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Peter Singer's Moral Dilemmas and Resolutions
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Caroline Tapp
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Updated Sep 30, 2021
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00:00
3,960 drowning-related deaths in children per year (C.D.C. 3)
00:08
6.3 million preventable deaths (W.H.O. 1)
00:25
Poverty can be prevented just as drowning can.
00:25
Peter Singer's Moral Dilemmas and Resolutions
00:26
Poverty can be prevented just as drowning can.
00:37
Peter Singer's Moral Dilemmas and Resolutions
00:37
Pond Argument by Analogy
00:39
Peter Singer's Moral Dilemmas and Resolutions
01:11
Pond Argument by Analogy
01:45
One is morally obligated to help save an endangered life unless it will cause harm to oneself.
02:24
Singer's utilitarian perspective emphasizes maximizing happiness for the greatest amount of people.
03:01
Objection: because you incur harm via financial loss, you aren't morally obligated to save the child
03:31
Financial Objection Rejoinder: difference between physical harm and other forms
04:00
Objection: someone is in danger but they're far away; you aren't morally obligated to save them.
04:15
Singer's Distance Objection Rejoinder: one is obligated to save the endangered at any distance.
04:42
Objection: there may be many people not contributing to the beneficence of others.
04:42
Ad Populum Rejoinder: there is no real reason not to save a child based on the action of others.
04:45
Objection: there may be many people not contributing to the beneficence of others.
05:00
Ad Populum Rejoinder: there is no real reason not to save a child based on the action of others.
05:00
We have a measurable moral duty to aid the world's impoverished.
05:02
Ad Populum Rejoinder: there is no real reason not to save a child based on the action of others.
05:26
We have a measurable moral duty to aid the world's impoverished.
05:26
Strong version: we should donate until we reach marginal utility.
05:29
We have a measurable moral duty to aid the world's impoverished.
05:35
Strong version: we should donate until we reach marginal utility.
06:23
Weak version: we should donate as much as we can without morally significant sacrifice.
06:25
Strong version: we should donate until we reach marginal utility.
06:42
Weak version: we should donate as much as we can without morally significant sacrifice.
06:42
Collapse of consumer society
06:44
Weak version: we should donate as much as we can without morally significant sacrifice.
07:10
Collapse of consumer society
07:43
Bugatti Argument by Analogy: emphasizes personal sacrifice to uphold moral obligation
08:22
Saving a child's life is a greater moral obligation than financial loss.
09:06
There are few things more valuable than a child's life.
09:27
One should do what is most morally beneficial to the most people.
09:39
There are few things more valuable than a child's life.
09:53
Pond analogy, duty to the impoverished, Bugatti analogy, and worth of a child's life
10:11
Many "impoverished" Americans still have cars, TVs, and access to food and water
10:11
Simple things like skipping a cup of coffee every day can add up and make a profound difference.
10:13
Many "impoverished" Americans still have cars, TVs, and access to food and water
10:31
Simple things like skipping a cup of coffee every day can add up and make a profound difference.
Audio Transcript
Auto-generated
00:00 - 00:04
According to the CDC, there are over 3960 drowning related
00:04 - 00:06
deaths in Children per year in the United States.
00:07 - 00:09
While it's tragic statistic is far too high.
00:09 - 00:12
The World Health Organization estimates that there are over 6.3
00:12 - 00:16
million preventable deaths in Children and impoverished countries per year.
00:16 - 00:19
So at first glance, the statistics may seem completely unrelated,
00:19 - 00:22
but Peter Singer um reveals that they might not actually
00:23 - 00:23
be completely different.
00:24 - 00:27
Um He explains that poverty related death can be prevented
00:27 - 00:30
just as easily as johnny related death can, and that
00:30 - 00:32
by choosing not to aid in improving the lives of
00:33 - 00:35
Children. And both of these scenarios, um you're ignoring a
00:35 - 00:36
moral obligation.
00:37 - 00:40
Hi, my name is Caroline tap, and I will be
00:40 - 00:44
explaining Peter Singer's application of his um pond argument analogy
00:45 - 00:47
and Bugatti argument analogy, as well as his assessments on
00:48 - 00:50
the extent of one's duty to aid the world impoverished
00:51 - 00:52
and the worth of a child's life.
00:53 - 00:57
Ultimately, this demonstrates his utilitarian perspective and how this would
00:57 - 00:58
affect one's moral obligations.
00:59 - 01:01
So, first, I'll be explaining Singers pond argument by analogy,
01:02 - 01:04
followed by his belief that there is a measurable duty
01:04 - 01:07
to aid the world's impoverished, followed by his Bugatti argument,
01:08 - 01:10
and then finally, his assessment of the value of a
01:11 - 01:11
child's life.
01:12 - 01:15
So first Singers upon argument by analogy is used to
01:15 - 01:18
determine the conditions on which a child's life should be
01:18 - 01:22
safe. So Singer creates this hypothetical scenario where a child
01:22 - 01:24
is drowning in the style of pond and he poses
01:24 - 01:25
a question, do you save the child?
01:26 - 01:28
So for most people, the answer would be a definite
01:28 - 01:31
yes, but Singer creates this analogy that the child drowning
01:31 - 01:34
in a pond, it's not so different than um helping
01:35 - 01:37
Children in impoverished countries that are struggling with famine.
01:38 - 01:40
Um so he shows that by not helping a child
01:40 - 01:43
in need regardless of the circumstance, you're choosing not to
01:43 - 01:44
fulfill a moral obligation.
01:45 - 01:49
So his first condition states that one is morally obligated
01:49 - 01:51
to help save an endangered life unless it would cause
01:52 - 01:52
harm to himself.
01:53 - 01:55
So if a child is drowning in the shallow pond,
01:55 - 01:57
the average person should be able to go easily save
01:58 - 01:58
the child.
01:58 - 02:00
There's no real danger in doing this and therefore you
02:01 - 02:01
should save the child.
02:02 - 02:04
So it compares this analogy um with a moral dilemma
02:05 - 02:07
of helping resolve world hunger, stating that there is really
02:07 - 02:11
no difference in the danger between saving a drowning child
02:11 - 02:14
and the shallow pond and then providing aid to Children
02:14 - 02:15
in impoverished countries.
02:16 - 02:18
So because we have the capability to save these Children,
02:18 - 02:21
we are morally obligated to do so and by not
02:21 - 02:23
doing so, we are ignoring moral obligation.
02:24 - 02:29
So Singers utilitarian perspective emphasizes maximizing happiness for the greatest
02:29 - 02:29
amount of people.
02:31 - 02:33
Um so obviously it is better for two people to
02:33 - 02:34
be happy than one.
02:34 - 02:36
And according to dr Jonas grin, who is a professor
02:37 - 02:39
in the Philosophy department of Gutenberg University.
02:40 - 02:44
The principles of act utilitarianism justify saving a drowning child
02:44 - 02:47
because the act is optimistic both for oneself and for
02:47 - 02:47
the child you're saving.
02:48 - 02:50
So because more people will be happy if the child
02:50 - 02:52
is saved, you should save the drowning child.
02:52 - 02:55
And then based on this analogy were more morally obligated
02:56 - 02:58
to save Children in impoverished countries, because these Children could
02:59 - 03:00
also contribute to greater worldwide happiness.
03:02 - 03:04
So one key objection to Singers argument is that because
03:04 - 03:07
you will incur harm through financial loss, you're not morally
03:07 - 03:08
obligated to save the child.
03:08 - 03:11
So they create another hypothetical scenario in which there is
03:11 - 03:13
still a child drowning in a shallow pond, but you're
03:14 - 03:16
wearing your best suit in your best shoes, and if
03:16 - 03:17
you get in the water to save them, they'll get
03:18 - 03:22
ruined. Um so because you'll incur harm through the financial
03:23 - 03:25
loss of ruining your best suit, you're not morally obligated
03:26 - 03:26
to help save these Children.
03:27 - 03:29
By analogy, you wouldn't have to help save Children in
03:29 - 03:30
impoverished countries.
03:30 - 03:34
However, singers um financial objection to join our states, that
03:34 - 03:36
there is a clear difference between physical harm and other
03:36 - 03:39
forms of forms of harm, And especially something as trivial
03:40 - 03:42
as ruining one suit and shoes doesn't result in child
03:42 - 03:43
physical harm.
03:43 - 03:46
Um so saving a child doesn't result in any physical
03:46 - 03:48
harm, so you're still morally obligated to do so.
03:49 - 03:52
And then obviously by analogy, um by donating to help
03:52 - 03:55
these Children in impoverished countries, it's causing you financial strain
03:55 - 03:56
rather than physical harm.
03:57 - 03:58
So you're still morally obligated to help them.
03:59 - 04:03
So, another objection is um the distance objection, So if
04:03 - 04:06
someone is drowning in a shallow pond, but they're far
04:06 - 04:08
away, you're not morally obligated to save them because you
04:08 - 04:09
might not be able to reach them.
04:09 - 04:12
Um So there really is no moral obligation to save
04:13 - 04:13
the child.
04:14 - 04:17
However, singers distance objection joined explains that one is obligated
04:18 - 04:22
to save endangered person at any distance, um you're still
04:22 - 04:25
morally obligated to help another life unless there's a morally
04:25 - 04:28
significant reason not to do so, and just because the
04:28 - 04:31
pond is farther away, that's no significant moral reason not
04:31 - 04:32
to help save them.
04:33 - 04:35
Um So through analogy, even though Children in impoverished countries
04:36 - 04:38
maybe far away from those of us living in the
04:38 - 04:40
United States, for example, this is not a morally relevant
04:41 - 04:42
reason to not help them.
04:43 - 04:47
So, another objection is that um there may be other
04:47 - 04:49
people not contributing to the beneficence of others.
04:50 - 04:52
Um So in the analogy, there may be people watching
04:53 - 04:56
the child drowned and so you can you're not morally
04:57 - 04:59
obligated to do so because there's other people that are
04:59 - 05:03
just watching um Hover singers at popular rejoinder explains that
05:04 - 05:07
there's no morally significant reason not to save a child,
05:07 - 05:08
just based on the actions of others.
05:09 - 05:11
Um and so the fact that others are not saving
05:12 - 05:14
a drowning child is not a morally valid reason for
05:14 - 05:15
you not to save the child.
05:16 - 05:18
Um said the analogy, even though there are plenty of
05:18 - 05:21
people in the world not contributing to the problem of
05:21 - 05:25
world hunger financially, um that's still no not a morally
05:25 - 05:26
valid reason for you not to do so.
05:27 - 05:30
So seeing your second concept is that we have a
05:30 - 05:32
measurable duty to aid in the world's impoverished.
05:33 - 05:35
And for this, he provides two versions of this argument,
05:35 - 05:38
the first one being the strong version which states that
05:38 - 05:40
we should donate until we reach the level of margin
05:40 - 05:43
marginal utility or until we only have enough money for
05:44 - 05:45
necessities rather than luxuries.
05:46 - 05:47
And in fact, he goes so far as to saying
05:48 - 05:50
we should donate until we reach the level of a
05:50 - 05:51
Bengali refugee financially.
05:52 - 05:54
According to dr desk Gaspar who is a professor of
05:54 - 05:57
developmental ethics at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
05:58 - 06:00
There is an obligation for the wealthy to transfer resources
06:01 - 06:04
to the poor for things like needs, utilities, reits historical
06:05 - 06:05
debts, etcetera.
06:06 - 06:09
Um And so based on this as well as singer
06:09 - 06:13
statement, we are morally obligated to financially contribute until we
06:13 - 06:16
have reached that level of margie marginal utility where we
06:16 - 06:18
have exactly what we need for survival.
06:19 - 06:23
Um So he also supports his claim by saying that
06:24 - 06:30
um the things that individuals should be valuing more so
06:30 - 06:33
than um material things are the lives and well being
06:34 - 06:34
of others.
06:34 - 06:38
Um and that we still have a moral obligation to
06:38 - 06:41
help these people and this should take precedence over our
06:41 - 06:41
selfish needs.
06:42 - 06:45
So for the non extremists um he proposes a weak
06:45 - 06:47
version of this where we should donate as much as
06:47 - 06:50
we can financially without morally significant sacrifice.
06:51 - 06:56
Um so it's important to make personal sacrifices unless they
06:56 - 06:57
are outweighed by moral consequences.
06:58 - 07:02
Um so for example, um if the whole principle of
07:02 - 07:05
this major financial donation is only partially adopted by the
07:06 - 07:09
upper classes of society is still important to give enough
07:09 - 07:13
money that would completely eliminate consumer society, which really embodies
07:14 - 07:18
um sort of this unnecessary consumption of luxury things we
07:18 - 07:18
don't need.
07:18 - 07:21
Um because so much money of this consumer society is
07:21 - 07:22
spent on trivial things.
07:23 - 07:26
Um if we actually gave enough financial contributions to a
07:26 - 07:29
level that's morally adequate consumer society, as you can see
07:29 - 07:32
in the graph, which is completely collapsed, so this again
07:33 - 07:33
may also seem extreme.
07:34 - 07:37
Um but the rise of consumer society is really only
07:37 - 07:38
promoting unnecessary spending.
07:39 - 07:42
Um and so by supporting this consumer society, we're ignoring
07:42 - 07:44
a moral obligation to the impoverished.
07:45 - 07:47
So the third concept is the Bugatti argument by analogy,
07:47 - 07:51
which emphasizes the factor of personal sacrifice to uphold our
07:51 - 07:51
moral obligations.
07:52 - 07:55
So it creates another analogous situation where a man has
07:55 - 07:59
Bugatti has invested his entire retirement and life savings into
07:59 - 08:02
it, no insurance, um and he has to make this
08:02 - 08:04
choice where you can either save the car or you
08:04 - 08:06
can save a child that is on the train tracks.
08:07 - 08:09
Um but if he saves the child, his car will
08:10 - 08:10
be destroyed.
08:10 - 08:13
Um so shockingly in the scenario, he allows the child
08:13 - 08:14
to die by saving his car.
08:15 - 08:19
Um, so he uses his analogy, Singer does to show
08:19 - 08:22
that when we fail to make personal sacrifices for the
08:22 - 08:26
greater happiness, we're not helping um, save these child child's
08:26 - 08:28
life, even though, you know, we could be.
08:29 - 08:32
Um, so he states that saving a child's life is
08:32 - 08:34
a greater moral obligation than just the financial loss.
08:35 - 08:38
Um, so although it's easily recognizable in the scenario that
08:38 - 08:40
the man made the wrong decision is a lot less
08:41 - 08:42
easy to see that we are also doing the same
08:43 - 08:46
thing by contributing to the suffering of these impoverished Children,
08:46 - 08:49
by prioritizing our material needs over the lives of these
08:50 - 08:53
Children. Um, so even though you're losing your retirement fund,
08:53 - 08:55
you're only losing a single source of happiness rather than
08:56 - 08:58
entire life as opposed to a child that can generate
08:59 - 08:59
more happiness in the world.
09:00 - 09:03
And S Singer states utilitarianism is important to maximize happiness
09:04 - 09:05
for the greatest amount of people.
09:06 - 09:08
Singers final claim states that there are a few more
09:08 - 09:11
things more valuable than a child's life and you are
09:11 - 09:13
morally obligated to uphold and enforce this principle.
09:14 - 09:18
Um, so his utilitarianism claim they say that you should
09:18 - 09:20
do what is most morally beneficial to the most people.
09:21 - 09:23
Um, so saving a child really is more morally valuable
09:24 - 09:26
than being able to afford superficial items.
09:27 - 09:29
Um, so naturally there is no set price on a
09:30 - 09:32
child's life or well being, and by purchasing luxury items,
09:33 - 09:35
you're choosing to ignore the needs of these impoverished families
09:35 - 09:37
by putting their needs at a lower value than your
09:38 - 09:38
own personal desires.
09:40 - 09:42
Because there are few things more valuable than a child's
09:42 - 09:44
life when those of us in the more fortunate situations
09:45 - 09:47
have the power to give other people these things essential
09:48 - 09:49
for life such as food and clean water.
09:49 - 09:51
And instead we choose to spend that money on luxuries.
09:52 - 09:54
We are committing immoral act in conclusion.
09:55 - 09:57
Singers arguments of the pond analogy duty to the impoverished
09:58 - 10:00
Bugatti analogy and the worth of a child's life debate
10:01 - 10:04
demonstrate his utilitarian principles that one is morally obligated to
10:04 - 10:04
do this.
10:05 - 10:08
Um They should help the poor whenever they have the
10:08 - 10:08
ability to.
10:09 - 10:13
So even though millions of americans are impoverished, um many
10:13 - 10:15
of them still have access to things like T.
10:15 - 10:17
V. Cars, food, water.
10:17 - 10:22
Um unlike many citizens of truly impoverished countries, so although
10:22 - 10:25
donating money to these people from so far away, especially
10:26 - 10:28
until we have a little more than the Bengali refugees
10:29 - 10:29
may sound extreme.
10:30 - 10:33
But taking the resources for something that would be normally
10:33 - 10:35
used like a cup of coffee every day or a
10:35 - 10:38
new pair of shoes and by using them to save
10:38 - 10:41
the lives of impoverished Children worldwide is not so quite
10:42 - 10:45
daunting or unrealistic by making a small change in our
10:45 - 10:47
lives. We may be able to have a more profound
10:48 - 10:49
effect than what we could even imagine
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