK + ASK)
  • Continuous phase modulation (CPM)
  • and many more...

Wiegand 26, 30, 32, 33, 36, etc.

  • Facility Code (1 byte usually 0-255)
  • Card Number (24, 32 bits, etc.)
  • Reference RFID, et al.

Bitstream: 000100001101111101010000000001011

[33]: Code: 0x21bea00b Facility: 16 CardId: 14635013 (parity success)

Oh, and also Differential Pulse Position Modulation

Market Impact

DFW - 70% of infosec participants polled that live in an apartment complex, are impacted by this attack.

Help me measure broader risk and exposure.

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