Loading presentation...

Present Remotely

Send the link below via email or IM


Present to your audience

Start remote presentation

  • Invited audience members will follow you as you navigate and present
  • People invited to a presentation do not need a Prezi account
  • This link expires 10 minutes after you close the presentation
  • A maximum of 30 users can follow your presentation
  • Learn more about this feature in our knowledge base article

Do you really want to delete this prezi?

Neither you, nor the coeditors you shared it with will be able to recover it again.


Changing Nature of Warfare

No description

Todd Robinson UIUC

on 6 February 2014

Comments (0)

Please log in to add your comment.

Report abuse

Transcript of Changing Nature of Warfare

Changing Nature of Warfare
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
A Revolution in Military Affairs is a fundamental change in the way that warfare is conducted
RMAs can occur gradually or rapidly
Often driven by the introduction of new technologies or tactics
Examples include the advent of the catapult (400 BC), the Crossbow (3rd century BC), Blitzkrieg (WWII), the Atomic Bomb (1945)
Invasion of Iraq 2003
War planners sought to use the lessons of Kosovo, talked about the "new way of war"
Aerial Bombing Campaign - Shock and Awe

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq
Both Afghanistan and Iraq brought about a new type of war, one that the military, by and large, wasn't prepared for. Instead of armies fighting armies or aerial bombardment, now we get counterinsurgency and nation building
Drone Warfare
Another RMA?
Issues of sovereignty
Major ethical issues
The Next RMA?
Prompt Global Strike (Hypersonic Cruise Missiles)
Something else?
The late-20th Century RMA
In 1992, the Office of Net Assessment in OSD circulated a report that suggested that a new RMA was coming, largely due to advances in precision munitions, wide-ranging sensors, and computerized command and control (C2)
This morphed into a focus on C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
Case Study - Kosovo War
Feb. 28 1998 - June 11 1999
Fought between the Yugoslavian Republic and the Kosovo Liberation Army
Yugoslavs claimed they were engaged in a war against terrorists
Kosovo's claimed they were trying to stop Milosevic's ethnic cleansing
NATO authorized intervention, but wanted to keep boots off the ground, resulted in widespread bombing campaign
Resolution on the use of force vetoed by Russia and China, US turned to NATO

Iraq and Afghanistan raised the question "how do you win a war when technological capability doesn't make a difference?"
The US seemed to have forgotten the lessons of Vietnam and the Philippines
An insurgency is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict"
NATO doctrine defines counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, and civil actions taken to defeat insurgency"
To win such wars, it is necessary not only to defeat an adversary, but to "win the hearts and minds" of the population. Only real way to eliminate counterinsurgency
The "oil spot approach" of securing bases first then spreading outward

Nation Building
Nation building as a goal of war
Nation building as a byproduct of war
Should war fighters or planners be concerned with nation building?
How do you train war fights to build nations? Should we?
The Morality of Drone Warfare
Full transcript