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International Politics of the Middle East & North Africa Fall 2015
Transcript of International Politics of the Middle East & North Africa Fall 2015
photo credit Nasa / Goddard Space Flight Center / Reto Stöckli
Us - who we are, where we are, how we interact with international politics
Them - who they are, where they are, how they interact with international politics
The Universal and the Particular
Borders, States, Geopolitics
Identities, Ideologies, Culture
Geography: natural & social sciences
Short assignments & midterm
Conflict & Cooperation
IR as a field of study
George Orwell is
Ottomans in European State System
Iran between Britain & Russia
Mehmet Ali's Egypt
French North Africa
And the rise of nationalisms
“It soon became impossible to wonder merely, as in the days of Mohammad Ali, ‘How can we modernise ourselves?’ More complicated questions inevitably arose: ‘How can we modernise ourselves without losing our identity?’”
Attempted growth of central power, through military and bureaucracy, reversing earlier trends
Penetration of global capital, through capitulations (1838-), trade, investment
Land reform dispossesses some of traditional rights, creates landowners, marketized relationships (Timars abolished 1831)
Tax reform partially successful, but debt...
Subsistence to commercial
Very price/market sensitive:
Cotton crashes after 1864
Fruit and grains more consistent, NB Jaffa oranges offering a 10% annual return on investment in 1870s-1880s
Example: British consular agents promote cotton growth
Dependency encouraged, not ISI or ELG
Global prices in late 19th century favor agricultural over industrial exports
Enacted reforms not always implemented, e.g. tax exemptions
International politics: Britain’s protection of its industrial hegemony
Lack of water power
Low population density, & small domestic market (total pop 26m)
Failure of industrialization
Selim III (1789-1807): Modernization starts with the military
Foreign instructors, French language
Mahmut II(1808-1839): 1826 – Defeat of the Janissaries
Schools: War/Artillery/Engineering, Medicine
Abdülmecit ( 1839-1861): Gulhane and Hatt-i Himayun Decrees
Abdülaziz (1861-1876): the first sultan to travel to Europe and Egypt (other than as conqueror)
Abdülhamit II (1876-1909): first constitution, 1876; but modernizing despotism
Debt: bankruptcy 1876
Mehmet Ali/Muhammad Ali Pasha
Albanian, Ottoman officer
Impact of French occupation 1798-1801
Massacre of Mamluks, reconquest of Hijaz 1811
Educational and bureaucratic support
Industrialization – monopoly system
Land and tax reform
Empire building in Africa and Syria
Treaty of London 1841
Egypt: Mehmet Ali
Qajar central authority weaker than Safavids
autonomy of Shi`a ulama’
No significant/successful reform program
Russian/British imperial and commercial penetration
Dependency: raw material exports (except carpets)
Concession competition stifles investment
19th century Iran
Protests December 1905-mid 1906
Bazaaris, some ulama, liberals
Shahs grant two Fundamental Laws
1908-9 counterrevolution crushed
Britain & Russia
1901 Oil concession: birth of BP
1907 ‘Spheres’ agreement
Bolsheviks spill the beans
BRITAIN AND FRANCE
The Sharif Hussain and his sons
Fall of Damascus
Arab Kingdom of Syria, 1920
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of an autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
the War of Independence
Iraq (special case in Hussein-McMahon) & IPC
Origins of Zionism and early settlers
Great Power politics
UN Partition Plan
Creation of Israel
Start of the refugee problem
ZIONISM AND ISRAEL
Kingdom of Egypt,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Was MENA exceptional?
Did tails wag dogs?
Relative importance of geostrategic & ideological interests?
British & French
exhaustion & withdrawal
Role unclear - fungible commodity
In killing the left & persecuting intellectuals, did the Cold War kill MENA democracy?
Since the Cold War
Grand narratives/theories versus 'intermestics'
What do we mean by "East" and "West"?
What is the nature of US relations with MENA?
What is the nature of European relations with MENA?
"US" and "Them" / Here and There
'traditional trio of US interests'
Levels of analysis
domestic sources of policy
Competing nationalisms in MENA
Truman & Zionism
Camp David ~ Iran revolution ~ Grand Mosque militants ~ invasion of Afghanistan ~ Saddam Hussein
EU & US on different paths?
hopes among the Arabs and Iranians that Europe
might serve as a counterweight or tempering influence on the United States are complicated by perceptions that both are components of 'the West' and thus, in some senses, 'the other', which must be resisted if the indigenous states and peoples are to assert their own disctinctive identities and place in the world (Hollis in Fawcett, 332)
rule of law
Ray Hinnebush (in Fawcett):
The incongruence of identity and material structures has produced a conflict-prone Middle East. Imperial boundary drawing, in frustrating identity, left behind states facing competition for the loyalties of their populations from both sub- and supra-state identities, and hence afflicted with legitimacy deficits. Irredentism was built into the fabric of the states system, reflected in multiple sites of chronic civil war and border conflict. The way identity was incorporated into the fabric of states produced two of the world's most war-prone states and many revisionist ones---until these were 'socialized' by systemic constraints. Finally, identity has motivated but material power structures frustrated efforts to create a regional security community.
the Middle East, along with Africa, has been and remains one of the most war-prone regions globally - Janice Gross Stein (Fawcett, 2nd ed., ch 11)
GWOT & Clash of Civilizations
crushing al-Q unilaterally
crushing al-Q multilaterally
transforming 'breeding grounds'
Sadowski cautions on researching Islamist movements:
Muslim societies tend to be at least as diverse as they are similar;
There is a large gap between Islamic doctrine and Muslim practice;
The aspirations of Muslims do not differ markedly from those of other cultures, although the means they deploy to pursue them may [this is an instance of the famous “fundamental attribution error” (Reed 1993)];
Despite the criticisms made during the Enlightenment, religion neither prevents people from behaving rationally nor prevents them from innovating;
The great struggles in which Muslims are caught up are structured by history but not determined by it. Their outcomes may still be uncertain.
Commenting on Blogs
Some sound advice from Jabiz Raisdana
success of EU (peace, prosperity)
post-Cold War UN/global agenda (globalization, regional security)
But "inter-state cooperation ... has been fragile and institutional development limited" (Fawcett 186)
3 levels of insecurity: domestic, regional, international
Gulf Co-operation Council
Arab Maghreb Union
see Fawcett box 9.1, pp. 195
"Foreign policies are shaped by national situations, values and perceptions of policy makers and global and regional environments. Systemic conditions provide opportunities of constraints to action and generate pressure that push or pull states in different directions" ~ Paul Noble in Fawcett, 2nd edition, 206
Quest for power & security
Actions of strong states
Levels of interdependence
Shared identities & values
weak states, low levels of institionalism, external interference
What size & shape is 'the region'?
Will democratization lead to deeper/more real regionalization?
A new norm, or cynical geopolitics?
Weak economies and emerging democratic regimes are not the only factors that make Israel’s situation more secure than might be otherwise thought. During the Cold War, Israel had to contend with surrounding Arab states that were backed by the Soviet Union, which had nearly limitless resources to arm its proxies. In contrast, the only country today that approaches an outside power willing to fund the battle against Israel is Iran, and it is a poor substitute for the Soviets.
Dolatyar & Gray
water scarcity has not caused war
will it? No, and not because of virtual water, desalination or water pricing, but because water is too precious
therefore water could help with peace negotiations
"water rationality" - mutual vulnerability
Problem of food security
Energy, waste brine, vulnerable
Security problem: traditionalist (state-centered) v holist (global) analyses
Arabian Peninsula: Seeking Food Self-Sufficiency
Morrissette & Borer
Environmental security may yet cause war
Domestic delegitimation --> interstate conflict
Virtual water as conflict avoidance strategy
Oil producers depend on markets, imports: interdependence
Everybody needs annually ~1,100 m3 of
Rising Food Prices
political economy of development: water of marginal significance
late & superficial incorporation into capitalist world
feudal/tributary social relations
oil's effects on economies, states & societies
weak internal legitimacy
agriculture in decline as % of GDP
"oil can be used to make water, while water cannot be used to make oil" (345)
"Oil is essentially allocated through the market, not through power and appropriation"
concentration ... polarization
outside powers pulled in
Table 5.2, p. 107, Luciani in Fawcett
Would GCC be one state without British interest in dividing oil producers?
"In recent years, oil has more frequently been used as a tool, rather than as an objective" Luciani
allocation states rather than production states
rent from rest of world
no representation without taxation
Power shift? Rise of GCC states, decline of older states
Yael Zeruvabel ~ Recovered Roots (Chicago UP: 1995)
League of Nations
Arab & Zionist identities
Mandate - muddling through
Arab rebellions (esp 1936-9)
LEHI/Stern Gang & Lord Moyne
(nakba; contested reasons)
new state for European DPs; hostile environment for 'Oriental' Jews?
bottom page 105
## 4 Proclamation of Israel and 1st War
May 14 1948 proclamation doc 4.1
UNGA appoints Bernadotte as mediator.
Mid-June month-long truce. Israelis re-arm from Czechs et al.
Sept 16 B recommends partition:
> Negev for Arabs, Galilee for Israelis, Jerusalem partitioned
> Stern Gang assassinate B; Ben-Gurion dissolves Irgun & Stern, but no-one tried
> December 1 Transjordan ceasefire
> February 24 Bunche-negotiated armistice with Egypt; others follow
Israel occupies 75% of mandate Palestine.
Jordan annexes West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Was 1956 a war about Palestine?
cycle of raids and reprisals (115)
waterways: Tiran; Suez Canal
Cold War (Baghdad Pact)
1967 war - why a turning point? (Ch 6)
Arab Nationalism (Nasser/Baath)
Russian mischief and muscalulation (142)
summary p 149
UNSCR 242 (p. 152)
Israel's interstate wars
Empires old and new
A special note on UNSCR 242
First peace process - Camp David
PLO to Tunis; Intifada
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process (MEPP)
End of Cold War
1990-1 Gulf War
Back channel diplomacy
First face-to-face negs b/w Isr officials & PLO
Sponsorship of Quartet
Israel-Jordan peace treaty
Assassination of Rabin
Failure of talks at end of Clinton Presidency
Rightward drift in Israel politics (Sharon, Netanyahu, Yisrael Beiteinu)
Successes of Hamas, especially in Gaza
Where are we today?
“the closer the process comes to success, the more certain it is that lunatics on both sides will unleash their fury in every way possible to derail the process”
“In order to engineer a settlement of a conflict as protracted and severe as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the forces pushing toward agreement must be overwhelming and they must be strong on both sides”
“decades of American aid to Israel at the annual rate of three to five billion dollars, and virtually complete political protection against adverse United Nations Security Council resolutions, have shielded the Israeli polity from feeling the real costs of both grandiose ambition and decisions not to decide in its policies toward the occupied territories and the Palestinians.”
Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion.
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that.
The Islamic Resistance Movement views seriously the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salah ed-Din al-Ayyubi and the rescuing of Palestine from their hands, as well as the defeat of the Tatars at Ein Galot... The Movement draws lessons and examples from all this. The present Zionist onslaught has also been preceded by Crusading raids from the West and other Tatar raids from the East. Just as the Moslems faced those raids and planned fighting and defeating them, they should be able to confront the Zionist invasion and defeat it.
“the clarifying effect of unbearable pain”
“the Camp David II negotiations as by far the best failure we have ever had” – “peace based on the "two states for two peoples" formula”
“Begin, Shamir, and Netanyahu pursued failure as a strategic objective”
“Rabin, Peres, and Barak ensured failure by strategic error”
“in 1999 Barak changed his policy. He made proposals flawed in the details of their substance and presentation, yet representing a real basis for moving toward a two-state solution. He contributed to failure, not by strategic error but by tactical blunder”
“the prevention of foreign rule west of the Jordan River”
“understanding and mutual respect between Israelis and their Arab neighbors”
“peace treaties between Israel and the Arab countries”
Basis of claims:
“a document called the Bible”
Palestinians not a people (“Samarian-Judean-Gazan Arab people”)
Ze’ev Begin ~ “The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace” (Foreign Affairs 1991)
The Israeli Right (and their supporters)
Hamas (and their supporters)
Blood & Fire?
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
The Islamic Resistance Movement … strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned.
Official Slogan: “Allah is its target [goal?], the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”
Where do we go from here?
"Saddam Hussein's war decisions in 1980 and 1990 (and even his behavior in the lead-up to the 2003 war) and the alliance decisions of regional powers are best explained by leaders' concerns about their own hold on power domestically, and how regional events and regional rivals could affect their own security at home. They view threats primarily through the lens of regime security rather than more conventional balance of power considerations" (Gause 2010, 1).
US from stability-seeking to revisionist power
EU, BRICs - who plays, for what stakes?
Barry Buzan: regional security complexes
Table 1, p.28
increasing US arms sales to Iran & KSA
arms race 1975-80
Iran-Iraq War ------------------->
Algiers Agreement 1975
1979 - Camp David & Iranian revolution leave Iraq as Arab 'strongman'
End of US-Iran alliance
New global oil crisis, prices almost double
Precipitated Iran-Iraq war, 1980-88
Iran weaker militarily; more aggressive politically
July 16 1979 Saddam replaces Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr as president of Iraq
Second oil shock 1978-80
most damaging blow to US interests in the region since WWII
Sept '80-summer '82 in Iranian territory
summer '82-end '86 mostly in Iraqi territory
1987-summer '88 Iraqi initiative
US tilt to Iraq
civil or territorial nationalism
execution of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr & sister April 1980
June 1981 Osirak -> end Soviet embargo
US forces directly engaged
Anfal; Halabja; Chemical Ali
Cold War ends
Invasion August 1990. Iraq forces expelled in operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm. UN-backed US-led Coalition - no 'Arab solution' available. No pursuit to Baghdad or attempted regime change.
years of containment through sanctions, NFZs (SCR687; UNSCOM)
failure of uprisings and revenge (NB US does not support for fear of Iran)
inspections to dismantle WMD and missile programs
US military infrastructure in region, but not hegemony
Less obviously: Oslo, Madrid, Israel-Jordan treaty
paragraph mid-p.90 shows view from Baghdad
oil prices too low
Regional shuffling: Jordan, PLO, Yemen; Syria, Egypt, GCC, Turkey; Iran, Israel sit out.
NB divided US public & Congressional opinion
September 11, 2001 attacks
1996: Al-Qa'ida's "Declaration of Jihad against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy mosques" - shift from near to far enemy
1998: "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders"
2003 US invasion of Iraq
Feb 5, 2003: Powell presentation to UNSC links Iraq to al-Qa'ida, alleges continuing WMD program. Few convinced apart from US public.
March 21: shock & awe strikes begin
April 9: Baghdad secure; statue brought down
April 14: end of major attacks
May 1: "Mission Accomplished"
Winners: Kurds, some Shi'ites, Iran, oil companies
June 2004 Transitional Government
October 2005 Constitution approved
2007 surge (Petraeus)
Saudi-Iran games - sectarian (identity) or balancing (security)?
Lustick - Supply Side War
Gauss - motivated & cognitive biases
WMD - even if low probility, overwhelmingly high risks
Near enemy & far enemy
Values versus Interests
Tragedy of the commons? Or traditional sovereignty issue?
Nations are imagined communities of people, including some and excluding others.
States are ... ?
Thinking systematically about conflict and cooperation
Ray Hinnebusch on identities
Legrenzi & Calculli on the regional security order
Stephen Walt on balancing against threat*
Sorli et al on why so much conflict*
Greg Gause on regional subsystems*
Power matters, but inflected by perceptions, which can draw on identity factors
Review of four books, including Walt's
Argues four principles necessary to explain regional system
Anarchy of formal equals is contested by hierarchy based on Arabism or Islamism
Interaction of global & regional polarity
Changing nature of state-society relations in units that make up system
Region's level of economic integration
Consequences of identities mismatching states?
Separatism, irredentism, civil war, colonialism, ethnic cleansing...
Do identities drive interests or interests wield identities?
"We can assume that the national interest of Arab states is structured in a relationship of absolute identity with regime's interests (that is, the interests of political elites), which can be strictly conceptualized as the preservation of power" (in Fawcett 3rd ed., 206-7)
disconnections between form and content
what drives foreign & security policy? external or internal forces?
"identity is not enough: if states feel threatened by Israel or Iran, or even by a drop in oil prices, the politics of identity will not save them; there must also be compelling material reasons to act" (Fawcett 203)
Britain in Iran and Iraq
Foundation - Abdullah Tariki, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso; Petroleum Summits
The ‘oil weapon’ and OAPEC: 1973 – European supplies at risk
Price and supply stability
The pathology of oil
Overcoming the curse?
King Fahd “we, too, are a developing country”
Rashid Khalidi –
(Columbia, 2000) argues for distinctive Palestinian identity from late Ottoman times
Advocates of “Jordanian solution” and others deny any distinctiveness
Whatever the history, the course of the conflict and struggle most certainly produced a distinctive identity by the 1960s, and probably the 1930s.
Arab or Palestinian nationalism?
Zionism = colonialism (Rashid Rida, ‘Tiberias’)
Collaboration, land sales
Mirror of Zionist claims of ‘uplift’
Appeals to Wilsonian principles and League of Nations
But the Zionists can appeal to the same principles: “the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation”
Arab reactions to early settlement
“We are facing an elemental calamity, a kind of social earthquake. Three generations of Jewish thinkers and Zionists ... have come to the conclusion that the cause of our suffering is the very fact ... that we are everywhere a minority. It is not the anti-Semitism of men; it is, above all, the anti-Semitism of things, the inherent xenophobia of the body social or the body economic under which we suffer”
Jabotinsky’s structural account of the Jewish dilemma
Count Stanislaw de Clermont-Tonnerre, speaking on behalf of Jewish emancipation at the December 1789 French National Assembly session:
As a nation the Jews must be denied everything, as individuals they must be granted everything; their judges can no longer be recognized; their recourse must be to our own exclusively; legal protection for the doubtful laws by which Jewish corporate existence is maintained must end; they cannot be allowed to create a political body or a separate order within the state; it is necessary that they be citizens individually
The modern nation-state and the problem of minorities
World Zionist Organization
European anti-semitism; Dreyfus affair
Maximalist, advocates use of force
Two founding figures of political Zionism
Zionism & Palestinian Nationalism
What is the relative importance of the following factors in giving modern political Zionism its particular features?
Rise of European nationalism
Rise of the modern nation-state
(related to these two: rise of political anti-semitism)
Decline/change/collapse of the Ottoman Empire
WZO versus Jews in the Yishuv
Integrationists, liberal progressives, nationalists
Change wrought by 1908 (Young Turks), WWI, Mandate
CUP nationalism, repression of Arabs, Armenians and others, end of multi-national Ottoman Empire, provokes mirror-image response from minorities.
Ideas & Institutions
laws & treaties
Modern descendents of Isaac & Ismail?
See also the writings of Hannah Arendt on statelessness
"the mutuality of threat/fear felt among the members toward each other" (Gause 2010, 3)
role of institutions?
according to Gause - do we agree?
"ideas can affect leaders' perceptions of their material interests. Transnational ideas about identity and politics can be power resources for ambitious leaders and can be threats to the regimes against which they are directed. It is only when those ideas are matched to the tangible power resources available to a state or political group that they become drivers in security decision-making" (Gause 2010, 12)
"After the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration fundamentally changed the purpose of American policy in the Persian Gulf. Changing the status quo, including the domestic political arrangements of Gulf states, replaced preserving it" (Gause 2010, 14)
Implications and outcomes today?
Note key role of UNSC. Resolutions from 660, 661 through 678 to 687, 688 and beyond.
"hypocrisy, skullduggery, and unsolved puzzles" (Gause 2010, 121)
1995 UNSCR 986
"Oil For Food"
1999 UNSCR 1284
ends limits on oil sales;
1998 UNSCOM collapse: Desert Fox
"dual containment" of Iraq & Iran under Clinton