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Hamburg 15 November 2017

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Hans Hansen

on 26 February 2018

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Transcript of Hamburg 15 November 2017

Very much a "binary" threat - it is most likely nothing or full war

Some threats in the grey area between peace and war:
North Korean Nuclear missile tests
North Korean testing of electronical warfare against civilian targets
North Korean cyber attacks

Good source to follow: www.38north.org
API integration
API integration with Pole Star products during 2018 (MaRisk incident layer already integrated)

Cooperation with Marcura and Portpages/Portpoint with agents lists for each port

Statistics module
Pilot project for a Cruise version of the System (PortRisk version with only relevant cruise terminals)
Webshop for single ports

International military presence

2-3 ships in area but only 1-2 in Somali basin.

Less than 50% of having a warship supporting if attacked (Indian Ocean much less)

Zero coordination with India and China

Hamburg client seminar
Hotel Barceló
15 November 2017

- in a nutshell
Today's programme

1200-1300 Luncheon
1300-1315 Welcome and news from Risk Intelligence
1315-1345 Risk Intelligence System (MaRisk+PortRisk) update
1345-1400 Managing Corruption and Security Risks at Port: A New Alternative to the P&I
Model by Stefan Sievers, Hiscox
1400-1415 Coffee break
1415-1500 Threat updates: Libya, Yemen, South East Asia, East Asia & Horn of Africa
1500-1510 The situation at the Korean Peninsula and potential impact on shipping
1510-1530 Naval Co-ordination and Guidance to Shipping - an overview
1530-1545 Coffee break
1545-1600 West Africa & Gulf of Guinea update
1600-1650 Nigeria maritime security providers: Update & discussion on latest
developments (MOU)
1650-1700 Wrap Up / Closing remarks

Risk Intelligence System (PortRisk+MaRisk)

Independent, unbiased, intelligence-led security analysis and advisory services
Yemen ports & terminals threat assessment report
24 May 2016 vs 14 November 2017
Houthi controlled ports Hudaydah and Saleef partly operational

Aden, Mukalla and al-Shihr are all operating, but also affected by the flow of the conflict.

The port and terminal at Balhaf have remained closed since halting operations in April 2015 due to the deteriorating security situation

K&R against tugs Southern Philippines/ Sulu archipelago 2016
Risk Intelligence
Marievej 23
2950 Vedbaek

Tel: +45 70 26 62 30
Fax: +45 70 26 62 40



Follow us on Twitter
Total 189 ports
Master's reporting forms being implemented
200 ports (planned total 2017)
300 ports (planned currently) to 400 ports
Port surveys 2017 in Iran, UAE, Greece, Cameroun, UK, Nigeria and Ghana, Togo, Benin - Kenya and Panama upcoming
tug K&Rs
Fishing trawler
heavy lift vsl
Introduction of Risk Intelligence staff
Introduction of Stefan Sievers
Introduction of participants

Intelligence process

Sources (collection, verification, analysis, assessment, distribution, feedback)
Private clients:

Maritime Domain Awareness for shipping, oil & gas and insurance ->
Risk Intelligence System (MaRisk+PortRisk)

Weekly reports on Yemen, Libya and Turkey

Bespoke reports and Advisory Services
e.g. Regional TEAs and RAs
PMSC assessments (Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea)

Offshore operation off Libya (migration)
1. Similar operations in the past off India, off Mozambique and off Nigeria as well as transits

Government clients:

Maritime Domain Awareness
Risk Intelligence System (MaRisk+PortRisk)

Knowledge building and training since 2006 – Horn of Africa and West Africa

OPS intelligence support Mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East, Indian Ocean and West Africa

Mapping piracy leaders, investors, groups and networks

Libya threats to shipping
i. Indirect/Collateral damage in ports or at anchorages
ii. Direct threats to ships

International military presence

Libya situation – cities, areas, ports and terminals

Libya risk mitigation
i. Keep updated on the situation and make sure to have contact with sources in land -> Libya weekly report

Libya ports & terminals threat assessment report 20 October 2015
Libya ports & terminals threat assessment report 19 April 2016
Libya ports situation is very volatile and the situation can change in days if not hours. This applies both to the operations as well as to the security situation.
Libya ports & terminals threat assessment report 24 May 2016
Libya ports & terminals threat assessment report 11 October 2016
Libya ports & terminals threat assessment report 14 November 2017
Quick facts:
Set up in 2001
Today one of the leading companies in its field
Launched MaRisk in 2008
31 staff (full time, part-time) plus 4-5 project
Advisory Board chaired by Admiral Sir James Burnell-Nugent

12+% of the World fleet plus oil majors plus insurance plus government agencies/defence

Intelligence and source network
Experienced staff and associates
Close cooperation with clients
Risk Intelligence provides clients with a combination of services tailored to enable them to assess, plan and execute operations in areas of risks

Two clients meet in the Indian Ocean
Duty Ops team
Building/maintaining threat picture
Risk Intelligence System (PortRisk+MaRisk)
Risk Intelligence System (PortRisk+MaRisk)
Fleet tracking integration
South East Asia
Risk Intelligence System (PortRisk+MaRisk)
Horn of Africa
Horn of Africa threats to shipping

HoA situation -> “normal” low activity like pre-2007
1. In reality only two real Somalia piracy MO attacks
2. One uncertain - maybe Somali piracy MO attack (NAVIG8 PROVIDENCE)
3. Five/six other attacks (3-4 dhows, 2 local tankers)

Famine not the cause of the resurgence but famine helps recruitment to pirates and al shabaab and IS it is criminal mindsets and enough opportunity that is the cause

Risk Intelligence assessment:
1. Frequency -> Low, but increasing
2. Capability-> Intact
3. Intent -> Low, but Increasing
4. Opportunity -> Increased

Change in preferred MO? Kidnap for ransom?
Horn of Africa risk mitigation

Keep updated situational picture (warnings, PAGs, motherships & attacks)

BMP and follow guidelines incl IRTC if you want to be as near as possible to a warship

Armed guards? – individual risk assessment for each class of vessels or fleet. Possible to use other levels such as live safety monitoring.

DO NOT use Socotra gap

Threat updates
Log of DutyOps 29-30 April 2017
Good year so far with 29% increase in turnover first 9 months compared to 2016
Significant government contract with major NATO Navy for API integration into maritime domain awareness system

Streamlining organization to improve client relations, development & production

Henrik Ehlers Kragh appointed COO

West Africa maritime security provision
West Africa joint due diligence

Preparing setting up office in Singapore during 2018
Risk Intelligence System (MaRisk+PortRisk)
K&R attacks Sulu archipelago 2017

SEA Quick overview

Sulu Sea and ASG
Governments' reaction
ASG project

SEA risk mitigation
BMP to prevent or delay boarding -> much better boarding techniques that HoA and WAF

Legal PMSCs or not so legal?

Maritime threats related to the Yemen conflict
1. Types of threats

2. Threats from Houthis/Saleh side

3. Threats from AQAP/(IS)

4. Threats to commercial shipping
1. Types of threats
WBIED/Drone attacks
Houthis/Saleh Capability: Existing and increasing
Missile capability
Primarily C802: Reduced, but not removed
Original Yemen inventory MYAM, MKB og M-08 mines of Soviet origin - capability intact plus new Yemen-constructed (local) mines
Threats from AQAP/(IS)
Drone or possibly suicide WIED attacks against vessels in area from Mukallah to BAM

Oil and gas tankers primarily

GALICIA SPIRIT 25 October 2016

MUSKIE 31 May 2017

and similar MO to M.STAR 28 July 2010
Most likely the case of:
- primarily AQAP
4. Summary: Threats to international shipping
Houthis/Saleh ->
Direct/targeted attacks against vessels directly supporting the coalition operations
Indirect attacks (collateral damage from being at wrong POS at wrong time) connected to attacks against coalition naval vessels
Direct attacks against Saudi (UAE) vessels
Direct attacks against vessels carrying Saudi cargo
Direct/indirect attacks against vessels at Saudi terminals
Possibly but less likely threat from mines (used defensively against coalition until now)

Game changers
If the Houthis are cornered by occupation of Hudaydah or otherwise closure of supply lines
Split in alliance between Houthis and the Saleh side

Primarily tankers and most likely especially LPG/LNG tankers
The situation at the Korean Peninsula and potential impact on shipping
Potential impact on shipping?
Evacuation of land-based staff from offices and at e.g. ship yards
Consider EVAC plans

Evacuation of vessels and crews
Consider vessels positions, routes and weather (wind direction)
If in port do not expect tug support

Impact from nuclear explosions (testing or war)
Navigational systems fall-out because of EMP

NATO Naval Cooperation and guidance to Shipping ATP-02.1
Thank you very much for your attention
Is it a bird, is it an aeroplane?
The attach on the HANIT 14 July 2016 and collateral damage - sinking of the the MOONLIGHT
Naval coordination and guidance to shipping
Full transcript