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EISENHOWER & THE NEW LOOK IB History
Transcript of EISENHOWER & THE NEW LOOK IB History
WHAT WAS NEW ABOUT THE NEW LOOK?
CASE STUDY: GUATEMALA
HOW NEW WAS THE NEW LOOK?
Read "Guatemala: The Mother of Interventions"
Stephen G. Rabe specializes in U.S. foreign relations, with a particular interest in U.S. relations with Latin America. Rabe has written or edited 10 books and has published scholarly articles, numerous book chapters, book reviews, and encyclopedia articles on U.S. and Latin American history. His most recent books are: U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (2005); John F. Kennedy: World Leader (2010); and The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (2011), which was published by Oxford University Press. Rabe earned his doctorate from the University of Connecticut. He is also a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and serves as the faculty adviser to the Veterans Club at UT Dallas.
WHY A NEW LOOK?
THE ROLE OF FOSTER DULLES
New Look * Dwight D. Eisenhower * John Foster Dulles * Alan Dulles * CIA * Brinkmanship * Asymmetrical Response * Psychological Warfare * Covert Operations * Massive Retaliation * Military Industrial Complex * More Bang For the Buck * Quemoy and Matsu * Rollback * NORAD * Oligarchies * strongmen * mestizos * Juan Jose Arevalo * Carlos Castillo Armas* Jacobo Arbenz * United Fruit Company * Operation PBSuccess * labor unions *Soviet Bloc * Carlos Castillo Armas * Bolivian Revolution * Richard Nixon * Operation Poor Richard * gunboat diplomacy * Juscelino Kubitschek * Operation Pan America * The Act of Bogota * military junta *
“Presidents are rarely made by endorsing their predecessors, though, and Eisenhower soon came under pressure to put 'distance' between himself and the incumbent administration in the area of foreign affairs. To this end, he enlisted the help of the Republican whose criticisms of containment he found least objectionable-the advocate of "boldness," John Foster Dulles. Certainly Dulles's promises of greater effectiveness at less cost appealed to Eisenhower, who had long nursed a vague sense of uneasiness about the country's ability to sustain indefinitely large military expenditures.”
Why John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State?
Eisenhower selected “Dulles only after his advisers had warned him that the Taft wing of the party would accept no one else. It was largely politics, then, not intellectual affinity, that brought about the curious Eisenhower-Dulles ‘partnership.’”
"But the most important reason for perceiving means as limited was the belief that unrestrained spending could alter the very nature of American society, either through the debilitating effects of inflation or through regimentation in the form of economic control. It was based on the assumption that economic stability and military strength were inseparable."
Truman wanted to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons
"The number and variety of nuclear weapons had dramatically increased by the time he took office, both at the tactical and strategic level. Intercontinental jet bombers were becoming operational. The new Chief Executive was determined to cut back on expensive ground force commitments on 'bottle washers and table waiters,' as he put it. Overseas military bases were beginning to provoke anti-American sentiment in the countries where they were located; the governments concerned. Dulles warned, were coming to see such bases as 'lightning rods rather than umbrellas.' Together, these considerations made a powerful argument for greater emphasis on a U.S.-based airborne strategic nuclear deterrent: 'It was agreed,' Eisenhower noted after a conference with Dulles, Humphrey, and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in November 1953 'that the dependence that we are placing on new weapons would justify completely some reduction in conventional forces- that is, both ground troops and certain parts of the Navy.'"
"Atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed forces,"
"It is reasonable to ask, then, just what the administration's strategy was on the use of nuclear weapons, and how it differed from the recommendations put forward in NSC-68. The answer revolves largely around the question of symmetrical versus asymmetrical response. The Truman administration after 1950, of course, had emphasized symmetry: deterrence would work by creating certainty in the mind of the adversary both as to the inevitability and the limits of an American response-the United States would counter, but not exceed, the initial provocation. The Eisenhower administration, embracing asymmetry, sought to combine the certainty of a response with uncertainty as to its nature. The idea was to open up a range of possible responses so wide that the Soviet Union would not be able to count on retaining the initiative: lacking that, it would come to see the risks of aggression as outweighing the benefits. All of this had to be done at tolerable cost, though: hence the attraction of threats to use nuclear weapons. As a top-secret statement of 'Basic National Security Policy' put it early in 1955: 'So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would endanger the regime and the security of the U.S.S.R..'"
Terms like "brinkmanship" and "massive retaliation" have tended to obscure the non-nuclear components of the New Look.
Dulles' hope was to encircle the USSR & China with a ring of states aligned with the US either by treaty or unilateral declaration..
Anything "from the singing of a beautiful hymn to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage."
Psychological warfare had other dimensions as well. It involved, of course, the constant use of propaganda, both printed and broadcast. It could involve such transparently self-serving gestures as the offer of one hundred thousand dollars to the first Soviet pilot to defect in a MIG, or such apparently sincere initiatives as Eisenhower's "open skies" inspection scheme, proposed at the Geneva summit conference in 1955. It could involve simply maintaining poise and ·self-confidence in the face of the enemy: "we even shook hands with some Communists," Vice President Richard Nixon acknowledged in a 1953 televised report on a trip to Southeast Asia. "They were picketing us, and we walked right among them, and met them,. greeted them, talked to them, and as a result of doing that the Communist demonstration broke Up." It could involve impromptu episodes like Nixon's famous "debate" with Khrushchev in the kitchen of all American model home on exhibit in Moscow, or deliberate moves like the dispatch of Henry Cabot Lodge as a one man "truth squad" to follow the Soviet premier around the United States during his 1959 visit." What all of these tactics had in common was a desire to "score points" to make the United States look good, and to embarrass or discredit the other side.
-GADDIS, Strategies of Containment
The NSC defined as "all activities ... so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”
“primary mission is to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the president and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to the national security."
yOu ArE thE CiA: HOW WOULD YOU UNDERMINE REGIMES DEEMED HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES COVERTLY?
He felt that the US was not strong enough to go to every spot in the world and defend those nations.
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed …. The cost of one modem heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We, pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people”
He feared that Americans might become isolationist if the price of internationalism seemed to be indefinite sacrifice through prolonged, inconclusive limited wars.
''lt is not easy to convince an overwhelming majority of free people, everywhere, that they should pull in their belts, endure marked recessions in living standards, in order that we may at one and the same time develop backward countries and relieve starvation, while bearing the expenses and costs of battle in the more fortunate countries... People grow weary of war, particularly when they see no decisive and victorious end to it."
JOHN GADDIS. Origins of Containment
Dwight D. Eisenhower
JOHN GADDIS. Strategies of Containment
Eisenhower to the United Nations in December 1953.
"Simply because atomic bombs do create casualties-and very heavy casualties against women and children~is no reason why we should become sentimental over ... what weapons must be used.”
NATO Supreme Commander General Alfred M. Gruenther, 1954
“Where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes... I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”
The general idea, was “to blow hell out of them in a hurry if they start anything.”
Eisenhower to Congressional leaders, 1954
Wanted to keep the Soviets off balance.
Many felt the US could not meet its defense needs without the support of allies.
Dulles, in his 1954 Foreign Affairs article, listed alliances ahead even of nuclear deterrent capability as "the cornerstone of security for the free nations.”
The idea was not that the countries involved could contribute directly to US defense, but rather that an American security "umbrella" over them would discourage Russian or Chinese attacks
The belief was that by merely making pronouncements & striking poses, the US could increase the difficulties under which its adversaries operated.
The psychological warfare counterpart of "liberation" in East Asia shows up in the administration's attitude toward China. As in the case of Eastern Europe, Washington officials had no illusions about who controlled the territory in question, or how difficult it would be to overthrow them: as NSC-162/2 noted late in 1953, "the Chinese Communist regime is firmly in control and is unlikely to be shaken in the foreseeable future by domestic forces or rival regimes short of the occurrence of a major war.”
But there were things that could be done to make the task of ruling China more difficult. One was to remove the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Straits thereby "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek to attack the mainland; another was to continue withholding diplomatic recognition from Mao’s regime, and to oppose to its seating in the United Nations. "You may have to recognize the fact of evil," Dulles commented, "but that doesn't mean that you have to clasp it to your bosom." Even the United States' refusal forcibly to repatriate Korean War prisoners had a psychological warfare dimension to it:· knowing that in future wars defectors could expect and would get political asylum, Dulles argued, "the Red Armies become less dependable and there is far less risk that the Communists will be tempted to use these armies for aggression. "
-GADDIS, Strategies of Containment
Director of the CIA
“I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now flounders," the President wrote privately in 1955.
1954 NSC directive gave examples: “propaganda, political action: economic warfare; escape and evasion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans and operations; and all activities compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing.”
Overthrew Iranian government and the Guatemala government.
Attempted overthrow in Cuba and Indonesia
Infiltrated refugees in Eastern Europe to try to provoke disorders there, conducted guerrilla & paramilitary operations against China & North Vietnam.
Organized aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union & China,
Organized assassination plots against several foreign leaders (Zhou Enlai, Castro, Trujillo).
Covert domestic activities, including mail and telecommunications surveillance, the infiltration of student, academic, journalistic, and cultural organizations, and financial subsidies to publishers and foundations.
Rabe's boigraphy on the University of Texas website
Both wanted to contain the Soviet sphere. Both are CONTAINMENT.
Both knew the importance of Alliances and NATO.
Truman had a "Europe First" mentality.
Truman was willing to use American ground forces in indefinite, limited wars. Believed the nation could afford whatever it took to achieve security.
EISENHOWER MOVED TOWARDS THEM
EISENHOWER BELIEVED THIS WAS FAULTY AND DESTRUCTIVE.
EISENHOWER BELIEVED THIS WOULD LEAD TO ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AND COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN WILL TO FIGHT.
Truman believed the US had a mandate to rule the world and would not tolerate diversity among the governments of the world.
EISENHOWER DID NOT BELIEVE THIS
Eisenhower as Quoted in Gaddis
Truman believed in symmetrical response
EISENHOWER BELIEVED IN ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSE.
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment
Juan Jose Arevalo
Carlos Castillo Armas
THE MAJOR ACTORS
United Fruit Company
Using the Reading, complete a chart listing the major causes, events, and consequences of the US involvement in Guatelmala (1954)
How did America apply the New Look Policy in Guatemala?
What is Rabe's overall assessment of the US role in Guatemala?
What are the most important consequences of American intervention in Guatemala?
“"A platoon leader doesn't get his platoon to go that way by getting up and saying, 'I am smarter, I am bigger, I am stronger, I am the leader.' He gets men to go with him because they want to do it for him, because they believe in him. " The Truman administration, he argued, had talked too loudly about world leadership. "This business of saying we are out in front, we know all the answers, you boys come along ... they are just not going to do it, that I can tell you just from the knowledge of people I have.” But toleration of diversity could not extend to those communist regimes that were puppets of Moscow, and hence the very negation of diversity. “
COLD WAR REALITY TV
Create a trailer for a Cold War reality TV show starring Eisenhower and Truman that showcases the differences and similarities in their Cold War policies.
America's Next Top Cold War Policy
The Amazing Arms Race
Keeping Up With the Eisenhowers
Survivor: Cold War
Using your chart, work in groups of three to outline an answer to the prompt "With what reasons and with what results did the US intervene in Guatemala?" or "With what methods and with what level of success did the US intervene in Guatemala?". Do this in your Evernote and be ready to share with the class.
Write full introduction including thesis.
Intro sentences for each paragraph
Bullet points on the specific content.
Explanation of how you will use arguments, perspectives, historiography.
Can you challenge the question?