Loading presentation...

Present Remotely

Send the link below via email or IM

Copy

Present to your audience

Start remote presentation

  • Invited audience members will follow you as you navigate and present
  • People invited to a presentation do not need a Prezi account
  • This link expires 10 minutes after you close the presentation
  • A maximum of 30 users can follow your presentation
  • Learn more about this feature in our knowledge base article

Do you really want to delete this prezi?

Neither you, nor the coeditors you shared it with will be able to recover it again.

DeleteCancel

Sartrs

No description
by

Armands Leimanis

on 22 April 2010

Comments (0)

Please log in to add your comment.

Report abuse

Transcript of Sartrs

divi veidi, kā objekts var nokļūt apziņā percepcija/uztvere iztēle kā ar beletristisku stāstu? vai Sartrs sašaurina uztveri līdz tam, kas tieši sajūtams ar maņām? "For Sartre, by contrast with Descartes, consciousness is necessarily embodied: it comes into being only with our advent in the world at birth, and goes out of being with our exit from the world in death."

"Why Sartre Matters", Benedict O’Donohoe
Philosophy Now! #53 imanences "ilūzija"? What happens in the brain when you conjure up a mental image in your mind's eye? We tested whether the particular regions of extrastriate cortex activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the image. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRRI), we demonstrated selective activation within a region of cortex specialized for face perception during mental imagery of faces, and selective activation within a place-selective cortical region during imagery of places. In a further study, we compared the activation for imagery and perception in these regions, and found greater response magnitudes for perception than for imagery of the same items. Finally, we found that it is possible to determine the content of single cognitive events from an inspection of the fMRI data from individual imagery trials. These findings strengthen evidence that imagery and perception share common processing mechanisms, and demonstrate that the specific brain regions activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the visual image.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11177421 embodied cognition vai iztēlotie priekšmeti var iemācīt ko jaunu? manbearpig half man, half bear,
and half pig Vai iztēles objektu kombinēšana nav jaunrade? Kā atšķirt iztēles priekšmetus no īstajiem? kas notiek, ja to nevar izdarīt? PoM: Autistic spectrum disorders: imagination impairments. A child with autism given a pile of toy bricks is likely to arrange them obsessively in patterns or colours, but unlikely to use them for a tea party or make-believe train. Full blown imagination requores not just the ability to see, but also to manipulate. PoM: Brain - imagining oneself involved in an action may activate the same areas of brain (Robertson 2002). When imagining a particular object, the primary visual cortex is activated, as it would be on actually viewing such an object. Londonas taksistiem lūdz iztēloties kā viņi aizbrauktu, kas aktivizē labo hippokampu. (Skaļās domas) Reprezentācija / relācijas For example, in The Psychology of Imagination (1940), Sartre argues that Husserl remains captive to the idealist principle of immanence (the object of consciousness lies within consciousness), despite his stated goal of combating idealism, when he seems to consider images as miniatures of the perceptual object reproduced or retained in the mind. On the contrary, Sartre argues, if one insists that all consciousness is intentional in nature, one must conclude that even so-called “images” are not objects “in the mind” but are ways of relating to items “in the world” in a properly imaginative manner, namely, by what he calls “derealizing”them or rendering them “present-absent.” (Stenforda) Naïve realism claims that the world is pretty much as common sense would have it. All objects are composed of matter, they occupy space, and have properties such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour. These properties are usually perceived correctly. So, when we look at and touch things we see and feel those things directly, and so perceive them as they really are. Objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone present to observe them doing so.

http://www.theoryofknowledge.info/naiverealism.html Naivais reālisms We are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world, as objects are hidden behind a "veil of perception" bet .. The indirect realist view is also incredible, for it suggests that the solid stable structure of the world that we perceive to surround us is merely a pattern of energy in the physical brain. In other words, the world that appears to be external to our head is actually inside our head. This could only mean that the head we have come to know as our own is not our true physical head, but is merely a miniature perceptual copy of our head inside a perceptual copy of the world, all of which is completely contained within our true physical skull. Stated from the internal phenomenal perspective, out beyond the farthest things you can perceive in all directions, i.e. above the dome of the sky and below the earth under your feet, or beyond the walls, floor, and ceiling of the room you perceive around you, beyond those perceived surfaces is the inner surface of your true physical skull encompassing all that you perceive, and beyond that skull is an unimaginably immense external world, of which the world you see around you is merely a miniature virtual reality replica.

The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior, Consciousness and Cognition.
Lehar, Steve (2000) Stated from the internal phenomenal perspective, out beyond the farthest things you can perceive in all directions, i.e. above the dome of the sky and below the earth under your feet, or beyond the walls, floor, and ceiling of the room you perceive around you, beyond those perceived surfaces is the inner surface of your true physical skull encompassing all that you perceive, and beyond that skull is an unimaginably immense external world, of which the world you see around you is merely a miniature virtual reality replica. The two worlds, the imaginary and the real, are constituted
by the same objects; only the grouping and the interpretation of these objects
varies. What defines the imaginary world, as with the real universe, is an
attitude of consciousness.
The Imaginary, 20 lpp.
Full transcript