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on 15 June 2016

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Transcript of Sandugo

PNP ISO Master Plan


The insurgency problem, whether of the communist or the secessionist type, has
social, economic, political and security dimensions.
security part, as manifested by armed guerilla activities, is the most visible sign or symptom of the problem.
The security acts only because of the political organization that provides the leadership and the direction. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction and grievances of the people resulting from the socio-economic and political conditions in the area provide the insurgency movement the reason for its being.
Thus, insurgency may not be solved by police/military solution alone (although police/military action is vital and an important part), but by a package of government policies and programs that can effectively and simultaneously address the socio-economic, the political and the military aspects of the situation.
Accordingly, the whole government machinery and instrumentalities must strongly and coordinately be made to bear on the problem.


This serves as the long-range and holistic master plan of the PNP in waging an internal security support operations nationwide. Premised on the estimate of the national situation and other considerations, it prescribes the counterinsurgency support strategy, operational concept, scheme of implementation, service support, and coordinating instructions in order to accomplish the PNP”s internal security support mission.

All subsequent and supplemental Programs of Action, LOIs, and other related issuances to be prescribed and executed by PNP units and personnel at all levels which would have a bearing on internal security, must therefore conform with the intent/spirit and strategic and operational guidelines embodied herein. This is to ensure the continuity, unity, consistency and synergy of all internal security efforts at all times.

The military and police counter-insurgency campaigns and other complementing efforts by concerned civil government agencies LGUs and NGOS, may be classified into three major operations or activities, namely:


Internal Security Operations (ISO)

by the AFP and the PNP to provide security to the people and the government;

National Development
operations by the civil government agencies to address the root causes of insurgency; and

Peace Process by the Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
to complement the overall government effort to attract rebels back to the mainstream of society, in the spirit of equality, peace, reconciliation and unification.

Essentially, these three mutually complementing efforts are the government’s three-pronged strategy in addressing the country’s insurgency problem.
Strategic Guidance

The National Peace and Development Plan

This Plan sets forth the government’s overall plan for addressing insurgency. It recognizes insurgency as a multi-dimensional problem requiring a holistic and collaborative response and involvement of all sectors of government and of the citizenry. It prescribes the
Clear – Hold – Consolidate – Develop (CHCD)
operational methodology and envisions to launch a concerted, integrated and collaborative campaign to address insurgency and its root causes through the “left – hand” and the “right – hand” responses. .

“left – hand”
response involves the conduct of political and socio-economic reforms to address the root causes of insurgency and win the hearts and minds of the people, while the
“right –hand”
response involves the conduct of offensive operations that directly contribute to the decisive defeat of the insurgents and the dismantling of their politico-military infrastructures. These offensive operations include diplomatic, political, intelligence, psychological and military offensive
Strategy of "Total-Approach"
The National Peace and Development Plan has adopted the Strategy of "Total Approach". Its holistic approach to effectively address armed conflicts in the country consists of a security component, a political component and a socio-economic component. The security component directly addresses violent conflicts, the political component seeks to tap the full cooperation of local government units and civil society to promote good governance and local peace initiatives, while the socio-economic component focuses on ways and means to eradicate/alleviate poverty.
AFP ISO Campaign Plan “BALANGAI”:
This is the implementation of the National Peace and Development Plan and consistent with the National Strategy of “Total Approach” and the Clear – Hold – Consolidate and Develop Methodology prescribed in the national plan. It envisions the clearing of barangays one after the other by simultaneously and decisively defeating CPP/NPA armed groups, dismantling LCM politico – military infrastructures and more importantly Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People. The SOT concept is applied in dismantling the politico– military structure of the enemy and employs the TRIAD of intelligence, combat and psychological operations as separate weapons system to decisively defeat its armed groups.

I intend to have all the PNP Offices and units consistently and vigorously perform our tasks as mandated by RA 8551 and further provided in EO 110. The Police Regional Police Offices and other tasked PNP Units shall be employed accordingly to help support the AFP neutralize the LCM nationwide. This way, the armed components, the infrastructures, and the political machinery of the CPP/NPA/NDF will be dismantled by the government. I likewise intend to have the organization help Local Government Units (LGUs) re-establish or strengthen government authority and control over insurgency-affected barangays, and have linkages with other security and development agencies and organizations to help attain the aims of the National Peace and Development Plan of the government. In so doing the PNP would be able to effectively implement and succeed in this campaign plan as the PNP will be greatly involved in harnessing all government resources in the fight against insurgency and its root causes.


1. Broad Objective

The PNP, in strengthening its participation and involvement in the government’s peace and development machinery, and concurrent with its statutory functions and mandate through Executive Order 110, shall support the AFP in ISO for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security and to perform its tasks in the National Peace and Development Plan.

2. Specific Objectives

a. To develop the capability of field units to fully operationalize this ISO support plan for the government and the AFP in particular.

b. To support the AFP in the isolation of the underground infrastructure and front organizations of the insurgents in the towns and cities from the general population

c. To enhance intelligence activities against threat groups

d. To enhance the conduct of legal offensive against the

e. To support the governments’ National Peace and Development Plan to include the Peace and Reconciliation plan.

1. Strategic Concept
a. The PNP shall basically support the AFP’s ISO Campaign Plan “Balangai” through the conduct of limited internal security operations, sustained law enforcement and PCR activities, intensive information gathering and the conduct of investigation and prosecution of ISO related cases.

b. The PNP campaign plan shall also follow the Clear- Hold-Support operational methodology as herein indicated in support to the integration efforts of the military and other civilian agencies of the government as envisioned in the NPDP and the strategy of “Total Approach”.

1. Strategic Concept
2. Operational Concept
2. Operational Concept
HOLD Stage
Consolidation Stage
Development Stage
The NHQ-PNP, through its directorial staff, shall supervise and support the Police Regional Offices in implementing the strategic agenda and operational concept of this counter-insurgency strategy. The PNP leadership, through the NALEC, the NDCC and the NPOC,shall coordinate and cooperate with other national government agencies in the realization of the intent of this counter-insurgency strategy.
The Police Regional Offices, through the police provincial/city offices and municipal/city police stations, RMGs and PMGs shall implement their localized counter-insurgency plans based on this master plan. Their plan shall be focused towards the implementation of localized activities to attain:

(1) development of the capabilities of fields units to support the AFP in the resolution of ISO problem;
(2) isolation of the underground infrastructure and front organizations of insurgents in towns and cities from the general population;

(3) enhancement of intelligence activities against threat group;
(4) enhancement of legal offensive against the insurgents.
b. The
Special Action Force
is designated as the reserve mobile/strike unit of NHQ, PNP. It shall be deployed/committed to support the police Regional offices as situation warrants and/or upon request.
c. The PNP National Support Units, through their specialized operating units and various regional offices, shall assist/support the local police units in the conduct of ISO related activities in accordance with their mandated mission and functions.
e. In areas where the AFP due to its limited resources, cannot physically occupy or adequately secure an area, and where PNP units are present or available, the PNP within its capability shall initially provide security in the area until AFP reinforcements shall have arrived. However, in areas where there is preponderance of AFP forces or where it is declared by MOA/policy that they are the OPR, the PNP shall, through the conduct of limited combat support operations assist the AFP mainly because the police personnel to be committed on this aspect are the same personnel that are performing law enforcement functions.

On the ground, the Regional Directors, PDs and Chiefs of Police are enjoined to enter into memorandum of understanding with their AFP counterparts purposely to delineate and define their respective responsibilities/tasks and command relationship based on their capabilities, limitations and the prevailing threat situation and within the limits of the MOA set by DILG/PNP and DND/AFP.
f. The PNP through the PROs, PPOs/CPOs and MPS shall undertake the following specific activities during the Clearing and Holding Phases of the operational Methodology:
1) Operations
2) Intelligence Operations:
3) Police Community Relations
4) Legal Offensive Activities:
g. In the Consolidation and Development Phases, the activities are as follows:

1) Assist the Local Government Units (LGUs) and concerned civil government agencies in the strengthening and consolidating control and authority over targeted barangays/areas pursuant to the strategic concept laid down in the NPDP.

2) Provide/extend appropriate security coverage to civil government agencies, local government units NGAs, NGOs and GO’s in the delivery of basic services and development projects to the community during the consolidation and development phases.

3) Participate in, and support the Local Chief Executives (LCEs) in the selection process of the Civilian Volunteer Organizations (Bantay Bayan/Kababayan).

4) Intensify intelligence gathering:

5) Ensure that the Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is fully operationalize in coordination with the local government units.

i. Counter-organization effort against insurgents/ secessionists above ground organizations.

Counter - organization such as the CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayan and CAFGUs are organized in barangays that have been de-influenced or cleared from enemy control.

The CAFGUs and CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayan shall, during the holding phase, augment the PNP for territorial defense in order to free the AFP maneuver forces to go on all offensive. The CVOs shall help mobilize the people to support the government, the police and the military against the insurgents.

Another important element of counter organization is the setting-up of people's organizations and cooperatives in the cleared barangays for various livelihood projects and community - based reforestation (when appropriate). The people's organizations (POs) and Cooperatives can also serve as the nuclei for rural economic development and environmental protection to be orchestrated by concerned government agencies under the baton of the governor or Mayor.

. Organization of CVOs for ISO Support

The CVO is an overt but unarmed component of the Local Defense Organization. They are directly under the control and supervision of the local chief executives who shall be assisted by the local police and/or military elements in the community.

The PCR elements of PNP units/offices in collaboration with the local officials, recruit volunteers to become members of the CVOs from all sectors of society such as peasants, workers, students, professionals, businessman, religious sectors, out of school youth and others.

The CVOs shall among others perform the following tasks in support of the police and the military in the area:

activities; information; in cases of emergency;

1) Collect intelligence reports;
2) Conduct ronda and similar neighborhood watch

3) Assist in the dissemination of public

4) Assist in providing safety and security services

5) Support and assist in the identification and

implementation of community development projects; and

6) Perform other related tasks.

k. Conduct of regular meetings of Coordinating Councils to plan, monitor, supervise and revitalize ISO government efforts

Government fora such as the peace and order councils, development councils and the disaster coordinating centers and area coordinating centers are excellent venues or facilities through which various government programs are discussed and facilitated.

Concerned PNP units are therefore directed to actively participate in the activities of these bodies for the attainment of a revitalized internal security support operations to the AFP and the government as a whole.

l. The operationalization of the DILG/PNP and DND/AFP Joint IRR to EO 110

The core objective of the Joint IRR is to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the PNP and AFP in the implementation of the provisions of EO 110 in the areas of Operations, Intelligence, Police Community Relations and Investigation of ISO related cases and other related activities. Likewise, it set forth the concept in Internal Security Operations to be conducted jointly by the AFP with the PNP in the support role in order to preserve the internal security of the State against insurgents and other serious threats to national security.

Relatedly, the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop operational methodology shall be applied to carry out the integrated and focused effort of the military, police, the entire government machinery and the NGOs, GOs, POs in addressing insurgency as outlined in the National Peace and Development Plan and the Strategy of Total Approach. (See Annex- ): Schematic Diagram of the Operational Methodology)


1. Respect for human rights shall be paramount, and strict adherence with the PNP Operational Procedure (Revised Rules of Engagement) shall always be emphasized in all police operations.

2. All PNP units shall re-assess respective resources and capabilities. All IMPLANS AND SOPs, shall be updated to conform with this master plan.
3. Tasked units shall operate on the existing logistical and financial allocations. NHQ-PNP shall provide additional logistical and financial support on a case-to-case basis.

4. Maximum coordination with national government units, non- government organizations and all sectors of the community, for the success of this strategy, is authorized and highly encouraged.
5. In order to insure uniformity in adopting/implementing the COPS and IA/CPSP concepts, all chiefs of police/police supervisors implementing them must always be guided by the "Community-Oriented Policing System (COPS) Manual for the PNP" issued thru NAPOLCOM Resolution Nr 2000-157 dated October 31, 200 and IA/CPSP guidelines and requirements.

6. This Master Plan shall supersede PNP LOI 41/96 CAMPAIGN PLAN SANDUGO III (PNP Counter Insurgency Strategy). However, all applicable issuances, MOUs/MOAs not in conflict with this Master Plan are still in effect.

7. All RDs, PROs and Dirs, NSUs shall submit IMPLANs to this Plan and periodic reports on its implementation.

8. This Master Plan shall take effect upon approval.

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