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International Relations: 9/11

After September 11th

Ira B

on 19 November 2012

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Transcript of International Relations: 9/11

1. Events on September 11th, 2011 2. The War on Terror [The Wars (Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq)] 1. Events on September 11th, 2011

2. The War on Terror [The Wars (Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq)]

3. Change on USA's inner policies

4. 9/11 and IR

5. Questions to the class http://hosted.ap.org/interactives/2011/sept11-10years/ -http://hosted.ap.org/interactives/2011/sept11-10years/

•First, the perceived threat posed by non-liberal democratic, so-called ‘rogue states’ such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq under Saddam Hussain. two contemporary military threats posed to modern liberal democratic states: War-making is no longer the monopoly of nation states because a new type of warfare has emerged, one described as ‘asymmetrical warfare’. This is increasingly fought out between states and non-state or sub-state actors that employ terrorist methods to advance their cause. In response to 9/11, and the perceived threats of ‘rogue states’, a case for states to engage in military pre-emption has been made. The idea is that states may, in certain circumstances, pursue a ‘just war’ to protect themselves as well as prevent evil, restore peace, ensure justice and secure order.
The notion of a defensive ‘just war’ – one waged ‘to protect the innocent from certain harm’ through ‘proportionate force’ – reflects a long historical tradition. •Second, the threat posed by non-state and sub-state actors, particularly from terrorist organisations, guerrilla armies and insurgent movements. These can be supported or sponsored by rogue states. In Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power, Jean Bethke Elshtan argues that 9/11 again demonstrated that it is no longer ‘wise or prudent or even decent to wait for threats to develop fully, courting the potential loss of massive numbers of civilians’ (Elshtan, 2003, p190). In an open letter issued by the Institute for American Values, he argues (alongside many other US academics and intellectuals) that a just war should:

‘... only be fought by a legitimate authority, with responsibility for public order. Violence that is freelance, opportunistic, or individualistic is never morally acceptable. A just war can only ever be waged against persons who are combatants … . Although in some circumstances, and within strict limits, it can be morally justified to undertake military actions that may result in the unintended but foreseeable death or injury of some non combatants, it is not morally acceptable to make the killing of non-combatants the operational objective of a military action.’
(Elshtan, 2003, p201) Table 1 Use of force principles

Primary Principle
Force should be used proactively against rogue states and terrorists that possess the capability and motivation to harm the United States and its allies.
Preferential principles
US partners in the region of interest should be the first to take up the fight, and the United States will assist. If the United States must use force, multilateral action is preferred, but the United States reserves the right to act unilaterally, if necessary, in self-defense.
Practical principles
The action must target a specific threat and eliminate it. The use of force should be measured.

Source: Enriquez (2002) By 2001, the US occupied a position of unprecedented dominance in world affairs and was aptly perceived as a unique kind of ‘global hegemon’. (By ‘hegemon’ we mean a world power that is so powerful it can help determine the policies of other powers in its vicinity, and is technically able to defeat any other power or combination of powers with which it might go to war.)
• the response of some of its major international partners to the way in which the US has used its unprecedented power For Professor James Sheehan of Stanford University:

Americans tended to see terrorism as a global movement that directly threatened their national security. To defeat it would require a war like the one that had destroyed the Axis powers in the Second World War – a comparison underscored by the constant association of September 11th with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour.
(Sheehan, 2008, p211)

(Europeans)… still have armed forces – just as garrison states had economies – but politically, symbolically and economically, these military institutions are subordinated to the agencies that do what citizens regard as important: managing the economy, promoting economic growth, providing welfare, and protecting people for life’s vicissitudes.
(ibid, p221)

… only three European governments – France, Germany and Belgium – actively opposed the war in Iraq; the rest responded with varying degrees of support or at least compliance. But the overwhelming majority of Europeans, including those whose governments had joined the American-led coalition, were strongly and often vocally against military actions. WAR FOR OIL
• This line of argument contains two distinct components:
• That ‘the war on terror’ was intimately bound in with (and conditioned by) the US’s commitment to exercise and maintain its hegemonic role in global affairs.
• That the pursuit of this objective was equally closely linked with activity to preserve and enhance control over global oil resources. UN
The Security Council

The 15-member United Nations Security Council did not authorize the March 19, 2003 attack on Iraq. It unanimously passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling for new inspections intended to find and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The United States, backed by Britain and Spain, began to seek a second U.N. resolution to declare Iraq in material breach of its obligation to disarm. Veto-wielding permanent members France, Russia and China, as well as a number of other members, preferred to give inspectors more time on the premise that inspections were working. Up against a deeply divided Council, the U.S. pulled its proposal on March 17.

President Obama has ended the official use of torture, withdrawn U.S. troops from Iraq and plans to withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan in 2013 — all good steps. But despite the decimation of al Qaeda, he’s perpetuated some of the worst policies of the Bush administration’s grand war against them: indefinite detention without trial of terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan, the use of a second-class justice system in the form of Guantanamo military commissions, impunity for U.S.-sponsored torture, and commanding a perpetual and costly global war.
(The Guantanamo military commissions are military tribunals created by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 for prosecuting detainees held in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps.)
Lybia and next 12 September 2011

Public Discussion: "Ten Years After September 11: What Impact on International Affairs?"

The speakers agreed on the following conclusions:
• Although today Al Qaeda is weaker as an organisation, the US war on terror in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan created more home-grown terrorist groups
• The democratic wave in the Middle East did not reach all countries in the region, and Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to be a hot spot for the years to come
• There needs to be a “smart war” against terrorism, with less money spent on fighting it and a better distribution in combating other global problems, such as poverty and disease 3. Change on USA's inner policies
-How a Bill Becomes a Law (graphic, video:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxT7QjlvDqM)
-Patriotic Act and others
-Obama and Guantanamo, previous slide

-Video-shift- from RT (Abby Martin explains what freedoms have been lost in a post 9/11 America. Artist, Journalist and Rebel)

the consequence of international terrorist attacks that appears to be the most likely to have a medium to long-term duration is the change in policy, and especially the reinforcement of security and military sectors. security reinforcement also imposes costs on the economy. Indeed, “immediately after the attacks (9/11), the US Administration and (to a lesser extent) other OECD governments increased public spending to help reconstruction, strengthen domestic security and combat terrorism” (http://www.oecd.org, 2002). In order to defend themselves better, these countries continue to tighten security policy and border control, which is likely to lead to spiraling costs. Moreover, security measures also have a direct effect on trade: “Stronger security regulations, however, imply that trade becomes more expensive, such as by increasing delivery times. For instance, after terrorists attacks on 11th September 2001, US borders were temporarily closed, trucks on the border between Canada and the United-States had to wait up to 20 hours for a crossing that normally takes minutes” (Brück, 2007 : 175).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ECONOMY
The 9/11 attacks had both immediate and long-term economic impacts, some of which continue to this day. The attacks caused the Dow to drop more than 600 points, the 2001 recession to deepen, and led to one of the biggest government spending programs in U.S. history -- the War on Terror.
Debt Crisis
Perhaps the biggest economic impact of the 9/11 attacks was inflated defense and security spending. This created the debt crisis in 2011, where Congressional Republicans called for severely limiting Medicare expenditures, thereby cutting benefits. It also led to the first-ever downgrade ofU.S. debt by Standard and Poor's. This national debt will reach $16 trillion in 2012. This means the debt-to-GDP ratio is more than 100%. The debt crisis means there is less funding available to fundstimulus programs, and reduce the high unemployment left over from the 2008 financial crisis. HUMAN RIGHTS

The response to 9/11 included torture, extraordinary rendition, prolonged detention without charges or trial and secret imprisonment. Those grave abuses are an indelible part of our human rights legacy, even if they primarily occurred at Guantánamo and other overseas sites.

From a human-rights perspective, the most worrisome aspects of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, hastily enacted in December, 2001, were preventive arrests, which allowed someone to be detained without being charged for 72 hours, and investigative hearings, which compelled people suspected of having information on terrorist activities to testify before a judge at a secret hearing. Both had five-year sunset clauses, however, and expired in December 2006. And while they were on the books, only the investigative hearing option was used ― once.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/28/humanrights.politics 5. QUESTIONS
- If 9/11 would have taken place in other country, would it have been so influential?
(Terrorismo Global)
-How much of these events are influenced by the mass media?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxT7QjlvDqM) -How a Bill Becomes a Law CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the ways in which the execution and the reporting of 9/11 and the subsequent Iraq War have relied upon the production of media 'spectacles' in the context of an ongoing 'image-war'. The media is now seen as a vital tool for both terrorists and governments, offering a means to disseminate and communicate causes, values and beliefs, providing a channel for provoking (and assuaging) fear, creating moral legitimacy and swaying public opinion.
While the Western media tend to create spectacles and reports that promote only US and allied interests, we should note that the media spectacle is always somewhat unstable and inconsistent – and that independent and critical media images and discourses can disrupt the dominant message, providing a crucial corrective to more conventional and established pro-war arguments.
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