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Inmate Civil Liberties

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Law NJustice

on 19 June 2013

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Transcript of Inmate Civil Liberties

Brown v. Plata (2011)
Inmate
Civil Liberties

Search and Seizure Case
1st Amendment
Due Process
14 Amendment
8th Amendment Cases
Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Harmelin v. Michigan (1991)
By: Kevin Lyons
Hudson v. McMillian (1992)
By: Kevin Lyons
Fact Summary: An inmate from Louisiana claimed he was beaten by two prison guards, one being Jack McMillian. Hudson argued that the guards used force that was not necessary which went against the eight amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled in favor of Hudson, however the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision claiming an inmate most display a significant injury to substantiate their violation claim which made Hudson bring this case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Does an inmate have to display a significant injury in order to substantiate that his eight amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated?

Rule of Law: The Supreme Court decided in favor of Hudson claiming that an inmate does not have to display a significant injury in order to substantiate a breach of their eight amendment right. Although the Supreme court decided that the degree of an injury is an important factor in the eight amendment, a significant injury does not have to be present in order to prove a violation of the eight amendment.

Analysis: The Supreme Court stressed that Courts need to consider if the punishment on the inmate had to be done or was done maliciously. Sandra Day O' Connor stated "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated". Since it was evident that Hudson was maliciously and sadistically harmed, his constitutional rights were violated.

Conclusion: This case resulted in more rights to inmates and less rights in law enforcement. This case marked a transition towards greater recognition of the right of the eigth amendment.
Fact Summary: Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison w/o parole after being accused and convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Harmelin felt that the punishment of life in prison w/o parole was too harsh and strict for the crime he committed. He argued that this was unconstitutional citing the eight amendment and cruel and unusual punishment.

Issue: Was Harmelin's punishment of life in prison w/o parole constitutional considering the crime he committed was possession of cocaine?

Rule of Law: The primary rule of law involved in this case is the eight amendment, specifically “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”does not contain a proportionality guarantee. Therefore Harmelin's punishment was constitutional and suitable.

Analysis: It was ruled that the eight amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee because it is not directly stated in the eight amendment. It is up to the legislature, not the judiciary branch, to determine the gravity to which a punishment is fit for a crime.

Conclusion: This precedent followed a strict interpretation of the constitution. The result was more power given to law and less power given to convicts.
Beard v. Banks, 2006
Facts: Pennsylvania houses “incorrigible, recalcitrant” prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was a prisoner in level two of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. The LTSU’s policy is to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates, who are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks claimed that this policy was a violation of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.
Issue:Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?
Rule of Law:No; in a six to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit decision and upheld the prison’s policy.
Analysis:
The court held that Banks failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate the less-restrictive level one; accommodating prisoners’ rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison’s goals without restricting the prisoners’ rights. Justice Thomas wrote that “this case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework.”
Conclusion:Beard v. Banks limited the First Amendment rights of prisoners; it ultimately allowed prisons to deny prisoners access to media to motivate good behavior in the pool of most dangerous and worst-behaved inmates.
Lewis v. Casey, 1966
Facts:
Fletcher Casey, Jr. and twenty-one other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) brought a class action, “on behalf of all adult prisoners who are or will be incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department of Corrections” against ADOC officials. They alleged that the ADOC officials were “depriving [respondents] of their rights of access to the courts and counsel protected by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,” violating Bounds v. Smith, which held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” The District Court identified shortcomings, ranging from training of library staff, to the updating of legal materials, to the availability of photocopying services, of the ADOC system.
Issue:Do prisoners have rights to particular, specific materials under the Constitution?
Rule of Law:No, in an eight to one decision, the Court ruled the Arizona prison officials did not unconstitutionally fail to provide inmates with adequate research facilities.
Analysis:The Court held that the success of Casey’s systematic challenge was dependent on the ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court’s failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a systematic violation of Bounds v. Smith invalid. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia said that the 1977 ruling of Bounds v. Smith “does not guarantee [inmates] the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.”
Conclusion:Lewis v. Casey ultimately limited the due process rights of prisoners. Prisons are not obliged to provide prisoners with adequate legal aid to help them in the appeal process.
Overton v. Bazzetta, 2003
Overton v. Bazzetta, 2003
Facts:The population of Michigan’s prisons increased in the early 1990’s, increasing the number of visitors and thus straining the resources available for prison supervision and control. Special problems were encountered with the increase in visits by children, who were at risk of seeing or hearing harmful conduct during visits and must be supervised with special care in prison visitation facilities. During this period, the incidence of substance abuse in Michigan’s prisons also increased. In response, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) passed regulations, establishing that an inmate may receive visits from only individuals placed on an approved visitor list, except that qualified members of the clergy and attorneys on official business may visit without being listed. Minors under the age of eighteen may not be placed on the list unless they are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate. The child may not be a visitor if an inmate’s parental rights have been terminated. A child authorized to visit must be accompanied by an adult who is an immediate family member of the child or of the inmate or who is a legal guardian of the child. A visitor who is a former prisoner could not be placed on the list unless he or she is a member of the inmate’s immediate family. A group of prisoners sued, claiming that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Eighth Amendment and their right to association of the First Amendment.
Issue:Did the restrictions on visits with prison inmates placed by the State of Michigan Department of Corrections violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?
Rule of Law:No, in a nine to zero opinion, the Court held that the MDOC’s regulations were valid and did not violate the inmates’ constitutional rights.
Analysis:The Supreme Court held fact that the regulations beat a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The visitation restriction for inmates with two substance abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violation the Eighth Amendment because the withdrawal of visitation privileged for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions.
Conclusion:Overton v. Bazzetta limited the constitutional rights of inmates by temporarily restricting the visitors allowed.
***Also in 8th Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Facts:The population of Michigan’s prisons increased in the early 1990’s, increasing the number of visitors and thus straining the resources available for prison supervision and control. Special problems were encountered with the increase in visits by children, who were at risk of seeing or hearing harmful conduct during visits and must be supervised with special care in prison visitation facilities. During this period, the incidence of substance abuse in Michigan’s prisons also increased. In response, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) passed regulations, establishing that an inmate may receive visits from only individuals placed on an approved visitor list, except that qualified members of the clergy and attorneys on official business may visit without being listed. Minors under the age of eighteen may not be placed on the list unless they are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate. The child may not be a visitor if an inmate’s parental rights have been terminated. A child authorized to visit must be accompanied by an adult who is an immediate family member of the child or of the inmate or who is a legal guardian of the child. A visitor who is a former prisoner could not be placed on the list unless he or she is a member of the inmate’s immediate family. A group of prisoners sued, claiming that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Eighth Amendment and their right to association of the First Amendment.
Issue:Did the restrictions on visits with prison inmates placed by the State of Michigan Department of Corrections violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?
Rule of Law:No, in a nine to zero opinion, the Court held that the MDOC’s regulations were valid and did not violate the inmates’ constitutional rights.
Analysis:The Supreme Court held fact that the regulations beat a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The visitation restriction for inmates with two substance abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violation the Eighth Amendment because the withdrawal of visitation privileged for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions.
Conclusion:Overton v. Bazzetta limited the constitutional rights of inmates by temporarily restricting the visitors allowed.
***Also in First Amendment
Brown v. Plata- 2011
By: Nicole Salzano
Facts- In California, the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is designed to hold up to about 80,000-85,000 inmates; however, it was nearly double the limit with 156,000 prisoners. Before this case came to the USSC, there had been another case regarding constitutional violations of CDCR: Coleman v. Brown (1995), involving inmates with mental health conditions. Brown v.Plata was first in court in 2002, involving inmates with serious medical conditions. In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals judges from both Coleman and Brown cases were present and ordered the population of the prison to be reduced by 46,000 inmates. This decision was appealed to the USSC where Brown v.Plata was heard and decided in 2010-2011.
Issue- Is a court-mandated population limit necessary in prisons in order to follow the inmates Eight Amendment constitutional rights?
HI KEVIN
Rule of Law- Yes. In a five to four decisions the justices decided to uphold the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision to reduce the population in the CDCR. Overcrowding is seen as cruel and unusual punishment of the prisoners, which is violating their Eighth Amendment rights.
Analysis- The justices of the USSC stated that this overcrowding was the primary cause of the inadequate medical and mental health care of the prisoners. This case helped deal with the issues brought up in Coleman mandating the prison systems to set and abide by population limits because overcrowding can have various negative effects on the inmates, like mental and medical problems. This case set the precedent that prisoner’s are entitled to adequate space and screening while in prison.
Conclusion- After Brown, it was stated that court-mandated population limits are necessary to make sure the prisoners’ 8th Amendment rights are not being violated. It also helped take care of other inadequacies of the prison system, like mental and medical health screening care, that were thought to be related to the overcrowding of prisons
Ewing v. California (2003)
Fact Summary: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing got arrested for stealing golf clubs from a Los Angeles golf club. Ewing had already been convicted of two prior convictions consisting of three convictions of burglary and one of theft. Because California has a three strike rule, which states that if Ewing got another felony conviction, he would be required a sentence of 25 years to life. Therefore, the Court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison, but Ewing appealed to the Appellate Court. He argued that the punishment granted by the lower court was not proportional to his crime, but the Appellate Court denied his appeal, and he further appealed to the USSC.
Issue: Did Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life, in accordance to California 3 strikes law, violate his Eight Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment?
Rule of Law: The Court ruled that Ewing’s 8th Amendment right had not been violated, and the lower court’s sentencing was warranted. The Court also reinforced the constitutionality of the 3 strikes law by stating that it protects the interest of the state’s people by incapacitating its repeating felons.
Analysis: The Court ruled that the Ewing’s constitutional rights had not been violated based on the precedent set in Rummel v. Estelle, which stated that the 3 strikes law was constitutional because law penalizes “in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society." Therefore, Ewing’s sentence was also considered lawful as the intent of the 3 strikes law is to penalize repeat offenders who do not contribute to society.
Conclusion: The USSC’s decision was an essential moment in criminal justice because it validated the states’ efforts to deterring crime. Also, the Court also set a defined line between what is cruel punishment and what is not. The Court clearly defined that long imprisonment is not cruel if a person exhibits no signs of rehabilitation and commits crime perpetually.
Holt v. Sarver (1970)
Fact Summary: Inmates of Cummins Farm and Tucker Intermediate Reformatory in the Arkansas Prison System brought a lawsuit against the commissioner of corrections, Robert Sarver in 1969. They claimed the prison institute inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in the prison system in the control of Sarver’s leadership. The allegations made were that white and black prisoners were intentionally put in the same cells, resulting in prison deaths due to racial tensions. Also, more than ten men were put in isolation rooms together, which had the capacity to hold three. The men were also fed after long intervals and starved. The lower trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of the inmates, claiming that their lives and safety was jeopardized through such solitary confinement. The case reached the United States Supreme Court in 1969, after the prison institute appealed the lower court’s decision.
Issue: Was the prison institute’s solitary confinement a violation of the inmates’ 8th amendment protection form “cruel and unusual” punishment?
Rule of Law: Yes, the inmates’ 8th Amendment protection from cruel and unusual” punishment had been violated when they were put in solitary confinement with ten other men in a small room and were not fed. The prison was mandated to “eliminate the unconstitutional conditions that have caused the Court to condemn the System… Unless conditions at the Penitentiary farm are brought to a constitutional tolerability, the farms can no longer function”.
Analysis: The Court ruled in favor of the defendants because “solitary confinement of that type is to serve any useful purpose, it must be rigorous, uncomfortable, and unpleasant. However, there are limits to the rigor and discomfort of close confinement which a state may not constitutionally exceed." The Court found the inhumane conditions such as overstuffing the rooms, starvation, and torture as unconstitutional.
Conclusion: This case is a landmark case of the USSC because it was the first case to recognize that prisoners have certain rights as well. The Court allowed “solitary confinement” as a punishment, but put parameters around its conditions. Ultimately, the Court gave state institutions guidelines as to how they can punish convicts, because they also have some basic rights.
Furman v. Georgia
Fact Summary: William Furman was burglarizing a home, when a family member caught him during his robbery. While attempted to flee, he accidentally shot the women and was convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death for murder. However, Furman appealed to the Appellate Court, but they also supported the trial court’s sentencing. Finally, he appealed to the USSC, and two other death penalty cases, including rape and murder convictions, were concurrently fought with his appeal. The USSC heard and decided the three cases together.
Issue: Does the sentence of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Rule of Law: Yes, the lower court’s sentencing of the death penalty in these three cases qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment, and is a violation of the defendants’ 8th and 14th amendment rights of due process.
Analysis: The Court ruled in favor of the defendants because their punishment was not proportional to their crimes. The defendants who committed murder did not premeditate their killings, but accidentally or circumstantially killed the victims. As for the rape, the Court recognized that the rape was not brutal enough in nature to be punishable by death. Also, the Court recognized the arbitrary nature of the statutes, stating that it was discriminatory towards African Americans, as all the defendants were African Americans. Therefore, the Court ordered the states to reconsider the statute and prevent it from targeting impoverished minorities.
Conclusion: The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner. Even till today, the death penalty is only used in the most severe cases, as the precedent of Furman v. Georgia defined its severity.
Turner v. Safley
By: Kira Scarangella

Fact Summary:
In 1987, inmates from the Missouri Division of Corrections brought a suit over the facilities regulation that permits inmates to marry only with permission of the prison superintendent and allowed for approval only when compelling reasons exist. Prison officials testified that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child where considered compelling. Plaintiff inmates brought a class action suit for injunctive relief and damages. They wee arguing whether their right to marriage was a violation of their due process right of the 14th Amendment.
Issue:
Should a different rule apply in a prison forum that does not include marriage as a constitutionally protected right?
If the rule burdens prisoner’s constitutional rights, should the restriction be tested under a reasonableness standard?
Rule of Law:
On certiorari review, the Court held that a lesser standard of scrutiny, the responsible relationship standard, applied to the regulations. Multiple elements of marriage that are not inconsistent with the status of a prisoner are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected right to marriage. Even under a reasonable relationship test, the marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny.
Prison inmates retain those constitutional rights not inconsistent with their status as a prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives. Although the right to marry is subject to substantial restriction for prisoners, the expressions of emotional support and public commitment; the religious spiritual significance; and the expectation that most inmate marriages will ultimately be consummated remain unaffected by confinement or legitimate correctional goals. Petitioners rely on security and rehabilitation as their support for the reasonable relationship between the rule and correctional goals. This is because marriages can lead to violent love triangles and the domination of female prisoners who are overly dependent on male figures. However, love triangles can develop without marriage, and the focus on banning mainly the female prisoners from marriage is unacceptable. The almost complete ban on such marriages is overly broad and not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. Reversed its holding that the correspondence regulation was unconstitutional, and remanded for consideration of whether the correspondence regulation had been applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Analysis:
The Court did not reach the question of if a higher standard of scrutiny is necessary because it found that the rule did not pass muster under the reasonable relationship test. However, the Court did state that the regulation may impose an unacceptable constitutional restriction on non-prisoners because they would be unable to marry incarcerated individuals. This decision is in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the liberty element of the due process clause. The Supreme Court found that it was a violation of a constitutional right to now allow a prisoner to marry when appropriate.
Conclusions:
Citing the reduced liberty and greater security needs of the prison context, the Court declined to use the strict scrutiny standard of review. It upheld a regulation that allowed prison officials to prohibit inmates at one prison from corresponding with those at another in certain cases, calling it "reasonable and facially valid". It struck down another regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying without the permission of the warden, finding that it was "not...reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives" and "impermissibly burdened" their right to marry. The marriage actions should be appropriate and reasonable, but the jail does have the responsibility to allow an inmate to marry if he or she chooses to do so because it is a constitutional right. They should be allowed to marry if they have other reasons such as bearing a child.
Turner v. Safley (1987)
Rhodes v. Chapman
By: Kira Scarangella

Fact Summary:
Kelly Chapman was an inmate who was in jail for armed robbery. He was held in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucas-ville. In 1981, Chapman filed a class action against the jail because he said that the 1-room cell (which was 32. sq ft), was not enough room for personal space, since he shared a room with another inmate. Chapman said that the jail cell was less than the state of Ohio provided for a "5-week year old calves in feed lots." Timothy Hogan, his defense lawyer, said that Chapman made a valid point and that since the jail had a double ceiling, this violated his 8th Amendment right of cruel and unusual punishment.
Issue:
Does a jail with a "double ceiling" violate the 8th Amendment of the Constitution and if so, should the defendant be granted injunctive relief?
Rule of Law:
The Court ruled that the double ceiling in question is not cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 votes for Rhodes, 1 vote(s) against. According to the conditions of confinement, as constituting the punishment issue, must not involve the wanton unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment. But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminals pay for their offenses against society. In view of the District Court's findings of fact, virtually every one of which tends to refute respondents' claim, its conclusion that double ceiling at the prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment is insupportable.
Analysis:
The five considerations on which the District Court relied are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. Such considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than by a court. They fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that double ceiling under the circumstances either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment. In discharging their oversight responsibility to determine whether prison conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons" and that deference to the legislature was appropriate in the absence of infliction of needless pain or other Eighth Amendment violations. The U.S. Supreme Court was able to rule on these findings because it was not stated directly in the Constitution and the inmates are getting their basic needs such as food, water, and clothes.
Conclusion:
The U.S. Supreme Court found that Chapman's accusations and request was not a violation of the 8th Amendment of the Constitution because although the double ceiling was uncomfortable, it was not a cruel and unusual punishment case. The U.S. Constitution does not specify what is a comfortable prison and whether the person is in pain or not. The Supreme Court found that criminals are admitted into a jail for a reason and as long as they are not physically abused or severely psychologically, it is not a violation of the 8th Amendment. Comfort is not the prison's responsibility to maintain for the prisoner. As soon as prisoner walks into a jail, all of their rights to comfort and individual rights are restricted because they are under the supervision of the government for their unlawful actions.
Rhodes v. Chapman (1981)
Wilson v. Seiter
By: Kira Scarangella

Fact Summary:
In 1990, Pearly Wilson claimed that he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio. Wilson sought financial awards and injunction against the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed a suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson and to show that the prison officials had a "culpable state of mind" when inflicting harm upon him.
Issue:
Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit err by holding that prison officials must have a "culpable state of mind" in order to establish cruel and unusual punishment of an inmate?
Did the Court of Appeals err by overlooking an inmate's claim that prison officials showed "deliberate indifference" to his conditions of confinement?
Rule of Law:
5 votes for Seiter, 4 vote(s) against. The Supreme Court found that appellants' allegations regarding inadequate cooling, housing with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding are insufficient to provide a specific basis for an eighth amendment violation. Additionally, they found that appellants' affidavits, in that they fail to raise a reasonable inference of obduracy and wantonness on the appellees' behalf, present no genuine issue as to that material fact. Thus, they held that the district court properly entered summary judgment in appellees' favor, and therefore AFFIRM. The Supreme Court had no reason to suspect However, Wilson's allegations are wholly conclusory and without any support in the record.

Analysis:
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Resweber and Estelle v. Gamble to establish that cruel and unusual punishment required the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." For this to occur, the prison officials had to exhibit intentional cruelty, which would result in a "culpable state of mind." However, "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to this standard. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered this aspect of Wilson's grievances. A prisoner claiming that the conditions of his confinement violate the Eighth Amendment must show a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials. This was established in Whitley v. Albers and Rhodes v. Chapman. An intent requirement is implicit in that Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Wilson's suggested distinction between "short-term" or "one-time" prison conditions (in which a state of mind requirement would apply) and "continuing" or "systemic" conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant) is rejected. The "deliberate indifference" standard applied in Estelle v. Gamble, to claims involving medical care applies generally to prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement. There is no merit to respondents' contention that that standard should be applied only in cases involving personal, physical injury, and that a malice standard is appropriate in cases challenging conditions. As Whitley teaches, the "wantonness" of conduct depends not on its effect on the prisoner, but on the constraints facing the official. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider Wilson's claims under the "deliberate indifference" standard and applying instead a standard of "behavior marked by persistent malicious cruelty." It is possible that the error was harmless, since the court said that Wilson's affidavits established "at best . . . negligence." Conceivably, however, the court would have reached a different disposition under the correct ruling.
Conclusion:
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff because there was not real evidence supporting his claim. They could not prove that it was cruel and unusual punishment because there was not a "deliberate indifference" and the punishment was not intended. The ending of this case established what classifies as real evidence versus a complaint by a prisoner. State officials are allowed to use any force necessary to keep the prisoners in order.
Wislon v. Seiter (1983)
Hudson v. Palmer (1983)
Facts: Russell Palmer, a Virginia prisoner sued Hudson, an officer at the prison. Hudson searched Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer charged Palmer for destroying the state's property when they found a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer had to reimburse the state.
Issue: Did the officer's search of Palmer's locker and cell violate the 4th Amendment? Was Hudson's deprivation by Hudson his property a violation of the 14th Amendment?
Rule: No, Palmer's 4th Amendment wasn't violated and the Due Process Clause wasn't violated.
Analysis: The Supreme Court ruled that the 4th Amendment which guarantees the right against unreasonable search and seizures didn't apply in the confines of a prison cell. The court also found that the interest in maintaining safety and security in the prison outweighed any privacy concerns. The USSC also found that random and unwarranted deprivations of property didn't violate the Due Process Clause as long as postdeprivation remedies were available.
Conclusion: This case gave prison officials more leniency and it established that prisoners didn't have certain rights.
Shaw v. Murphy (2000)
Facts: Kevin Murphy, a Montana state prisoner, sent a letter to another inmate to help him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. Due to prison policy, the letter was then intercepted. Because of the letter's policy, the prison also sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy wanted relief since he felt his 1st Amendment was violated, including the right to give legal assistance to other inmates.
Issue: Do prisoners have a right to give legal assistance to other inmates?
Rule of Law: No, they do not have a right to give legal assistance to other inmates.
Analysis: The Court unanimously ruled that prisoners don't have a special First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates which enhances the protections otherwise available in an opinion by Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas in his opinion stated that giving 1st Amendment protection for inmates to give inmates legal advice would undermine prison official's ability to address difficult problems of prison administration. He also talked about safety and how prisoners previously used legal correspondence to pass contraband and make drugs or weapons.
Conclusion: Ultimately, the USSC believed that since the prisoners already had substantial legal advice from their lawyers, they shouldn't be able to give or receive legal advice from other prisoners. The Court felt it also secured safety in the prison.
Roper v. Simmons (2005)
By: Kevin Lyons
Fact Summary: Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993 however appeals in various levels of court prolonged it up to 2002. All of Simmons appeals were denied until his case was presented to the Missouri Supreme Court and the precedent of Atkins v. Virginia was set in the USSC. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the proposed execution of Simmons was unconstitutional since it was viewed that the execution of minors and the mentally ill was cruel. This decisions went against the precedent set in 1989 of Stanford v. Kentucky. The government appealed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to the USSC arguing that state courts can't have enough leeway and rule solely on the change of opinion in America.

Issue: Does the sentencing of minors to death violate the eight amendment?

Rule of Law: The USSC ruled in favor of Simmons. The USSC decided that the "standards of decency have evolved" and it went against the eight amendment for minors to be executed.

Analysis: The USSC viewed the death penalty as disproportionate to minors. They also factored in international disapproval against the juvenile death penalty.

Conclusion: The case marks an important continuation of more rights given to inmates in regards to the eighth amendment. It supports the theme that there is an increasing recognition of the eight amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Minneci v. Pollard (2011)
By:Emma Califano
Facts: Richard Lee Pollard was an inmate at a federal prisons run by the private GEO Group. He slipped on a cart left in the doorway and injured both elbows. When the GEO employees were transporting him to an outside doctor’s office, they made him wear a black jumpsuit and “black box” wrist restraints that caused him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO because they violated his Eight Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

Issue: Can employees of private prison operators be sued for violating constitutional rights of inmates?

Rule of Law: With 8 votes for Minneci and 1 against, the Supreme Court ruled that a prisoner can not assert an Eighth Amendment claim for damages against prison employees.

Analysis: Those who supported the ruling emphasized that he believed the previous precedent set in Bivens which created a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment, should be limited. Justice Ginsburg, who opposed this ruling, claimed that Pollard should have relief because he was placed in a privately owned prison, rather than a federal or state operated prison.

Conclusion: Overall, the Supreme Court did not support Pollard in his claim that those whose eighth amendment rights were violated in prison should be able to sue the employees of the privately owned prisons.

Nelson v. Norris (2008)
By:Emma Califano
Facts: In 2003, Shawanna Nelson was six months pregnant and serving a short sentence in Arkansas State Prison when she went into labor and was taken to the hospital. Her legs were shackled to opposite sides of her hospital bed and remained on during the duration of her labor. She argued that the Constitution does not support the cruel and unusual punishment of shackling a prisoner while in labor.

Issue: Is shackling during labor considered cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the 8th amendment?

Rule of Law: In a six to five decision, the Eighth circuit held that this was a constitutional violation and that the guard was not entitled to qualified immunity

Analysis: Those who agreed with the court’s opinion suggested that the medical risks of shackling were obvious because if there was an emergency the shackles would create an obstacle and they also caused unnecessary suffering in a time when she would be in no state to flee. Those who were against the ruling said that an Eighth Amendment violation was clearly established by the use of restraints during labor, writing that the officer did not act with deliberate indifference and Ms. Nelson was not made to suffer unnecessarily
.
Conclusion: Because this case was decided by such a narrow margin, it shows how far the U.S. still has to go to protect the rights of incarcerated and pregnant women. The court did support Nelson by ruling that the shackling was a violation of her Eighth Amendment right of cruel and unusual punishment, and that the guard was not entitled to qualified immunity.
Barber v. Thomas
By: Emma Califano
Facts: Michael Barber argued that Bureau of Prisons inaccurately calculated his good time credit toward his federal prison sentencing. He argued that the court should base their good time credit off the sentence imposed, not off the time already served.
Issue: Does the “term of imprisonment” require the computation of a good time credit based on the sentence imposed, rather than on time actually served? And if “term of imprisonment” is ambiguous, does it require the computation of good time credit based on the sentence imposed, rather than on time actually served?
Rule of Law: The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Bureau of Prisons method for calculating good time credit was lawful.
Analysis: Those who supported the decision reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose supported the Bureau of Prisons construction of the statute. Those who were against it argued that this interpretation of the statute would impose an unreasonable amount of time on federal prisoners according to a mathematical formula they will be unable to understand.
Conclusion: Overall this case was lost by Barber because the Supreme Court supported the Bureau of Prisons method for calculating good time credit. This was proven because there was 6 votes for Thomas and 3 against.
Coker v. Georgia 1977
Nicole Salzano
Coker v Georgia-1977
Facts: Elrich Anthony Coker was serving sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault. He escaped from prison and broke into a Georgia home, raped a woman, and stole the family’s car. The women had no serious physical injuries. Coker was then sentenced to death on the rape charge.
Issue: Was the imposition of the death penalty for rape a form of cruel and unusual punishment?
Rule of Law: Yes. In a 7 to 2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty was no proportionate to the punishment for the crime of rape.
Analysis: With cases like Gregg v. Georgia, guidelines were set for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty. One of the standards for capital punishment is that the defendant must have deliberately taken another’s life. Rape does not involve the taking of another’s live, so the Court ruled that the death penalty for rape cases is considered “cruel and unusual punishment”, in violation of the 8th Amendment.
Conclusion: From precedent set by cases like Gregg, the crime of rape is not proportionally punishable by the death penalty. Defendants charged with rape cannot face capital punishment because they did not take another’s life.
Thompson v. OK
Nicole Salzano
Thompson v. Oklahoma- 1988
Facts: Thompson, age 15, was tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder for killing his brother-in-law. He was sentenced to death. This was challenged due to the fact that Thompson was only fifteen years of age.
Issue: Does the execution of a 15 year old violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment?
Rule of Law: Yes. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional.
Analysis: The Court’s stated "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” as its primary rationale. The Court noted that many jurisdictions in the US and all industrialized Western nations banned the execution of minors under 16 years old.
Conclusion: The decision of this case stated that people under the age of 16 years old cannot face the death penalty because it stands as cruel and unusual punishment. This case’s decision was reformed in Roper v. Simmons where the age was moved up to those under 18 years old.
Clement v. California Department of Corrections (2002)
By: Lorraine Laban
Fact Summary: At least nine California prisons have adopted policies prohibiting receipt of material printed from the Internet. These policies banned prisoners from receiving hard-copies of documents downloaded from the Internet, including hard-copies of e-mails, regardless of content. The ban substantially impaired prisoners’ abilities to receive important information. The plaintiff, Pelican Bay prisoner Frank Clement’s pen-pal correspondence was returned to the sender due to the new policy. Clement had subscribed to an Internet penpal service that allows prisoners to post a web page and solicit pen-pal correspondents. Potential correspondents respond by sending an e-mail to the prisoner’s web page, which is then downloaded by the service-provider and mailed to the inmate. The prison mailroom rejected letters sent by the Internet service to Clement containing messages downloaded from Clement’s web page.
Issue: Is it constitutional for prisons to prohibit inmates from receiving mail that is printed on the Internet?
Rule of Law: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clement
Analysis: The Supreme Court stated prisons prohibiting inmates from receiving mail that is printed on the Internet was a violation of the prisoners’ First amendment right. Prisoners were entitled to the information that was available online and preventing them from receiving this information through the mail was simply unconstitutional.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Clement was unconstitutionally denied his right mail, which contained information that was published on the Internet.
Pell v. Procunier (1974)
By: Lorraine Laban
Fact Summary: Four inmates and 3 journalists brought this case before the Court system. The members of the press were denied the right to interview prison inmates in a face-to-face format. Pell challenged the constitutionality of the California code that prohibited press interviews with prison inmates. All of the requests that were made to interview inmates in California prisons were denied. Issue: Is it unconstitutional to prohibit the media physical access to prison inmates?Rule of Law: The Court ruled in favor of Procunier.Analysis: The Supreme Court held that journalists do not have to have face to face interactions with inmates in order to conduct interviews. This does not violate the first Amendment of freedom of press as the information can still be acquired via alternative means of communication. The state limits visitors to those who will be helpful in the rehabilitation of the inmate. The state interest in maintaining security of the facilities outweighs the right to speak to the press especially since there are alternative means of communication.Conclusion: The Supreme Court did not rule in favor of the inmates and journalists. Journalists have alternative ways to gather needed information other than physically having face- to –face encounters.
Cruz v. Beto (1972)
Facts: Cruz was an inmate in a prison in Texas, and he was an alleged Buddhist. He complained he wasn’t able to use the prison chapel, that he couldn’t write to his religious adviser, and that he was placed in solitary confinement for sharing his religious material with other prisoners.
Issue: Was Cruz's Equal Protection and 1st Amendment right to freedom of religion violated?
Rule: Yes, his Equal Protection and 1st Amendment was violated.
Analysis: The USSC felt that the state of Texas discriminated against Cruz because he was Buddhist. They were "denying him a reasonable opportunity to pursue his Buddhist faith comparable to that offered other prisoners adhering to conventional religious precepts." Because other religions were able to be practiced, his 14th Amendment was violated along with his 1st Amendment.
Conclusion:The Supreme Court held Texas discriminated against Cruz’s reasonable opportunity to practice his Buddhist faith compared to that offered to other prisoners.
Estelle v Gamble (1976)
By: Lorraine Laban
Fact Summary: J. W. Gamble, an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections, was injured on November 9, 1973, while performing a prison work assignment. The Doctor he saw treated him with rest and pain management. The corrections officers failed to comply with the Doctors orders. At one point the Doctor requested that the inmate be moved to the lower bunk, and he was denied. The prison staff ordered him back to work, Gamble insisted he was unable to perform the work due to his back injury. He was confined to solitary confinement. In addition to his back injury, Gamble also suffered from high blood pressure and developed chest pain one day. He asked the guards to see a doctor and they refused. He asked again the next day to see a doctor when he develop chest and arm pain, the guards again refused. Gamble complained of the treatment he received after the injury.
Issue: Whether or not the poor and negligent treatment Gamble received was cruel and unusual punishment.
Rule of Law: 8-1 in favor of Estelle
Analysis: The Supreme Court ruled that the failure of receiving the appropriate aid and treatment after the injury did not measure up to cruel and unusual punishment. “The failure to perform an X-ray or to use additional diagnostic techniques does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment”.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court recognized that Gamble was not treated properly and that he did not receive the best diagnosis. However, the medical malpractice does not qualify as cruel and unusual punishment and is not unconstitutional.
Mentally Incompetent Criminals
Penry v. Lynaugh (1989)
Facts: Penry was a mentally retarded man who committed murder and was sentenced to death. During the trial, the jury was not told that it could use Penry’s illness as a mitigating factor and lessen their charge. The case was repealed to the US Supreme Court with the claim that sentencing a mentally incompetent person to death was Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The US Supreme Court ruled that the jury should have been told that the mental illness could be considered in the sentencing, however, the punishment of death was not considered cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment.

Issue of Law: Is the death sentence of a mentally incompetent person considered Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the 8th Amendment?

Rule of Law: The 8th Amendment does not prevent states from giving mentally incompetent people the death penalty.

Analysis: The USSC ruled that the death penalty for mentally incompetent persons is not considered cruel and unusual punishment. The methodology behind this was that for a capital crime, the punishment no matter who committed it, should be the death penalty if the state rules so. The US Court ruled that the jury should have been informed of Penry’s mental defect and could have used that as a mitigating factor for a lesser charge. However they ruled that there was nothing cruel and unusual about the death punishment for a mentally retarded individual.

Conclusion: This landmark case set the precedent until it was overturned by the future case of Atkins v. Virginia. As society changed and began to move away from the death penalty and more towards long sentences and rehabilitation, it was ruled that the death sentence for someone who is mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.








*Aleks*
Atkins v. Virginia (2001)
Facts: The defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. During the trial, a forensic psychologist was brought in and testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury still charged Atkins with the death penalty; however the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered a second sentence hearing because the trial had used a misleading verdict form. In the resentencing, the same forensic psychologist testified that the defendant was mentally incompetent. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. The Virginia Supreme Court relied on the previous case of Penry v. Lynaugh and Atkins was sent to death row.

Issue of Law: Does the death penalty for mentally retarded people violate the 8th Amendment?

Rule of Law: This landmark case reversed the decision of Penry v. Virgina and declared that it is considered cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a mentally retarded person to death.

Analysis: The majority opinion in this case held that it is cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a mentally retarded person to death. Prior to this case, the Supreme Court assumed that most states prohibited the death penalty for mentally retarded people. But the Supreme Court was concerned with the justification for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence of capital crimes, application to mentally incompetent persons. The majority opinion stated that as the standard of decency is evolving the 8th Amendment against Cruel and Unusual Punishment extends to protect the lives of incarcerated mentally incompetent people.

Conclusion: This landmark case creates the dictum that puts limitations on the death penalty which paves way for the future cases that eliminate the death penalty. Atkins v. Virginia establishes that the Constitution prevents such excessive punishment to a mentally incompetent person. This decision paves way for a different class of incarcerated persons and more civil liberties to those that have mental disabilities.




*Aleks*
Madrid v. Gomez (State Case 1995)
Facts: Prisoners in Pelican Bay State Prison in California filed a class action suit against the prisoner for cruel and unusual punishment. The inmates argued that the guards used excessive force when handling prisoners, did not provide proper medical attention to inmates, did not provide mental health care, allowed for prisoners to easily be victimized by other prisoners, and failed to give access to the courts to inmates. The U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California granted injunctive relief to these inmates and ruled that there was unnecessary force used by prison guards, medical care to inmates was not adequate, extreme punishments such as isolation were considered cruel and unusual to mentally ill inmates, and that inmates should be allowed their rights to court. As a result of this ruling the District Court ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to keep the reforms even without court supervision.

Issue of Law: Is the excessive force of prison personnel against prisoners considered cruel and unusual punishment? If inmates are denied basic medical attention, including mental health, is that considered cruel and unusual punishment? Is extreme isolation considered cruel and unusual punishment? Is interfering with prisoners’ judiciary situations a violation of their due process rights?

Rule of Law: The District Court of Northern California ruled that the excessive force of prison personnel is cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment. Prisoners also must be provided with proper health attention including mental health. Extreme isolation is only considered cruel and unusual punishment to prisoners who are mentally incompetent. Lastly interrupting with prisoners’ court appointments is a violation of Due Process that the prison should therefore not interfere with.

Analysis: In this state case, the District Court of Northern California ruled for basic rights at Pelican Bay State Prison (as well as set the precedent for other prisons) to be necessities that the prison must provide its prisoners with. The state court ruled that all prisoners must be provided with the right to due process without the prison’s interference. Also the court ruled that prisoners must not be neglected in areas of medical needs, which would fall under the category of cruel and unusual punishment. The most unique ruling in the case is the one dealing with isolation as punishment. The state court ruled that isolationism is constitutional for normal prisoners; however for mentally incompetent prisoners it is considered cruel and unusual punishment on the basis that this only worsens a person’s mental defects.

Conclusion: Overall this state case reflects the nature of state prisons during the 1990s. At this time mentally incompetent inmates were handled with more care, and after two great prison riots, the courts wanted to ensure that inmates were getting rights to health and to the courts. The medical precautions are results of the 1976 case of Estelle v. Gamble which reflects states following precedent. Since isolation was still allowed in this case, we see the states court acting differently despite the decision in Holt v. Sarver which declared solitary confinement as cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court of Northern California in this case demonstrates the regulation of state prisons under precedents placed.


*Aleks*
O’Lone v. Shabazz
Facts-Prison inmates and members of the Islamic faith were denied the access from attending Jumu'ah, a Muslim congregational service held on Friday afternoons, and thereby violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The first such policy, Standard 853, required inmates in respondents' custody classifications to work outside the buildings in which they were housed and in which Jumu'ah was held, while the second, a policy memorandum, prohibited inmates assigned to outside work from returning to those buildings during the day.

Issue- Does the free exercise clause of the first amendment apply to inmates in prison?

Rule of Law- The defendant was not violated their right to the first amendment.

Analysis-the Supreme Court applied the Turner v. Safley standard in the context of a free exercise challenge. This ruled that marriage is constitutionally protected. Being married in prison has no effect on others or the penal system. However, in O’Lone v. Shabazz the Court held that the challenged policies were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and therefore did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court accepted the state’s argument that the policies helped to ease overcrowding in the prison building, which aided in maintaining order and security. Further, the Court found that the policies left open adequate alternative means of exercising their rights. While the inmates would not be able to attend Friday services, the Court found it enough that they were able to participate in a number of other religious ceremonies.Therefore, this decision was in favor of protection go the community.

Conclusion- Moreover, the defendant was denied his rights to attend religious activities in order to keep the prison safe. The regulations that this prison has ensures the safety of every prisoner and their surroundings. If multiple prisoners are wondering around, there would be no order and chaos would be created. Therefore, the rights of the defendants were not violated,as there were other religious activities that they could have taken part in within their community prison. Angelica Leventhal
1987
Facts- The defendant. DeMont Conner was an inmate at the Halawa Correctional Facility, which is a maximum security prison in Oahu. Conner was placed under the authority to give a strip search, but he refused with anger and foul language. Moreover, Conner was charged with “high misconduct”. He was sentenced to 30 years of segregation from other inmates and was not allowed to present witnesses. The Deputy Administrator found the high misconduct charge charge unsupported and expunged the record. The defendant Conner requested injunctive relief, declaratory relief and damages for a deprivation of procedural due process in connection with the disciplinary hearing and not allowed to  present witnesses. The State District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment for the prison officials, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Conner had a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation.
 
 
Issue-Is there a state-created liberty interest in imposed segregation if there is no substantial evidence of misconduct?

Rule of Law- A prisoner has a cause of action for deprivation of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only when it is atypical to or causes a significant hardship on the prisoner in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. In this case, Conner does not have atypical circumstances.

Analysis-The Court reversed the court of appeal. The Due Process did not mandate Connor a protected liberty . Moreover, in McDonnell v. Wolff, the defendant was violated their minimum rights to due process, in which they were not entitled to a 24 hour notice before a written hearing or statement of a disciplinary hearing.However,t eh court also ruled that prisoners do not have the right to cross-examine witnesses or to have assistance of counsel. Moreover,Connor had a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth amendment because confinement for high misconduct adds a stigma that could diminish parole prospects. There has to be an atypical hardship towards the inmate in order for the fourteenth amendment to be violated. Therefore, neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the Due process Clause itself afforded appellee a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff.Even if the Hawaii regulations were a question, the fourteenth amendment out weights the Hawaii laws,as it part of the United States Supreme Courts law.

Conclusion- the defendant faced punishments that consisted of consequences of a deprivation of his rights, including the fourteenth amendment. First, because the punishment caused a major change in Appellee’s conditions. The prison regulation under the Court’s liberty-defining standards deprives the appellee of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. The regulation does so by having a punishment that is substantial restricts imposition as a punishment to instances in which an inmate has committed a defined offense, and prescribes non-discretionary standards for determining whether or not an inmate committed that offense. The majority in its decision seeks to change the liberty standard by stating a standard, such that a deprivation falls within the Fourteenth Amendment only if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” It had been ruled that a prisoners rights were taken away. Angelica Leventhal
Sandin v. Connor(1995)
Facts- The Federal Bureau of Prisons officers stopped publications that may seem toe encourage criminal activity. However, the officers can not reject the publication because of sexual,political, religious or repugnant expression.

Issue-Is this restraint on incoming publications rationally(violation of the 1st amendment) related to a legitimate and content-neutral governmental objective?

Rule of Law- The ruling was in favor of the government,since it is valid under the reasonableness standard scrutiny.

Analysis- This ruling is in regard to the balancing test,as the regulation is to protect each inmate from one another. regulations such as those at issue that affect the sending of publications to prisoners must be analyzed under the standard set forth in Turner v. Safely, and are therefore "valid if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Prison officials are due considerable deference in regulating the delicate balance between prison order and security and the legitimate demands of "outsiders" who seek to enter the prison environment.

Conclusion- Moreover, the idea of prisoners being eligible to read inappropriate magazines and newspapers may lead them to harmful actions against one another or themselves. This ruling is not a violation of the fourth amendment. The goals of the penal system can be effected from an inmate reading an inaccurate magazine and therefore create violence in such a setting. Angelica Leventhal
Thornburgh v. Abbott(1989)
In Graham v. Florida:

Fact Summary: When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

Issue: Does the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicidal offense violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual” punishment?

Rule of Law: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that because this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders (juveniles).

Analysis: Ultimately, the court's ruling of this issue does not surprise me considering the incredibly harsh nature of the punishment. There is also a good deal of past precedent that states that the main focus of treating a juvenile should be less to incarcerate them but more to rehabilitate them from their improper and criminal ways. Through this case, juveniles now have the same status as mentally impaired defendants as it was ruled through Atkins v. Virginia that mentally disabled people can be sentenced to death as it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's “cruel and unusual punishment” clause.

Conclusion: All in all, the court ruled that sentencing juveniles to a death sentence is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's “cruel and unusual punishment” clause and thereby is unconstitutional.
Ford v. Wainwright:

Fact Summary: In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first- degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue: Does the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the imposition of the death penalty upon the insane?

Rule of Law: Yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the majority noted that English common law found executing the insane "savage and inhumane." In addition, no State permitted such executions. Opponents of such executions maintained that it "offends humanity" and that such executions had neither a deterrent nor a retributive effect.

Analysis: This case is very similar to the questions proposed and ultimate rulings of the other case I discussed being In Graham v. Florid. Essentially, similar to executing juveniles, the execution of the mentally insane was determined to be “inhumane” by the court and the idea behind this ruling is that the mentally insane do not have the ability to differ between what is right and what is wrong. Therefore, execution of the mentally insane is declared as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's “cruel and unusual punishment” clause.

Conclusion: It seems that the court seems to be ruling in a similar and concurrent manner concerning questions of the violation of the Eighth Amendment's “cruel and unusual punishment” clause. Both Ford v. Wainwright and In Graham v. Florida have resulted in rulings favoring the defendant's of the case as both defendant's have evaded death sentencing.
Bell v. Wolfish

Fact Summary: A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.

Issue: Do certain conditions of confinement violate the individual liberty, due process, and privacy of pretrial detainees as protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Rule of Law: No. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with "judgment calls" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of "safeguarding institutional security" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.

Analysis: This case differing from the previous two focuses more on the treatment of defendant's awaiting trial. The case questioned whether or not the conditions of confinement and being held as a defendant awaits trial violates individual liberty, due process, and other rights pertaining to civil liberties of defendant's as protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conclusion: Ultimately, it was ruled that the treatment of defendant's as they await trial and sentencing is very flexible and that there is not much that the US Constitution governs regarding this issue. The court included that there are a number of situation regarding such instances that involve “judgement calls” and spur of the moment decisions. When it comes down to it, the court basically ruled that what is constitutional and what is not considering this issue shall be determined by the facts of the case. However, the court's ruling made it clear that they rule in favor of the government on this particular issue.
Wolff v. McDonnell
Facts: Respondents Gerald Hill and Joseph Crawford are inmates at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole. Petitioner is the superintendent of that facility. In May 1982, respondents each received prison disciplinary reports charging them with assaulting another inmate. At separate hearings for each prisoner conducted on May 11, 1982, the prison disciplinary board heard the testimony of a prison guard, Sergeant Maguire, and received his written disciplinary report. Respondents presented some exculpatory evidence, but the board found that respondents had committed the offenses. On June 8, 1982, respondents filed complaints in Massachusetts state superior court asserting that their federal constitutional rights had been violated because the prison disciplinary board's decision was not adequately supported by the evidence before the
board.
Issue: Did the decision of the disciplinary board violate the rights of the inmates to due process under the 14th amendment?
Rule: Yes, a prison inmate is entitled under the Due Process Clause to certain
procedural protections before he can be deprived of good time credits in which he has a liberty interest.
Analysis: The court below stated that due process requires in addition "judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence" supporting the decision of a prison disciplinary board to revoke an inmate's good time credits. The Court has held that due process is violated when a governmental decision infringing upon a liberty interest is not based upon any evidence. The Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates that certain state prison disciplinary hearings observe procedural safeguards. Among these is the requirement that disciplined inmates receive "'a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action"
Conclusion: In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the rights of prisoners to due process when their liberty is at stake. Since the inmates' liberty was at stake, they had the right to due process in their hearings because the governmental interest was not based upon sufficient evidence to override their rights.
Woodson v. North Carolina

Facts:North Carolina adopted reforms to the mandatory death sentence in 1893, and the crime of murder was divided into two degrees, with only first-degree murder being punishable by death. First-degree murder as currently defined in the North Carolina General Statues is, “any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” In 1974, James Woodson was found guilty of first-degree murder in North Carolina and was automatically sentenced to death until this rule. Woodson appealed his death sentence, arguing that it was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment. Woodson challenged North Carolina's mandatory death sentence but the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the law.

Issue: Did North Carolina's mandatory death penalty law violate the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments?

Rule: Yes, the mandatory death penalty law was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments.

Analysis: The Supreme Court denounced the mandatory death penalty law as unconstitutional based on three problems that were found with the law. First, the law departed from contemporary standards that surrounded death sentences because historical records indicated that the public generally rejected mandatory death sentences. Secondly, the law had no standards to guide jurors in their exercise of their power to determine whether or not the first-degree murderer should live or die. Lastly, the statute didn't allow for the consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before sentencing them to death. Since the Constitution had an underlying "fundamental respect for humanity" in the Eighth Amendment which the North Carolina law had violated.

Conclusion: The case made it's name as one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" and forced the state to remove its mandatory death penalty laws. The decision came in a 5-4 decision that along with Jurek v. Texas, Proffitt v. Florida, Gregg v. Georgia, and Roberts v. Louisiana that established the two pronged criteria that state legislatures must follow to craft a constitutional capital sentencing plan.
Procunier v. Martinez 1974

Facts: Appellees, prison inmates, brought this class action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the Director of the California Department of Corrections and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. The mail censorship regulations, inter alia, proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." The District Court held these regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment, void for vagueness, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process, and it enjoined their continued enforcement. The court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of correspondence and that the author of the correspondence be allowed to protest the decision and secure review by a prison official other than the original censor. The District Court also held that the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates abridged the right of access to the courts and enjoined its continued enforcement. Appellants contend that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations.

Issue: Does the censorship of direct personal correspondence involve incidental restrictions on the right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents?

Analysis: The Court ruled that censorship would be sustained under United States v. O'Brien if it furthered “an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." The Court also held that the regulation must involve an infringement of First Amendment rights “no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Since the censorship that was being used by the California Department of Corrections was not being used to compel any sort of major governmental interest, it was unconstitutional.

Conclusion: The Court set forth in their majority opinion the precedent that correctional facilities could not unreasonably limit the First Amendment rights of prisoners without the presence of some sort of compelling government interest that would require a violation of the First Amendment, however, that violation cannot be excessive and only be what is necessary to carry out that government interest.
Cutter V. Wilkinson
Fields v. Smith
Facts: In 2005, Wisconsin law prohibited prison doctors from administering hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery to prisoners while they are in the state’s custody. Two prisoners, Kari Sundstrom and Andrea Fields, had been receiving hormone therapy for years prior to their incarceration. The plaintiffs sued arguing that they were not seeking a sex reassignment surgery, but rather the continuation of treatment which they had been receiving all of their adult lives.Issue: Is the Wisconsin rule which bars prisoners from hormone therapy unconstitutional by the 8th Amendment?
Rule of Law: Yes. The Wisconsin law was declared unconstitutional and was struck down.
Analysis: Medical Doctors testified saying the the side-effects of completely stopping hormone therapy to prisoners who have been receiving it their whole lives could be life threatening and extremely harmful to the individual. This case also involved the equal protection clause in that it barred transgender inmates from receiving individualized medical care which was vital to their life.
Conclusion: The Wisconsin Law was unconstitutional because the prohibition of hormone therapy could be threatening to a person’s life, making it cruel and unusual. Additionally, the barring of treatment to transsexuals posed as an equal protection issue. All of this resulted in the striking down of the law.
Facts: In 2005 prisoners in Ohio alleged that prison officials were violating The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. This act stated prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." The prisoners argued that the prison failed to accommodate their nonmainstream religions, like Wiccan and Satanism, because they were not given certain items needed to perform their rituals. Prison officials counter argued that the act itself was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment’s establishment clause by advancing a religion. Specifically section 3 which requires that prison officials accommodate inmates’ religious needs in certain cases, even if doing so means exempting them from general prison
rules.
Issue: Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
Rule of Law: No. Unanimous opinion upheld the RLUIPA.
Analysis:Justice Ginsberg wrote the opinion on behalf of all the judges. She expressed that section 3 of the act was not meant to inhibit any type of religious practice inside jails. Jails obviously limit the activity of prisoners. Activity needed for religious customs may then be prohibited inside a jail. Section 3 was meant to simply alleviate some government created burdens on private religious exercise, therefore the prison officials skewed it’s intent by accusing it of being unconstitutional. And since the prison involved received federal funding, it was required to comply with this law.
Conclusion: The act’s intent was not to promote religion to any extent whatsoever. It was to protect those who do practice religion and allow them to practice it, no matter their religion. Therefore the rights of prisoners was reinforced.
Bounds v. Smith
Facts: Prisoners in North Carolina filed a suit arguing that the prison violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights through denial of proper avenues to legal research. The prison lacked an adequate legal library for the prisoners. Specificallythe substance of valuable legal assistance was scarce and thus presented a possibly more logistical problem than argued by the respondents. The District Courts did recognize this fact. The District Court ruled that North Carolina must develop and institute a plan that provided inmates with a form of legal assistance that satisfied a degree of Constitutionality. It was suggested to Senators that create an effective and economic plan possible providing lawyers and other legal professionals along with the expansion of state law libraries.North Carolina ended up instituting a series a prison legal libraries and used it as a substitute for actual lawyers
Issue: Does access to a legal library fill the requirement for a prisoner’s access to the courts?
Rule of Law: Yes, 6:3
Analysis: Comprised by the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments the courts ruled that prisoners have a right to access the courts anytime they please. Essentially, if they feel they have been wronged they have the right to research the law to determine their criminality. The Courts ruled that fulfilling this requirement via prison legal libraries was sufficient as it gave criminals the ability to research the law.
Conclusion: After this court decision North Carolina instituted a prison system which provided legal libraries to almost every prison. Since then legal libraries have become the most popular way of fulfilling this right.
Facts:
A Muslim inmate at a Colorado penitentiary, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections for interfering with his right to observe the Muslim holy month of Ramadan by fasting each day between dawn and sunset. During Ramadan, Muslim inmates had to eat between sunset and two hours before sunrise in a specially designated place set up for them. However, segregated inmates, like Makin, were required to take meals only in their cells. Plaintiff was unable to eat when meals were delivered. He was able to keep his meals in his cell until after sundown and eat what he could then. Plaintiff was able to maintain his fast for the entire month in 1993, but it was extremely difficult and as a result "he was unable to enjoy the full spiritual experience of Ramadan."
Issue:
Has the Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights to exercise religion in prison been violated?
Rule of Law:
The district court rejected defendants' argument that the fact that Mr. Makin was able to fast the entire month of Ramadan absolved them of any liability their restrictions on meal service may have warranted, thereby a violation of the First Amendment.
Analysis:
Applying the standards relevant to the alleged denial of a prisoner's fundamental constitutional rights, [Turner v. Safley] (1987), the district court concluded that defendants Sullivan and Johnson had violated Mr. Makin's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. It computed damages for denial of this right on a per diem basis of $300 or $9,000 for the entire month of Ramadan, assessed jointly and severally against defendants. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's ruling on three grounds: (1) the court erred in rejecting their defense of qualified immunity; (2) the denial of special meal accommodations during Ramadan did not violate Mr. Makin's First Amendment rights; and (3) the court's determination of damages was incorrect.
Conclusion:
The special Ramadan meal accommodations did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights, and the damages calculation was incorrect. Trial Court awarded damages based on "the abstract value of the constitutional right rather than on the actual injuries" Plaintiff suffered from the denial of his right to free exercise of religion. The appellate court concluded that more than nominal damages was appropriate, as argued by the defendants, because Plaintiff offered evidence of suffering mental or emotional distress as a result of defendants' actions.
Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections 1999
Booth v. Maryland (1987)
FactsJohn Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. Irvin Bronstein, 78, and his wife Rose, 75, lived a happy life of retirement in West Baltimore, Maryland. John Booth lived three houses away in the same neighborhood. In 1983, Booth and Willie Reid entered the Bronsteins' home to steal money to buy heroin. During the crime, Booth and Reid bound and gagged the Bronsteins and then stabbed them to death with a kitchen knife. The Bronsteins' son found his dead parents two days later. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases.

Issue Does the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment, prohibit a jury from considering a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial?Rule of Law

Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment.AnalysisIn this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime. The Eighth Amendment prevents the government from using cruel and unusual punishments

. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court said death penalty laws that give juries total control are cruel and unusual. The Court said juries must be guided to decide between life or death based on the defendant's character, his background, and the circumstances of the murder he committed. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decision making" which is crucial in capital cases.ConclusionJustice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. With a 5 decision, the Supreme Court reversed Booth's death sentence. Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., said the jury's job in a death penalty case is to decide whether the criminal deserves to die based on his character and background and the circumstances of the murder. The jury is supposed to focus on the criminal's personal responsibility and moral guilt. Victim impact statements make the jury focus on the victim instead of the criminal.
Austin v. United States (1993)
FactsRichard Lyle Austin was a convicted cocaine dealer from Garretson, South Dakota. Austin in 1990 pleaded guilty in state court to one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Shortly thereafter the United States government filed an action against Austin's property, notably his mobile home, worth about $3,000, and his auto body shop, worth about $33,000.IssueDoes the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment, prohibit the excessive fines given the nature of his crime?Rule of LawYes, Justice Harry Blackmun concluded that the Eighth Amendment did apply to property forfeited in civil proceedings and was not limited to criminal cases.AnalysisIn a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia insisted that the measure of a forfeiture's excessiveness should be the relationship between the seized property and the offense. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy also concurred, raising doubts about the soundness of Blackmun's historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment. In the same term, the justices, this time in a sixmember plurality opinion, decided United States v. Parcel of Land (1993), holding that title to property acquired from the proceeds of crime does not automatically belong to the government.ConclusionJustice Harry Blackmun's historically rooted opinion sharply limited the federal government's power to seize homes and businesses used in illegal drug trafficking. The test to determine whether the amendment applied, Blackmun concluded, was whether the forfeiture amounted to a monetary punishment. He rejected the government's position that forfeiture was merely a remedy and not a punishment. The exact scope of that test, however, was the business of the lower courts and not of the Supreme Court. Hence the justices in Austin declined to provide specific guidance about whether or not innocence should be considered and what guidelines would be appropriate to determine whether the Eighth Amendment had been violated.
Gregg v. Georgia
Facts:
Troy Leon Gregg was found guilty and sentenced to death in 1973 for armed robbery and murdering two people. He filed an appeal and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence for his murder. While in death row, Gregg challenged his death sentence claiming that his capital sentence was a “cruel and unusual” punishment that violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue:
Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as “cruel and unusual” punishment?
Rule of law:
In a 7 to 2 decision, the USSC held that the death sentence did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances.
Analysis:
The USSC ruled that Georgia’s system for applying the death penalty was “judicious” and “careful.” The jury must find “aggravating circumstances” to impose the death penalty which was present in Gregg’s case. There was therefore no Eighth Amendment violation, and the death penalty was constitutional. The Court ruled, “The imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States and in England...,At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every State...the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.”
Conclusion:
Gregg v. Georgia was a very important case because it establishes the constitutionality of the death penalty. It gave more rights to the law enforcement and justified the death penalty.
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
Fact: Albert Florence was arrested on an outdate bench warrant for a non-indictable offense and was subjected to “strip searches” in two separate prison facilities. Florence sued both facilities claiming that their blanket policies of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their offense, violate the Fourth Amendment.Issue:Does the Fourth Amendment permit a jail to conduct a suspicion-less strip search whenever an individual is arrested, including for minor offenses?Ruling:In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court ruled that jail strip searches do not require reasonable suspicion, at least so long as the arrestee is being admitted into the general jail population.Analysis:The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable” searches. Whether a search is reasonable depends on the context of the search. When determining “unreasonable searches,” there needs to be a balancing of “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights the search entails.” The Court concluded that a prisoner’s likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee’s criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. Correctional facilities have a strong interest in keeping their employees and inmates safe. A general strip search policy adequately and effectively protects that interest.Conclusion:Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders limits the rights of detainees and sets an important precedent regarding the Fourth Amendment search and seizure.
Kahane v Carlson (1975)
Facts:
In 1971, Kahane, an orthodox Jewish rabbi, was sentenced in the Eastern District of New York to imprisonment. However, the sentence of imprisonment was suspended by the court and Kahane was placed on probation. While she was on probation, they she removed to Israel with the permission of the court and had become a candidate for election to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. His probation was revoked, but his sentenced of imprisonment was reduced to a term of one year. He then sought orders requiring the prison administrators to conform the conditions of his incarceration to his religious beliefs concerning diet and prayer. The government refused to provide Kahane with kosher food, claiming that “it would be burdensome to meet the religious dietary needs of its diverse prison population.”
Issue:
Under the First Amendment right to freedom of religious practices, does the government have to conform with the religious diet of prisoners?
Rule of Law:
The court held that Kahane is constitutionally entitled to an order…that allows him to conform to Jewish dietary laws.
Analysis:
The court agreed that the finding of deep religious significance for a practicing orthodox Jew was justified and was entitled to constitutional protection. The prison was required to provide the incarcerated orthodox rabbi with a diet sufficient to sustain his good health without violating the Jewish dietary laws.
Conclusion:
Kahane v Carlson establishes that the freedom to practice religion in prisons is important and the government must conform to the dietary practices of orthodox Jews.

2005
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