Zahavi: Subjectivity and Selfhood

"Lived pre- reflective consciousness has no egological structure. As long as we are absorbed in the experience, living it through, no ego appears. It is only when we adopt a distancing and objectifying attitude toward the experience in question, that is, when we reflect upon it, that an ego appears.

Even then, however, we are dealing not with an I-consciousness, since the reflecting pole remains non-egological, but merely with a consciousness of an ego. The ego is not the subject, but the object of consciousness. It is not something that exists in or behind consciousness, but in front of it." (p.101)

Hume

Sartre

"All that has been explained previously by reference to a phenomenological notion of “self” can consequently be better explained with the notion of a phenomenally transparent self-model whose representational, or more important, misrepresentational (hallucinatory) nature cannot be recognized by the system using it" (p.111)

Is there a Self?

Aim: provide a new egological account based on an examination of the structure of experience

Nietzsche

Metzinger

two opposing conceptions of self/non-self

non-egological: experiences are acquaintances that C has with itself

the self is a product of reflection or of a complex brain state

egological:

every experience has a central unifying subject

Descartes

the self is given, conceptually or experientially

Kant

minimal/core

self

Notions of Self

"To be conscious of oneself, consequently, is not to capture a pure self that exists in separation from the stream of consciousness, but rather entails just being conscious of an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness; it is a question of having first-personal access to one’s own experiential life." (p.115)

Phenomenology

foundation

• self is the first-personal giveness of experience

Zahavi

replacement

• subject has specific access to the stream of consciousness

Hermeneutics

• self is constructed through narration and interpretation during life-time

Classical View

self as an

experiential

dimension

• necessity to be part of a linguistic social community

• self is a formal and abstract identity principle

Ricoeur

Conclusions

Core Sense of Self

Rather than choosing between these two narrow alternatives:

Are there other theories of self?

= sense of mineness constituted by the pre-reflective first-personal mode of givenness, that distinguish my from other's experiences

• subject gives coherence+unity to the ever-changing flow of experiences

• no separate identity-pole that transcends the stream of experiences (Kant)

• nor "non-existent" as constructed or a mere self-awareness of experiences

Mineness and Selfhood

self as social and narrative

construction

The self is not an object, but the subject(ivity) of experience, or its basic ipseity

the feature common to all intentional qualities of experience is their mineness, their first-personal mode of givenness

self as a

distinct

identity-pole

• it is its first-personal givenness that reveals the mineness or ipseity of experience

Kant

Dan Zahavi:

Subjectivity and Selfhood

• no explicit I-consciousness that I am the subject of the experience, but a subtle background of mineness

Selfhood and Personhood

• this pre-reflective sense of mineness constitutes the minimal/core sense of self

Transcendence and Immanence

the self is not the independent spectator of experiences, but an integral part to the conscious engagement with the world

"Self-awareness is there not only when I realize that

I am perceiving a candle, but whenever I am acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness, that is, whenever there is something it is like for me to have the experience." (p.146)

"[...] it is necessary to distinguish the self from any single experience, as the self can preserve its identity whereas experiences arise and perish in the stream of consciousness, replacing one other in a permanent flux [...] although the ego must be distinguished from the experiences in which it lives and functions, it cannot exist in any way independently of them. It is a transcendence, but in Husserl’s now famous phrase, it is a transcendence in the immanence."(p.140)

the self is a specific mode of how experiences can be given, namely first-personal givenness

"narrative personhood presupposes experiential selfhood (but not vice versa)" (p.129)

the pre-reflective knowledge of mineness grounds any reflective construction of a narrative (autobiographic) self/person

How can narrative and experiential self concepts be integrated?

Clinical and Neural

Support

self(-affection), or subjectivity is:

• the grounds for a meaningful world
• coupled to perception (significance~attention)
• and action (affordances)

disrupted in:

• schizophrenic personality disorder

• hyperreflexivity: compulsive self-monitoring

Parnas

Sass

• double dissociation between core/extended (autobiographical) consciousness (~ self)

Intentionalistic Interpretation

of Phenomenal Qualities

Damasio

note of caution: necessity for refined phenomenological descriptions

sensory, emotional and intentional states do have a specific phenomenality;

i.e. "what it is like" to be in a mental state

• it is the subjective phenomenal quality of mental states that makes them a conscious experience (p.119)

• the intentional quality of experiences themselves differ from the intentional matter of experience

• different qualities or matters change the phenomenality

intentional matter/object

intentional quality/act

phenomenal

experience

Husserl

Narrative Self Concept

"Although no ego exists on the pre-reflective level, consciousness remains personal because [it] is, at bottom, characterized by a fundamental self-givenness or self-referentiality that Sartre called ipseity."

(p.124)

Experiences are intentional,

Intentional states are experiential

ipse-identity

idem-identity

Experiences present us with Objects

• identity as selfhood
• linked to interpretation and self-understanding

• identity as sameness
• personality traits permanent over time

• worldly properties

• experiential properties

• continuous self-inter-pretation+construction

• appearance to the subject; e.g. hard, bitter, warm, red...

• modes of givenness to the subject; e.g. in perception, dream...

• unchangeable substrate allows reidentification

worldly dimension

experiential dimension

• objectivity = intersubjective accessibility

• "Who am I?" needs an answer from a 1st ps perspective

• subjectivity = exclusive first-personal givenness

• definitive + informative answers from a 3rd ps perspective are possible

"I attain insight into who I am by situating my character traits, the values I endorse, the goals I pursue within a life story that traces their origin and development; the self is the product of a narratively structured life" (p.107)

both poles of experience involve a first-person perspective

"[...] the narrative identity can include changes and mutations within the cohesion of a lifetime" (p.108)

"Who we are depends on the stories told about us, both by ourselves and by others. Our narrative self is multiple-authored and under constant revision. The story of any individual life is not only interwoven with the stories of others (parents, siblings, friends, etc.), it is also embedded in a larger historical and communal meaning-giving structure" (p.118)

Problems of Narrative Identity

• life story can be (internally or externally) incoherent

Jopling

Ricoeur:

Problems of Narrative Identity

• the narration cannot capture all aspects of our selfhood and might even impose an order that is not given in life

character

complement

narration

• idem: identity as the same
• ipseity: identity as the self

Gallagher

faithfulness of self

ethics

Aim: ground the narrative self concept in a more fundamental notion of ipseity (selfhood): an experiential core self

• the self is wholly constituted by our descriptions; it is nothing but a linguistic and social invention

first-person

perspective

• accountability
• responsibility

experience

Dennett

• self/nonself
• agency

replace

Zahavi

the self is not theoretical fiction, but grounded in experience and giving organisation, structure, and meaning to our life

"[W]e should not confuse the reflective, narrative grasp of a life with an account of the pre-reflective experience that makes up that life prior to that experience being organized into a narrative."

Drumond

Ngan-Tram Ho Dac

Universität Osnabrück

25. Mai 2013

Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood. MIT Press.