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DTEL

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on 1 April 2017

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Transcript of DTEL

What are the objects of trust?
non-humans: algorithms and instruments
research communities
the scientific community as a whole
types of social groups within science
Trust relations and extended knowledge
Can groups be reduced to individuals?
collective epistemology’s debate of whether group knowledge and justification are reducible to individuals
Individuals
Groups
Models
The commitment model
The distributed model
for describing the production of knowledge within the scientific collaboration context
Bird (2015)
The Glue is Unity
Knorr-Cetina & Gieri
Clark
Wilholt 2016
directed at the respective research community and their collective competence in setting the appropriate standards.
Wray (2006)
Plural Subject
Wray 2016
Chris Dragos (2016) offers fresh insight into the debate about which sorts of groups in
science can be properly said to have knowledge, with a focus on a debate between
K. Brad Wray (2007)
determine which types of groups are relevant to the epistemology of science (see also Gilbert 2000; Andersen 2010; and Fagan 2011).
scientific research teams; scientific specialty communities; and the scientific community as a
whole.
research teams only
Kristina Rolin (2008)
Research teams, unlike scientific specialty communities and the scientific community as a whole, have
organic solidarity
. In such groups there is a division of labor. Each contributor attends to only some concerns and research problems that contribute to the larger project, which
enables the group as a whole to know things that individually the members of team may not be able to investigate on their own.

Wray insists that neither a scientific specialty community nor the scientific community as a
whole has a division of labor designed to achieve research goals. Instead, these sort of
scientific groups are characterized by
mechanical solidarity.
The members of such groups are
likeminded insofar as they have undergone a similar socialization or training. But when these
latter sorts of groups are said to know something, what we really mean is that each individual
member of the group knows. For example, it is individual
chemists that have knowledge of
the periodic table of elements, not the community of chemists.
Thus, there is no irreducibly collective knowledge in these sorts of cases.

an agent is justified in believing something provided she is
able to meet challenges to her claims when they arise. But the assumption is that an agent is justified, by default, until challenged (see Williams 2001; Rolin 2008). Rolin believes that there is no reason to think that scientific specialty communities and the scientific community as a whole cannot satisfy this condition.

Hyundeuk Cheon (2014)
Justification be possessed by an agent or not
not - On this account of justification, an agent (be it an individual or group) may be justified even when some of the traits and features that provide the justification are not possessed by the agent.
compatible with the notion of extended cognition
fruitful to explore the relationship between the notions of (i) collective knowledge and (ii) extended knowledge and cognition. (Wray 2016)
Lackey (2014) has sought to show that Alexander Bird’s somewhat radical account of group knowledge is not viable (Carter, group knowledge)
Carter(2015) notes between two

[Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat]

Radical
Moderate
Socially Extended Knowledge-Moderate (SEK-M): A group, G, can know that p even when not a single individual member of G
knows
that p

Gilbert (1987; 2002; 2013), Knorr Cetina (2009), Mathiesen (2006), Tollefsen (2006), Tuomela (1995), Wray (2007)
Socially Extended Knowledge-Radical (SEK-R): A group, G, can know that p even when not a single individual member of G is
aware
that p
Bird 2010
dragos (supporter)
Wray
A plural subject is an agent composed of individuals that has an existence above and beyond the constitutive individuals (see Gilbert, 1992). The plural subject has intentions that may differ from the intentions of the constitutive individuals

A collaborative research team creates an author that is, in some sense, above and beyond the sum of its parts (see also Beaver (2001, p. 371) cited in Wray 2006)
Who trusts?
The literature, and we, focus and discuss an individual
If we adopt active externalism to support distributed cognition then we adopt
virtue reliabilism (Kallestrup 2016; Palermos ?)
and prefer it on Goldman's Social Process Reliabilism
Kallestrup, J. (2016). Group virtue epistemology. Synthese, 1-19.
process reliabilism vs virtue reliabilism
within a reliabilist framework:
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