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Multinational Intelligence Sharing: NATO Case Study - Doctoral Research Project

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Wouter Vlegels

on 25 December 2014

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Transcript of Multinational Intelligence Sharing: NATO Case Study - Doctoral Research Project

Multinational Intelligence Sharing : NATO Case Study
Research Hypothesis
NATO Political Agenda
Research Questions
What roles can NATO and nations play in adapting an
integrated
common policy and model for Intelligence sharing?
Sub Question 2:
How to enhance intelligence sharing while
preventing
information leaks, protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties.
Sub Question 3:
How did the Alliance overcome the collective action problem when it comes to intelligence sharing (what made it possible so that Nations made the 'investment' to share intelligence?)
The political agenda of NATO and the Nations of the Alliance changed the Intelligence Community culture over the last 10 years from ‘Need to Know’ to ‘Need to Share’ because the benefits of sharing each other secrets on common threats (and to engage in common action) are perceived to be more beneficial.
Successful multinational intelligence sharing requires a set of rules and assigned accountability - built by consensus (enhanced trust building) - and - where nations play the central role (vs a centralised authority).
Effective multinational intelligence sharing requires an effective intelligence architecture which is supported by agile and secure information technology and a transparent governance and oversight structure*

Methodology and Conceptualization
Structure
Review of Related Literature
Intelligence Sharing and Information Technology
Significance of the Research Project
Preliminary Research Observations
1) Military intelligence services of the Alliance are sharing intelligence in a meshed setup. The Nations communicate to all other nations including NATO.

2) NATO nations provide National Intelligence released to NATO member nations (and/or) mission partners. Nations are assumed to remain the information owner of their shared intelligence and classify their products by a national marking (protected by national laws). Only NATO produced intelligence is classified as NATO intelligence and protected by NATO policies.

3) Military Intelligence services start to share intelligence with the civilian services in an informal manner.

4) Communication technology used by the military alliance are based on Internet protocols and web technology in order to support the information sharing. Efficient Publication, Search and retrieval of Intelligence products is dependend on the correct meta-data tagging.
Data collection and Analysis
(Strategic) Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence Sharing at the Tactical Level
It will strive to deduct from the NATO Intelligence Architecture an intelligence sharing model to provide valuable insights on multinational intelligence sharing.

It will strive to Identify and deduct governance practices that enable intelligence sharing in a multi-national setting.
Significance
A Doctoral Research Project by Wouter Vlegels
Dr. Kristian Gustafson , Primary Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Philip Davies, Secondary Supervisor

Prague Summit
Istanbul Summit
Riga Summit
Sub Question 1: How important is Information Technology to the
standardisation
efforts required for multinational intelligence sharing?
H1:
H2:
H3:
“Case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon with its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.”
Yin, 1981

Research Rationale
Case Study Design
Thank you!
Tentative Outline
NATO 2020
Intelligence Cooperation and liaison

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Scalingi PL (1991), "Intelligence community cooperation: The arms control model", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence., December, 1991. Vol. 5(4), pp. 401-410.

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The literature review and the preliminary research observations make it possible to focus on one of the following research directions and choosing/testing a potential tool (existing academic theory) for trying to explain the phenomenon and extracting conclusions:

- Analysis and explanation of the governance aspects: e.g. Economic theory on 'Transaction Cost;, the creation of meta organisations and 'high and low trust economies' Others: Institutional theories - Open method of coordination, etc).

- Analysis and explanation of the integration and standardisation aspects: e.g. 'near functionalist theory'.

- Analysis and expalnation of the information management and sharing aspects: e,g. 'Process tracing theory'.
Since 11 September 2001, NATO Nations have increased consultations on improving intelligence-sharing.
Main Research Question
Contribution to the body of Knowledge
1) Civilian Intelligence services of the Alliance are sharing intelligence in a star setup. NATO is the centre where nations provide their threat reports to NATO.

2) Civilian security services provide NATO Intelligence (informal or formal). NATO is assumed to become the information owner of the released intelligence. (tagged with NATO markings). The released intelligence will be protected by NATO policies. (And not any longer by national laws.)

3) Civilian Intelligence services of the Alliance do not share Intelligence with the Military Intelligence services.

4) Communication Technology used is developed to communicate bilaterally with NATO.

1) The (embedded) single-case research of multinational intelligence sharing in NATO represents a unique case. NATO
combines a political agenda with military cooperation.

2)The case is revelatory.
The opportunity of researching multinational intelligence sharing in NATO is a phenomenon previously inaccessible to researchers.

1) Military intelligence services of the Alliance tend to support missions rather than the NATO political agenda. Emerging security challenges such as Energy Security, Cyber Defence, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction hardly show up in the analysed meta-data of shared intelligence products.

2) Military intelligence services of the Alliance tend to share intelligence once there is a common goal. (e.g. mission in Afghanistan). Intelligence related to a NATO mission or operation is shared from the moment the nation that is sharing is part of the mission/ operation.

3) Civilian Intelligence services of the Alliance tend to share intelligence on a need to known basis. Sharing is established after 'Requests for Intelligence' around a specific domain from NATO to the nations is stated.
Research Orientation
Time-series of historical unclassified meta-data from NATO systems used in high level presentations: looked at trends over time, matching with possible explanations

Interviews of key subject matter experts in NATO and Nations

Research literature

Publically available articles
Higher integration and standardisation in multinational intelligence sharing was achieved trough and enabled by Information Technology in dialogue with all the involved "intelligence sharing" nations.

Correctly labeled, tagged, and cataloged data together with a greater identity management of the sharers and receivers made effective multinational intelligence sharing possible.

Sharing and safeguarding of intelligence products are performed in tandem. Nations involved in multinational intelligence sharing are finding constantly the balance between responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information via formal dialogue between the subject matter experts of the individual nations. Decisions are made by consensus. Each nation can propose, support or deny a new safeguarding requirement.

Nations tend to share more if they are and remain the information owner. The shared or released information/ intelligence remains protected by the national laws and not by e.g. the NATO policies. This has a far reaching legal implication as officers of other nations have to abide to the national laws of information protection of each other.
1) The NATO ISAF mission was regarded as a system with a lower trust level because of the amount of Non NATO troop contributing Nations that took part in the operation.

2) The ISAF mission had its own mission network and was heavily filtered from the core NATO systems. This resulted that the intelligence products that were tagged for ISAF in the NATO domain were not immediately available to the ISAF commanders. It had to pass strict protection mechanisms.

3) Because of the restriction related to the trust two seperate architectures in the sharing of intelligence with the ISAF mission were engineered. A NATO architecture for sharing intelligence and a multinational architecture - sponsored by the individual national intelligence agencies.
Preliminary observations of sub Case 3: Intelligence Sharing in a mission (ISAF)
Preliminary observations for sub case 2: Intelligence Sharing in the civilian/political context
Preliminary observations for Case Study: NATO
Preliminary observations for sub Case 1: Intelligence Sharing in a military context
Context
Related work
literature Review
Methodology
Analysis
- NATO political agenda
- Intelligence sharing in a NATO Military Setting
- Intelligence Sharing in a NATO Civilian Setting
- Intelliegnce Sharing in a NATO Mission Setting
Conclusions
Emperical Qualitative research that is aimed at investigating the contemporary phenomenon of multinational Intelligence sharing using NATO as the case study.
Research Strategy
Data Sources
The research proposal theme arises from gaps in the literature in multinational intelligence sharing. The intelligence sharing phenomenon remains largely under-studied.

It will be significant for several reasons, some of which are related to the complexity of multinational intelligence sharing. The attempt to provide valuable insights on multinational intelligence sharing in a NATO context creates opportunities to further optimize intelligence sharing governance, with associated implications for improved oversight and accountability.
Aims
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At the 2002 Prague Summit, improved intelligence-sharing was identified as a key aspect of cooperation among Allies.
At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, a decision was taken to review intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters.
At the Riga summit in 2006, Alliance leaders adopted the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which set out the framework and priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines, and intelligence for the foreseeable future.
The “NATO 2020” report, delivered in May 2010 by the Group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, attaches the importance to increased intelligence sharing.
Note: The National Intelligence Cells (NICs) are intelligence officers tasked to protect deployed national troops. They are not working for the ISAF mission as such. The intelligence they produce/receive are not meant for the ISAF commanders. They use typically national provided systems - not connected to the mission network and are not in the scope of the research.

The technology/governance observations

*to enforce 'H2'
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Intelligence Sharing Governance and Accountability
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