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A Global War on All Terror: How to fight a tactic with a different tactic

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We Thrive

on 22 August 2012

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Transcript of A Global War on All Terror: How to fight a tactic with a different tactic

AVAW FACT: TERRORIST GROUPS ARE DEFEATED BY MILITARIES 7% OF THE TIME. AND THE REST...? POLICING 40% POLITICS 43% VICTORY BIN LADEN ISSUE STATION 1996-1999 . 2001-2004 "The fundamental flaw in our thinking about Bin Laden is that 'Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than what we do.' Muslims are bothered by our modernity, democracy, and sexuality, but they are rarely spurred to action unless American forces encroach on their lands. It's American foreign policy that enrages Osama and al-Qaeda, not American culture and society." "Security is an important pillar of human life. Free people do not relinquish their security. This is contrary to Bush's claim that we hate freedom.

Let him tell us why we did not strike Sweden, for example." OSAMA BIN LADEN 1 REVENGE 2 STATUS 3 IDENTITY 4 THRILL 1 JUSTICE 2 STATUS 3 IDENTITY 4 THRILL POLICING NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS SELF-DETERMINATION WITHDRAWAL GREEN ENERGY POLITICS THE AVAW SOLUTION but what about afghanistan? our mission in afghanistan. DEVELOPMENT PEACE JUSTICE RECONCILIATION PEACE. WAR GAMES. US ARABIA CHINA AL QAEDA IRAN THE CULPRITS... PAKISTAN INDIA but what about the eternal threats? COIN NOT WHO CAN FIGHT THE BEST. WHO CAN GOVERN THE BEST. afghans feel torn. TALIBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ENDING CORRUPTION IS KEY. THE US "ENABLES BAD GOVERNANCE" DOES NOT "EMPOWER GOOD GOVERNANCE" LEGITIMACY JUSTICE RESPECT HOPE IN OTHER OTHER WORDS... political pressure against afghan government must come come from a different constituency: THE PEOPLE 1.Peace education programs
2.Local and international dialogue/relationship-building - particularly with the Afghan Diaspora
3.Developing sustainability and self-reliance
4.Nonviolent direct action
5.Media utilization
6.Development of “peace resource centers” in Afghanistan 6 POINT STATEGY 2012 ACTIONS Caravan of Nonviolence Community of Shared Pain Walk of Unity Million Friends to End the Afghan War DR. ABDUL KHALIQ "AK" RASHID gandhian advocate CIA Counterterrorist Center Colonel John M. Venhaus, US Army Carl von Clausewitz "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." Colonel Robert L. Helvey US Army ? terror is lawless and chaotic, but it is not without reason BERNARD FALL "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered" LAND REFORM DAMS V STRUCTURAL S FUNCTIONAL Former Chief Counterterrorism Strategist, United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism DAVID KILCULLEN Dams Culverts Roads Schools Electricity Organizational Infrastructure CASE STUDY: Corruption GDP WAR LORDS DRUG LORDS INSECURITY BACHA BAZI RIGGED ELECTIONS "The classic way of stopping [terror] was depicted in Siena: Security is gained through public justice that is backed up by a monopoly of retribution." AFGHANISTAN US FOREIGN POLICY DOWN. TOP. BOTTOM.UP. "AUGMENTS THE SPECTRUM OF CONTROL." CONSENT THEORY OF POWER 1 LEGITIMACY 2 JUSTICE 3 RESPECT 4 HOPE "empower good governance" "enable bad governance" NATION-BUILDING FROM THE BOTTOM-UP "Empowering Success in Afghanistan: Towards a New U.S. Grand Strategy" Colonel Robert C. Jones, former Director of Strategic Studies, SOCOM MARIA J. STEPHAN Formely employed at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for European/NATO policy, U.S. Department of Defense Former Fellow on Intra-State Conflict, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TWICE AS EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS ANALYZING 323 1900-2006 AHMADULLAH ARCHIWAL DIRECTOR, ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND REHABILITATION Paul Negley SENIOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ADVISOR, PAUL NEGLEY: COMISAF (COMMANDER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE) FORMER FIELD PROGRAM OFFICER, PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM, KUNAR PROVINCE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 1964 SRĐA POPOVIĆ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CENTER FOR APPLIED NONVIOLENT ACTION AND STRATEGIES A POSTMODERN DEFENSE TACTIC FOR A POSTMODERN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF how to fight a tactic with a tactic. Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns
driven time and again off course, once he had plundered
the hallowed heights of Troy.

Many cities of men he saw and learned their minds,
many pains he suffered, heartsick on the open sea,
fighting to save his life and bring his comrades home.
Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns
driven time and again off course, once he had plundered
the hallowed heights of Troy.

Many cities of men he saw and learned their minds,
many pains he suffered, heartsick on the open sea,
fighting to save his life and bring his comrades home.
- Homer
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