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International Relations Spring 2016
Transcript of International Relations Spring 2016
What's wrong with this map?
Levels of analysis
(foreign policy (interstate))
ideal types, i.e. models
presumption of objective facts
discursive objects & meanings
correlation & causation
substantiation through thick description
permitting us to make informed judgments
Self-help (also unilateralism/minilateralism)
Power (as capabilities)
Balance of power
Bandwagoning & buckpassing
Power balancing or equilibrium
Hegemonic stability & hegemony
Pre-emptive & preventive war
NGOSs/civil society/transnational relations
Deterrence/defense - minimum deterrence & disarmament (lib) versus extended deterrence, counter force etc (realist)
Int'l law/human rights
Collective goods, collective security
Diplomacy. compromise, legitimacy
Construction of Identities
External, relative & shared identities
failed states, rogue states
History contains too many facts
Perspectives allow us to make sense of history by directing our attention to certain kinds of facts.
Realism: cyclical; empire/equilibrium; material forces, power
Liberalism: linear, progressive; expanding complexity, governance; distribution of legitimacy; procedural rules
Identity: emergent; norms, identities, ideologies drive politics, institutions, power
Critical: critiques of disguised power relations; desire for change
Westphalia 1648 - sovereignty
Richelieu - raison d'etat
Classical balance of power; Britain as offshore balancer
Congress of Vienna; Concert of Europe
Napoleon - nation-state; nationalism
Agricultural & industrial revolutions; 'free trade' & laissez-faire
Capitalism; world system
World War I - The Great War
Realist view: unification & economic growth of Germany --> security dilemma
Liberal view: secret diplomacy, interaction, misperceptions, information, rules
Identity view: competing nationalism, racial theories, social Darwinism; cult of offensive
Triple Entente v Triple Alliance
Bismarck & Kaiser Wilhelm II
path dependent logic of alliances, military plans
militant nationalisms vie for supremacy
liberal & socialist nationalisms overcome
Willy & Nicky in 1905. Wilhelm is wearing a Russian officer tunic; Nicolas is wearing German uniform
How could it happen again, so soon, on an even larger scale?
World War II
Functions of Force
The world that WWII created
Realism: balance of power, again
Liberalism: failure of collective security
Identity: revanchism, irredentism, racism, xenophobia
League of Nations - common rules; discipline any threatening power
collective security; unanimity; peace as collective good; disarmament
Balance of power
favorite historical analogy for some ever since...
buckpassing; bandwagoning; revisionist states; offensive realism; domestic cartels; tripolarity; preventive war
Convergence of procedural norms; divergence of substantive norms
NATO v WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization, aka Warsaw Pact)
not World Trade Organization
Cuban Missile Crisis
Institutions - NATO, ECSC-->EU, CSCE-->OSCE
Technology - information revolution
Perceptions and Decision-Making
Problem of inference
Applied to question of Vietnam
(13) If it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others.
(14) Actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views
(11) Actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces.
(12) When actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions. Only rarely do they believe that others may be reacting to a much less favorable image of themselves than they think they are projecting
(8) There is an overall tendency for decision makers to see other states as more hostile than they are
(9) actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than they are
(10) because a state gets most of its information about the other state's policies from the other's foreign office, it tends to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the government as a whole
Perspective of the perceiver
(5) When messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely.
(6) When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver.
(7) Actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned.
(3) Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and considered bit by bit rather than all at once.
(4) Misperception is most difficult in the case of a missing concept and least difficult in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled concept.
(1) Decisionmakers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. A theory will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation of data (a) the greater the ambiguity of the data, and (b) the higher the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the theory.
(2) Scholars and decisionmakers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories.
Cold War is over: now what?
"New World Order"
UN ~ UNSC Chapter 7, RTP
CTBT ~ WMDs, NPT, IAEA
FRY - Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo
UNSG Boutros-Ghali - An Agenda for Peace - peacekeeping & peace-enforcement
Oslo process & Accords
Jordan-Israel peace 1994
see also START, CFE
Realists on Unipolarity:
stable (power transition/hegemonic stability school)
unstable (power balancing school)
End of history or just a holiday?
power transition - divided world, attempt to sustain hegemony
balancing - need to contain revisionist powers, promote stability
address causes - poverty, exclusion, injustice
treat terrorism as crime, increase police cooperation
understand and mitigate clashes of ideology, identity
'Axis of Evil'
contrast Iraq 1991/2003 - no longer collective security
'global war on terror'
Greater Middle East Initiative
ties of ethno-national identities to specific territories
Economics, Trade, Globalization
as measured by polarity
degree of openness, yielding amount of economic expansion
Logic of relative gains
Fewer poles: greater predictability: less risk in openness
Realist view of world economic history since early modern period
(First period of globalization)
inflation, devaluations, beggar-thy-neighbor
unilateral provision of public goods
Bretton Woods era
MFN/non-discrimination, dollar/gold standard, IFIs
Pax Americana, post-1973 version
Rise of OPEC, stronger USSR, collapse of Bretton Woods, eurodollars, MNCs, massive devaluation of US$, NIEO, G77, G7, stagflation, petrodollars, N-S debt crisis,
Agricultural & Industrial Revolutions
Free Trade & Market Institutions
Bretton Woods Institutions
How Globalization Works
portfolio & FDI
balance of payments
microeconomic (sectoral) policies
exchange rate policies
current account surplus as instrument of power
tariffs & NTBs
Movement of factors of production:
Most economic activity still takes place within countries
regulations, subsidies, price controls/supports, competition policies, labor laws
More on Globalization ~ Trade, Investment, Finance
real economy v financial economy
Adam Smith - specialization, division of labor, comparative advantage
needs free exchange; horizontal & vertical integration
David Ricardo - absolute advantage; lower opportunity costs
Reasons to limit trade:
infant industries (ISI)
Inter-industry & intra-industry trade
Economies of scale --> strategic trade, monopoly rents, competitive advantage
trade equalizes prices for inputs as well as traded goods
Lowest-paid lose out - least adaptable to changing patterns of employment
fair & unfair trade
Multilateral trade negotiations (GATT, WTO)
Regional trade blocs (EU, NAFTA)
FDI v portfolio investment - different political implications?
Resource curse - rentier states
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Why is so much investment in the developed economies?
Outsourcing & offshore investment: why? implications?
Finance & financial markets
Financial crisis of 2007-8:
lack of international governance?
technology outpaces ability of states to regulate?
Is this a STRUCTURAL shift?
Challenge to sovereignty?
Empire --> Neocolonialism
comparative advantage as "a pattern of historically determined and dominant relationships shaped by colonial governments and raw power" (441)
distortions of agriculture
subsistence to cash crops
Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder-Frank
Division of labor at global scale
Total system of core/semi-periphery/periphery
Stratified and fixed
MNCs limit sovereignty, structure and perpetuate inequitable division of labor
Who loses? Peripheral countries. Workers. Cultural diversity. Indigenous peoples. Women.
Moises Naim - 5 wars
governments versus networks
globalization helps criminals:
technology; trade; migration; even international law
not bound by geography
defy traditional sovereignty
governments versus market forces
bureaucracies versus networks
Solutions? Flexible sovereignty; strengthen multilateral institutions; new mechanisms & institutions; regulate rather than repress
What is 'civil society'?
Is there a global civil society?
IGOs weaker than states. Weaker than national NGOs also? How about MNCs?
Where should authority be exercised?
Is Nau a universalist or relativist?
Can world anarchy become hierarchy?
Is sovereignty changing?
Evolving rights regimes
EU as special case?
Key concepts p. 509
Institutions - what are they good for?
It's a matter of perspective, of course.
G7/8, G20, G77
Liberal institutionalists argue that IGOs solve coordination & collaboration problems by reducing information costs & lengthening shadow of the future
Neofunctionalism (p. 515)
Also: judicial - ICJ;
econ/social - ECOSOC
Ch VI peacekeeping
Ch VII peace enforcement
UNSC & P5
Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF, IBRD/World Bank, GATT-->WTO
see also other regional orgs on p. 524
Single European Act 1986
Maastricht Treaty 1992
EC, JHA, CFSP
Five rounds of enlargement:
6 to 9 to 12 to 15 to 27
Commission = bureaucracy; Council = national governments; E. Parliament = directly elected reps; ECJ
EMU (Eurozone - overseen by ECB)
Genocide Convention 1948
Crimes Against Humanity
Responsibility to Protect - post-Cold War; encroaches on sovereignty
1990-1 Iraq/Kuwait war
Kant's 'pacific republics'
Some use democracy as the independent variable
Some use democracy as an intervening variable
Some see it as coincidental correlation
Some see it as overdetermined
NB - transitional states particularly conflict-prone
(Mansfield & Snyder)
KEY CONCEPT: Anarchy and its Consequences
For each term: with which perspective is it most strongly associated--realism (power)--liberalism (institutions)--ideas (constructivism)--critical?
If equally associated with all, say so.
NB also Proxy Wars
Soviet expansionism? (offensive realism)
US/capitalist expansionism? (revisionism: combines realism & critical approach)
Power vacuum: spheres of influence as balancing strategy (structural realism)
Global balance of terror
Why did it end?
US won military & economic competition?
Work from the list of terms on page 204 - identify all the terms directly connected to the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War
1990s: Clash of Civilizations? Unipolarity? Benign Hegemony? Interventions & R2P
Daniela Aldrich, Vato Chapichadze, Zac Cowit, Sarah Quinlan, Nick Williams
Globalization is the new imperialism: the Global South is still exploited.
Alvin Lecomte, Alexandra Leff, Alden Mohacsi, Mackenzie Santorelli, Katie Sullivan
"Responsibility to Protect" is little more than an excuse for major powers to pursue their own interests by intervening in weaker countries' affairs: the principle of sovereignty must be reaffirmed in the international system.
Thomas Connell, Andy Hernandez, Adeline Murphy, Samantha Reiersen, Erykah Rivera
Effective action to address global environmental challenges is impossible within an anarchic international system.
Francesca Bellesi, Andrea Caya, Bridgette Corbran, Briona Hawkins, Eleanor Herting
The main cause of WWII was the failure of other major powers to balance effectively against the rising threat posed by the Third Reich.
In each case, what were the most effective arguments? What level of analysis and perspective did they employ?
Presentation techniques: what works?
Stand straight, raise head, make eye contact, speak at moderate pace, breathe well, project voice.
In order to do this: prepare well; use limited notes.
Better to make a few points, clearly articulated and well supported, rather than a lot of points that can only be touched on superficially
Conceptual model on page 23
Cooperation through repeated interaction
Interactions as fixed-sum or zero-sum games?
(reduce transaction costs, extend shadow of future)
"anarchy is what states make of it" - Alexander Wendt
distribution of identities
(we'll come back to this later)
(can also be considered identity, but critical because seeks change)
(compare earlier Pax Britannica, Pax Romana)
Benign hegemon faces asymmetric threats, manipulated by revisionist states or rising powers
Preventive war (justified as preemption) as strategy of dominant power - power transition/offensive realists
More cautious approach of power balancing/defensive realists
Ethnic conflicts & failing states
Libya: ambiguous example of collective security. Syria?
International law: truly international/universal; or mainly Western?
NB we revisit a lot of this later in the course!
What does it mean?
How does it relate to culture?
How does it relate to power?
How does it relate to institutions?
Jihad doesn't mean quite what the book says. The stuff on the Salafis is wrong (307). Iran doesn't want the Caliphate (308)
Also, be cautious about citations of Bernard Lewis (306). Olivier Roy is French (309).
Clash of civilizations
How else might religion infuse IR today?
Universal versus local rights regimes
How do national economies interact?
Whole economy, e.g. interest rates
Sectors, industries, companies
Tariffs, NTBs, credits
Exchange rates, banking regulations
Same policy processes as country A
current account (goods & services, govt transfers, net income on capital investment)
capital account (net flows on capital, both portfolio & FDI)
together make up balance of payments
exchange rate can be floating or managed
ISI/infant industry protection versus ELG/open market
Strategic trade theory: competitive advantage, governments intervene to exploit monopoly rents, economies of scale
regional trade blocs
table 8.4 page 374
Who Wins & Who Loses from Globalization?
why/how are costs & benefits distributed unevenly between regions, within countries?
Millennium Devpt. Goals
ODA, debt relief, concessional loans
Externalities of development
(more on March 24)
Globalization as Imperialism
West rose through systematic exploitation of rest
- colonialism & imperialism.
Dependency theory - fixed relations between metropole and satellite
World Systems theory - division of labor imposed between core, semiperiphery, and periphery
terms of trade favor core
Globalization depends on marginalization of indigenous peoples, women, others
Contrary to liberal claims, inequality is systematic and persistent: digital divide as an example
As UN Under Secretary General and UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner stated at the opening of the first universal session of the governing council of UNEP in Nairobi on February 18, 2013, "We cannot continue to 'save the planet,' one species, one ecosystem, one policy, one issue, one law, one treaty, at a time. Our challenge at the beginning of the 21st century has become a systemic one" (Nanda 2013, 542).
UNEP underfunded & no enforcement power
but tries to develop international environmental law
"The existing international environmental governance system has been generally criticized as fragmented, because multiple organizations, governments, and instruments with overlapping functions have been engaged in activities related to global environmental protection. The system is also perceived as lacking common vision, clear goals, and effective coordination. Another line of censure is the system's lack of accountability and coherent performance metrics,
with the result that there is no sanction for those who violate the terms of MEAs. Inequitable, inadequate, and ineffective allocation and utilization of financial resources has been another common thread. The system also suffers from an implementation gap and capacity gap at the national level," (Nanda 2013, 558).
"Coercion, translated in the present context as command-and-control regulation is part of the tool-kit of any State, and it will continue to feature in climate change regulation through a variety of measures such construction and efficiency standards for mitigation or zoning requirements for adaptation. Coercion is clear, but not necessarily efficient (as efficiency gains arising from trading are not permitted) and, sometimes, not even effective (as compliance sometimes requires knowledge and resources, without which a system, however coercive, will not be effective).
"Interest has become a major approach in regulatory intervention. Setting rules that
create the desired economic incentives in the regulated entities is a subtle and important art that has been embodied in a variety of mechanisms from emissions trading systems, to taxes internalising negative externalities (e.g. for carbon dioxide emissions), to subsidies compensating for relative positive externalities (e.g. for renewable energy).
"Virtue relies on education, understanding and civic commitment. An action that entails major negative consequences for the environment is expected not to be performed, however profitable, if such consequences are understood. Perhaps more realistically, virtue or education is expected to provide a more solid political basis for political movements that pay
due regard to environmental protection." (Vinuales 2016, 15)
republican representation (accountability, transparency-->credible commitments)
ideological commitment to fundamental human rights (principles-->respect)
transnational interdependence (cosmopolitan interests)
Empirical support for institutions (representation) & trade (interdependence) in Russett & O'Neal )2001); for shared ideals in Tomz & Weeks (2013) - morality & threat, not perception of higher costs/risks.
Spurious correlation: coincidence of interests - Farber & Gowa (1997): no correlation of polity type and incidence of conflict before Cold War
"In the United States, around 55% of respondents wanted to strike an autocracy that was neither an ally nor a major trading partner. In contrast, only 30% were willing to attack a democracy that was alsoan ally and a trading partner. Thus, if the United States typically entered alliances with other democracies and traded extensively with them, while forgoing alliances and trade with autocracies, respondents would be 25 points less willing to attack democracies than to attack autocracies. In the United Kingdom, around 43% of respondents supported attacking a militarily weak, autocratic non-ally, whereas less than 17% supported attacking a militarily powerful democratic ally, a swing of 26 points" (Tomz & Weeks 2013, 862)
The R2P debate: sovereignty vs. intervention
UN reframes humanitarian intervention as "responsibility to protect" (Evans/Sahnoun)
(also to prevent and rebuild)
Article 2 of UN Charter enshrines sovereignty
"shift from culture of sovereign impunity to one of national and international accountability" (E & S 102)
State security --> human security
"de facto emerging norm"
For military intervention: "just cause"; 4 precautionary principles; "right authority"
Problem of capacity: where do troops come from?
What do we learn from NATO intervention in Libya?
Parallel with Rwanda: Qadhafi's infamous "cockroaches" statement
Prospect of imminent massacre
UNSCR 1970 quickly approved
UN first called on Libya to protect its citizens
Regional orgs also urge responsibility
UNSCR 1973 authorizes NATO-led intervention
prospect of stalemate/partition: goal changes to regime change
UNSCR 2009: UNSMIL
abstentions but no veto
Success? Massacre averted. But rebuilding patchy.
Action stretched mandate. Was it minimal sufficient means?
Why no intervention in Syria?
Not possible to agree "muscular" UNSCR
Russia critical of Libya precedent. Asserts Syrian sovereignty
BRICs support that position.
Arab League, Human Rights Council urge action.
Russia/China veto: "most acrimonious debate since ... Cold War" (Zifcak 25)
Zifcak p. 20
Who wants it (and who doesn't)?
In what ways could or should it be reformed?
What are the barriers to reform?
What are the consequences of it being unreformed?
path dependence, others
p.5 - tenets not tenants of realism
p. 30 - principles not principals
representativeness (geog., contribution)
G4, coffee club, Africa
Global Financial Orders
Power + ideas --> rules & roles --> systemic outcomes
rules/norms/meta-rules: who bears costs of adjustment?
life cycle: emergence, dominance, collapse
2008 financial crisis
How does the EU work?
How has integration taken place?
How could it disintegrate?
Webber: hegemonic stability theory - benign hegemon provides public goods;
domestic politics approaches.
durable; common interest
spillover; transactionalism; liberal intergovenmentalism
Changing German priorities
71 regional organizations globally
similar institutional forms
emulation; epistemic communities;
Variable efficacy: Europe/N. America effective; African orgs much less so
"Global War on Terror" (GWOT)
Buzan: GWoT as new cold war, solving the U.S. "threat deficit," legitimizing unipolar leadership
9/11 changes beliefs: new "social fact" to frame world politics: securitization
"Although a real threat from terrorists does exist, and needs to be met, the main significance of the GWoT is as a political framing that might justify and legitimize US primacy, leadership and unilateralism, both to Americans and to the rest of the world" (Buzan 2006, 1102).
Fragile macrosecuritization because: 1) GWoT not all of U.S. grant strategy; 2) means pursued threaten core aims - unity of west & liberal values
International terrorism as a common threat. Exploited by some governments (Russia, India) to justify approach to local issues.
Connects 'dark side' of globalization: trafficking across open borders (drugs, WMD)
Will US sustain this framing, or will US population react against it (torture, surveillance etc.)?
Continuing terrorist attacks help sustain
Legitimacy of US leadership globally?
To extent GWoT links religion & politics it favors zero-sum thinking
"Rising sea levels or approaching asteroids, or the spread of a new killer plague, could easily put planetary environmental concerns at the top of the securitization agenda. But in conventional mode the most likely threat to the GWoT as dominant macro-securitization comes from the rise of China" (Buzan 2006, 1114).
GWoT strategies put at risk liberal values, domestically & internationally
A certain level of insecurity is the cost of freedom.
Dalby (2007): enforced economic integration as strategy of empire.
"re-mapping of the whole planet as a potential battlefield" (Dalby 2007, 591)
From garrison forces (Cold War) to expeditionary (GWoT): frontier wars/policing
integrating the "wild zone" into the global core
Revolution in Military Affairs: high-tech warfare. More relevant to great power competition than imperial small wars
Gender & GWoT
Women of daesh - don't reduce them to two dimensions; recognize complexity and agency (Sjoberg 2015)
"sensationalized, stereotypical, and partial accounts of what the women of Daesh are, and how they come to be related to or victims of the organization, remain the norm"
Why? How do these accounts function? Who benefits?
"those who do not think about gender, or who think about gender in over-simplistic ways, do so at the risk of the accuracy, coherence, and effectiveness of their engagement with violent extremism"
Refugees & Migration
EU as most desired destination for refugees (e.g. from Syria, Libya, Eritrea, Afghanistan) and economic migrants (e.g. from many parts of Africa). Why?
Poses policy challenges:
Practical - best addressed by EU as whole, member states, IOs, INGOs?
Ethical - EU as normative/ethical power: can it live up to its Nobel Prize? To what extent are values and interests in tension, and if they are, how to resolve that tension?
Millions of refugees from MENA conflicts. Only a few hundred thousand in EU. Thousands die en route.
"Chain of responsibilities" diluted among many actors.
Schengen at risk
Dublin Convention to be changed (first country principle)?
Germany calls for distribution of asylum-seekers
Some countries say only accept Christians (EU a Christian club?)
Poor transregional governance in Mediterranean
Introduce EU-wide asylum status & service, rather than national? History suggests would operate at lowest common denominator level.
Rabat & Khartoum
IOs: UNHCR; IOM - advocating different policy priorities & approaches
save lives (at sea in particular)
safe routes to Europe
address stranded migrants; adapt to mixed migration flows
IOs constrained by their reliance on donors: the states. Also by dual role of advocates & migration managers.
Partnerships with INGOs in Lampedusa etc.
IOs advise Frontex, other bodies
Hadfield & Zwitter
Europeans historically refugees: many millions in 20th century alone. Global instruments emerge in part from that experience.
How to handle different classes of migrant? Those dislocated by war/politics and those by economic forces: how different?
Crisis threatens member states' sovereignty, borders, & identity: makes EU-wide response hard.
States raise objections on quantitative grounds (too many) & qualitative (can't integrate)
U.S. policies have driven many of the sources of migration
Hadfield & Zwitter cont.
"the EU still divides its perspective between ‘a responsibility to protect our citizens’ and a need to promote ‘our interest and universal values’ which, alongside European prosperity, are precisely the magnets transforming Europe into the sole safe haven for hundreds of thousands" (131)
Europe must become more cosmopolitan, less Westphalian.
Weak spot in R2P: post-conflict protection & reconstruction
ENP (neighborhood policy) not holding partners to standards
Iran & nuclear proliferation