Loading presentation...

Present Remotely

Send the link below via email or IM

Copy

Present to your audience

Start remote presentation

  • Invited audience members will follow you as you navigate and present
  • People invited to a presentation do not need a Prezi account
  • This link expires 10 minutes after you close the presentation
  • A maximum of 30 users can follow your presentation
  • Learn more about this feature in our knowledge base article

Do you really want to delete this prezi?

Neither you, nor the coeditors you shared it with will be able to recover it again.

DeleteCancel

Make your likes visible on Facebook?

Connect your Facebook account to Prezi and let your likes appear on your timeline.
You can change this under Settings & Account at any time.

No, thanks

Conceptia lui Hume cu privire la cauzalitate

Prezentare sustinuta la Facultatea de filosofie, Universitatea Bucuresti, in cadrul colocviului "David Hume la 300 de ani"
by

Gheorghe Stefanov

on 27 August 2012

Comments (0)

Please log in to add your comment.

Report abuse

Transcript of Conceptia lui Hume cu privire la cauzalitate

Conceptia lui Hume cu privire la cauzalitate 'Vechiul Hume': ideea de relatie cauzala nu poate fi distinsa de ideea de succesiune regulata; a spune ca in natura exista conexiuni cauzale revine la a spune ca anumite clase de evenimente (Hume vorbeste in special despre obiecte) se succed cu regularitate.

v: Antony Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief; Peter Millican, Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science s.a.

'Noul Hume' (realism sceptic): are sens sa vorbim despre relatii cauzale ca relatii mai stranse (thick) decat cele de succesiune regulata, dar natura acestor relatii cauzale nu este cognoscibila; nu putem cunoaste nimic in afara succesiunilor regulate de evenimente (sau obiecte).

v: Kemp Smith, Norman, The Philosophy of David Hume; Edward Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of Man; Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion; John Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume s.a. Doua tipuri de asteptari:
asteptarea ca un eveniment sa urmeze unui alt eveniment aparuta datorita unei stimulari senzoriale uniforme (de pilda, ma astept ca sosirea mea acasa sa fie urmata de descoperirea ca usa e incuiata);
asteptarea ca producerea unui eveniment sa fie efectul producerii unui alt eveniment aparuta datorita unei stimulari senzoriale uniforme (de pilda, ma astept ca actionarea unei corzi intinse sa aiba ca efect producerea unui sunet).

Potrivit vechiului Hume, distinctia dintre cele doua tipuri de asteptari e lipsita de sens (sau nu tine de prezenta sau absenta unei relatii cauzale, ci fie de faptul ca generalitatea primei asteptari e nejustificata, fie de faptul ca in al doilea caz relatia poate fi redusa la relatii cauzale mai simple, care trebuie sa fie intelese in termenii succesiunii regulate) .

Potrivit noului Hume, distinctia nu e lipsita de sens, dar nu putem avea certitudinea ca vreuna dintre asteptarile noastre e de primul tip sau de al doilea tip. 10 decembrie, 2011
gstefanov@gmail.com Teme importante ale dezbaterii:

interpretarea pasajelor in care Hume sustine ca stiinta trebuie sa studieze relatii cauzale
cele doua definitii (v. in continuare)
consistente / inconsistente in argumentele lui Hume
etc.
v. prezentarea dezbaterii Old Hume vs. New Hume in Millican (2009);

Blackburn (1990) sustine o pozitie intermediara - Hume poate sa inteleaga prin cauzalitate ceva mai mult decat o simpla succesiune regulata, dar nu e realist cu privire la relatiile cauzale.

Obs.: Diferentele dintre interpretari acopera si problema inductiei, dar exista exegeti care considera ca tema inductiei si cea a cauzalitatii, asa cum apar la Hume, pot fi discutate separat. Bibliografie:

David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I: The Understanding (edited by Jonathan Bennett, retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/htb.html ) - JBT
David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (edited by Jonathan Bennett, retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/he.html ) - JBE
Mircea Flonta (1987), Studiu introductiv la David Hume, Cercetare asupra intelectului omenesc, Ed. Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, in special sectiunea "Teoria cauzalitatii", pp. 58-66.
C. M. Lorkowski - Hume: Causation (2010), in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/
Harold W. Noonan (1999), Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Knowledge. Routledge, Cap. 3 - Causation, induction and necessary connection, pp. 91-159.
Simon Blackburn (1990), Hume and Thick Connexions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:237-250
Peter Millican (2009), Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science. Mind 118 (471):647-712 (retrieved from http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican.html ) Treatise Enquiry Prima
definitie A doua
definitie A cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are similarly precedent and contiguous to objects that resemble the latter." (III.14, p. 87 in JBT) "A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and united with it in such a way that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of one to form a livelier idea of the other." (III.14, p. 88 in JBT) A cause is "an event followed by another, where all events similar to the first are followed by events similar to the second." (VII.2, p. 38 in JBE) A cause is "an event followed by another, where the appearance of the former always conveys the thought to the latter." (VII.2, p. 38 in JBE) Argumentul lui Hume:
O parte negativa: "No isolated episode of mental or physical causation yields any impression of power or necessary connection. Therefore, no such episode can prompt us to form any idea of power or necessary connection." (VII.2, p. 39 in JBE)
O parte pozitiva: "When many similar episodes are observed to occur, however, and events of one kind are always followed events of a second kind, we then start to form the notion of cause and connection. The experience of this regularity gives us a new impression, namely the feeling or impression of a custom-induced connection in our thought or imagination between one event and another; and the idea that we have been hunting for - the idea of power or necessary connection - is copied from this impression." (VII.2, p. 39 in JBE)

obs: ideea existentei unei parti negative si a unei parti pozitive a argumentului apare in Flonta (1987); Partea pozitiva din nou:

"The numerous instances of resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and necessity. These instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other and have no union except in our mind, which observes them and collects their ideas. So necessity is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind—a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another. If we don’t view it in this way we can never arrive at the most distant notion of it, or be able to attribute it either to external or internal objects, to spirit or body, to causes or effects.

[...] the necessary connection between causes and effects is the move our mind makes from an impression of the cause to a lively
idea of the effect, or perhaps it is not the move itself but rather our being made or determined to make the move." (III.14, p. 85 in JBT) "Asteptarile cauzale" trebuie sa fie efectul stimularii senzoriale uniforme.

Putem intelege aceasta relatie cauzala in termenii vechiului Hume?

Primul caz: Sa presupunem ca o persoana nu are instinctul natural despre care vorbeste Hume, iar asteptarile sale cauzale sunt formate in alt mod (printr-un soi de nebunie). Am o succesiune regulata, in cazul acestei persoane, intre stimulari senzoriale care produc in mod obisnuit "asteptari cauzale" si aparitia nebuneasca a asteptarilor respective. Din perspectiva vechiului Hume, nu are sens sa distingem cazul acestei persoane de cazul unei persoane obisnuite.

Ce e in neregula cu acest lucru? Al doilea caz: Asteptarile cauzale adecvate apar dupa stimularile senzoriale
uniforme, dar nu sunt produse de stimularile senzoriale, ci sunt innascute, stimularile senzoriale contribuind doar la actualizarea lor.

Potrivit vechiului Hume, acest caz nu poate fi distins de cel in care asteptarile cauzale ale unei persoane se succed regulat stimularilor senzoriale uniforme, iar acest din urma caz nu poate fi distins de cel in care asteptarile respective apar din cauza stimularilor senzoriale uniforme.

Dar persoana din al doilea caz are un soi de cunoastere innascuta cu privire la relatiile cauzale.

Prin urmare, distinctia dintre o persoana care are o cunoastere innascuta cu privire la relatii cauzale si o persoana care nu are o cunoastere innascuta cu privire la relatii cauzale ar trebui sa fie lipsita de sens.

Dar ar fi absurd ca Hume sa creada ca distinctia dintre ineism si empirism e lipsita de sens.

Prin urmare, interpretarea traditionala a conceptiei lui Hume despre cauzalitate e gresita.
Full transcript