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Allows PIN-based authentication, even for offline transactions
Makes card cloning harder
amount, currency, date, nonce, TVR, etc
"When a card company receives a claim about a fraudulent transaction from a customer, they will always rely on primary evidence to review the facts of the case and would never use a paper receipt (which in fact they could only see if the customer provided the copy) for evidence as suggested."
"Neither the banking industry nor the police have any evidence of criminals having the capability to deploy such sophisticated attacks. Our research suggests that criminal interest in chip-based attacks is minimal at this time as they are unable to find ways to make sufficient amounts of money from any of the plausible attack scenarios."
"The industry is confident that the forensic signature of such an attack is easily detectable within the data available at the time of the transaction."
In addition to the TVR, the card produces a CVR (card verification results) and the terminal may optionally produce a CVMR (cardholder verification method result)
In our attack, the CVR will not match the CVMR
We hear that the industry are working on a defence based on comparing the CVR and CVMR, but it is not quite that simple:
If the PIN is not required by the terminal, the TVR is all zeros
If the PIN is entered correctly, the TVR is still all zeros
A man-in-the middle tell the card that the PIN was not required
and the terminal that the PIN was correct
Now the criminal can use a stolen card,
give the wrong PIN to the terminal
and still have the transaction succeed
Card to Terminal: card details, digital signature
Terminal to MitM: entered by criminal
Terminal to Card: PIN as entered by customer
MitM to Terminal: PIN correct
Card to Terminal: PIN correct (yes/no)
Messages relayed without modification
amount, currency, date, nonce, TVR, etc
Terminal to Card: description of transaction
Messages relayed without modification
Terminal to Card: description of transaction
Card to Terminal: MAC over transaction and other details
MAC and transaction sent to bank for verification
Bank to Terminal: transaction authorized (yes/no)
down 53% to £54.1m
down 86% to £10.2m
up 31% to £169m
online banking
up 330% to £52.5m
card-not present
up 118% to £328.4m
checks
down 9% to £41.9m
False applications
up 28% to £47.4m
Data from APACS (2009)
dip in 2005—2006,
but up 25% to £704.3m
EuroPay
MasterCard
Visa
EMV is deployed or in planning in most countries
except the US, but vendors are working hard to change this
Credit and Debit
Point-of-sale and ATM
Smart card based payments
Used on 750m cards, billions of pounds, euros, dollars
BBC Newsnight, February 2010
Many customers claim that their card has been stolen and used
Banks claim EMV is infallible, so victims do not get their money back
44% according to latest figures