Send the link below via email or IMCopy
Present to your audienceStart remote presentation
- Invited audience members will follow you as you navigate and present
- People invited to a presentation do not need a Prezi account
- This link expires 10 minutes after you close the presentation
- A maximum of 30 users can follow your presentation
- Learn more about this feature in our knowledge base article
Nuclear Proliferation, ‘Rogue States’, and the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
Transcript of Nuclear Proliferation, ‘Rogue States’, and the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
Heavy water production plant, Arak, Iran
Uranium enrichment plant, Natanz, Iran
Nuclear Proliferation, ‘Rogue States’, and the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
Nuclaer Proliferation, Arms Control & Disarmament
North Korea: a 'rogue state'?
Strategies vis-a-vis 'rogue states'
Accommodating or Containing North Korea
Invade North Korea?
Smith, H. 2000. Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea. International Affairs 76(3): 593-617
North Korea refuses US food aid (18 March 2009)
North Korean Missile launches, July 2006
Loss of key allies
Collapse of North Korean Economy
North Korean elite increasingly wary of reform because of a 'hostile international environment'
Increasingly reliant on China (Haggard and Noland 2009)
Problems with sunshine policy
Kim Jong-il and Madeline Albright, October 2000
Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
From Accommodation to containment
Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Disarmament (CVID)
Military first policy
Democracy and capitalism
Lack of reciprocity
Repression in South Korea under Syngman Rhee
Kim Il Sung
Chinese troops cross the Yalu River 1951
“If communist armies could now march across internationally recognized boundary lines, the world would have returned to the conditions of the prewar period. The generation that had lived through Munich was bound to react”
(Kissinger 1994, 476)
US bombing of Wonsan, North Korea
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain meets Adolf Hitler to discuss German annexation of Czech border areas on 24 September 1938,
May 1948 Jeju Residents await execution
Why not invade North Korea?
North Korea's advanced nuclear program compared to Iraq & Iran (Howard 2004: 809)
Why invade Iraq rather than North Korea?
realism, liberalism, and mainstream constructivism cannot explain this
Language-based constructivist approach (Howard 2004)
actions assume meaning in the context of a given security game
rules define what is possible in the game
US and North Korea locked into the diplomatic process of the Agreed Framework since the 1993-4 nuclear crisis
Oct. 2002 North Korea admits to restarting nuclear program
US policy in Iraq was of unilateral action and not negotiation
fear of escalation rather than language games was the reason for not using force in North Korea
Iraq invites International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to verify US WMD claims, whereas North Korea throws them out.
“the image of North Korea as a 'rogue state' severely hinders both an adequate understanding and a possible resolution of the crisis. The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how US foreign policy continues to be driven by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns. The 'Evil Empire' may be gone; not so the underlying need to define safety and security with reference to an external threat that must be warded off at any cost. Rogues are among the new threat-images that serve to demarcate the line between good and evil” (Bleiker 2003: 721).
'Noble' Self vs. 'Evil' Other
'axis of evil'
US Nuclear Posture Review June 2002 - pre-emptive nuclear strikes
North Korea's ‘crisis-orientated negotiation style’
North Korean goals :
non-aggression pact with US
Lee Myung-bak, 2008-2013
Park Geun-hye, Feb. 2013
Appeasement: 'acceding to demands of aggressive states to prevent war' (Griffiths, O'Callaghan & Roach 2014: 9)
30 Sept. 1938 Munich Agreement
Accommodation or Appeasement?
'as close as lips and teeth'
End of the Cold War
Crisis orientated negotiation style
1993 North Korea threatens to withdraw from Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1994 North Korea signs Agreed Framework
George Kennan, Foreign Affairs in July 1947, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’
Kennan - multifaceted containment policy
militarized containment approach
defence budget from a projected $13.5 billion to $48 billion in 1951 – a 257% increase
NSC-68, 14 April 1950
psychological balance of power
Cold War: an ideological conflict & US Exceptionalism
Gaddis (1982, 106) “NSC-68 was… a deeply flawed document”
“tangible external behavior of concern” (Litwak 2000: 7)
requires Great Power response: containment or accommodation (appeasement?) (Litwak 2000: 1-15), or pre-emption
‘states of concern’ & Great Power support for repressive regimes
Four primary norms: “the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction… the support of, or active engagement in, acts of terrorism… a vast assault on human rights with externally harmful consequences… [and] outright territorial aggression”
(Nincic 2005: 15).
“[a] regime is considered a renegade… because its methods of rule and/or its goals violated norms embraced by the bulk of the international community” (Nincic 2005: 13).
Acheson’s 12 Jan 1950 statement
Assumptions and misperceptions
Kim Il Sung's persuasiveness
Border tensions and withdrawal of USSR and US troops
North Korean perspective?
the spectre of appeasement
initial North Korean aggression?
Ramifications of the Korean War
Berlin Blockade June 1948-May 1949
Czech Coup, February 1948
CCP Victory October 1949
Communism on the march?
Nuclear Proliferation Arms Control & Disarmament
(i) ability to inflict massive collateral damage,
(ii) raise moral questions about their ‘non-legitimate, inhuman’ nature,
(iii) have a powerful deterrent effect,
(iv) are portable, relatively easy to make & cheap to produce.
(v) Arms control treaties reduced tensions between the Superpowers.
Do nuclear weapons promote peace & stability?
Fallibility of deterrence systems
Danger of nuclear imbalances
Useable nuclear weapons
Irresponsible nuclear powers
Absence of nuclear war
See Heywood, page 278
Nuclear Arms Control
known to possess
NATO nuke sharing
Nuclear armed states
Arms control is difficult because:
(i) security dilemma & arms races
(ii) states favour national security over international/multilateral commitments
(iii) difficult to limit/inhibit powerful states.
(iv) technical issues such as verification & monitoring are difficult.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (1958)
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) launched in 2007
5 April 2009, Prague, Obama calls for an end to nuclear weapons
NYT, 5 April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/us/politics/06prexy.html
Derida on 9/11, "We must also recognize here the strategies and relations of power. The dominant power is the one that manages to impose and, thus, legitimate, indeed to legalize... on a national or world stage, the terminology and thus the interpretation that best suits it in a given situation" (In Borradori 2003: 105)
power & knowledge
Luttwak Edward 2018. It’s Time to Bomb North Korea Destroying Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal is still in America’s national interest. January 8, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/
If North Korea retaliates, its South Korea's fault for being unprepared
Easy to eradicate North Korea's nuclear arsenal
China won't intervene
Colin Powell, Spring 1991: "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung" (Mann 2004: 203).
Towards a new post-Cold War Strategy
“As the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community” (Lake 1994: 46)
US has a “special responsibility to nurture and promote… core values [namely: democratic institutions, free markets, peaceful settlement of conflict, and collective security]… At the same time, our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values” (Lake 1994: 45)
Lake, A. 1994. Confronting Backlash States. Foreign Affairs 73: 45-55.
North Korea: a 'Rogue State'?
"a state's willingness and ability to attack another state that poses an imminent threat to its national security" (Griffiths, O'Callaghan & Roach 2014: 283)
Challenge to classical realism:
& Liberalism: International law
nuclear proliferation = “the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not possess them prior to 1968, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed” (Griffiths, O'Callaghan & Roach 2014: 248)
arms control = regulating the number of nuclear weapons held by nuclear armed states & preventing proliferation,
disarmament = eliminating nuclear weapons from the calculations of states.
Arms control today focuses on ‘rogue states’ , e.g. IAEA & Iran
(i) anxiety about nuclear proliferation, 'rogue states' & terrorists
Post-Cold War: 2nd nuclear age
(v) mixed success in terms of limiting proliferation.
(ii) continued use of nuclear strategies by established nuclear powers.
(iii) greater incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons
(iv) greater accessibility of nuclear technology & 'loose nukes' (especially
Cold War: 1st nuclear age
(i) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968)
(ii) Vertical proliferation (nuclear arms race) between the Superpowers & missile shields.
(iii) Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
(iv) Superpowers provided security guarantees to allies, limiting proliferation
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
atomic, biological and chemical weapons
Withdrawal from Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1994 & 2003
Missile launches 1993 (Nodong), 1998 & 2006 (Taepodong), 2009 (Unha), 2016-2017 (Pukkuksong)
Cheonan Sinking March 2010
Yeonpyeong November 2010
Failed satellite launch April 2012
Nuclear tests Oct. 2006, May 2009, Feb. 2013, Jan. & Sept. 2016, Sept 2017.
Belligerent & Threatening behaviour?
G.W. Bush State of the Union ‘axis of evil’ speech, Feb 2002
US Nuclear Posture Review, June 2002, allowing for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against 'rogue states'
War on Terror
Oct 2002, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, DPRK, Kang Sok-ju "We are part of the axis of evil... If we disarm [our nuclear capability] because of US pressure, then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan's Taliban, to be beaten to death" (Hecker 2010, 50).
Bruce Cumings “civil wars do not start: they come”
Strategies vis-a-vis 'rogue states'
Which one of the following is a characteristic of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?
A. WMD are expensive to produce
B. WMD are a legitimate weapon of war
C. WMD have a powerful deterrent effect
D. WMD are relatively difficult to make
Noland, Robinson & Wang (1999) estimate that during the 1994-98 famines between 240,000-3,500,000 North Korean citizens died. According to Hazel Smith, this tragedy reflects which of the four securitization paradigms that she outlined?
D. Rational Actor
According to Nincic a state can be deemed ‘rogue’ if it violates one or more primary norms of international society. For Nincic the four primary norms comprise, “the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)… the support of, or active engagement in, acts of terrorism… a vast assault on human rights with externally harmful consequences… [and] outright territorial aggression” (Nincic 2005: 15). Which of these norms has North Korea continually violated since the collapse of the Six Party Talks (SPT) in 2009 from the perspective of the US?
A. The pursuit of WMD and engagement in terrorism.
B. A vast assault on human rights and outright territorial aggression.
C. Engagement in terrorism and outright territorial aggression.
D. The pursuit of WMD and a vast assault on human rights.
North Korea Removed from State Sponsors of terrorism list (2008-2017)
Obama to See if North Korea Should Return to Terror List, NYT, 21 Dec. 2014
Moon Jae-in's Olympic gamble on North Korea
, 6 Feb. 2018
Anna Fifield, A. & Parker , A. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un invites South Korea’s president to Pyongyang,
, 10 Feb. 2018
Oct. 2002 North Korea admit to restarting nuclear program
Obama's deal with Iran vs 'strategic patience' with North Korea
Choi, Jong Kun 2016. The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea, The Washington Quarterly, 38(4): 57-72.
spoiler: abduction issue
China's 'Ukraine model'
Van Ness 2005
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Peaceful Coexistence
3. Economic cooperation and aid to North Korea
14 April 2009 North Korea officially withdraws from SPT
Return to the negotiation table based on CVID & IAEA inspections
sanctions & proliferation interdiction have failed
North Korea's economy is doing ok
Deconstruction – radically unsettling ‘stable’ concepts
Each time the US used an aggressive policy to pressure North Korea into giving way, the latter became more recalcitrant. By contrast, when Washington relied on a more cooperative attitude Pyongyang usually responded with concessions. Tension on the Korean peninsula thus decreased only when the US adopted a 'give-and-take' diplomatic style in recognition that Pyongyang's recalcitrance can, and should, be read as a bargaining tactic to get something in return for giving up the nuclear option. (Bleiker (2003: 723)
North-South Summit June 2000
Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Kaesong industrial zone
Sunshine Policy and Reform