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The secrets of patron-client politics and political change in SEA inspired by James C. Scott
Transcript of The secrets of patron-client politics and political change in SEA inspired by James C. Scott
Gabriela Faltusová · two models of association and conflict
one model is the horizontal
the second model emphasizes on primordial sentiments (such as ethnicity, language, and religion)
· until recently used by anthropologists
· terms related to patron-client structures - clientelism” “dyadic contract” “personal network”.
· Clientelism The Resource Base of Patron II. Variation in Patron-Client Ties
- in patron-client relationships there are many distinctions such as in other pre-industrial nations as well - patron has one main target - get his investments back
- patrons may, in this sense, rely on:
a) their own knowledge and skills
b) direct control of personal real property
c) indirect control oft he property or authority of others (often the public) Balance of Affective and Instrumental Ties - at the periphery are situated clients who are not strongly bounded with patron in the core are clients and patron much closer Balance of Voluntarism and Coercion - there are many ways hoe to keep relationship patron-client
- we could could recognize for example voluntarism and coercion Durability Over Time - power relationship keep all things strong bounded because patron offer to cliet required services III. Survival and Development of Patron-Client Ties in Southeast Asia
A. Conditions for Survival With the penetration of colonial government and commercialization of the economy, land ownership made its appearance (especially in the Philippinesand Vietnam) as a major basis of patronage. As Huntington aptly expressed it, "The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government." 1) The General Trend
the typical patron in traditional SEA was a petty local leader,who owed his local leadership to his personal skills, his wealth and so on
two important reasons for oscillation in local power:
a) the weakness of the central state
b) the relative ease with which could clients in a slash-and-burn economy move to another area B. The Transformation of Traditional Patron-Client Ties patronclient structures are now more closely linked to the national level, but the old style patrons still thrive 2) The Dynamics of the Transformation
traditional peasant societies works on the base when one family gain is another's loss, have generally developed a variety of social control mechanisms that guarantee a measure of security to each family
a wealthy man is pressed to assume expensive ceremonial offices, to make large religious contributions, to give loans and donations
unless a wealthy individual can persuade most of the community that his wealth is no threat to them or can win enough personal allies to sustain his position, he is in danger
the wealthy man in a peasant village can seldom rely on outside force or law to protect him most of the transformations in patron-client bonds apply with greatest force to the directly ruled, lowland areas of SEA. To ease the financial and administrative burden of colonial rule in these areas, the colonizers generally kept local rulers in place and used them as agents.
the effects of this policy on patrons, in contrast to the directly ruled regions, were twofold:
1. local patron/leaders tended to be strengthened by colonial backing and the new powers given to them
2. the sanction of colonial authority permitted many such leaders to broaden the resource base of their authority 3) Electoral Politics and Patron-Client Ties
most SEA states have had functioning electoral systems at one time since their
the dynamics of electoral competition transformed patron-client relations in
at least four
1. it improved the client's bargaining position with a patron by adding to
2. it promoted the vertical integration of patron-client structures from the
hamlet level to the central government
3. it led to the creation of new patron-client pyramids and the politicization of old ones
4. it contributed to the survival of opposition patron-client pyramids at the local level.
in one sense, popular elections can be seen as a reestablishment of the
redistributive mechanisms of the traditional setting
second, nationwide elections make it necessary for a national party to
establish a network of links extending down to the local level. to this point we have focused on the general influence of elections on patron-client structures.
depending on the region and the party in question, however, there has been a noteworthy variation in the connection between party and patron-client structures.
the essential distinction is one between a party that has created its own network of patron-client linkages from the center and a party that relies on preexisting patron-client bonds and merely incorporates them into its organization. For those of you who did not like our presentation and our pathetic tries of british accent, here is a picture of potato: Thank you for your attention! ...and for those of you who do not like potatoes, here is a picture of cute kitty: (and yes, we found the cutest one.) 4. The Inflationary Character of "Patron-Client Democracy"
the strength of the downward distributive pressures generated by electoral procedures in Southeast Asia depended primarily on four variables which are stated below in contrasting