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LA CRISTALERA

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Transcript of LA CRISTALERA

The Trust and Testimony Approach
to Knowledge from Instruments

Ori Freiman
Graduate Program in Science, Technology and Society
Bar-Ilan University
Israel
ori.freiman@biu.ac.il

Traditional approaches to
knowledge from instruments
Is it possible for instruments to testify?
Orthodox views
Non-Orthodox views
Technology
-based beliefs
(i) Influences on cognitive abilities to use, understand, and avoid error when using instruments
Justification for the Trustworthiness of a Quasi-Testifier (
Justified Trust
):
The Trust and Testimony Approach's advantages over the traditional approaches:
Mere perception, or Inferential beliefs and Reliability
Lehrer
Sosa
Millar
"A subject
S
knows that
P
through instrument
I
, iff [...]"
Sense organs that detect an instrument’s output


Mere perception or Inferential beliefs
A causal chain running from a specimen’s sensory properties to the instrument’s output
Reliability
Evaluation Model of Instrumental Knowledge
The subject must be able to defend the acceptance of P against possible objections
Basis for the evaluation of the belief that the instrument is trustworthy
a subject has an indication that the instrument indicates the truth outright
Knowledge from indicators
grounded in the notion of a subject's successfully exercising her recognitional abilities: The reliability of the cognitive abilities to acquire indications
The Trust & Testimony Approach for Knowledge from Instruments
only persons participate
in the act of testimony
Advocated,
inter alia
,
by
sociologists of knowledge
(e.g. Collins & Kusch 1998; Bloor 1999; Collins 2010),
and by
most philosophical accounts of testimony
(Coady 1992, 268; Lackey 2008, 189).
Only testimony-based beliefs
originate from epistemic subjects
who are "susceptible to full-blooded normative assessment" (Goldberg 2012, 191).
It is possible to receive
testimony from instruments
Defended mostly by proponents of
Actor-Network Theory
, primarily
Latour
, who claims that testimonies of instruments may be
“even more reliable than [those of] ordinary mortals” (1993, 23).
Also advocated, on different grounds, by
a minority of philosophers
(e.g. Humphreys 2009).
Frank knows that P
P
George knows that P
P
Knowledge can only travel along uninterrupted chains of knowers
Generative
Theories of Testimonial Knowledge and Justification
Frank knows that P
P
Estelle does not believe that P
George generated the knowledge
that P
P
a hearer can acquire testimonial knowledge from
a speaker who herself lacks knowledge
Prima facie
, a new possibility arises:

A hearer can acquire
testimonial knowledge
from
an instrument
P
Estelle knows that P
Transmission
Theories of Testimonial Knowledge and Justification
P
P
P
Algorithm
Estelle
P
P



P
was initiated by a non-human
Frank
P


(i)
S
has a trustworthy basis for the evaluation of the belief that
P
; and
(ii) is able to defend the acceptance of
P
against possible objections.
(iii)
S
has an indication that
I
indicates the truth outright, and accepts that indication by successfully exercising her recognitional abilities.

(iv) Social Institutions assure the reliability of
I
.

(v)
S
has technological knowledge regarding
I
’s internal processes for better successfully exercising her own cognitive abilities in recognizing its indicators, understand and avoid errors when using
I
.



A (non-gettiered) human subject
S
knows that
P
iff
(i)
S
receives
quasi-testimony
from instrument
I
that
P
,
(ii)
S
has
Justified Trust
in
I
, and
(iii)
P
is true.

Technology-based beliefs
Testimony-based beliefs
Quasi-Testimony
of instruments
as a way to overtake this impasse debate
Towards
a Theoretical Framework
of Techno-Epistemology

Record, Isaac. 2009. “Daniel Rothbart, Philosophical Instruments: Minds and Tools at Work”,
Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science
3(1): 233-235.
Lehrer, Keith. 1995. “Knowledge and the Trustworthiness of Instruments”, The Monist 78(2): 156 170.
Sosa, Ernest. 2006. "Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial", In The Epistemology of Testimony, J. Lackey and E. Sosa (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 116-123.
Millar, Alan. 2009. "Knowledge and Recognition", In The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91-190.
Individual

justifications for
relying on instruments
Nickel
et al.
(2010)
Nickel (2013)
Trust is given by users to the people who are behind the technologies or socio-technical systems
Not only trusting in people who are behind the technologies, but also in social institutions
e.g.: A failure to perform will lead to an effective sanction by institutional structures
Social Assurance for the Trustworthiness of Instruments
Nickel, Philip J., Franssen, Maarten, & Kroes, Peter. 2010. "Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?", Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23(3-4): 429-444.
Nickel, Philip. J. 2013. "Trust in Technological Systems", In Norms in Technology, M. J. de Vries et al. (eds.). Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 223-237.

Reliability of Instruments
Epistemology of measurements,
calibration, etc.
Chang, Hasok, and Cartwright, Nancy. 2014 [2008]. “Measurement”, In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition. Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (Eds.), Routledge: London and New York, pp. 411-419.
Tal, Eran. 2013. “Old and New Problems in Philosophy of Measurement”, Philosophical Compass 8(12): 1159-1173.
Tal, Eran. 2015. “Measurement in Science”, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

Correctness conditions for measurement, and
Coordination between theoretical quantity concepts and empirical measurement procedures
Conditions for relying on instruments
Individual OR social
The argument in brief:
Knows
that P
P
P
that P
Initiated P
Audi, Robert. 1997. “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 405–422.
Burge, Tyler. 1993. "Content Preservation", The Philosophical Review 102: 457-488.
Welbourne, Michael. 1981. “The Community of Knowledge”, Philosophical Quarterly 31: 302–314.

Recorded phone message (Green 2006, 27; 2008)


Instruments as testimonial sources of knowledge
Bloor, David. 1999. "Anti-Latour", Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 30(1): 81-112.
Coady, C. Anthony. J. 1992. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
Collins, Harry M, & Kusch, Martin. 1999. The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Collins, Harry M. 2010. “Humans not instruments”, Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 4(1): 138-147.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012. "Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief", Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 15(2): 181-197.
Kusch, Martin. 2002. Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Humphreys, Paul. 2009. “Network Epistemology”, Episteme 6(2): 221-229.
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Green, Christopher R. 2006. The Epistemic Parity of Testimony, Memory, and Perception. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame.
Green, Christopher R. 2008. “The Epistemology of Testimony”, In Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.) B. Dowden & J. Fieser

Quasi-Testimony:
A (non-gettiered) human subject
S
obtains knowledge that
P
from instrument
I
by quasi-testimony iff:
(i)
P
is not a result of mere measurement,
(ii)
P
is considered generative knowledge which no other
human subject who knows that
P
was directly involved,
(iii)
P
is true, and
(iv)
S
has justification to trust in
I
.

Active Externalism
in social epistemology (Palermos & Pritchard 2013; Palermos 2015)
Distributed Cognition
(Hutchins 1995), and
Extended Hypothesis
(Clark 2007)
Cognitive processes extends beyond the biological limitations
Clark, Andy. 2007. "Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of the Extended Mind", Journal of Philosophy 104: 163-192.
Hutchins, Edwin. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. & Marc J. De Vries. 2009. “Technological Knowledge”, In A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, Olsen, J.K.B., Pedersen, S.A. and Hendricks, V.F. (eds). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 70-74.
Palermos, Orestis and Duncan Pritchard. 2013. “Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology”, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 105-120.
Palermos, S. Orestis. 2015. "Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge", Synthese: 1-32.
(ii) Extends the subject's cognition to her surroundings
Individual
Social
Technological
Justified Trust

Quasi-Testimony
Captures the motivation of non-orthodox views about non-humans as trust-worthies and as testifiers BUT remains compatible with the orthodox views.
Follows a common intuition that instruments are testimonial sources of knowledge
Do not oppose or contradict; they just focus on different epistemological elements
Hybrid approach for
-internalists/externalists about justification and knowledge
-process reliabilism/evidentialism
-transmission/generation theories of testimonial knowledge and justification
(Reduction of) normative epistemic assessment of a quasi-testifier is possible
Knows that
P
How can Frank trust
I
?
P
(reduction)
Trust and Testimony Approach:
Though it does not offer a way to settle these debates, it does offer a novel way to overtake these impasse debates.
Technological justification opens the door for extendedness theories and further analyzes of knowledge
Considers individual, social, and technological justifications for trustworthiness
(all together and not separately)
Orthodox views of trust, as reduced
to humans behind the technologies
and

Testimony
-based beliefs
Individual Justifications
Social Justifications
Technological Justifications
Justifications for the
Reliability of Instruments
Technological knowledge plays a role in the justification for trustworthiness of instruments:
normative epistemic assessment of a quasi-testifier
is reduced
to normative epistemic assessments of
people and institutions behind the technology
Similar to Trust in technologies,
Quasi-Testifier
People & Institutions
and not on sensory-perceiving knowledge from instruments
By using testimony, we assume that the subject sees (or hears) well, etc.
Carter, J. Adam, and Nickel, Philip J. 2014. ”On Testimony and Transmission”, Episteme 11(02): 145-155.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kusch, Martin. 2002. Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

mediating
initiating
"knowledge that is involved in the designing, making and using of technical artifacts and systems"
(Meijers & De Vries 2009)
THANK YOU
Instrument
I
reduction
Unified Analytic Framework for the Analysis of Knowledge
(Anthropomorphize T&T)
A (non-gettiered) human subject
S
has
Justified Trust
in quasi-testifier
I
when
Sixth Annual Graduate Epistemology Conference
La Cristalera
September 2017

[COGA ] If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her cognitive success is to a
significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency
.
[COGA ] S knows that p iff S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her cognitive success is
primarily creditable to her cognitive agency
.
Pritchard (2010)
P
Vaesen (2011) will argue that the instrument is primarily creditable for Estelle’s true belief

Kelp (2013) will argues that this case can be interpreted in such a way that Estelle's abilities are still primarily credible for her true belief, because they reliably function in the cognitive environment in which Estelle is situated
T&T approach
Extended and Distributed Credit:
Estelle has Justified Trust (focus on technological knowledge)
Cognitive character of Estelle
Technological processes (orthodoxy reduced to...)
STRONG
WEAK
Extended and Distributed Credit & Justification
I do not try to be descriptive, but to offer an account of the
ideal knower
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